Jews and Violence

Images, Ideologies, Realities

Edited by Peter Y. Medding

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Preface

As reflected in the title *Jews and Violence: Images, Ideologies, Realities*, the 11 essays composing the symposium in this volume focus primarily on violence *by* Jews, not that *against* Jews. To be sure, the two are closely connected insofar as the former may be a direct response to the latter (and vice versa). However, they are also clearly separable: Jews may refrain from responding to violence in kind and may resort to violence even without being subjected to it. In sum, violence against Jews does not always or necessarily beget violence by Jews, and the latter is not always a response (or the only response) to violence against Jews.

Thus, as is amply attested to in these essays, violence by Jews may be directed against other Jews. It may also occur in a wide range of contexts, including struggles for communal supremacy, conflicts over values and policies, maintaining political authority and social order, and ensuring obedience to and implementation of collective decisions. Furthermore, Jews have responded to violence against them in a variety of ways—for example, by persuading, buying off, and otherwise appeasing or mollifying their oppressors; by preaching and practicing nonviolence and other forms of passive resistance; by flight and emigration; by prayer, inaction, and passivity; and by seeking salvation either by repairing the society in which the violence against them occurs, relying upon divine or messianic intervention, or achieving political independence by means of the establishment of a sovereign state. Finally, the actual achievement of Jewish sovereignty, and the need to govern and defend the state of Israel, radically broadened the scope and incidence of violence by Jews, both against fellow Jews and against others.

While such uses of violence by Jews involve ideological and pragmatic considerations and require empirical assessments of reality, they are also affected by images and perceptions. For many centuries, the most significant of these was the image (if not the myth) of the Jew as timid and passive, as unable or unwilling to use force or resort to arms—even in self-defense—and, consequently, as powerless. Historically the imposition of such a negative image upon Jews (in itself, a form of violence against them) and its internalization had a clearly inhibiting influence on the use of violence by them. Once this negative image was rejected, however, the Jews' inhibitions with regard to the use of violence were removed and the myth was shattered. What is more, the effective use of violence by Jews reinforced their propensity to employ it in pursuit of collective Jewish goals—so much so, that among some Jewish groups, it gave rise to the glorification of violence and its transformation from a means to an end. Among other Jewish groups, however, these developments led to ideological soul-searching as to the necessity, legitimacy, and justification of using violence, and to calls for limitations upon it. All in all, these confrontations with the

realities of the use of violence led both to conservation and to change in Jewish values.

In commissioning our authors to contribute to this symposium on Jews and violence, we construed the latter term broadly. As a result, the manifestations and types of violence that come under discussion are of considerable variety. They include criminal and deviant behavior; verbal threats and harassment; incitement; attacks on persons resulting in physical injury or deprivation of life; capital punishment; property damage; military conscription; resort to arms; terror; the use or threat of physical force; coercive sanctions (including fines, taxation, and confiscation; incarceration; and expulsion); and corporal punishment. Moreover, these forms of violence are located in a variety of contexts—individual and collective, personal and communal, private and public. So, too, while in some instances, the legality and legitimacy (or otherwise) of the violence is clear, in others, it is not, and either or both may be questioned, contested, or rejected.

In general, these issues are particularly critical in a state context and are integrally related to the nature of political authority. As Max Weber famously defined it, "the state is an association that claims the monopoly of the *legitimate use of violence*," or, as he also termed the latter, "the naked violence of coercive means." Although much state activity proceeds by agreement and does not require the actual application of coercive means, the latter is always available to be applied legitimately as a last resort. Thus, the capacity of the state to act collectively, to implement its decisions, and to maintain itself against both external and internal enemies rests, in the final analysis, on its control over and use of coercion and violence. In that sense, state activities, if not the state itself, may be deemed to be inherently (even if not manifestly) coercive and violent. Wars, military activity, conscription, imprisonment, physical punishments and restraints, taxation, fines, confiscations and other economic sanctions, and the enforcement of laws regulating individual and collective behavior are no less coercive or violent by virtue of their being regarded as legitimate state functions carried out by those authorized to do so. Indeed, the question is not whether such activities are coercive or violent but whether and how they can be justified and limited. Similarly, terror against states and their citizens is no less violent or coercive by virtue of its being directed against an authority structure that is regarded (by the perpetrators of such terror) as lacking in legitimacy.

Some of our authors address these issues theoretically and philosophically, focusing primarily on values (religious, ideological, and moral). Others are more historical, sociological, or political in their outlook and address the subject via an examination of behavior, events, and processes in different periods and societal circumstances—although here, too, the values and images held by the actors and their impact on what transpired are also examined closely. Yet others deal with the representation of these issues and images in both Jewish and general literature, showing how these percolated down and developed a life of their own in popular culture.

To be sure, no single volume could do justice to this vast, rich, and relatively unresearched subject, and although its historical, geographic, thematic, and disciplinary coverage is broad and varied, this collection makes no claims to comprehensiveness. In particular, two important topics addressed in the original planning for the symposium did not, unfortunately, come to fruition. One related to the external and internal

armed struggles in the Yishuv prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and to the subsequent battle to defend and secure Israel's existence against the hostility and military attacks of the surrounding Arab states. The other focused on the philosophical and value considerations that went into the drawing up of the Israeli army's ethical code, which sought to set guidelines for and limits upon the legitimate use of violence by soldiers in the field in real life and death situations, rather than relying on the license implied in the popular motto of "in war as in war."

Here, of course, although not only here, we come face to face with the contemporary image of the fearless, active, tough, and virtually all-powerful Jews that has largely replaced the age-old passive image—although the former, too, is often maintained side by side with images of Jews as eternal victims and of Israel as the "helpless Samson." In recent years, the latter images have been too often tragically reinforced and acted out in Israel (indeed, literally on our doorstep—in the bombing of a cafeteria at the Hebrew University less than 50 yards from our editorial offices—while these words were being penned).

This is the sixth volume of *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* that I have edited. As ever, I am deeply indebted to my fellow editors, Jonathan Frankel, Eli Lederhendler, and Ezra Mendelsohn, whose combined wisdom, erudition, and critical eye contributed greatly to the ongoing and fruitful dialogue with the symposium authors as we made progress toward the end product. This volume (as well as many that preceded it) also owes much to the charm, tact, and superb editorial skills of our managing editors, Laurie Fialkoff and Hannah Levinsky-Koevary, and in particular to their unique ability to work with authors and publishers and generally keep things moving while simultaneously dealing with three other volumes at various stages of production and with the day-to-day matters of office administration. It is a pleasure to thank them publicly for their unstinting dedication.

We are also deeply grateful to the Samuel and Althea Stroum Philanthropic Fund, the Lucius N. Littauer Foundation, and the Federman and Ben Eli funds at the Hebrew University for their generous financial support. It is with great sadness, however, that we pay tribute to the memory of Samuel Stroum, who passed away on March 9, 2001. Published annually since 1984, *Studies in Contemporary Jewry* would never have appeared in the first place were it not for Samuel Stroum's munificent endowment, which, over the years, has been its financial mainstay. *Yehi zikhro barukh.*

P.Y.M.

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Symposium

Jews and Violence: Images, Ideologies, Realities

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The State and the Legitimate Use of Force and Coercion in Modern Halakhic Thought

Gerald J. Blidstein
(BEN-GURION UNIVERSITY)

It is commonly acknowledged that Jewish thought contains little in the way of systematic political discourse, and that halakhah, a legal discipline, is severely limited in its ability to serve as a resource for such discussion. Halakhah, nonetheless, is the quintessentially authentic expression of the Jewish ethos, making up in concreteness what it lacks in breadth and theory.[1] With these two statements in mind (and in agreement with both), this essay will focus on opinions and attitudes that have become current in the last hundred years or so—or more broadly, on the halakhic response to the modern state, to modern political ideology, and to the powers of coercion of the modern state.

Any discussion of the modern state must begin by noting the massive expansion of the role of government. In today's world, we (and possibly the halakhah as well) find governmental activity necessary in regulating a wide range of life's experiences. At the same time, the growing intrusion of centralized government into more and more areas of life may arouse principled antagonism. The state, after all, has always had an inherent connection with both coercion and violence, and legitimate control over them has, in modern times, been widely regarded as a state monopoly. Hence the question: Are these transformations in forms of governance and the scope of government (say, since the French Revolution) reflected in halakhic discussion? Further, has the halakhic mind absorbed aspects of modern political discourse, concepts, and principles that were unknown centuries ago?[2]

Tackling this ambitious agenda is complicated, for a number of reasons.

There is, first and foremost, the incremental nature of halakhah as a legal system. Legal systems in general are conservative, and halakhah is all the more so: over the centuries, it has come to rely more on interpretation and precedent than on legislation. As a result, even the most current halakhic discussion incorporates medieval and ancient precedent as an integral part of the argument. Recognized halakhists hardly ever set off on a completely new track.

Second, the vast majority of halakhic discussion concerns the impact of the state—ancient, medieval, or modern—on the Jew, not the legitimacy or proper modalities of the state per se. Discussion usually focuses on problems that the law of the state poses to the Jew qua Jew, that is, a citizen of the state who nonetheless maintains an alle-

giance to a different legal order altogether. Most restrictions falling under the rubric "the law of the kingdom is law"—*dina demalkhuta dina*, an expression of the Jewish legal community's allegiance to the law of the non-Jewish state—can be seen as attempts to maintain the integrity of halakhah within the wider, yet alien, system of authority.[3] Halakhah, in other words, does not launch a principled assault on the powers of government.

This complication becomes particularly fraught when the issue is the modern state of Israel, since the very nature of a Jewish state is itself a matter of debate. Some authorities view Israeli legislation as halakhically legitimate, bestowing the status of "kingdom" (*malkhut*) on the Jewish state and dina demalkhuta on its laws, despite their origin in a secular parliament. Others—usually anti-Zionist but not necessarily so—deny this status to the state and its legislative organs, asserting that only Torah law is legitimate in the land of Israel. Still other halakhists acknowledge the legitimacy of Israeli law but situate it in categories other than dina demalkhuta, such as the force of communal legislation or consensus.[4]

Discussions in the diaspora are also frequently predicated on the need to preserve the status of Torah laws. By and large, the discussion remains fairly detached, although a characteristic diasporic perception occasionally makes an appearance, even well into the modern era. Thus, R. Moshe Feinstein (d. 1986), a U.S.-based authority, can be found expressing a reluctance to discuss the halakhic limits to dina demalkhuta dina, lest he be seen as ungrateful "to our country, to which we are grateful for the good [*ḥesed*] it bestows upon us and on the Jewish people as a whole, and for whose peace and prosperity we pray . . . " Such discretion is more apt to be expected in a medieval writer, but old habits apparently die hard.[5]

The various questions concerning dina demalkhuta (when does a challenge to the concept arise out of the perceived need to preserve the integrity of Torah law? When, alternatively, are the rights of the citizen the issue? When does the Israeli context influence the halakhic discussion?) are at the center of a debate over two related doctrines associated with a 17th-century authority, R. Shabbetai Kohen (the Shakh). The Shakh applied the authority of dina demalkhuta solely to cases in which state law filled a lacuna left by the halakhah; any regulations that contradicted existing Jewish law were excluded. He also confined it to instances where the king (that is, the state) benefited directly from the impositions, as, for example, in the case of tax laws. This excluded from consideration any regulations that simply improved the lot of the citizens.

It is clear that the Shakh's first condition is relevant only to Jews who wish to be loyal both to the halakhic system and to state law. The second, however, may represent a legitimate (if nonmodern) limitation on the power of the state vis-à-vis *any* citizen. Interestingly, Shmuel Shilo has noted that the Shakh's restrictions on the scope of dina demalkhuta were widely opposed by European authorities, both contemporaneous and more modern. Modern Israeli halakhists, however, have tended to side vigorously with him—a tendency that Shilo attributes to an ideological commitment to the view that Israel ought to be a halakhic state, rather than one in which the laws of the Knesset prevail on secular grounds.[6]

Despite the limiting factors that have been outlined here, the halakhic tradition does incorporate a number of perspectives that are relevant to political discourse More-

over, at least some of the political/legal concepts and considerations originating in the Jewish halakhic tradition (intended to govern the interaction between the Jewish community and the non-Jewish state) are also of universal significance.[7] Consequently, halakhic reservations with regard to the authority of certain norms and regulations of the Gentile state will be viewed here as the product of a coherent and principled tradition, rather than as merely defensive responses to pragmatic dilemmas. Indeed, the occasional Judaic skepticism as to the legitimacy of some forms and expressions of political authority is bracing—although the more frequent expressions of approbation of the use of governmental power are no less instructive.

Although formulated in legal terms, dina demalkhuta dina is fundamentally a rule with political significance, as it both requires and legitimates Jewish loyalty to the non-Jewish state. Its legal character reflects the significance of the daily routine, governed by law; the essentially legal mode in which the Jewish community ordered and conceptualized its own authority; and the possibility of subjecting the rules of the state and their implementation to legal scrutiny. Dina demalkhuta is the means by which the law of the state is subsumed within the Jewish legal system, such that state law becomes binding on Jews (also) from the perspective of Jewish law. But beyond this, the very phrase "dina demalkhuta dina" also bears an assumption that the law of the kingdom is law—from the Jewish point of view—for non-Jews as well: indeed, it is only by virtue of its being law for non-Jews that it is law for Jews. Thus, the rule presupposes the existence and authority of the non-Jewish state while at the same time limiting and articulating its basic sphere of operation.

Most of the medieval halakhic rationales for dina demalkhuta (popular consensus, the Noahide obligation to establish government [*dinim*], royal "ownership" of the land, and the extension of biblical monarchic rule to non-Jewish governance)[8] are equally relevant to the non-Jewish populace; they supply the theoretical bases for the state's legitimacy vis-à-vis its entire population, and not only the Jews. In part dogmatic and in part rational, the arguments for dina demalkhuta dina are no less universal than the Aristotelian rationale ("man is by nature a social animal") that was relied upon by medieval philosophers such as Maimonides.[9]

This universalist reading of dina demalkhuta dina has far more than merely theoretical implications. Halakhic discussions of dina demalkhuta not only buttressed the legitimacy of the state but also indicated when and how government behavior or demands were illegitimate, in which case they were categorized as *gazlanuta demalkhuta*, or state violence. From talmudic times on, not everything desired by Caesar was to be rendered to him; even the state was subject to normative regulation. Most notably codified by Maimonides but found less systematically in other thinkers as well, the halakhah required of the state, for example, that its laws not be directed at one segment of the population alone. This meant less in practice than in theory, to be sure, as some Jewish legists acknowledged the "law of the state" even when it discriminated against Jews. But no one challenged the normative principle, which thus became part of the definition of dina demalkhuta.

The latter, it is true, functioned almost completely to regulate relations among Jews, as opposed to interactions between Jews and the Gentile government. Put somewhat differently, if a ruler's demands were declared illegitimate by the halakhist, this hardly

meant that the individual Jew or the community could—or should—resist them; it simply meant that no Jew could benefit by them or rely on them in dealings with other Jews.[10] On occasion, halakhic authorities did advise resistance to the king's law. In one noteworthy instance, Maimonides instructed a questioner to swear falsely in order to circumvent a ruler's (illegitimate) confiscation of an inheritance—in fact, he wrote, it was even a mitzvah to do so. Broadly speaking, however, halakhic judgments functioned to regulate relations among Jews, not between Jews and their overlords.[11]

In granting universal relevance to this body of discussion rather than restricting its relevance to the legal need it met within the Jewish community, significant statements of political principle become apparent. Interestingly, the fact that a given state law was not identical with Torah law did not necessarily disqualify it as *gazlanuta*; rather, universal standards of equity were mobilized by halakhic authorities on a case-by-case basis. Much the same point can be made about the more modern evaluation of state law. Originating within the internal debate concerning the proper scope of dina demalkhuta, and growing in volume as the state exercised more and more authority—among the issues raised were whether the "king's law" encompassed only public law (which includes criminal law) or private law as well, and whether the concept of dina demalkhuta dina ever impinged on areas where halakhah did take a position—halakhists beginning with the eminent 19th-century authority R. Moshe Sofer (Ḥatam Sofer) asserted that wherever the state's law provided a reasonable solution to a societal problem, one could assume that the halakhah would have adopted the same solution.[12] In this perspective, state law is not automatically valid but rather subject to constant critique. Although this position emerges from the need to resolve the tension between two competing systems of law, it is nonetheless significant.

No less potentially significant is the assertion that state authority, as expressed by dina demalkhuta dina, is limited to matters of civil law, with religious issues and matters of personal status falling outside its domain.[13] Although this doctrine may be devised merely to preserve the integrity of halakhah, its implications are quite interesting: Is the position of Jewish law simply that religious/personal status questions are solved for Jews by their own internal law, which takes priority for them over state law? Or is a more universal point being made—namely, that the state should not exercise authority over *any* of its citizens in matters of religion and personal status?

A major aspect of modern political culture is the growth of democratic polities. Although the question whether Israel can be both "democratic" and "Jewish" is a matter of ongoing debate, modern halakhists have had little difficulty in allowing that a *malkhuta*, despite its literal meaning of "kingdom," includes republican and democratic states as well.[14] As Shilo points out, many respondents have discussed the laws of democratic states within the context of dina demalkhuta, with none objecting that the category is inappropriate.[15] This, in a sense, is an argument from silence. However, more explicit evidence can also be marshaled.

Some of the evidence for granting the status of malkhuta to a democratic polity is diffuse, relating as it does to modern treatment of the consensual elements of dina demalkhuta. It will be recalled that one of the medieval rationales for the legitimacy of the state, alongside theories derived from feudal thought or those that simply cited biblical precedent, was that the people consented to the rule of the king or to his law.

While one need not claim, as does Michael Walzer, that "consent is the rationale most likely to be invoked" by medieval theorists, it is certainly very much present—most dramatically in Maimonides, but in others as well.[16] To be sure, the consent assumed was frequently tacit, but the idea was mobilized in later medieval times in order to declare various royal laws illegitimate on the grounds that they were not worthy of consent.[17]

More explicit discussion of the democratic state appears in responsa from the 19th century onwards. In considering the case of the Italian republican states, the skeptical views of some halakhic authorities (who considered the states in question to be inherently unstable and incapable of governing) were bypassed.[18] R. Malkiel Zvi Tannenbaum (d. 1910) of Lomza, Poland made the anachronistic but systemically interesting claim that medieval authorities who did not rest their case on the feudal notion of the king's ownership of his country, basing themselves instead on a form of consent theory, were in this way anticipating the development of modern states "such as ours."[19] R. Ovadiyah Hodayah (Israel, d. 1969) was similarly approving of the democratic state. Previously, in a frequently cited responsum, R. Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook (d. 1935), the Yishuv's first chief rabbi, had asserted that the authority of the king (the Jewish king, at least) was derived from the people.[20] Writing in the United States, R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin (d. 1973) stated that "in a constitutional state where the laws are made by representatives elected by the entire population after deliberation . . . these laws certainly have the status of *dina demalkhuta dina*."[21] And R. Eliezer Waldenberg, a contemporary Israeli halakhist, has urged that laws adopted by a popular legislative body be considered even more authoritative than laws with the status of dina demalkhuta.[22]

An interesting appropriation of the democratic model is found in those Israeli halakhists (such as R. Yitzhak Herzog and R. Shaul Yisraeli) who argue that women and non-Jews need not be halakhically disqualified to hold office in a democratic Jewish state. Their claim is that democratic officeholders, subject as they are to defeat at the next election, do not possess kingly power (*serarah*). At the same time, these same halakhists do not deny Israel the status of malkhuta, since the concept of "kingdom" clearly applies to any form of effective government.[23] A more subtle but perhaps even more profound expression of this perspective is to be found in the argument that the legal function of consent theory is to make the state, monarchic or not, analogous to the community—which in Jewish legal theory is frequently seen as a partnership. In this perspective, even the king is to be seen as a representative of his subjects, with his laws the equivalent of communal ordinances.[24]

There is no doubt that the rise of the modern territorial state, with its enlarged political ambition and reluctance to acknowledge the political authority of other bodies, engendered a far more profound halakhic engagement with the "law of the kingdom." The challenge of the modern state was all the greater in that it dovetailed with the erosion of certain European Jewish communal structures, as well as with an accelerated thrust toward acculturation and assimilation. As noted, the discussion of dina demalkhuta most often concerned internal Jewish relations. Indeed, the very rubric of dina demalkhuta dina became symbolic of the pressure (and often desire) to accommodate Judaism—including at times its purportedly religious norms—to the stan-

dards and rules of the host state. Notwithstanding, the modern discussion also reflects the new role of the state irrespective of the issue of Jewish political or communal survival.

Classic discussion of dina demalkhuta had focused primarily on three issues derived from the earliest talmudic sources: the right of the king to tax; the status of documents produced by his officials; and (in medieval times) his rights of confiscation. Two of these topics, in other words, deal with the rights of the king vis-à-vis his subjects. More modern discussions of dina demalkhuta (from late medieval times on) focus much more on the legitimacy of the plethora of laws and rules by which the modern state governs its citizens and regulates the relations between them. This development has paradoxical results. While most early medieval jurists generalized from the talmudic cases to all areas, the late medieval assertion of R. Moshe Isserles (d. 1572) and R. Shlomo Luria (d. 1573), that dina demalkhuta applies to all matters legislated for the communal good, remains to this day severely challenged—recall, for instance, the opposing view of the Shakh, who severely limited its scope. One presumed explanation for this resistance is that modern halakhists are wary of making legal accommodation with the wide-ranging activities of the modern state.[25]

My impression, however, is that much private law is in fact included in the rubric of dina demalkhuta by halakhic authorities from the 19th century onwards, on the assumption that such legislation exists for the good of the state and all its citizens. An interesting example (though one drawn from theoretical discussion rather than a concrete responsum) is provided by R. Isser Zalman Meltzer (Israel, d. 1953). R. Isser Zalman ostensibly works with the most restrictive definition of dina demalkhuta, in which the state is halakhically entitled to interfere with property rights only in order to tax. But a closer reading of his argument shows that the right to tax is presented as an example of the right to legislate for the public good. As Shilo points out, the shift is signaled by R. Isser Zalman's assertion that the state *must* tax in order to fulfill its governmental responsibilities, not that it is simply permitted to do so.[26] Another indication of halakhic adaptation to the modern polity is that the widespread medieval view that dina demalkhuta applies only to land is increasingly discounted or overlooked as the modern state begins to emerge.[27] Similarly, the medieval distinction between "old law" (from time immemorial) and "new law" (enacted by either the king or parliament) is either interpreted away or falls into desuetude.[28]

Overall, the expanding role of the modern state made the hitherto complicated issue of dina demalkhuta even more complex. On the one hand, some halakhists tended to accommodate themselves to the reality, scope, and ubiquity of modern forms of governance. On the other hand, one encounters surprising pockets of resistance, some authorities either rejecting a specific law of the state or else laboring to justify it on grounds other than "the law of the kingdom is law."

In this sphere, the Ḥatam Sofer, for example, issued a number of interesting and influential rulings. Contrary to much halakhic opinion that rejected the obligatory nature of military conscription (a relatively modern phenomenon), Ḥatam Sofer asserted, on the grounds of dina demalkhuta, that the draft could not be evaded: conscription was to be seen as a tax, which traditionally was part of the king's authority.[29] Ḥatam Sofer was well aware that army service led in many cases to abandonment of Sabbath observance and to the eating of nonkosher food—indeed, in the

same responsum, he condemns the common practice of dragooning the poor and unobservant to serve in place of others. Nonetheless, his responsum implies, conscription is *mamona* (a matter of financial significance alone), not *isura* (a mattter of religious significance), and thus the community is obliged to provide its quota.[30] Similarly, Ḥatam Sofer argued the right of the ruler to sell *arenda* rights (that is, a monopoly in a retail trade, most commonly, the sale of liquor in a given village or locality), on the grounds that these too were derived from the right to tax.[31]

A different ruling of Ḥatam Sofer that was alluded to earlier may reflect a similar rapprochement with state law. In cases where Jewish law is silent but the law of the state is explicit, he wrote, we may assume that the Jewish legislator would have adopted the same legal solution found in the fair and equitable law of the state. In another ruling, Ḥatam Sofer went so far as to say that fairness in a particular case is demonstrated by the fact that a particular solution is legislated into state law, even where that law does not dovetail with the requirements of Jewish law (on condition, of course, that it does not contradict halakhah). It is true that these rulings may be less substantively significant than they appear, insofar as Ḥatam Sofer set out reasons why Jewish law could tolerate or even encourage the same results with regard to the specific laws in question. Nevertheless, his rhetoric is significant, as it leads to the conclusion that state law is in effect absorbed into Jewish law.[32]

From Ḥatam Sofer's view, it emerges that the old category of gazlanuta demalkhuta no longer applies only to a law that in effect despoils the Jews, but affects any law that is unreasonable or unfair—unfair, that is, not because it violates Jewish law, but on its own terms. Accordingly, Ḥatam Sofer argued, a state law denying employers the right to select their workers was unfair and hence not binding. Similarly, R. Meir Arik (d. 1925) ruled that rent control laws were designed (inequitably, in his opinion) to protect the rights of tenants at the expense of the landlord, while R. Ben-Ziyon Uziel (Israel, d. 1953) rejected the validity of a statute of limitations, on the grounds that its restrictions on past claims were inequitable.[33]

The materials just cited indicate that despite the generally authoritative status of "the law of the state," it is not automatically endorsed, particularly when the question concerns intra-Jewish affairs. A dramatic instance of this independence of mind is afforded by a responsum of R. Feinstein that discusses "whether it is permissible to accept employment as a tax accountant for the government." The heart of the question is the possibility that an accountant will catch fellow Jews cheating and subsequently report them to the authorities—a serious crime ("informing"), according to Jewish law. R. Feinstein does answer permissively, but only because the job profile includes much more than punishing Jewish miscreants. The notion that the government is within its rights in taxing residents and in punishing those who are derelict does not really enter the discussion; neither does the question of the Jews' historical relationship with the U.S. government. R. Feinstein's utilization of the "informer" model dramatizes how far he is from fully internalizing the basic concept of the legitimacy of expanded state authority.[34]

Hence the paradox: attempts to defend the legitimacy of state laws, without directly relying on the rubric of dina demalkhuta, nonetheless make use of the same rationales—notably, the appeal to consensual elements of the Jewish legal tradition. State law, and especially civil law, is justified either by virtue of its representing the will of

the populace; as being no more than the logical outcome of a voluntarily adopted condition (that of being governed); or even as custom (*minhag*).[35] As previously noted, R. Eliezer Waldenberg, a contemporary halakhist, believes that law adopted by a popular representative legislative body is even more authoritative than the law of dina demalkhuta precisely because it represents the will of the populace.[36] A particularly interesting construction concerns the assumption that, regardless of its halakhic status, "the law of the state" is in fact widely observed, thereby becoming the working assumption behind all civil transactions. A case in point is found in a responsum by R. Feinstein concerning the proper mode of repaying debtors; despite the fact that the specific state law being questioned is not in accordance with halakhah, he rules, it must nonetheless be obeyed, since all civil transactions are implicitly conditional on the fact that the law of the state is the relevant standard. In another responsum (involving the right of a landlord to evict his tenant), R. Feinstein ruled that one need rely on dina demalkhuta only where contracts were signed before specific state regulations went into effect; afterwards, all transactions were implicitly (and willingly) subject to those regulations, since everyone (Jews included) presumed that the courts would enforce them.[37]

The reliance on consensual elements of private Jewish law may reflect a desire to negotiate between the authority of halakhah and the authority of the state. Put somewhat differently, by not activating the rationale of dina demalkhuta in instances where state law does not entirely conform to halakhah, one remains loyal to halakhah while retaining one's allegiance, on the behavioral level, to the rules of state law.

A more technical aspect of this topic may lead in the same direction. The medieval R. Yonah ben Avraham Gerondi (d. 1263) had claimed that "the law of the kingdom" might allow for confiscation of private property. Such property, however, could not be transferred to another private party. This position (doubtless a highly idiosyncratic one in its time) became central in a modern-day discussion of R. Avraham Dov Shapiro (Poland, d. 1943) in his *Devar Avraham*. R. Shapiro notes that R. Yonah had understood the force of dina demalkhuta to be identical with the rule of *hefker bet din hefker* ("property declared ownerless by the court is ownerless"), that is, property can be confiscated by a Jewish *bet din*, or halakhic court, possibly to be used for the public good.[38] The question of whether a court could transfer such property to another person had long been debated, R. Yonah taking the position that it could not, R. Shapiro continues.[39] From here, he goes on to make his own seminal claim: that in declaring property *hefker*, or ownerless, the bet din functions as an *agent of governance*, in his words, "as ruler and government [*serarah vememshalah*] . . . not in its character as a court that gives [halakhic] decisions."[40] By extension, then, neither the court nor the king are allowed to transfer one person's property to another, even though such property may possibly be confiscated for the public good.

R. Shapiro's position dovetails with most of the talmudic sources concerning dina demalkhuta and property rights, which consider the obligation to pay taxes to be an alienation of property rather than its transfer to someone else.[41] Be that as it may, the basic thrust of *Devar Avraham's* (admittedly theoretical) argument is to limit the power of the state to either dispose of or redistribute the property of its citizens. Does this development reflect a modern apprehension regarding expanded state power? Or is it an immanent development of the law itself, propelled by the legists' desire to pro-

duce a new theoretical insight? In truth, the latter seems to be the case, since the state's right to tax is not at issue in R. Shapiro's discussion. (Moreover, in its use of tax revenue, the state in fact is engaged in massive redistribution of wealth.)[42] At most, the distinction between alienating and redistributing property may be halakhically relevant only to the functioning of state courts in civil cases and to the right of the state to legislate in matters of private law, topics that involve transferal of property.[43]

Until this point, the consensual elements in Jewish law have been seen as factors in the halakhah's acceptance of "the law of the state." I would now like to discuss the role played by nonconsensual elements—particularly in the modern halakhic discussion, in which both the reality and the legitimacy of the state are taken as givens. Nonconsensual elements especially come into play when the issue under consideration is the legitimacy of war as a state activity.[44]

While hardly abundant, halakhic discussion on the pursuit of war can be found in talmudic and in subsequent halakhic literature; the full title of Maimonides' "Laws of Kings," for instance, is "The Laws of Kings and Their Wars." Such discussion, however, concerns wars waged by Jewish kings and states, whereas modern halakhists devote their attention to the legal status of wars waged by the Gentiles. Examples are the opening essay of R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin's *Leor hahalakhah* and the first volume of *Devar Avraham*, which contains a number of essays on the subject.[45]

Some researchers have tried to generalize about the "Jewish view of war" on the basis of the body of halakhic literature governing Jewish behavior during war.[46] Just as relevant is the halakhic discussion of norms that guide the non-Jewish state, although this discussion appears to assume that Gentile norms reflect very little of the Judaic view of things (indeed, the opposite may be the case). It is also important to keep in mind that most discussion concerns the legal status of conquered lands or other objects, not the normative or moral status of war per se. The reason for this is simple: the legal status of conquered lands or booty has consequences for the Jewish community and as such is a subject for responsa and theoretical discussion. Not so the normative status of war, since Gentile rulers were not in the habit of turning to rabbis for moral guidance.

As previously noted, classic medieval justifications of the state were not confined to arguments based upon consent theory, that is, upon the tacit or express general willingness of a population to be governed. Two other rationales were also widely noted. The first was biblical authority, based most often on Deut. 17: 14–20 and I Sam. 8–12, which deal with choosing a king. These passages can be interpreted in varying ways, the institution of kingship being viewed as either an imperative or an option. In either case, however, the legitimacy of the institution is a given, not only for Jews, but for other nations. The second rationale derives from feudal theory: the king "owns" his country, and allegiance is the price paid for continued residence. This is certainly true of Jews, whose "rights" were always tenuous—but it applies as well to all other residents. Although this theory also incorporated certain consensual elements (it being assumed, for example, that the residents had willingly consented to their lord's conditions),[47] it is clear that the major thrust was to assert the ruler's power over his fiefdom.[48]

That the state is a given is also assumed by R. Shapiro, whose discussion in *Devar*

Avraham deals with the more traditional problem of finding a basis for dina demalkhuta dina. He proposes two solutions, both with a basis in nonconsensual models of authority.[49] The first derives from a biblical source other than Deuteronomy or I Samuel: the book of Ezra (10:8), in which Ezra is authorized by the Persian king to punish those Jews who reject his authority and threatens to revoke ownership of property. As understood in the Talmud, this verse refers to a situation of hefker bet din hefker, that is, an authorization for extraordinary rabbinic powers. In the innovative reading mentioned previously, R. Shapiro sees the verse as empowering the court in its character as a governing body and also notes in passing that this function of hefker bet din hefker extends as well to Gentile governance, thus locating the latter within what was hitherto presumed to have been an internal Jewish legal rubric. However, he apparently favors his second proposition, namely, that dina demalkhuta is rooted in "ownership," which itself derives from the ruler's conquest (*kibush*) of the land and its inhabitants.[50] In this scheme, war becomes basic to political sovereignty. Consent is clearly insignificant, and in fact is hardly mentioned in R. Shapiro's discussion.

While seldom omitting discussion of *Devar Avraham*, more current halakhic discussion rarely adopts its author's point of view. One possible exception is R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz (Ḥazon Ish, d. 1953), who stated that "as for the rationale of dina demalkhuta dina, it is similar to acquisition [*hu ke'ein kinyan*] in war . . . here too the sovereign has power over that which he rules."[51] As this quote appears in an analysis of the halakhic modes of acquisition generated by the legal analogy of dina demalkhuta, it is somewhat surprising to see Ḥazon Ish bringing war and conquest into the discussion. Indeed, it is interesting to speculate whether, despite the rhetoric of democracy that was prevalent at the time, halakhists such as R. Shapiro and Ḥazon Ish were also attuned to the often brutal realpolitik of the early 20th century.

R. Shapiro returns to the subject of war in a number of other responsa unconnected to the question of political legitimacy. In one, based (as is common) on implicit talmudic evidence and on the sometimes elliptical comments of medieval authorities and commentators, he demonstrates the binding character of conquest.[52] In another, he asserts, in consonance with Ḥazon Ish, that conquest is a mode of acquisition (*kinyan*).[53] This proposition is another instance of the disregard of consent, even if one makes the formal argument that power also generates consent.[54] R. Shapiro went so far as to claim (in the context of a question concerning how one defines "conquest") that even an individual who completely extends authority over an object or territory—for instance, the leader of a gang—can be said to have "conquered" it, thus reducing the issue of legitimacy to one of physical control, a position that is akin to some 19th- and 20th-century definitions of law. This reduction of political concepts to the level of the rifle barrel was thoroughly rejected by R. Shapiro's father, R. Zalman Sender Shapiro, who in an appendix to *Devar Avraham* responded to his son that he had gone too far: "what you have written . . . is completely unacceptable."[55] But perhaps, as noted, R. Avraham Dov's seeming realpolitik was more in line with the times.

The nexus between legitimacy (as expressed by dina demalkhuta dina) and war is found fully drawn in an earlier source, the 18th-century *Shulḥan arukh* of the founder of Habad Hasidism, R. Shneour Zalman of Lyady. But here the opposite proposition is formulated: it is state sovereignty that legitimizes the conquests of war, not the reverse.[56] For R. Shenour Zalman, a king

> acquires . . . the country he conquers, along with its rivers and forests, even if he has performed no other act of acquisition [*kinyan*], for it is the law of states that the entire country, its rivers and forests, is in the possession of the king, both his own country and the country that he conquers in war, and the law of states [*mishpetei hamalkhut*] is as binding as Torah law.

International law, as it were, is what makes the fruit of conquest legitimate.[57]

Is war itself legitimate? Regarding a Jewish state, halakhah draws a distinction between "religiously commended" war (*milḥemet miẓvah*) and "permissible" (or "optional") war (*milḥemet reshut*). Although it clearly recognizes conquest after the fact, does the halakhah also "permit" a Gentile war of aggression? Basing himself on a talmudic comment, Ḥatam Sofer hinted that it did not.[58] R. Menahem Zemba (who was to be killed in the Warsaw ghetto) was explicit: non-Jews, even in wartime, are not permitted to kill—except, of course, in self-defense, which presumably could be interpreted broadly to include participation in defensive wars.[59] Other halakhists, however, accepted the world as it was. A preeminent 19th-century scholar, R. Naphtali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (Neẓiv), asserted that God's threat to punish "he who sheds his brother's blood" (Gen. 9:5) does not apply to killing in wartime, "for then men are not expected to act in brotherliness, for war is a 'time to kill' and there is no punishment, for so was the world created."[60] On the surface, at least, it would appear that the Neẓiv simply concedes that the Gentile world has no international ethic and is not expected to have one, despite the Noahide command against murder.[61]

Remarkably, an expanded version of this perspective has been introduced into halakhic discourse in its construction of a Jewish military ethic. The basis for this equation is the assumption that the Jewish and the Gentile political structures, and the ethos underlying them, are roughly equivalent, as indicated by the biblical prooftext concerning the Jewish nation's (as yet unstated) request for "a king over me, like all the nations that are round about me" (Deut. 17:14). Although most commentators interpret this verse as a veiled divine rebuke, R. Shaul Yisraeli (Israel, d. 1995) regards it as an accurate (and approving) description of the equivalence of Jewish and Gentile modes of governance. The assumption of such equivalence—at least in part—is also implied by Maimonides and is stated more explicitly by the 14th-century R. Nissim of Gerona. Here, however, it is much fuller, probative, and public; overall, it appears that the argument for such equivalence has been advanced more prominently since the establishment of the modern state of Israel. [62]

The international "law of war," R. Yisraeli posits, is determined by the international community of nations. Despite various international charters and conventions, R. Yisraeli believes that war is recognized by international practice to be a legitimate mode of solving conflicts between states. Thus, "the law of the kingdom is law," he asserts, on the international no less than the national front; and war is a law of the kingdom. In other words, dina demalkhuta dina is determinative not only for civil and financial issues but also for matters involving life and death, war included.[63]

Given his assumption that the law for the Jewish state is to be inferred from the standard maintained by the international community, R. Yisraeli argues that a Jewish state ought to (or at least, may) conform to the international standard of war as well.[64] It follows from this that the contemporary Jewish state may also pursue "optional" wars, despite the general halakhic consensus that such wars are not legitimate.[65] True,

R. Yisraeli's argument also opens the door (as he notes) to future rejections of war by international consensus, and this rejection would then oblige the Jewish state as well. But the possibility remains just that: a possibility. His main thrust is to allow the pursuit of war, which is pegged at its lowest moral denominator, by detaching the law of war from any halakhic (or ethical) determination.[66]

R. Yisraeli has been taken to task on a number of points. Chiefly, his argument has been challenged because it allows international convention to determine what is legitimate (even, ultimately, for Jews) on topics that are ostensibly well within the halakhic/ethical bailiwick. R. Yisraeli had justified war and its fatalities with the argument that non-Jewish communities have the right voluntarily to waive their claim to life. But from R. Zevin on, critics have urged that as far as Jewish law and its ethos are concerned, no one—Jew or Gentile—has the right to waive his or her life, thus putting questions concerning the rules of war beyond the range of consent.[67] (In a sense, this is parallel to one of the critical philosophic limitations placed on consent theory, that consent to injustice is an unacceptable form of consent. As Joseph Raz put it, "consent to obey the laws of an unjust government . . . cannot be morally valuable.")[68] R. Yisraeli's argument is particularly controversial because of the specific case on which it is based, the Israeli army attack in 1953 against the Jordanian village of Qibya, in which many civilians were killed. Critics have argued that R. Yisraeli's desire to vindicate Israeli policies and defend the honor of the army in the fledgling years of the state[69] overwhelmed his better judgment.[70]

Although this essay has focused on halakhic materials, it has not dealt in any sustained or systematic way with the status of a Jewish state, its political ethos and culture, or its mode of governance. This is because the question of the halakhic status/legitimacy of the state of Israel has been widely discussed, whereas very few scholars have examined whether and how the Jewish political tradition might be relevant to political thought in general as it legitimates and relates to the state per se. Nonetheless, Israel poses a special case, and a few words on the subject are in order.[71]

As seen, R. Yisraeli's responsa on the general and universal nature of dina demalkhuta can be applied as well to the state of Israel. The significance of doing so, however, is to make the Jewish state halakhically legitimate, but only on the level of any other state: what is sacrificed is Israel's uniquely Jewish component.[72] A similar but more radical approach, that of R. Nissim of Gerona, addresses this point by asserting that even the "ideal" Jewish state is expected, as a practical necessity, to adopt some of the legal features common to all states.[73] In a sense, both approaches are the halakhic equivalent of the claim that the goal of Zionism is to "normalize" the Jewish political experience.[74]

It may also be the case that dina demalkhuta dina can apply to a Jewish kingdom in the messianic sense of the term—although only according to Maimonides' naturalistic conception (which postulates that even messianic structures will be governed by standard halakhic norms). But there are other, more ambitious visions. Some see the present state as a messianic reincarnation of the ideal Jewish state, at least in potential. This perspective liberates a variety of empowering rubrics, most notably that of "the kingdom of Israel" (*malkhut yisrael*). Yet another view of Israel as a halakhic

entity is that which appeals to indigenous Jewish institutions rather than to a universal "law of the kingdom." Here the model is the kehillah, the autonomous medieval Jewish community with its powers of legislation, its modes of control, and its self-image.[75] In a sense, this route has not been traveled by halakhists alone. The case can be made that interest in the kehillah, as expressed by historians such as Isaac Baer, was stimulated by its availability as an authentic model for an autonomous Jewish polity. Baer published his classic essay on the history of the kehillah in 1950, and its gestation doubtless coincided with the establishment of the state.

Needless to say, study of this alternative model would require a different essay altogether. But even the briefest of glances at the kehillah model cannot fail to acknowledge the difference between this organism—the metaphor is meant seriously—and the associations called up by "the kingdom." True, the appeal to the kehillah is intended, first and foremost, to provide a halakhic basis for the state. Nonetheless, by invoking the community, one is suggesting that the state is not only a nation-state but also a community of related individuals. Indeed, it has been claimed that the Jewish citizens of Israel are much more at ease thinking of themselves as a community rather than as a state;[76] and in an age of impersonal governmental and societal structures, an internalization of the communal model can be heartening and even positive. At the same time, such internalization may add yet another layer to the already problematic ethnic and particularistic character of Israel.

The contemporary Jewish state is a halakhic anomaly—a state populated by a largely secular population, in contrast to the "ideal" Jewish state whose legal norm is the Torah. Notwithstanding, significant components of the halakhic community wish to accord the state of Israel halakhic legitimacy, even if this is to be based on universal considerations or on the theory that political legitimacy is fundamentally universal. Beyond the technicalities of halakhic legitimacy, however, there is another issue: what may be called a halakhic tradition, or ethos. How might this bear on the political or legislative behavior of a Jewish state and, where necessary, offer a salient critique or an alternative vision? Until now, halakhists have mainly contributed to those topics where Israeli law grants jurisdiction to halakhah—marriage, divorce, and other issues of personal status. Yet given the wide range of halakhic discourse, which includes much more than it is empowered to deal with in Israel; the fact that both law and ethics are open to input from a variety of sources, cultural as well as legal; and the benefit that would accrue to the level of public discourse and to a "halakhic world" that is fully present in the public square, it is to be hoped that halakhists will also engage the issues of the day in a state where, though not empowered, they are hardly strangers.

In native Jewish terms, such a contribution would be similar to that ostensibly made by the "distinguished person" (*adam ḥashuv*) described in the Talmud—that is, an individual whose approval grants legitimacy to communal legislation. [77] It is true that today's halakhists would not have the veto power granted, at least in theory, to the distinguished persons of old, nor would their opinions be automatically privileged. Yet if halakhists truly believe that their tradition is "a tree of life to those who hold onto it," they should be eager to put it forward and confident that it will make its mark.

Notes

1. See, for example, Bernard Susser and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Prolegomena to Jewish Political Theory," in *Kinship and Consent: The Jewish Political Tradition and its Contemporary Uses*, 2nd ed., ed. Daniel Elazar (New Brunswick: 1997), 117–133. Cf. Michael Walzer (ed.), *The Jewish Political Tradition*, vol. 1 (New Haven: 2000). Walzer notes that

> this interpretative tradition never took on the firm shape of a doctrine or theory. Nonetheless it does display . . . characteristic modes of thought—themes, concerns, tendencies, and internal tensions. . . . What makes this body of work a distinct and more or less unified tradition, and what marks its limits, is its intertexuality. . . . Writers who opted out of the referential system . . . are not part of the Jewish political tradition. . . . Jewish writing about politics commonly takes a legal form. Political issues take shape as legal cases and are addressed in the idiom of the law. (pp. xxii–xxiv)

2. The internalization of modern sensibilities may at times be unconscious (just as one may also be uncertain whether the sensibility expressed is in fact modern), and its integration into the traditional discussion may be problematic. For example, a 20th-century halakhist, R. Ovadiyah Hodayah, argued that tax evasion was not permitted because it would deprive citizens of benefits brought by the taxes, such as sanitation, roads, and the like (see his *Sefer sheelot uteshuvot yaskil 'avdi*, vol. 4 [Jerusalem: 1981], *sheelat shalom* 5:2:9)—whereas the issue of tax evasion had traditionally been discussed in terms of the duty (or lack of same) to the sovereign or his appointed officials. The shift in argument reflects the developed role of modern government and the nature of modern society, and R. Hodayah's attempt to integrate his modernist argument with the traditional distinctions is awkward at best.

3. On *dina demalkhuta dina*, see Shmuel Shilo's indispensable work (in Hebrew) of the same title (Jerusalem: 1975). As will be seen, I have mined this volume assiduously and, I hope, accurately. See also Shilo's article on the subject in the *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 6:51–55; Gil Graf, *Separation of Church and State: Dina Demalkhuta Dina in Jewish Law, 1750–1848* (University, Ala.: 1985); and Jacob J. Schacter, "*Dina Demalkhuta Dina*: A Review," *Dinei yisrael* 8 (1977), 77–96. For a basic collection of source materials and informed discussion, see Walzer (ed.), *Jewish Political Tradition*, 430–462.

Although the familiar translation "the law of the kingdom is law" is accurate, it is a bit misleading in the modern context. Dina demalkhuta has included various kinds of administrative regulations and royal fiats that are not "law" in the legislative sense of the term. As will be shown, it has also been interpreted to exclude certain types of law; and my impression is that it is also used (in both halakhic writing and material prepared for a broader audience) in the looser sense of a governmental decree that cannot be resisted (see n. 5).

4. See Eliav Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael," *Shenaton hamishpat ha'ivri* 16–17 (1990–1991), 417–500. See also Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 107, where he notes that chief rabbis Ben-Zion Uziel and Yitzhak Herzog—both of them Zionists—nonetheless preferred to base the legitimacy of Israeli legislation on categories other than dina demalkhuta dina. The special status of the state of Israel will be discussed in more detail later in this essay.

5. R. Moshe Feinstein, *Igerot Moshe, ḥoshen mishpat*, vol. 1 (New York: 1963), no. 72. For a similar statement, see ibid., vol. 2 (New York: 1985), no. 29, where R. Feinstein elaborates on the benevolence of the United States in a ruling calling on yeshiva heads to deal honestly with governmental agencies, a statement apparently generated by an imminent food stamp scandal. It is true that, in a different responsum (vol. 2, no. 22), he states that "all persons are forbidden to aid the municipal authorities" in their efforts to change the racial balance of a largely Jewish community in Queens in 1962; but his intention here is hardly to call for active or even passive resistance. Rather, he is probably appealing to Jewish real-estate developers, builders, and possibly bankers not to become involved with the project.

Other modernist indications of a reluctance to limit dina demalkhuta include the ruling of R. Moshe Sofer (Ḥatam Sofer) on military conscription in his *Sheelot uteshuvot ḥatam sofer* (Vienna: 1882), 6:29 (it is not fully clear whether Ḥatam Sofer's hesitation derives from his

perception of the dangers posed by Gentiles or by the Jewish communal leadership, or from a combination of the two); R. David Zvi Hoffman, *Melamed leho'il, oraḥ ḥayim* (Frankfurt: 1926), 1:42 (in which he notes that "this responsum was written so as to demonstrate that according to the Talmud and later authorities, we are required to obey the king and the laws of the state in the land of Germany"); and Yehiel M. Epstein's introduction to the 1908 edition of his *Arukh hashulḥan, ḥoshen mishpat* (omitted in the post-tsarist 1923 edition), titled "kevod hamelekh," or "the king's honor." For a medieval perception, see the responsa of R. Asher in his *Sheelot uteshuvot* (Jerusalem: 1994), 8:10 (p. 45).

Naturally, the question of the relationship of halakhic ruling and political reality (or its perception) also arises. Compare, for example, R. Eliezer Flekles' introduction to his collection of responsa, *Teshuvah meahavah* (Kassa: 1912), which attempts to show that Jewish law is not prejudicial toward Gentiles, and his responsum (1:117) in which fulsome praise for the king appears to indicate an influence, albeit only indirect, on the halakhic content of the ruling. I was alerted to R. Flekles' introduction by my colleague Yosef Salmon; the material itself is found in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 127–128.

6. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 147–157. Those opposing the Shakh supported the position taken by the preeminent 16th-century Ashkenazic authority, R. Moshe Isserles.

7. For an instance in which the rubric of dina demalkhuta dina was considered authoritative (from the Jewish point of view) for Gentiles as well as Jews, see Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 190 (discussing R. Shmuel de Modena, a 16th-century authority). This perspective sits well with Rashi's derivation of the legitimacy of state law from the Noahide command regarding the setting up of governmental authorities (*dinim*). A more detailed discussion of the application of dina demalkhuta to Gentiles appears later in this essay.

8. For a survey of these rationales, see Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*; and Graf, *Separation of Church and State*, 10–12.

9. See Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed*, 2:40; cf. Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 83–84.

10. See Gerald J. Blidstein, "A Note on the Function of 'The Law of the Kingdom is Law,'" *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 15 (1973), 213–219. The point had already been made *in nuce*, I now note, by Jacob Katz in his *Exclusiveness and Tolerance* (New York: 1962), 54; see also Salo Wittmayer Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, vol. 5 (Philadelphia: 1957), 57. But see my qualification in the following note, and n. 35.

11. *Teshuvot HaRambam*, trans. Yehoshua Blau (Jerualem: 1960), 2:210 (pp. 371–373); for a different perspective, see ibid., 2:209. Also see Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 278–279. Note, however, that the instances Shilo cites in n. 395 refer to the more usual situation of conflict within the community, rather than conflict between a Jew and the Gentile state. Both sides of the case are presented in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 295–298. For a geonic ruling that rejects a king's demand, see Shilo's discussion of R. Sheshna (7th century) in ibid., 45–46.

12. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 150–152. A good example of a topic that has come up frequently in modern times is the status of rent control regulations; some halakhists feel that these are contrary to Jewish law, while others claim that they provide a fair solution to a societal dilemma. See ibid., 153, 174–176; J. David Bleich, "Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature," *Tradition* 34, no. 3 (Fall 2000), 77–79 (esp. notes 29–32).

13. This distinction was actually not quite so neatly observed in practice nor even defined in theory. "The law of the kingdom is law" was also used to defend harsh penal measures carried out by the Jewish community, up to and including death.

14. Thus, Israel's democratic constitution does not in itself disqualify the state from the legitimacy accorded by dina demalkhuta, as it would if "malkhuta" were taken literally as "kingdom." Although it is generally assumed that the democratic state automatically derives its halakhic legitimacy by virtue of consent theory, one may also argue that it "owns" its territory and makes residence or citizenship contingent on loyalty—although it can be claimed that "ownership" itself ultimately rests on a sort of tacit consent. See Gerald J. Blidstein, "Medinat yisrael bifsikah hilkhatit," *Dinei yisrael* 13–14 (1986–1988), 29–31.

15. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 95.

16. See Walzer in Walzer (ed.), *Jewish Political Tradition*, 432. Also see Daniel Guten-

macher, "The Legal Concept of Political Obligation in Medieval Spanish Law," *Dinei yisrael* 15 (1989–1990), English section, 63–95. For a stringent critique of the integration of medieval consent theory in modern discussion, see Carole Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Legal Theory* (Chichester: 1979), 98–102. See also Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1989), 193–196. Taylor distinguishes between the ancient and medieval theory of consent, in which allegiance to the state is expressed (usually by a group), and the modern concept, in which individuals have a primal willingness to be part of society. In fact, talmudic materials encompass the latter concept as well; see Sotah 37b on the individualizing of the covenant, as read by Emmanuel Levinas, "The Pact," in *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (Oxford: 1989), 211–226.

17. See Walzer in Walzer (ed.), *Jewish Political Tradition*, 433 (referring to a ruling by R. Hayim, author of *Or zaru'a)*; and Menachem Lorberbaum, "Consent Theory in *Dina de-malkhuta dina*," in ibid., 446–450. Note also R. Shlomo Luria, *Yam shel Shlomo* (on Baba Kama 6:14; cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 74). Once again, it should be emphasized that these opinions did not usually affect Jewish obedience to the demands of the state, but rather regulated relations within the Jewish community.

18. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 95 (a discussion of the rulings of R. Shmuel de Modena and R. Avraham Hayim Rodriguez). Although he never wrote about it in a halakhic context, Yitzhak ben-Yehudah Abrabanel, the renowned 15th-century biblical commentator and statesman, clearly preferred a republican government to a monarchy.

19. R. Malkiel Zvi Tannenbaum, *Divrei Malkiel* (Jerusalem: 1970), 6:65:24.

20. See R. Ovadiyah Hodayah, *Yaskil 'avdi*, vol. 6 (Jerusalem: 1982), *ḥoshen mishpat*, 28:2; and R. Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook, *Mishpat kohen* (Jerusalem: 1966), 144.

21. R. Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, "Dina demalkhuta dina," *Hapardes* 31 (1947), 3–5.

22. See n. 37.

23. See Gerald J. Blidstein, "Halakhah and Democracy," *Tradition* 32, no. 1 (1997), 25–26. Also see idem, "Torat hamedinah bemishnat harav Shaul Yisraeli," in *Shenei 'evrei hagesher: dat umedinah bereshit darkah shel yisrael*, ed. Mordekhai Bar-On (Jerusalem: 2002), 350–363.

24. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 75–76. According to Shilo, this perspective is developed by rabbis S.Y. Tabak, Malkiel Zvi Tannebaum, and Shlomo Zalman Auerbach. But this understanding is not shared by all jurists; see Gutenmacher, "Legal Concept of Political Obligation in Medieval Spanish Law," and Gerald J. Blidstein, "Individual and Community in the Middle Ages," in Elazar (ed.), *Kinship and Consent*, 327–370. It should also be noted that R. Samson Raphael Hirsch was a vigorous opponent of the voluntaristic view of the community (a view propounded in his time by R. Moshe Schick [*Maharam Schick* (Jerusalem: n.d.) *ḥoshen mishpat*, no. 34; ibid., *yoreh de'ah*, no. 14]). Hirsch instead interprets the community's resemblance to partnership in a narrowly formal way: see Jacob Katz, *Haker'a shelo nitaḥah: perishat haortodoksim mikelal hakehilot behungariyah uvegermaniyah* (Jerusalem: 1995), 280–282. Of course, Hirsch's views should also be seen in a historical context.

25. I rely here on the evaluation and analysis of Shilo in *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 148–150, 441.

26. See R. Isser Zalman Meltzer, *Even haezel, nizkei mamon* (Jerusalem: 1935), 8:5; Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 153–154.

27. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 97–99; as Shilo points out, this distinction had already been ignored by R. Yosef Karo in the Shulḥan Arukh.

28. Ibid., 199–201. Shilo is here relying mainly on Fritz Kern, who claims that "new" law was considered less legitimate during the Middle Ages than "old" law. See Kern, *Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: 1939), 149–151.

29. This reasoning has a talmudic basis, where dina demalkhuta extends to various forms of servitude. Nonetheless, it is *not* the obvious rationale for holding the draft to be obligatory. Perhaps this is an instance in which "dina demalkhuta" is used as a code to signify a governmental demand that it would be impolitic, if not outright dangerous, to evade or disobey. Also see Katz, *Haker'a shelo nitaḥah*, 143, 280–282. The phrase "dina demalkhuta"—without the

concluding "dina"—is certainly descriptive rather than normative: see, for example, R. Hoffman, *Melamed leho'il, oraḥ ḥayim*, 1:42.

30. See *Ḥatam sofer*, 6:29. In his sermons, Ḥatam Sofer expressed his apprehension about military service: see Jacob Katz, "Kavim lebiografiyah shel haḤatam Sofer," in *Studies in Mysticism and Religion Presented to Gershom G. Scholem* (Jerusalem: 1967), Hebrew section, 130. Ḥatam Sofer does insist that yeshiva students be exempted by the community from the communal draft. The subject is surveyed by Yitzhak Zeev Kahana in his article "Sherut haẓavah besifrut hateshuvot," *Sinai* 12 (1948), 129–161, esp. 133–140. For a precis in English of these materials, written under the impact of the Vietnam War, see Sheldon W. Zimmerman, "Confronting the Halakha on Military Service," *Judaism* 20 (1971), 204–212 (the halakhah loses). See also Walzer in Walzer (ed.), 434. The issue was an extremely sensitive one in 19th-century Europe; it constituted one of the questions posed to the Paris Sanhedrin, and it had already been raised in the late 18th century by a number of politicians, among them Michaelis and Paalzow. See Graf, *Separation of Church and State*, 57–58, 67–68, 93, 104–106.

31. See *Ḥatam sofer*, 6:175 (cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 418); this ruling of course, was confined to Jews. The use of dina demalkhuta dina in the context of arenda purchases is found even earlier, in a ruling by R. Shlomo Luria (cited in Shilo, ibid.). According to Shilo, Ḥatam Sofer is the first authority after Luria to use the rubric in this context. For a discussion of the delicate interplay of dina demalkhuta, communal custom, and the requirements of Jewish law in the context of arenda and other forms of leasing, see Edward Fram, *Ideals Face Reality: Jewish Law and Life in Poland, 1550–1655* (Cincinnati: 1997), 106–128.

32. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 152–153. Shilo claims that these rulings have been very influential. Perhaps they echo in the comment of R. Avraham Yishaya Karelitz in his *Ḥazon ish, likutei ḥoshen mishpat* (Bnei Brak: 1966), 16:9 (p. 466), that although a king may declare war, he may not rob his subjects, for the right "which honest people consider rapine is not granted him." For a different reading of Ḥatam Sofer, see Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael," 452–455.

33. See *Ḥatam sofer, ḥoshen mishpat*, no. 19 (cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 183–184), R. Meir Arik, *Sefer sheelot uteshuvot imrei yosher* (Munkatsh: 1913), 2:152, R. Ben-Ziyon Uziel, *Mishpatei Uziel*, vol. 3 (Jerusalem: 1930), 28:8. Also see Bleich, "Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature."

34. See R. Feinstein, *Igerot Moshe, ḥoshen mishpat*, vol. 1, no. 92. See also ibid., *oraḥ ḥayim*, 5:9:11 (p. 16), where he rules that an apprehended thief should not be handed over to the police lest he be subject to imprisonment, which is a halakhically improper punishment.

35. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 75–77.

36. R. Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg, *Ẓiẓ Eliezer* (Jerusalem: 1985), 5:30.

37. R. Moshe Feinstein, *Igerot Moshe, ḥoshen mishpat*, vol. 2, no. 62 and vol. 1, no. 72. See also R. Shlomo Daichovsky, "Hilkhot shituf: ha'im dina demalkhuta?" *Teḥumin* 18 (5758/1998), 18–31. For a dissenting view, see R. Avraham Sherman, "Minhag medinah beyaḥasei 'oved ma'avid," in ibid., 32–40; and Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael," 459.

38. For further explication of this rule, see Haim Hermann Cohn, "Confiscation and Appropriation," *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 5:880–882; Gerald J. Blidstein, "Notes on *Hefker Bet Din* in Talmudic and Medieval Law," *Dinei yisrael* 4 (1973), English section, xxxv-l. Property may be declared ownerless punitively, or the rubric may serve to legitimate legislation in the area of property rights.

39. R. Avraham Dov Shapiro, *Devar Avraham* (Warsaw: 1905), 1:1:6–7 (pp. 5–7). This work—which caused a sensation in the world of Lithuanian talmudists—contains very useful chapter summaries written by the author, which are found at the end of the volume. The pagination of the Tel Aviv reproduction of 1961 varies from that of the first edition. R. Yonah's view is also discussed (and rejected) by R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach in his *Ma'adanei areẓ* (Jerusalem: 1972), 20:6.

40. See *Devar Avraham*, 1:1:5 (p. 5), 1:11:7 (p. 59); ibid., vol. 2 (Pietrokov: 1913), 26:5 (p. 134).

41. See R. Auerbach, *Ma'adanei areẓ*, 20:6. Talmudic materials do treat other matters in-

volving properties (the writing of legal documents, the definition of "kinyan"), but not of transfer of property. See, however, Yevamot 46a, though even here the term "dina" does not appear.

42. I thank Peter Y. Medding for this point.

43. See Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael."

44. The tension between the legitimacy of war and consent theory is exemplified by the declaration of R. Hayim Benbenishti, a 17th-century Turkish halakhist, that conquest in war is legally binding even if the conquered population rejects the victor. Previously, R. Yehoshua Boaz (a 16th-century Italian halakhist) had ruled that conquest is conditional on consent. R. Benbenishti's ruling is found in his *Shiltei giborim* (on Baba Batra 3) (in the pagination of R. Alfas' halakhot, 29a); R. Boaz's ruling is in his *Keneset hagedolah, ḥoshen mishpat,* 2nd recension, 369:36; both are cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 74–75.

45. R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: 1957), 3–84; *Devar Avraham*, 1:11. So far as I know, the halakhic discussion does not entertain a possible distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish rights in conquest (although it does note the distinction between conquest of Jewish versus non-Jewish lands). This, however, is a subject debated in the Christian context, as between Innocent IV and Hostiensis. See James Muldoon, *Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250–1550* (Philadelphia: 1979). The absence of halakhic discussion on the matter is probably due to the fact that Jews have no mission to conquer infidel populations. See Gerald J. Blidstein, "Holy War in Maimonidean Law," in *Perspectives on Maimonides*, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: 1990), 209–221.

46. See, for example, Reuven Kimelman, "The Ethics of National Power: Government and War from the Sources of Judaism," in *Authority, Power, and Leadership*, ed. Daniel Elazar (New York: 1991), 247–294. The article contains a copious bibliography.

47. See, for example, R. Shlomo Luria, in *Yam shel Shlomo* (on Baba Kama 6:14). In R. Luria's view, the land belonged to the king, but this actually indicated a limitation on the king's power: the people would consent to confiscation of land, but not of movable possessions.

48. The popularity of this theory waned in modern times, as more and more monarchs were succeeded by democratic or republican states (or states with pretensions to that status), and the threat of expulsion came to an end. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 79–81. I believe that a variation of this argument can apply to the democratic polity; for a modernist reworking of this point, see R. Henkin, cited in Shilo, 80 (n. 91).

49. Fully three chapters of *Devar Avraham*, starting with its opening, deal with the issue of the legitimacy of (Gentile) war; R. Shapiro's theories of state sovereignty are developed in the context of these discussions. As noted, *Devar Avraham* was published in 1905, the first decade of what would turn out to be a century marked by war and the abuse of state sovereignty. R. Shapiro died (of illness) in the Kovno ghetto during the Second World War.

As is usually true in halakhic discourse, even a new theory is built, at least formally, on the work of earlier authorities. As noted, *Devar Avraham* takes as its starting point a number of comments by the 13th-century R. Yonah ben Avraham Gerondi. For Shilo's references to these discussions, see *Dina demalkhuta dina* (index), 502; for a fuller treatment, see R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 19–24. *Devar Avraham* also cites a number of commentaries to Baba meẓiya 72b and Yevamot 56a, but as he himself points out, the term "dina demalkhuta" is not found in either passage.

50. See *Devar Avraham*, 1:1:5–6. Even hefker bet din hefker, it should be noted, may be rooted in conquest, inasmuch as it is not necessarily (according to R. Shapiro) an aspect of judicial power. See ibid., 1:6 (p. 7b).

51. R. Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz, *Ḥazon ish*, *likutei ḥoshen mishpat*, 16:9 (p. 466). Although the phrase "is similar to" (*ke'ein*) qualifies his statement, Ḥazon Ish continues to assert the fundamental halakhic equivalence of these powers, also noting that "the power of the king to acquire for himself is by acquisition of war (*kinyan milḥamah*)." Also see R. Auerbach, *Ma'adanei arez*, 20:1 (p. 118a, "velikhora"). Ḥatam Sofer had noted that the talmudic Shmuel—who first formulated the phrase "dina demalkhuta dina"—had also referred to the number of war casualties that the king is permitted to cause among his own populace (see

Ḥatam sofer, ḥoshen mishpat, no. 44). A 19th-century contemporary, R. Zvi Hirsch Hayot, had also pointed to this material, as well as to Shmuel's permissive reading of I Samuel that would allow the king all the powers that the prophet had cited. See R. Zvi Hirsch Hayot, *hagahot* (on Nedarim 28a), cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 84, 105.

52. *Devar Avraham*, 1:11. Although some definite post-talmudic indications of this position exist, I know of no previous discussion of such dimension or detail. The basic talmudic text is Gittin 38a. R. Sherira of the geonic period had written that "the victorious kingdom acquires full property rights," that is, it even overrode prior private ownership (see *Ginzei kedem*, vol. 5 [Jerusalem: 1934], 121–122; cited in Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina,* 46). It is possible that kingly "ownership" of state lands, which is frequently cited as the basis for the authority of dina demalkhuta, is also ultimately derived from conquest.

53. See *Devar Avraham*, 1:10.

54. For a talmudic discussion, see R. Huna in Baba batra 47b, on compulsion with regard to buying and selling (the question is: if a person is forced to buy [or sell], is the sale valid?).

55. Quoted in *Devar Avraham*, 1:1:10–11 (p. 228). The exchange is also cited by R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 20–21. Actually, R. Shapiro had backtracked from this suggestion, as he pointed out to his father, in *Devar Avraham* 1:1:12.

56. R. Shneour Zalman of Lyady, *Shulḥan 'arukh, ḥoshen mishpat, hilkhot hefker vehasagat gevul* (Stettin: 1864), par. 2–3 (pp. 49–51); cf. R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 20–21.

57. This position has (implicit) talmudic precedent (in Gitin 38a), as R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 18–24, makes clear. Nevertheless, R. Shenour Zalman relies here on the notion of international practice. For a virtually identical formulation, see R. David ibn Zimra, *Sheelot uteshuvot* (Warsaw: 1882), 3:533, cited in R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 17–18.

58. *Ḥatam sofer, teshuvot yoreh de'ah* (New York: 1958), no. 19; Ḥatam Sofer bases his ruling on Sanhedrin 59a.

59. R. Menahem Zemba, *Zer'a Avraham* 24 (cited in R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 17–18).

60. This phrase "so was the world created" [*kakh nosad ha'olam*], found in the Neẓiv's biblical commentary, *Ha'amek davar*, on Gen. 9:5, is somewhat ambiguous, as Yosef Ahituv points out in his article "Milḥamot yisrael ukedushat haḥayim," in *Kedushat haḥayim veḥeruf hanefesh: kovez maamarim lezikhro shel Amir Yekutiel*, ed. Isaiah Gafni and Aviezer Ravitzky (Jerusalem: 1993), 260–261. It should be noted, however, that the Neẓiv follows his comment with a citation from Shavu'ot 35b, which indicates that he may have a normative basis in mind.

61. *Ha'amek davar* on Gen. 9:5; cf. R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakah*, 17. R. Zevin is clearly not happy with the Neẓiv's statement. A more moderate reading of the Neẓiv would be that, while war is not murder, it too has its rules. The legitimacy of war is also acknowledged by the Neẓiv in his commentary on Deut. 20:8, where he dismisses (as in his commentary on Gen. 9:5) the discomfiting fact that the participant in war is permitted to place himself in a life-threatening situation, which is contrary to the normal halakhic ethos. Incidentally, it is clear from this commentary that the Neẓiv does not distinguish between Gentiles and Jews on this issue. It has been pointed out that a Jewish "optional" war must be approved by the "Great Court," a distinct measure of normative approval. But it should also be noted that, according to the Neẓiv, the court *must* give its approval to the king, should the king so desire. See R. Naphtali Zvi Yehudah Berlin [Neẓiv], *Meromei sadeh* (Jerusalem: 1957), on Sanhedrin 20b ("bamishnah"), Kidushin 43a ("ma ḥerev").

62. See R. Shaul Yisraeli, *Yad yemani* (Tel Aviv: 1966), 1:9:10 (pp. 77–78); 1:16:5:24 (p. 196). For discussion of Maimonides and R. Nissim on this point, see Gerald J. Blidstein, "'Ideal' and 'Real' in Classical Jewish Political Theory," in *The Quest for Utopia*, ed. Zvi Gitelman (Armonk: 1992), 47–59. A fuller discussion is found in Menachem Lorberbaum, *Politics and the Limits of Law: Secularizing the Political in Medieval Jewish Thought* (Stanford: 2001); see also idem in Walzer (ed.), *Jewish Political Tradition*, 162.

63. R. Yisraeli, *Yad yemani*, 1:1:16:5 (pars. 10, 15, and 24, found on pp. 186, 189, and 196).

64. Ibid. R. Yisraeli does make somewhat contradictory claims. On the one hand, he argues that the standard generated by dina demalkhuta dina applies equally to Jews and Gentiles. On the other hand, he argues that the consensus of the international community that war is a legitimate solution for political problems is decisive even though it involves the sacrifice of life,

because only members of the Jewish community (not Gentiles) are forbidden to waive the right to live. Yet on this basis, "international standards" could not be applied to Jews, dina demalkhuta dina notwithstanding.

65. Ibid., 1:16:5:24, at end (p. 196).

66. To be fair, it should be noted that R. Yisraeli does suggest other qualifications on the legitimacy of war, for both Jews and non-Jews; see his discussion of Nahmanides in ibid., 1:16:5:8 (p. 185). Yet this discussion clearly remains peripheral to his major thrust, which is to permit war.

67. See R. Zevin, *Leor hahalakhah*, 9–18, 310–335 (part of this material is phrased in terms of a piquant discussion concerning whether Shylock the Jew had the halakhic right to wager his "pound of flesh nearest the heart"); see also Yehudah Shaviv, "Tokpan shel milḥamot bein haumot," *Teḥumin* 9 (1978), 225–227; Ahituv, "Milḥamot yisrael ukedushat haḥayim," 264–266, 271–273. See also Yakov (Gerald J.) Blidstein, "The Treatment of Hostile Civilian Populations: The Contemporary Discussion," *Israel Studies* 1–2 (Fall 1996), 27–45. R. Yisraeli argues that individual Gentiles may not waive their "right" to life but (Gentile) communities and states may, especially if this is the "way of the world" (*Yad yemani*, 1:16:24, beginning [p. 196]). This general distinction between individual and group morality has been expanded by some of R. Yisraeli's students; see Ahituv, "Milḥamot yisrael ukedushat haḥayim," Blidstein, "Treatment of Hostile Civilian Populations," idem, "Ma'aseh Shekhem: 'anishah kolektivit vehehagut hahilkhatit bat-zemanenu," *Ez hada'at* 1 (1997), 48–55.

68. Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: 1986), 92.

69. On R. Yisraeli, see Blidstein, "Torat hamedinah bemishnat harav Shaul Yisraeli."

70. See Ahituv, "Milḥamot yisrael ukedushat haḥayim." This point is true insofar as the question of military action was concerned, but the issue of the correspondence of Jewish and Gentile governance was raised independently, in a responsum by R. Yisraeli concerning the scope of Jewish governance and the ability of the community to define the parameters of state powers.

71. For discussion of the variety of ideological perspectives in which the state of Israel has been viewed, see Aviezer Ravitzky, *Messianism, Zionism, and Jewish Radicalism* (Chicago: 1996). See as well Uriel Tal, "Historical and Metahistorical Self-Views in Religious Zionism," in *Self-Views in Historical Perspective in Egypt and Israel*, ed. Shimon Shamir (Tel Aviv: 1981), 89–99; idem, "Contemporary Hermeneutics and Self-Views on the Relationship between State and Land," in *The Land of Israel: Jewish Perspectives*, ed. Lawrence A. Hoffman (Notre Dame: 1986), 316–338.

72. See Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael," 434 ff.

73. See Menahem Elon, *Jewish Law*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: 1994), 55–58; Blidstein, "'Ideal' and 'Real' in Classical Jewish Political Theory," 53–59; idem, "Halakhah and Democracy," *Tradition* 32, no. 1 (Fall 1997), 25 and n. 38; Aviezer Ravitzky, *Dat umedinah bemaḥshevet yisrael* (Jerusalem: 1998), 11–14, 45–53.

74. See Shilo, *Dina demalkhuta dina*, 99–108.

75. See Elon, *Jewish Law*, 60–61, 678ff; Shochetman, "Hakarat hahalakhah beḥukei medinat yisrael," 460ff.

76. See Charles Liebman, "Conceptions of the 'State of Israel' in Israeli Society," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 47 (Summer 1988), 95–107; Blidstein, "Medinat yisrael bifsikah hilkhatit." In my paper on R. Yisraeli, I suggest that much of his characterization of the Jewish state fits the kehillah model, though he himself would insist that he is describing Israel as a state.

77. See Elon, *Jewish Law*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: 1994), 751–759. I am not entering a claim concerning how historically pervasive or effective such an individual's impact actually was. See as well Shmuel Shilo's proposal, "Penei hamishpat kipnei hador," *Mada'ei hayahadut* 39 (1999), 150–151.

"They Fought Because They Were Fighters and They Fought Because They Were Jews": Violence and the Construction of Modern Jewish Identity

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No War nor Wisdom yields our Jews delight, they will not study, and they dare not fight.

These lines, penned by the English poet George Crabbe (1754–1832), sneered not only at the widespread preference of contemporary Jews for commerce over the liberal professions but also at their alleged cowardice and consequent aversion to military service—a stereotype, Cecil Roth grimly noted during the 1940s, that had "persisted in spite of Jewish participation with his fellow-countrymen in recent wars."[1] Roth, who resided in Oxford (where he had been educated), knew whereof he spoke. In 1933, one of his countrymen (hiding, rather pusillanimously, behind the pseudonym H.S. Ashton) had asserted that "it does, in truth, seem that the Jews lack that glorious spirit which will urge the majority of mankind to stand up in defence of their dignity and fight back." The Jew, Ashton asserted, is "long-suffering and resentful . . . but he does not carry the fight into the enemy's territory. . . . He inevitably, as history has shown us, gains his end by pacific propaganda, and he eschews physical combat."[2] To illustrate his point, Ashton included a humorous sketch of what the Battle of Waterloo (which, according to a popular saying, had been "won on the playing-fields of Eton") might have been like had Wellington's forces included Jewish troops:

> Had the Jews' Free School [of London] supplied its contingent, there would have been parlays with the enemy, a fusillade of verbiage . . . excessive gesticulation, long drawn out negotiations with bargaining, and finally a money settlement with a discount for cash, whereby honour would have been satisfied but no blood spilled.[3]

Ashton acknowledged that there were many Jews who had played their part "in the 1914–1918 slaughter and served in the Armies of many nations," including his own. Nonetheless, he was certain that the Jew "cannot have liked his martial task." This harsh dichotomy between the virile values exemplified by Eton and the excessive verbiage and gesticulation to be expected from graduates of the Jews' Free School

could be shared by those who themselves were Jewish. The English poet Stephen Spender, whose mother was of German Jewish background, recalled that when he was at school during the 1920s he began to realize that he "had more in common with the sensitive, rather soft, inquisitive, interior Jewish boys than with the aloof, hard, external English." Yet at the same time, he acknowledged, "I despised some of these qualities in myself which I thought of as Jewish, and my feeling for the English was at times almost like being in love with an alien race."[4] As I shall attempt to illustrate in this essay, the ambivalent attraction of the soft toward the hard and of the timid toward the aggressive has a more extensive and complicated role in the history of modern Jewish sentiment than has heretofore been acknowledged.

Although Ashton wrote as an antisemite, albeit of the genteel variety, similar views had been expressed by European authors of a decidedly more philosemitic persuasion. William Lecky (1838–1903), the great Victorian historian and essayist, wrote of his Jewish contemporaries (in an otherwise generally sympathetic essay) that "nothing is more conspicuous among them than their unhealthy colouring, their frail, bent, and feeble bodies." This Dublin-born and -educated historian of European rationalism and morals acknowledged that "many Jews no doubt serve in the great continental armies with honour," but confidently asserted that "the Jew is naturally a pacific being, hating violence and recoiling with a peculiar horror from blood."[5]

Lecky's assertion dovetailed with another strand of European thinking about the Jew and his innate proclivities, which found perhaps its purest expression in a book that was published in the year of Lecky's death—Otto Weininger's immensely popular *Geschlecht und Charakter* (1903), which went through six German editions before it was published in English (as *Sex and Character*) in 1906. Weininger, a former Viennese Jew who had converted to Protestantism, saw the Jew basically as a male with a female sensibility. "The homology of Jew and woman becomes closer the further examination goes," he claimed, asserting also that the time he lived in was "not only the most Jewish but the most feminine."[6]

As John Hoberman has aptly noted, "by the time Weininger absorbed it, this intuitive sense of the Jew's deficient masculinity had been germinating for centuries, dating from the Middle Ages."[7] Although overt claims concerning such biological characteristics as male menstruation were no longer common in the 19th century, this "intuitive sense" could be expressed, even by Jews and those sympathetic to them, in a variety of ways.[8] A decade before Weininger published his *Sex and Character*, the French author Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu observed that "the Semites are said to be a feminine race, possessing to a high degree the gift of receptivity, always lacking in virility and procreative power." Although Leroy-Beaulieu strongly disagreed with the claim that Jews lacked originality (arguing, in fact, to the contrary) he did acknowledge, in discussing the physiology of the Jew, that "his feebleness often gives him a somewhat unmanly appearance," adding that "in many countries he is manifestly unfit for heavy work."[9]

Such comments by even philosemitically inclined European intellectuals help provide the background to Max Nordau's espousal of *Muskeljudentum* ("muscular Judaism," or "Jewry of muscle"), first in his 1898 address to the Second Zionist Congress in Basle and then in his eponymous essay, first published in 1900. "For too long, all too long, we have been engaged in the mortification of our own flesh," wrote

Nordau. "Let us take up our oldest traditions; let us once more become deep-chested, sturdy, sharp-eyed men."[10]

In his highly polemical *Unheroic Conduct*, Daniel Boyarin takes the opposite tack, arguing that a cultural process taking place in the late 19th and early 20th centuries undermined "the tradition of the effeminate Jewish male" as characterized by "renunciation of the phallus." In place of the domestically oriented *mentsh* who pursued the ideal of *edelkayt* came the "new Jewish man" in pursuit of what Boyarin (with a nod to James Joyce) called *"goyim nakhes,"* or "games gentiles play." Vienna, which spawned both Herzlian Zionism and Freudian psychoanalysis, was seen by Boyarin as the prime locus of this tragic transformation.[11]

Yet as Allan Arkush has noted, there is little justification for Boyarin's linking this "modern deformation of Jewish masculinity" (if indeed it is to be described as such) exclusively with Central European developments—ignoring, at the same time, such cultural phenomena as modern American Jewry's romance with sports.[12] Although such figures as Woody Allen and Barbra Streisand make cameo appearances in *Unheroic Conduct*, no mention is made of Benny Leonard (1896–1947), probably the greatest Jewish boxer (and greatest lightweight) of the 20th century, or Dodgers pitcher Sandy Koufax, whose iconic status has even made its presence felt in American Jewish art.[13] Indeed, it is difficult to understand how not only Boyarin but also scholars such as Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, in their otherwise excellent documentary history *The Jew in the Modern World* (1995), could have ignored sports in general and boxing in particular.[14] The boxing ring, more than the baseball diamond or the tennis court, provided an arena in which traditional images of Jewish weakness and timidity, whether internally generated or externally imposed, could be challenged (if not quite undermined). Moreover, like other popular spectator sports, boxing appealed to the hearts and minds of those who often had little access to, or interest in, elite culture.

During the early decades of the 20th century, such boxers as Benny Leonard (né Leiner) and Barney Ross (Rasofsky)—both of them born on New York's Lower East Side and raised in observant families—became heroes for many young Jews. Leonard's impact was wonderfully captured by Budd Schulberg in an essay written more than half a century after the great lightweight's retirement as champion in 1925: "To see him climb in the ring sporting the six-pointed Jewish star on his fighting trunks was to anticipate sweet revenge for all the bloody noses, split lips, and mocking laughter at pale little Jewish boys who had run the neighborhood gauntlet."[15]

Was this merely *goyim nakhes*? Some of Leonard's older contemporaries, among them Barney Ross' parents, clearly thought so. In his (co-authored) autobiography, *No Man Stands Alone*, Ross, who was eight years old when Leonard won his first lightweight title, recalled his own pious father's dismissive reaction: "Once when somebody told him about the great boxing champ Benny Leonard, Pa's face turned blood red. 'What shame this Leonard has brought on his mother and father.'" The elder Ross, who owned and operated "Rasofsky's Dairy" and who wanted his son to be a Hebrew teacher, never saw him fight, having been killed by would-be robbers when Barney was a boy. When the widowed Mrs. Rasofsky learned that her son was beginning to box, she exclaimed: "No son of mine is going to be a fighter, a bum. You are shaming your father's name." And Barney himself later admitted: "If Pa had lived,

I think he would have killed me before he ever would have permitted me to put on a pair of gloves and climb into the ring."[16]

The careers of Leonard and Ross, to which I shall return, and the status they attained in American Jewish culture, illustrate the degree to which 20th-century Jews continued a highly ambivalent relationship with the virile values associated, in the Middle Ages and early modern times, with their "uncle Esau," and later, with *goyim nakhes*. In contrast to Boyarin, I would argue that such values aroused both repulsion and attraction. In a sense, this ambivalence was akin to premodern European Jews' reaction to the cross and other visible symbols of Christianity. The terms *ti'uv* and *to'evah* (both meaning "abomination") were often used by medieval Jews as euphemisms for the cross. Thus the chronicler Ephraim of Bonn, when describing acts of martyrdom in Würzburg during the Second Crusade, mentioned the case of a young maiden "who was brought into their place of idolatry in order to be defiled [that is, baptized] but she sanctified the name of God and spat upon the *ti'uv*. Then they struck her with stone and fist."[17] As I have suggested elsewhere, the term "abomination" alluded to such biblical verses as Deut. 7:26 ("And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and become accursed like it") where the reference is to idolatrous objects. But it also can be taken to refer to verses where the context is one of prohibited sexual relations.[18] In other words, the "abominated" cross was not merely an idolatrous object but also, it would appear, an object of potential illicit desire. It follows that Jewish violence against the cross (often dismissed as antisemitic inventions) may be seen as reflecting not only fierce hostility but also deep anxiety.

Curiously, such violent responses on the part of medieval Jews were not incorporated into the classic Zionist historiography of Jewish heroism, exemplified by such works as Yisrael Halpern's 1941 anthology *Sefer hagevurah*, the first book published by the Histadrut's Am Oved press. In the section dealing with Jewish heroism during the Second Crusade, Halpern included (from R. Ephraim's chronicle) the story of Samuel ben-Isaac of Worms, who, when attacked on the road to Mainz, managed to wound "three of the enemy" before he was killed. He also cited the case of Gutalda of Aschaffenburg, who refused baptism "and drowned herself in the river."[19] Yet Halpern chose to overlook a tale that appears between the two just cited: that of Kalonymos of Bacharach, who "spat conspicuously upon an image of the Crucified One" before being put to death. He also omitted Ephraim's story of the maiden from Würzburg.[20]

One suspects that the former two deeds were considered more heroic and more worthy of emulation, at least by the labor Zionist standards of the 1940s, than the latter two. But by dictionary standards, according to which any bold or daring behavior is deemed "heroic," Kalonymos of Bacharach and the maiden from Würzburg were Jewish heroes as well, and their heroism clearly left its mark on later generations. From the perspective of the Haganah, symbolic violence against the religious symbols of the oppressor may not have been particularly inspiring, but for Jews in Christian Europe such acts could—and often did—mean a great deal.

Somewhat ironically, the sneering poem by George Crabbe with which this essay opened was written during the lifetime of the great Anglo-Jewish pugilist Daniel Mendoza (1763–1836), who was the English champion between 1791 and 1795.

Mendoza was hardly the only prominent Jewish boxer of his generation. "From the 1760s through the 1820s," Todd Endelman observed, "at least thirty Jews were active enough in the ring to merit inclusion in the standard accounts of boxing compiled in the nineteenth century."[21] Indeed, in the first decade of the 19th century, the authors of the *New Newgate Calendar* complained that Jews had lately become "the bullies of the people of London." This phenomenon was linked to the "disgraceful practice of pugilism, revived by Mendoza on their part," which had allegedly "greatly increased as well their depredations as their audacity."[22]

The conspicuous Jewish presence in the world of British boxing was very much in the mind of the traveller Charles Macfarlane when he visited Istanbul in 1828 and encountered the Jews of the Ottoman empire, who were allegedly known for their timidity and cowardliness. "Throughout the Ottoman dominions," he wrote, "their pusillanimity is so excessive, that they will flee before the uplifted hand of a child. Yet in England the Jews become bold and expert pugilists, and are as ready to resent an insult as any other of His Majesty's liege subjects." Macfarlane, who clearly did not share the view that pugilism was a "disgraceful practice," saw this alleged difference between English and Ottoman Jews as "striking proof of the effects of oppression in one country, and of liberty, and of the protection of equal laws, in the other."[23]

Several years later, Julia Pardoe, also writing from Istanbul, was similarly struck by the timidity of Ottoman Jews and their alleged unwillingness to avenge themselves even upon "puny" enemies:

> There is a subdued and spiritless expression about the Eastern Jew, of which the comparatively tolerant European can picture to himself no possible idea until he has looked upon it. . . . It is impossible to express the contemptuous hatred in which the Osmanlis hold the Jewish people; and the veriest Turkish urchin who may encounter one of the fallen nation in his path, has his meed of insult to add to the degradation of the outcast and wandering race of Israel. Nor dare the oppressed party revenge himself even upon this puny enemy, whom his very name suffices to raise up against him.[24]

Pardoe's comments on the "subdued and spiritless expression" of the Eastern Jew, of which the European "can picture to himself no possible idea until he has looked upon it," are mirrored in the observations of another 19th-century female traveler, Frederika Bremer. Writing from Jerusalem just after mid-century, she explained to her readers how the male Jews of that multicultural city could be recognized: "And if you see a man in a fur cap, or any other cap, or without one, and who has long, thin, corkscrew curls hanging down his cheeks, you may be certain that he is a Jew. His countenance is usually pale and long, he has delicate features and an expression of humility, or rather that of one who feels himself oppressed."[25]

In line with the still widespread belief in the legitimacy of physiognomic arguments, Bremer felt quite certain that she could recognize which Jerusalem Jews were descendants of the "Pharisees and Scribes, against whom our Lord more than once expressed Himself strongly."[26] Of these she had detected "three gentlemen" whom she had seen "walking together more than once, in splendid attire and tall Jewish turbans." They had "an appearance of pride and self-satisfaction," which, Bremer claimed, "perfectly stamps them as Pharisees."[27]

Early in the 20th century, another female traveler to Jerusalem, Elizabeth Butler,

felt that her eye was an accurate instrument of judgment. The male Jews of Jerusalem, "extraordinary figures in long coats and round hats," appeared "white and unhealthy, many of them red-eyed and all more or less bent, even the youths." In her view, "no greater contrast could be seen than between those poor creatures and the Arabs who jostle them in the alleys, and who are such upstanding athletic men, with clear brown skins, clean-cut features, and heads turbaned majestically. They stride along with a spring in every step."[28]

Yet as other European visitors to Jerusalem realized, those pallid and unhealthy "poor creatures" could, on occasion, act quite brazenly—especially when they felt that their religion was threatened. When Margaret Thomas visited the city late in the 19th century, a Jewish woman died in the hospital operated by the London Society for Promoting Christianity Amongst the Jews. "The Jews," she reported, "refused to bury her as she died in a Christian house, and the English applied to their consul to know how to act." The English consul approached the city's Turkish governor, who made it clear that "if the Jews did not perform this office, the Turks would." Accordingly, the governor "sent a stretcher and four bearers, together with a number of soldiers, and they carried the body to a waste piece of land on the Jericho road . . . dug a grave and buried it. But the Jews assembled in their thousands and stoned the soldiers, who drove them back with whips." Thomas, who witnessed the scene, added: "Altogether it was a lively scene from where we saw it, and many people were hurt, for stones are very handy in Jerusalem."[29]

Earlier in the century, following the arrival in 1841 of Jerusalem's first Anglican bishop, the Jewish-born and -bred Michael Solomon Alexander (né Pollack), tensions between Jews, Anglican missionaries, and missionized Jews began to erupt into violence. In October 1842, three European-born Jews who had expressed interest in conversion were forced to seek shelter, fearing "personal violence in consequence of having declared their belief in Christianity."[30] In addition, the artist William Bartlett reported that, shortly after his return to Jerusalem in 1853, a clergyman connected with the Anglican Mission "in the exercise of a zeal certainly more fervent than prudent . . . had repaired to the Jewish quarter, to preach the Gospel in the open street." Soon after he began to speak, "certain of the Rabbis . . . instigated their followers to drive him from the spot with a storm of stones and dead cats." Bartlett's sober judgment of the missionary's "zealous" action is quite striking: "However disgraceful this violence, it was surely not a little imprudent thus to arouse the fanaticism of the Jews."[31]

The engineer Ermete Pierotti, who spent eight years in Palestine during the mid-19th century, noted that the Protestants of Jerusalem "call the Greeks and the Latins heretics, idolaters, heathen; and they stir up still worse feelings by sermons in which they ridicule their services, their processions, their worship of the Virgin and the Saints." Pierotti offered a similar observation about the city's Jews, who "do not show more moderation when speaking of their oppressors . . . and revenge their injuries when they get a chance."[32] His remarks, together with those of Bartlett and Thomas, confirm that the stereotype of Jewish timidity and timorousness could be undermined and even shattered in certain situations, particularly those in which the honor of the Jewish religion was at stake.

The stereotype, as noted, had been bolstered over the centuries, particularly in ec-

clesiastical circles that often returned to scriptural verses from Leviticus and Deuteronomy.[33] During the early 1840s, a pair of Scottish missionaries, Andrew Bonar and Robert M'Cheyne, traveled to Palestine and continued as far as Poland in order to assess the potentials and pitfalls of Protestant conversion efforts. Of the Jews of Safed, they wrote: "It was easy to read their deep anxiety in the very expression of their countenances: they were truly in the state foretold by Moses more than 3,000 years ago." The prooftext cited by the two Presbyterians was Deut. 28:65–66: "The Lord shall give thee a trembling heart . . . and sorrow of mind: and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life." When visiting a synagogue in Tarnopol some months later, the two missionaries were similarly confident about the message to be read on the countenances of the local Jews: "Our entrance caused considerable commotion to the worshippers," they wrote, whose faces "assumed an aspect of terror . . . and they whispered anxiously to another." Explaining that the Jews' alarm was based on their fear that the two Christians "were officers of the Austrian government come to spy their doings," the authors piously added: "How truly these words [from Lev. 26] have come to pass, 'I will send a faintness into their hearts in the land of their enemies; and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee as fleeing from a sword; and they shall fall when none pursueth.' "[34]

When Bonar published his popular commentary on Leviticus some years later, it is not surprising that he had the following to say about the book's 26th chapter: "The unwarlike, timid, feeble state of the Jews in every land fulfills verses 36, 37. . . . The Jews never can resist and never try to resist their foes: they suffer and complain and their cries spread over the earth."[35] He had apparently forgotten something he had been told during his travels by a former Jew who had served as a missionary in Hamburg. After sending a circular to the local Jews, the missionary reported, "many soon threatened to kill him."[36]

Joseph Hoffman Cohn, the son of a Scottish Jew who had converted to Christianity in Edinburgh in 1892 and two years later opened "the first Jewish mission in the history of Brooklyn," wrote of his father's travails: "On a Saturday afternoon, when he was going home from one of his gospel services in Brownsville, a bunch of Jewish lads chased after him and threw stones. . . . One stone hit him in the cheek . . . and caused the flesh to break and the blood to run."[37]

The son, too, had his share of altercations as a youth. Once, during his high school years, he was missionizing in Brooklyn's Williamsburgh section, where he would sometimes ascend five or six flights of stairs in order to distribute circulars. "By the time I reached the top floor of a building," he wrote, "the tenants in the lower floors had absorbed the contents of the circulars I had given them. . . . Hot soup was poured down on my head from above; pots and pans were thrown at me from open doors behind which my benefactors were lying in wait for me. Some tried to get hold of me and beat me."[38] Had Joseph gone home to seek solace in pious Bible study and opened the book of Leviticus with Bonar's commentary, he would perhaps have been astonished to read there of "the unwarlike, timid, feeble state of the Jews in every land," which allegedly confirmed Lev. 26:36–37.

What had happened in the half-century since the learned Scotsman had penned his commentary? Was the New World fundamentally different from the Old? Neither

Joseph Hoffman Cohn nor anyone else in Brooklyn, it might be added, had heard of Herzl's Zionism or Nordau's *Muskeljudentum*, and yet the Jews of Brownsville and Williamsburgh had managed to shed their faintness of heart and pursue their enemies rather than flee from them.

Yet what these Jews were doing in late 19th-century Brooklyn was not fundamentally different from what their coreligionists were doing in Jerusalem. These acts of reckless resistance in both Brooklyn and Jerusalem were in many ways a continuation of the combative and defiant stance taken by medieval Jews in northern Europe toward the symbols and representatives of Christianity. When their religion was on the line, and not only in situations of potential martyrdom, mild Jews could become wild Jews—whether urinating on the cross in medieval Europe[39] or attacking 19th-century Christian missionaries with such weapons of the weak as dead cats and hot soup.

In 1894, the year in which Hoffman Cohn senior opened his mission and promptly became a victim of Jewish street violence, Americans were becoming increasingly cognizant of Jewish fighting prowess in another area—that of the boxing ring. In that year, the San Francisco–born Joe Choynski, who had turned professional six years earlier and had already fought "Gentleman Jim" Corbett three times, went five rounds against the future heavyweight champion Bob Fitzsimmons in a bout that ended with no decision. In his 1925 autobiography, *The Roar of the Crowd*, Corbett recalled that his second match against Choynski (in June of 1889), which went 27 rounds, "was to be the very toughest battle I had ever fought or was to fight; one in which I was to receive more punishment than I have ever had in all my battles together."[40]

At the turn of the 20th century, another San Francisco–born Jewish boxer, the featherweight Abe Attell (a.k.a the "Little Hebrew"), began to make his mark, winning a 15–round decision against ex-champion George Dixon in October 1901.[41] The early years of Attell's boxing career overlapped with the growing popularity of Nordau's concept of *Muskeljudentum*. The context of Nordau's call to improve the Jewish physique is evident from such medical (or pseudo-medical) works as Weininger's aforementioned *Geschlecht und Charakter* and Heinrich Singer's 1904 *Allgemeine und spezielle Krankheitslehre der Juden*, in which the author (a Jew) asserted that "in general it is clear in examining the body of the Jew, that the Jew most approaches the body type of the female."[42] It is also apparent in the spiteful description of Adolph Ochs, the Jewish publisher of the *New York Times*, by his major competitor, William Randolph Hearst (owner of two New York newspapers, the *American* and the *Journal*). In 1904, one day before New York City passed an ordinance changing the name of Longacre Square to Times Square, Hearst's newspapers denigrated Ochs as "an oily little gentleman with . . . obsequiously curved shoulders" who took his orders from the Jewish banker August Belmont and passed them along to the editor of the *Times*.[43] This widely read description appeared not long after Nordau's call for his coreligionists to "become deep-chested, sturdy, sharp-eyed men," and helps to explain the wide appeal of Nordau's call even beyond the Zionist movement.

The impact of both *Muskeljudentum* and Jewish pugilistic prowess on American Jewry can be glimpsed in an entry that a Reform rabbi from Cincinnati, David Philipson, made in his diary in late September of 1905:

> I had an amusing experience this morning which showed me that "muscular Judaism" is not non-existent. Several weeks ago I preached a sermon on Bible teaching in the public schools. This sermon called forth a vicious attack by a Presbyterian minister by the name of Macauley, who was reported to have said among other things that he did not blame the Russians for the manner in which they treated the Jews. This almost incredible statement . . . aroused the keenest indignation on the part of the Jews. One of them, a teacher of athletics, Morris Isaacs by name, met me this morning and told me that he had written Macauley a letter . . . [in which] he had told him what he thought of him and had advised him to cease from troubling Dr. P[hilipson]. He, Isaacs, would be glad to meet him anywhere and at any time and would encounter him, as he might choose, "with or without gloves."[44]

Philipson found this incident "characteristic of the spirit now largely pervading Jewry." In his view, "the apologetic attitude is giving way to an attitude of self-respect and even aggressiveness." As an illustration of this new attitude, he cited the self-defense activities of the Russian Bund, which, especially after the flogging of Jewish workers during the May Day demonstrations of 1902, became one of the principal promoters (and in some instances, the primary organizer) of self-defense efforts against those involved in pogroms. "The more there is of this spirit in Russia, the better; so also in other lands, notably in the United States," remarked Philipson in his diary. He then added: "To use an expression of the streets, the Jews 'are beginning to feel their oats.' I do not believe in the bullying spirit, nor in undue assertiveness, but manly defense of their rights as men will do the Jews more good than the cringing, sycophantic attitude.' "[45]

This use of sexual street slang, which the U.S.-born rabbi relegated to the (temporary) privacy of his diary, reveals how closely notions of Jewish masculinity and self-respect (or lack thereof) came to be bound up with physical culture and self-defense, the "manly defense of their rights as men."[46] A Jewish teacher of athletics who could challenge a Presbyterian minister to a fight "with or without gloves" was a man who had not only muscles, but also "oats."

But Jews did not always "feel their oats," especially not in 19th-century Central and Eastern Europe, where the sense of their deficient masculinity was internalized among Jews. Solomon Schechter, who was born in Romania in 1847, recalled many years later that "on the occasion of my first fight with the boys of our Christian neighbors, I was warned not to hit back." Similarly, Samuel Kaufmann, who was born in nearby Podolia some eight years later, described the deep fear that he and other Jewish young men had of much younger Gentile boys: the mere sight of even one of whom, he claimed, would cause them to run "a bow-shot's distance."[47]

Both of these passages help provide the context for Jakob Freud's "unheroic conduct" (as perceived by his son) when, as a young man in Moravia (circa 1835), walking one Saturday while sporting a new fur cap on his head, he was accosted by "a Christian" who "with a single blow" knocked his cap off into the mud and shouted "Jew! Get off the pavement." When young Sigmund asked his father how he had reacted, Jakob responded quietly: "I went into the roadway and picked up my cap." Perhaps he, too, like his younger contemporary Solomon Schechter, had been warned "not to hit back." Freud later recalled contrasting his father at that moment with Hamilcar Barca, Hannibal's father, who "made his boy swear before the household

altar to take vengeance on the Romans." From that point on, he acknowledged, "Hannibal had had a place in my phantasies"[48]—a place not all that different from that attained several decades later by Benny Leonard. It will be recalled that "pale little Jewish boys" such as Budd Schulberg called up the image of Leonard as they endured "bloody noses, split lips, and mocking laughter" in the course of running the gauntlets of America's toughest urban neighborhoods. Unlike Freud, most of these boys had not received a classical education—Hannibal of Carthage was probably no more familiar to them than Hannibal, Illinois—but nearly everyone knew that Leonard (who never fought on a Jewish holiday) had knocked out the lightweight champion Freddy Walsh in his native New York on May 28, 1917.

It will also be recalled that Samuel Rasofsky (the father of Barney Ross), had commented disdainfully on the "shame this Leonard has brought on his mother and father." Like Jakob Freud, Rasofsky provided his son with a negative model of Jewish manliness. In his autobiography, Ross recalled hearing from his father about the latter's failed attempt to protect his synagogue's Torah scrolls from a crazed mob during the pogroms of 1902 in Brest Litovsk: "When Pa begged the mob not to touch the sacred scrolls in the Ark, they laughed at him, then tore the scrolls to shreds. They spat in Pa's face and knocked him down. Pa told us he didn't try to hit back. Even with such provocation by hoodlums, Pa's religious conscience prevented him from lifting a hand to a stranger."[49]

Although Ross (or his co-author) chose to interpret Rasofsky's reluctance to hit back as deriving from his "religious conscience," it is more likely to have been rooted in the same cultural assumptions about confronting Gentile aggression that had been passed on to Jakob Freud and Solomon Schechter. Yet at the very time that Rasofsky allowed himself to be spat upon and knocked down in his own synagogue, boxers such as Abe Attell were beginning to make their mark on the other side of the Atlantic. Attell, who was 12 years Leonard's senior and grew up in San Francisco, later explained how he became a fighter: "We were Jews living in an Irish neighborhood. You can guess the rest. I used to fight three, four, five, ten times a day. On the street, in the vacant lots, on the docks. A little of Abie's blood stained every street in Frisco."[50]

In February of 1905, Attell fought a fellow Jew (Abe "Kid" Goodman) for the world featherweight title in Boston. Although Harvard's president, Charles Eliot, probably was not in attendance on that evening, it is striking that he was able to assert—at a 1907 Chanukah meeting of Harvard's Menorah Society (!)—that "Jews are distinctly inferior in stature and physical development . . . to any other race."[51] Similarly, in 1914, the year in which Al McCoy (né Harry Rudolph), the son of a Brownsville kosher butcher, knocked out the world middleweight champion in New York City (thereby assuming his title), the sociologist Edward Ross, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, proclaimed that Jews "shun bodily activity and are extremely sensitive to pain."[52]

By then, however, thousands of sports enthusiasts worldwide were familiar with the careers of such Jewish boxers as Choynski, Attell, Goodman and, above all, Leonard, who proved to be the greatest of them all. Upon his retirement in 1925, New York's *Jewish Daily Forward* took pride in the "gloved fists of Benny Leonard and the rest of the Jewish fighting fraternity," while also acknowledging that there were still "people who are certain about the alleged congenital cowardice of the Jewish

race."[53] Another New York Jewish newspaper, *New Warheit*, compared Leonard with Albert Einstein, declaring that Leonard was "perhaps even greater . . . for when Einstein was in America only thousands knew him, but Benny is known by millions." The boxer's prowess in the ring was even given a Zionist spin. "Just as we need a country so as to be the equal of other people," the *New Warheit* declared, "so we must have a fist to become their peers."[54] As Michael Berkowitz noted: "Zionism helped open up a cultural space for the idealization of Jewish sports heroes. Muscular Jews, especially boxers, became important cultural icons in the United States, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands." Moreover, "the dissemination of their pictures, especially in the press, coincided with the growth of radio and movie audiences for prizefights."[55]

Like many of his contemporaries in the ring, Leonard traced the beginnings of his pugilistic career to his youthful experiences in the city streets. "You had to fight or stay in the house when the Italian and Irish kids came through on their way to the [public] baths," he later recalled of his youth on the Lower East Side. Similarly, Jackie Fields (né Finkelstein), who held the world welterweight title for most of the years between 1929 and 1933, made his debut as a fighter on Chicago's Maxwell Street, where his father had a kosher butcher shop. "We had Stanford Park three blocks away," he later recalled, "where you had to fight your way to the swimming pool because the Italians, the Polish, the Irish, the Lithuanians, were there. The Jews were surrounded by all of 'em. So in order to go to the pool you had to fight. 'What are you doin' here, you Jew bastard?' 'Hey, Kike.' You know. We'd start fighting right away."[56]

The bitter ethnic rivalries referred to by Attell, Leonard, and Fields carried over into the ring as well. Fields, who began his professional career in 1924, just after winning a gold medal (as a featherweight) at the Olympic Games in Paris, fought American fighters of Irish, German, and Italian extraction. "I remember in some fights, I'd be in the ring with a guy and he called me a name. 'Kike.' 'Jew,' " he later recalled. "I'd go after him. Pow! I'd just try to tear his [expletive deleted] brains out. But sometimes you just couldn't do it. They were tough, too."[57]

One particularly noteworthy set of boxing matches was that between Barney Ross and Jimmy ("Baby Face") McLarnin. Not only was the Irishman, a welterweight, bigger and stronger than his lightweight challenger but he had already knocked out half a dozen prominent Jewish fighters. Years later, Harold Uriel Ribalow (whose father, Menahem, was editor of the Hebrew weekly *Hadoar*) described the heady atmosphere of the three Ross-McLarnin fights, which took place in 1934:

> I was living in a section in New York where many European Jews—all young men—were attending *yeshiva*. . . . These boys knew little about boxing, but they could not miss the excitement throughout the city. And the fact that McLarnin had beaten many Jewish fighters made the event even more important to them. It was odd, watching these boys, with skullcaps on their heads, taking time out from their Talmudic studies to listen to a fight on the radio. And no matter how long I shall remember the famous trio of Ross-McLarnin fights, I shall remember the intense faces of the Jewish students who listened to each blow-by-blow account as if it were the most significant thing in the world.[58]

Many, if not most, of those yeshiva students had probably heard that Ross had walked his mother home after his Friday night victory over Tony Canzoneri in June 1933.

Some may even have known that, while training for the rematch, Ross "dug out the bag of tefillin" that he "hadn't touched for a couple of years" and began wearing them daily while reciting morning prayers.[59]

The lasting impact of these great Jewish pugilists on the hearts and minds of American Jews is also poignantly reflected in Philip Roth's memoir of his father, who would take him as a boy to the Thursday night fights at Newark's Laurel Garden, where the elder Roth had once seen Barney Ross in action. On a visit to his dying father in 1989, Roth brought along a copy of *The Jewish Boxers' Hall of Fame*, which he had found while browsing in a Judaica store on upper Broadway. After reminiscing about such great fighters as Attell, Leonard, and Ross, Herman Roth mentioned the name of "Slapsie Maxie" Rosenbloom, another fighter of the 1930s. "Do you know," asked his son, "that Slapsie Maxie fought another Jew for the light-heavyweight title?" Nearly 60 years after the event, Herman had little trouble remembering that the "other Jew" was Abie Bain, whom Rosenbloom knocked out in the eleventh round. "They were all bums," the elder Roth added:

> you know how it was: these kids grew up, they had a tough life, the slums, no money, and they always had an adversary. The Christian religion was an adversary. They fought two battles. They fought because they were fighters, and they fought because they were Jews. They'd put two guys in the ring, an Italian and a Jew, an Irishman and a Jew, and they fought like they meant it, they fought to hurt. There was always a certain amount of hatred in it.[60]

A year earlier, in his (slightly) fictionalized autobiography, *The Facts*, Philip Roth had discussed his own adolescent fascination, during the 1940s, with the heritage of Jewish boxing:

> From my father and his friends I heard about the prowess of Benny Leonard, Barney Ross, Max Baer, and the clownishly nick-named Slapsie Maxie Rosenbloom. And yet Jewish boxers . . . remained, like boxing itself, "sport" in the bizarre sense, a strange deviation from the norm and interesting largely for that reason: in the world whose values first formed me, unrestrained physical aggression was considered contemptible everywhere else. I could no more smash a nose with a fist than fire a pistol into someone's heart. And what imposed this restraint, if not on Slapsie Maxie Rosenbloom, then on me, was my being Jewish.[61]

For the adolescent Philip Roth in the aftermath of the Holocaust, being Jewish was still associated—perhaps above all else—with contempt for "unrestrained physical aggression," which was implicitly seen as a form of *goyim nakhes*. And yet perhaps for that very reason, boxing (like "shiksas" at a somewhat later stage in Roth's life) held a certain transgressive fascination. As an adolescent, Roth "could recite the names and weights of all the champions and contenders, and even subscribed briefly to *Ring*, Nat Fleischer's colorful boxing magazine." Like the Jewish newspapers eulogizing Leonard upon his retirement, Roth, too, resorted to the metaphor of Einstein in order to describe Jewish pugilistic prowess. "In my scheme of things," he later recalled, "Slapsie Maxie Rosenbloom was a far more miraculous phenomenon by far than Dr. Albert Einstein."[62]

Roth's father had recalled the bitter ethnoreligious rivalries that accompanied the Jewish boxers of his day as they stepped into the ring. An interesting sidelight on the

revenge that Jewish fighters were often seeking is provided by Herman Roth's contemporary Harry Golden, who, like Benny Leonard, grew up on New York's Lower East Side. In his 1969 autobiography, Golden described a particularly humiliating (and anthropologically fascinating) form of attack known as "cockalization" that he had suffered at the hands of three "Irish buckoes" at the age of eleven, when he once ventured beyond the Jewish slum into their neighboring territory. "There are hundreds of men in their sixties," he wrote, "who know what it is to be cockalized. Indeed cockalization was universal. My father once told me that there were specific Polish and Russian words for the process. The enemy kids threw the Jew on the ground, opened his pants, and spat and urinated on his circumcised penis while they shouted 'Christ killer.' "[63]

While Herman Roth's recollections of anti-Jewish violence in his native Newark also included some rather ghoulish practices, he remembered as well some rather violent Jews. One in particular was Charlie Raskus, who eventually became a killer for the kingpin Jewish mobster Abner ("Longie") Zwillman. From grade school, Charlie had serious discipline problems; once for example, he tied his teacher to her desk. "They threw him out," recalled Herman,

> and put him in an ungraded school and he wound up killing people for Longie. They were a bad bunch, Charlie and his friends. They were all Jewish boys around the Third Ward. The Polocks used to kill Jews who had beards, in the Third Ward I'm saying, not just in the old country, and so the Jewish boys started a gang . . . and they'd kill the Polocks. I mean personally kill them. They were all no good. My father used to call them "Yiddische bums."[64]

Meyer Lansky, who was perhaps the most famous of the "Yiddische bums" (but whose name, unlike many of the boxers mentioned earlier, cannot be found in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*), reminisced before his death about helping to break up a pro-Nazi rally sponsored by the German American Bund in Yorkville, on Manhattan's Upper East Side, in 1935: "There were only about fifteen of us, but we went into action. . . . There were fistfights all over the place. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran. We chased them and beat them up. . . . Yes, it was violence. We wanted to teach them a lesson. We wanted to show them that Jews would not always sit back and accept insults."[65]

Notwithstanding the fact that Ross had recently become the first boxer ever to hold the world lightweight and welterweight titles simultaneously—and that the lethal gang known as "Murder Inc." was run by none other than Lansky's colleague Louis (Lepke) Buchalter—Lansky, as so many others, retained in his mind the powerful stereotype of the Jewish "patsy." Although he certainly knew that "Jews would not always sit back and accept insults," he clearly felt that this lesson had to be taught (the hard way) to Yorkville's Gentiles.

Parallel to the cult of Jewish boxing champions among their younger coreligionists, Jewish gangsters could also be seen as heroes, especially during the 1930s and 1940s. For instance, Larry King (né Zeiger), who grew up in Brooklyn during the years that Philip Roth was growing up in Newark, recalled that "Jewish gangsters were our heroes. Louis Lepke who founded Murder, Incorporated. We were proud of that for some reason."[66] The pride that King and his friends felt for figures such as

Lepke and his coreligionist Dutch Schultz (né Arthur Flegenheimer) was clearly related to their degree of deviation from the nonviolent Jewish stereotype. Among King and his adolescent friends, as among Roth and his, fighting was simply not an option. "Jews didn't fight. Never fought. Never punched each other," recalled King. "Screamed a lot. Argued. Never punched."[67] Paraphrasing Roth, Larry King might have said that, in his adolescent scheme of things, Louis Lepke was a far more miraculous phenomenon than Albert Einstein.

The rise of Nazism, and especially the many public humiliations that German Jews suffered in its wake, seems to have undermined the sense of vigorous Jewish masculinity that had begun to emerge during the first decades of the 20th century. Even before the rise of Nazism, influential German scientists such as Fritz Lenz (who had been appointed to the first German chair of "racial hygiene" in 1923) continued to propagate the claim that, "in respect to both body and mind," Jews possessed a "less markedly developed masculine character" than did the Teutonic races.[68] Yet in those same years, an evening stroll in the streets of Berlin could provide evidence to the contrary. Christopher Isherwood's celebrated *Berlin Diary*, composed during the early 1930s, contains a fascinating description of a scene that occurred one evening along the Kleiststrasse, where he saw a crowd gathered around two young women seated in a car and two young Jews standing nearby on the pavement who were "engaged in a violent argument with a large blond man who was obviously drunk." What had led to the altercation?

> The Jews, it seemed, had been driving slowly along the street, on the lookout for a pick-up, and had offered these girls a ride. The two girls had accepted and got into the car. At this moment however, the blond man had intervened. He was a Nazi, he told us, and as such felt it his mission to defend the honor of all German women. . . . The Jews didn't seem in the least intimidated; they told the Nazi energetically to mind his own business. Meanwhile, the girls . . . slipped out of the car and ran off down the street. The Nazi then tried to drag one of the Jews with him to find a policeman, and the Jew whose arm he had seized gave him an uppercut which laid him sprawling on his back. Before the Nazi could get to his feet, both young men had jumped into their car and driven away.[69]

How different from the conduct of Jakob Freud on a Moravian street a century earlier! But was the heroic conduct of these two young men a consequence of the younger Freud's "heteronormative embrace of the phallus," or of Nordau's *Muskeljudentum*? It seems more likely that their self-confident virility was inspired by cultural phenomena of an entirely different order. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, Jewish champions dominated world boxing in nearly all categories except heavyweight (admittedly, a major exception). For five years (1926–1931) the junior welterweight title was held consecutively by two Jews—Mushy Callahan (né Vincent Morris Schneer) and Jackie ("Kid") Berg (né Judah Bergman), and for most of the five years between 1929 and 1934, the welterweight crown was held by either Jackie Fields or Barney Ross. Similarly, for four consecutive years (1930–1934) the world light-heavyweight champion was none other than Philip Roth's childhood hero—Slapsie-Maxie Rosenbloom.[70] And in 1935, the year in which the Nuremberg Laws were instituted and Rosenbloom ceded his title to a fellow Jew (Bob Olin), the English welterweight H.P. Hollander stressed the wider significance of Jewish pugilistic

prowess when he noted that "once he could get into the ring, the Jew could show the world that he could fight—and fight with brain and with strength and with courage. No one could deny him that he was a man amongst men."[71]

A year later, the famous "Battle for Cable Street" against local fascists in London's East End showed that English Jews, too, could engage in manly street-fighting with their people's professed enemies. In 1938, Labor MP Emanuel (later Lord) Shinwell, who had been born in the East End, responded memorably when he was interrupted—while addressing the House of Commons—by a fellow member, Commander Bower, who told him to "go back to Poland." Although Bower was reputed to have been a former heavyweight boxing champion of the Royal Navy, Shinwell (who had also been a boxer in his youth) approached his colleague and "struck him on the side of his jaw."[72] Here, too, it is likely that the former East Ender's heroic conduct in defense of his (and his people's) dignity was inspired less by Freud and Herzl than by the careers of such successful Anglo-Jewish pugilists as Ted ("Kid") Lewis (né Gershon Mendeloff), a former world welterweight champion.

Yet in 1945, George Orwell (who certainly had some knowledge of Jewish pugilistic prowess in early 20th-century England) still insisted that Jews, or rather Jewish males, could not inflict violence with the same abandon as other men. Orwell described an incident at an American camp for captured Germans in which a Jewish interrogator had kicked an SS general while shouting "Get up, you swine." "I concluded that he wasn't really enjoying it, and that he was merely—like the man in a brothel, or a boy smoking his first cigar, or a tourist traipsing around a picture gallery—telling himself that he was enjoying it," Orwell wrote.[73] Similarly, in his *Reflexions sur la question juive* (1946), Jean-Paul Sartre included the following passage:

> The Jews are the mildest of men, passionately hostile to violence. That obstinate sweetness which they conserve in the midst of the most atrocious persecution, that sense of justice and of reason which they put up as their sole defence against a hostile, brutal, and unjust society, is perhaps the best part of the message they bring to us and the true mark of their greatness.[74]

Sartre's comment was later taken up by two writers, Albert Memmi in France and Paul Breines in the United States. The Tunisian–born Memmi, whose autobiographical *Portrait of a Jew* was dedicated in part to the French philosopher, was clearly wrestling with the earlier quoted passage from *Anti-Semite and Jew* when he wrote:

> I noted one day that I had a horror of bloodshed. Did that mean that . . . I was aware of it as a Jew? That my aversion characterized me as a member of a group with which I shared the same repulsion? Not at all. . . . My own people told me that it was a sign of humanity, of morality, a rejection of violence; the enemies of the Jews called it a shameful weakness, in line with other taints, such as cowardice.

Memmi was aware that the allegedly Jewish aversion to bloodshed could be construed by Jews in positive terms and seen by non-Jews as a "sign of weakness." Nonetheless, he was uncomfortable with the very notion of a "specifically Jewish trait."

> I acknowledged certain facts. It seems true that the Jew rarely owns weapons. . . . It seems true that he loathes to shed blood or to see blood shed. . . . But, I added promptly, is that really peculiar to the Jewish temperament? Is it not rather the inevitable result of a given situation? The Jew has always paid more dearly than other men for the slightest retort,

> the slightest divergence. . . . Here, in point of fact, we come up against a long, collective pattern of behavior, or rather of inaction. But does the Jew not share that resigned passivity, that timid behavior, with many of the weak throughout history? It is not, I concluded, a specifically Jewish trait but a trait of the oppressed.[75]

Similarly, Paul Breines in his *Tough Jews* (1990) candidly refers to 1982, the year of Israel's war in Lebanon, as the occasion of his "first tough Jewish awakening"[76]—one that brought him (like Memmi before him) into critical engagement with Sartre's assertions concerning the Jew's essential gentleness.

> My work . . . has convinced me that if there is such a phenomenon as essentially Jewish behavior, it is not the behavior one would place under the rubrics weak or gentle. Jews, to be sure, generated a vital historical identity and tradition of gentleness and frailty, which Sartre called "the best part of the message they bring to us." . . . But there have always been tough, fighting Jews. Although they have existed largely on the margins of the prevalent, nonviolent Jewish tradition, such figures nevertheless indicate that Jews . . . will be as tough as the proverbial next guy—or tougher. In that sense, it cannot be said that Jews are essentially or "by nature" prone to one or another sort of conduct.[77]

Breines did not mention Memmi's grappling with Sartre, of which he was evidently unaware, but he did bring up the figure of Meir Kahane on several occasions, acknowledging that the Jewish Defense League, which Kahane founded in 1968, was "very much in the background" of his book. "It is the Kahane present in virtually all of us that really interests me," he noted tellingly.[78] This essay, which has sought, among other things, to place in historical perspective the admiration felt not only for Jewish athletes but also for Jewish gangsters, may also shed light on the origins of Kahanism. For if Meyer Lansky felt the need, in his words, to show that "Jews would not always sit back and accept insults," so, too, Israel's stunning victories in the Six-Day War and beyond did not neutralize the need for many diaspora Jews to show that they (too) would not be pushed around. In fact, such victories may have given rise to new and more widely supported manifestations of *Muskeljudentum*, whose destructive consequences—both in the Middle East and elsewhere—have tragically become clearer with the passing of time.

Notes

1. Cecil Roth, "The Unassimilable Jew," in idem, *Personalities and Events in Jewish History* (Philadelphia: 1953), 37 (n. 2). The essay appeared originally, under a somewhat different title, in *Jewish Social Studies* 3 (1944).

2. H.S. Ashton, *The Jew at Bay* (London: 1933), 69.

3. Ibid., 31. The comment about Waterloo is attributed to the duke of Wellington. It is perhaps worth noting the later rejoinder of another Etonian, George Orwell: "Probably the battle of Waterloo was won on the playing-fields of Eton, but the opening battles of all subsequent wars have been lost there." See Orwell, "England, Your England," in idem, *The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius* (London: 1941), 29.

4. Stephen Spender, *World within World: The Autobiography of Stephen Spender*, 2nd ed. (New York: 1994), 13.

5. William E.H. Lecky, "Israel among the Nations," in idem, *Historical and Political Essays* (London: 1908), 122, 128. Lecky's essay was written in response to Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu's French work of 1893 of the same title.

6. On Weininger's feminization of the Jew, see also George Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: 1985), 145; Paul Breines, *Tough Jews: Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry* (New York: 1990), 148–149; Bram Dijktra, *Evil Sisters: The Threat of Female Sexuality and the Cult of Manhood* (New York: 1996), 401–402; Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man* (Berkeley: 1997); and Nancy A. Harrowitz and Barbara Hyams (eds.), *Jews and Gender: Responses to Otto Weininger* (Philadelphia: 1995).

7. John Hoberman, "Otto Weininger and the Critique of Jewish Masculinity," in *Jews and Gender*, 143.

8. During the Middle Ages, it had been widely claimed, if not widely believed, that Jewish males menstruated. Although Abbé Grégoire, basing himself on Isaac (Fernando) Cardoso's *Las excelencias de los Hebreos* (1679), dismissed such claims as "ridiculous notions" in the late 18th century, he still noted that Jewish men "have almost all red beards, which is the usual mark of an effeminate temperament" (quoted in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz [eds.], *The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History* [New York: 1995], 52). On the menstruation myth, see Irven Michael Resnick, "On Roots of the Myth of Jewish Male Menses in Jacques de Vitry's History of Jerusalem," *International Rennert Guest Lecture Series, Bar-Ilan University* 3, (1998); idem, "Medieval Roots of the Myth of Jewish Male Menses," *Harvard Theological Review* 93, no. 3 (2000), 241–263; Willis Johnson, "The Myth of the Jewish Menses," *Journal of Medieval History* 24, no. 3 (1998), 273–295; David S. Katz, "Shylock's Gender: Jewish Male Menstruation in Early Modern England," *The Review of English Studies* 50 (1999), 440–462; Elliott Horowitz, "Jews, Stereotypes of," in *Encyclopedia of Medieval Folklore* (Santa Barbara: 2000), 554; idem, "A 'Dangerous Encounter,' Thomas Coryate and the Swaggering Jews of Venice," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 52, no.1 (2001) 344–347. On Abbé Grégoire, see John M. Efron, *Defenders of the Race: Jewish Doctors and Race Science in Fin-de-Siècle Europe* (New Haven: 1994), 182 (n. 11). On Cardoso's *Las excelencias*, see Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *From Spanish Court to Italian Ghetto: A Study in Seventeenth-Century Marranism and Jewish Apologetics* (New York: 1971), 123, 126–133.

9. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, *Israel among the Nations: A Study of the Jews and Antisemitism*, trans. F. Hellman (London: 1895), 163, 247. Early in the 19th century, the pioneering anthologist of Jewish humor, L.M. Buschenthal, found a fundamental similarity between Jews and women in the nexus between weakness and wit. "Jew, when oppressed," he asserted, "can attack only verbally. In that they are like women, whose lack of strength is compensated for by their wit" (quoted in Sander L. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology: Stereotypes of Sexuality, Race, and Madness* [Ithica: 1985], 180–181). This line of thinking later found expression, as Gilman has noted, in the writings of Otto Weininger, for whom humor, as opposed to mere mockery, was "a mode of truthful discourse which Jews and women cannot possess" (ibid., 188–189). On Jews and humor, see also Sander L. Gilman, *The Jew's Body* (New York: 1991), 135; idem, "Otto Weininger and Sigmund Freud: Race and Gender in the Shaping of Psychoanalysis," in *Jews and Gender*, 111–112; Huberman, "Otto Weininger and the Critique of Jewish Masculinity," 143.

10. Nordau's essay, which originally appeared in the *Jüdisches Turnzeitung*, is translated in *The Jew in the Modern World*, 547–548. Among the many recent discussions of Nordau's "muscular Judaism" and its impact, see Breines, *Tough Jews*, 142–149; Gilman, *The Jew's Body*, 53–54; idem, *Freud, Race, and Gender* (Princeton: 1994), 104–105; Michael Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture and West European Jewry before the First World War* (Cambridge: 1993), 105–109; Jay Geller, "The Conventional Lies and Paradoxes of Jewish Assimilation: Max Nordau's Pre-Zionist Answer to the Jewish Question," *Jewish Social Studies* n.s. 1, no. 3 (1995), 129ff; Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct*, 76–77, 336.

11. Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct*, 36–38, 85, 91–94. Boyarin described his book as less a work of history than "a polemical essay, based on a certain interpretation . . . of an aspect of Jewish history." See his "Response to Allan Arkush," *Jewish Social Studies* n.s. 4, no. 3 (1998), 93–95.

12. Allan Arkush, "Antiheroic Mock Heroics: Daniel Boyarin Versus Theodor Herzl and

His Legacy," *Jewish Social Studies* n.s. 4, no. 3 (1998), 69. For another important critique of Boyarin's arguments, see Hillel J. Kieval, "Imagining 'Masculinity' in the Jewish Fin de Siècle," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 16, *Jews and Gender: The Challenge to Hierarchy*, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York: 2000), 142–155.

13. See Norman L. Kleeblatt (ed.), *Too Jewish? Challenging Traditional Identities* (New York: 1996), and Elliott Horowitz, "Too Jewish? and Other Jewish Questions: A Review Essay," *Modern Judaism* 19 (1999), 199–200.

14. This is true also of Lloyd P. Gartner's *History of the Jews in Modern Times* (New York: 2001); cf. Israel Cohen, *Jewish Life in Modern Times* (New York: 1914), 92–93, and more recently, Michael Berkowitz, *The Jewish Self-Image: American and British Perspectives, 1881–1939* (London: 2000), 72–76. Two fairly recent books on Jews and sports are Peter Levine's *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field: Sport and the American Jewish Experience* (New York: 1993) and Allen Bodner's *When Boxing was a Jewish Sport* (Westport: 1997).

15. Budd Schulberg, "The Great Benny Leonard," *Ring Magazine* (May 1980), 32–37, quoted in Levine, *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field*, 155. Schulberg was 11 years old when Leonard retired from the ring.

16. Barney Ross and Martin Abrahamson, *No Man Stands Alone: The True Story of Barney Ross* (Philadelphia: 1957), 21, 80; Levine, *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field*, 173; Steven A. Riess, "A Fighting Chance: The Jewish-American Boxing Experience, 1890–1940," *American Jewish History* 74, no. 3 (March 1985), 244–245.

17. Avraham Meir Haberman (ed.), *Gezerot ashkenaz vezarefat* (Jerusalem: 1971), 119; Shlomo Eidelberg, *The Jews and the Crusaders: The Hebrew Chronicles of the First and Second Crusades* (Madison: 1977), 127.

18. See, for example, Lev. 18:22 ("You shall not lie with a male as with a female; it is an abomination") and Ez. 22:11 ("And each has committed an abomination with his neighbor's wife"). See also Elimelekh (Elliott) Horowitz, "'Hazelav hadoker' vihudei eiropah bimei habeinayim," in *Yehudim mul hazelav, gezerot tat"nu behistoriyah uvehistoriografiyah*, ed. Yom Tov Assis, Michael Toch, et al. (Jerusalem: 2000), 118–140. On the notion of conversion to Christianity as a form of adultery, see Ivan Marcus, "Kidush hashem beashkenaz vesipur R. Amnon memagenza," ibid., 142.

19. Yisrael Halpern, *Sefer hagevurah* (Tel Aviv: 1941), 64.

20. Both these cases are described by Christoph Cluse, "Stories of Breaking and Taking the Cross: A Possible Context for the Oxford Incident of 1268," *Revue d'Histoire Ecclesiastique* 90 (1995), 438–439.

21. Todd Endelman, *The Jews of Georgian England, 1714–1830* (Ann Arbor: 1999), 219–221; Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 223–224.

22. Quoted in Endelman, *The Jews of Georgian England*, 223–224.

23. Charles Macfarlane, *Constantinople in 1828*, vol. 1 (London: 1828), 115–116, quoted in Bernard Lewis, *The Jews of Islam* (Princeton: 1984). I thank Richard I. Cohen for bringing this passage to my attention.

24. Miss (Julia) Pardoe, *The City of the Sultan*, vol. 2 (London: 1837), 362–363.

25. Frederika Bremer, *Travels in the Holy Land*, trans. Mary Howitt (London: 1862), 1:181.

26. On this phenomenon, see Francis Haskell, *History and Its Images: Art and the Interpretation of the Past*, rev. ed. (New Haven: 1995), 60–67, 149–152, 266.

27. Bremer, *Travels in the Holy Land*, 1:181. Somewhat later during her stay, Bremer met a rabbi in Tiberias "who looked like a learned but not a good man" (ibid., 2:164). She also noted an Armenian patriarch with a "rigid cold glance" and "marble-like countenance" and "half-naked but armed" Arab men, "some with anxiety and wrath depicted on their countenances, others full of cheerfulness and eager for the fight" (ibid., 2:53, 87).

28. Elizabeth Butler, *Letters from the Holy Land* (London: 1903), 17.

29. Margaret Thomas, *Two Years in Palestine and Syria* (London: 1900), 37–38. See also ibid., 43, on Jews in the Sephardic synagogue of Jerusalem spitting on Thomas and other people with her, when they came to visit shortly before the Feast of Tabernacles.

30. Quoted in Martin Gilbert, *Jerusalem: Rebirth of a City* (London: 1985), 34–35.

31. W.H. Bartlett, *Jerusalem Revisited* (London: 1855), 27. The event described by Bartlett

may be identical with the one similarly described by the Finns in the same year, which took place, not coincidentally, on the day of Purim. See Arnold Blumberg, *The View from Jerusalem, 1849–1858: The Consular Diary of James and Elizabeth Ann Finn* (Rutherford: 1980), 125.

32. Ermete Pierotti, *Customs and Traditions of Palestine*, trans. T.G. Bonney (Cambridge: 1864), 28.

33. See Horowitz, "A 'Dangerous Encounter,' " 343–345.

34. Andrew Alexander Bonar and Robert Murray M'Cheyne, *Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland, in 1839* (Edinburgh: 1842), 365–366, 59.

35. Andrew Alexander Bonar, *A Commentary on Leviticus* (London: 1972), 489. The first edition appeared in 1846 and a fourth in 1861.

36. Bonar and M'Cheyne, *Narrative of a Mission*, 668. See also the report of another former Jew who had been a missionary in Amsterdam, many of whose Jews, he reported, "being rich and influential, are difficult to access, and bitter in opposition, while the meaner Jews do not hesitate to shew their dislike on the streets. On one occasion they beset his house and tried to raise a tumult" (ibid., 660).

37. Joseph Hoffman Cohn, *I Have Fought a Good Fight* (New York: 1953), 219.

38. Ibid., 42.

39. Horowitz, "Hazelav hadoker," 133–138.

40. Quoted in Joseph Siegman, *Jewish Sports Legends*, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: 2000), 51. On Choynski's career and its impact, see also Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 225–226 and Levine, *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field*, 147–148, 162–163.

41. On Attell's career (and suspension for corruption), see Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 232–234; Bodner, *When Boxing was a Jewish Sport*, appendix F.

42. Cited and quoted by Gilman, *Freud, Race, and Gender*, 42.

43. Quoted in *The New Yorker* (19 April 1999), 46.

44. Excerpts from Philipson's diaries were published under the title "Strangers to a Strange Land," in the *American Jewish Archives* 18 (Nov. 1966), 133–138. The passage quoted above (dated 25 Sept. 1905) appears on p. 137.

45. Ibid., 137–138. On the self-defense efforts of the Bund in the early years of the 20th century, including a 1903 policy statement declaring that "violence must be answered with violence," see Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson, "Self-Defense," in *Encyclopaedia Judaica*, 14:1 (pp. 1125–1126); Henry Tobias, *The Jewish Bund in Russia from Its Origins to 1905* (Stanford: 1972). See also the article by Ted Friedgut in this volume, esp. 49–50, 52–53.

46. See *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: 1993), s.v. "oat"; R.W. Holder, *A Dictionary of Euphemisms* (Oxford: 1995), 259, 346.

47. Solomon Schechter, *Seminary Addresses and Other Papers* (New York: 1960), 66; Samuel Kaufmann, *Zikhronot* (Tel Aviv: 1955), 14.

48. Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), 197. On various treatments of this story and its implications, see Kieval, "Imagining 'Masculinity' in the Jewish Fin de Siècle," 148–150.

49. Ross, *No Man Stands Alone*, 23–24.

50. Harold U. Ribalow and Meir Z. Ribalow, *The Jew in American Sports*, 4th ed. (New York: 1985), 148, 160; Robert Slater, *Great Jews in Sports*, rev. ed. (New York: 1992), 21, 159; Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 232–233.

51. Quoted in Bodner, *When Boxing was a Jewish Sport*, 2.

52. See Edward A. Ross, *The Old World in the New* (New York: 1914), 289–290, quoted in Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 229, 235. On Ross' overt antisemitism, see Dijktra, *Evil Sisters*, 221. On Rudolph/McCoy, see Siegman, *Jewish Sports Legends*, 59–60.

53. Quoted in Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (Chicago: 1928), 252–253.

54. *New Warheit*, quoted from the *Jewish Daily Bulletin* (where it was reprinted), in Levine, *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field*, 154.

55. Berkowitz, *The Jewish Self-Image*, 74–75.

56. Quoted in Ira Berkow, *Maxwell Street: Survival in a Bazaar* (New York: 1977), 142. On Finkelstein/Fields, see also Siegman, *Jewish Sports Legends*, 52.

57. Berkow, *Maxwell Street*, 145. Steven Riess has noted that, whereas as late as 1916, most

American contenders were either of Irish, German, or Italian background, "by 1928 Jews comprised the largest number of contenders, followed by Italians and Irish." Moreover, out of 49 champions in boxing's various weight categories during the 1920s, eight were Jews, in third place behind the Italians and Irish (each of whom had 12). During the following decade, 10 of the 60 world champion boxers were Jewish. See Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 234, 242.

58. Ribalow and Ribalow, *The Jew in American Sports*, 211–214.
59. Slater, *Great Jews in Sports*, 212; Riess, "A Fighting Chance," 246.
60. Philip Roth, *Patrimony: A True Story* (New York: 1991), 201–202.
61. Philip Roth, *The Facts* (New York: 1988), 28. See also Breines, *Tough Jews*, 23–24.
62. Roth, *The Facts*, 28.
63. Herbert Golden, *The Right Time: An Autobiography* (New York: 1969), 45.
64. Roth, *Patrimony*, 203–204. On Zwillman (whose real name was Abner), a prominent bootlegger who headed an ethnically heterogeneous gang composed of Jews and Italians, and whose clients included Seagram Distillers, see Albert Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America* (New York: 1980), 104, 115–116, 119, 121, 158, 193, 233, 239, 249; Jenna Weissman Joselit, *Our Gang: Jewish Crime and the New York Jewish Community, 1900–1940* (Bloomington: 1983), 93–97; Howard M. Sachar, *A History of the Jews in America* (New York: 1992), 348, 663.
65. Quoted in Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau, *Meyer Lansky: Mogul of the Mob* (New York: 1979), 184–186. See also Michael Berkowitz's article in this volume, 95–108.
66. Quoted in Howard Simons (ed.), *Jewish Times: Voices of the American Jewish Experience* (Boston: 1988), 133.
67. Ibid., 128.
68. Fritz Lenz, *Human Heredity*, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul (London: 1931), quoted in Kalman Bland, *The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual* (Princeton: 2000), 31–32. On Lenz, who served as editor of the *Archiv fur Rassen-und-Gesellschaftsbiologie* between 1913 and 1933, see also Robert Proctor, *Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1988), 48–55.
69. Christopher Isherwood, *Goodbye to Berlin: A Berlin Diary* (London: 1939), 294.
70. Bodner, *When Boxing was a Jewish Sport*, appendix B.
71. Quoted (from the *Detroit Jewish Chronicle*), in Levine, *Ellis Island to Ebbets Field*, 164.
72. Berkowitz, *The Jewish Self-Image*, 127–129.
73. George Orwell, "Revenge is Sour," *The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell*, vol. 4, *In Front of Your Nose*, 3–6, quoted in John Sack, *An Eye for an Eye: The Untold Story of Jewish Revenge against the Germans*, 2nd ed. (New York: 1995), 190. See also Robert Latzer, "Orwell's Jews," *Midstream* 46, no. 2 (2000), 38–39.
74. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew*, trans. George J. Becker (New York: 1948), 117. In the original French, the quote reads as follows: "Les Juifs sont les plux doux des hommes. Ils sont passionnément ennemis de la violence" (Sartre, *Reflexions sur la question juive* [Paris: 1946], 152–153.)
75. Albert Memmi, *Portrait of a Jew*, trans. Elisabeth Abbott (London: 1963), 62–63. On Memmi's book as a critical response to Sartre, see Susan Rubin Suleiman, "The Jew in Sartre's *Reflexions sur la question juive*: An Exercise in Historical Reading," in *The Jew in the Text: Modernity and the Construction of Identity*, ed. Linda Nochlin and Tamar Garb (London: 1995), 207.
76. Breines, *Tough Jews*, 8–13. Also see p. 242, n. 18, where it is evident that Breines originally chose a different subtitle that alluded to the original French title of Sartre's work.
77. Ibid., 49.
78. Ibid., xiv.

Jews, Violence, and the Russian Revolutionary Movement

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Late imperial Russia, even in the second half of the 19th century, was a violent, brutal, and arbitrary place. Both regime and society shared these characteristics. From the tsar-autocrat down, power was exercised without restraint, law was weak (and often ineffective where it existed), and relations within the regime, between the regime and its subjects, and often among subjects themselves, found expression in violent coercion rather than persuasion.

Throughout European Russia, for instance, there was a cultural phenomenon known as the *kulachnyi boi*, or fist fight—a massive, bare-knuckles, free-for-all that sometimes lasted for two or three days, often resulting in serious injuries and even deaths.[1] There was also widespread criminal activity, as richly depicted in Russian literature. Despite their picaresque detail, Isaac Babel's Odessa tales, which focus on Jewish ruffians, have an underlying layer of implied or actual violence.

But more relevant for the present discussion was the harsh relationship between the tsarist government and the people. The greater part of the public felt the heavy hand of tsarist authority, and the regime's unbridled cruelties, coupled with its aloofness from its subjects, engendered periodic violent uprisings that strained the entire social fabric. All disorder, whatever its origin and aim, was met by the regime with armed force. Mounted troops with knouts, sabers, and firearms were used to disperse crowds, and individuals who were arrested were publicly flogged as a deterrent. Such a flogging, for instance, was ordered by General Fyodor Trepov, the chief of police of St. Petersburg, against a young student accused of illegitimate political activity—despite a regulation exempting students from corporal punishment. The police chief's action enraged a young revolutionary woman named Vera Zasulich, who made a failed attempt on Trepov's life at the beginning of 1878. At her trial, she so impressed the jury with her condemnation of the regime's lawlessness that she was unexpectedly acquitted (and spirited abroad by friends before the authorities could rearrest her). Zasulich, a non-Jew, was an example and inspiration for numerous young revolutionaries, including many of Jewish origin.

In the eyes of revolutionaries, the pervasive violence of Russian society contained the potential for a new social order. Once stirred up and released, the people's anger, or so they believed, could be directed against the regime. Violence in some cases took

the form of pogroms against the Jews, but since most revolutionaries concurred in the widespread view that Jews in general were exploiters and interlopers in Russian society, they were willing at times to exploit anti-Jewish violence as a means of encouraging widespread popular disorder.

In September 1881, during the lengthy wave of pogroms that followed the assassination of Alexander II by members of the People's Will (Narodnaia vol'ia), the executive committee of that revolutionary group published a leaflet aimed at the Ukrainian peasantry that branded the Jews as bloodsuckers and oppressors and called on the people to revolt against "the tsar of the Jews and nobles" (*zhidovskii, panskii tsar'*). A similar if somewhat less inflammatory leaflet had been circulated by the quasi-Marxist Black Repartition group in June 1881, which urged workers and peasants to rise up against those authorities who had sided with the "kulaks and the Yids" in punishing those who had taken part in pogroms.[2] Yet Mendel Rosenboim, one of the founders of the League of Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) at the turn of the 20th century, described how he, "like most of the Jewish socialists of that period," shared the view of earlier Russian revolutionaries that pogroms signaled the beginning of a popular awakening that would end in social revolution. This belief, he explained, was a key to understanding the Russian and cosmopolitan tendencies of his fellow Jewish revolutionaries, who regarded members of the People's Will as their spiritual forerunners.[3] It took the horrors of the Kishinev pogrom in April 1903 for the SRs to pass a formal resolution condemning pogroms.

While the example of Jews supporting violence against Jews is extreme, it is part of a much wider phenomenon of Jewish participation in revolutionary movements. The extent of such participation, and the degree to which Jewish revolutionaries supported violence and terror against the Russian regime, is the focus of the following discussion.

Jews were deeply involved in all phases of the revolutionary movement in Russia. The first revolutionary street demonstration in Russia, in December 1876, was organized by a Jew—the future Socialist Revolutionary Mark Natanson—and was led, among others, by a 16-year-old Jewish girl named Felicia Sheftel.[4] Gesya Gelfman was one of those who took part in the assassination of Alexander II on March 1, 1881; because she was pregnant, she was the only one not executed.[5] Isaak Dembo (Brinstein) was part of a group, including Lenin's older brother, Alexander, who conspired to kill Alexander III in 1887. At the time of his death a year later (the outcome of a miscarried attempt to produce a small but powerful bomb), Dembo was engaged, together with two other Jewish revolutionaries named Rapoport and Gelfand, in an attempt to revive the People's Will organization.[6]

At its height in the years 1874–1881, the People's Will had a number of Jewish members, including several graduates of a clandestine circle of Vilna Jewish youth.[7] Aron Zundelevich played a key role in the group, smuggling illegal literature and organizing funds.[8] Another Jewish activist was Grigorii Goldenberg, who began his career in the nonviolent populist movement but later took part in terrorist actions, killing the governor of the Kharkov region in February 1879.[9] Goldenberg asked to be one of those assigned to throw a bomb at Alexander II. However, he was excluded from direct participation, the concern being that, should one of the assassins prove to be

Jewish, there was likely to be a wave of popular resentment against the People's Will.[10]

So prominent was the Jewish role in revolutionary activity that when Theodor Herzl visited Russia in 1903 to solicit the regime's support for the Zionist idea, the finance minister, Count Sergius Witte, asked him why the Jews, who were only a small minority of Russia's population, made up "half" of the revolutionaries. Herzl did not attempt to dispute this obviously inflated figure. Instead, he asked Witte for his own explanation, and Witte conceded that the Russian regime oppressed the Jews excessively. Similarly, Governor F.E. Keller of Ekaterinoslav province noted in one of his reports to the tsar (just before the 1905 revolution) that the reasons underlying Jewish radicalism

> are rather varied, and are, of course, at least partly connected to the abnormal situation of the Jewish question in present times, whether with respect to material or civic conditions whose cause is the exclusionary policies of the government toward the Jews, as well as by the peculiarities and institutional structures of the Jewish population, which, however strange it may seem to be, are supported by our legislation.[11]

Others were less understanding. A religious and cultural dislike of Jews permeated Russian society from top to bottom; indeed, resentment among Russian nationalists concerning the Jewish role in the revolutionary movement persists to the present day. In his recent book, *Dvesti let vmeste* (*Two Hundred Years Together*), Alexander Solzhenitsyn plays down the effect of the discriminatory laws against the Jews by bringing examples of how these were often circumvented, and essentially claims that the Jews were ungrateful and disloyal, as well as being foreign to the Russian spirit. In Solzhenitsyn's view, Jews, as an alien minority, should not have presumed to intervene in Russia's internal affairs and are certainly to be blamed for participating in such large numbers in the political revolution against the tsar—the father of the Russian people.[12]

Among Jews as well, there were various opinions regarding the Jewish role in the revolutionary movement. Different views were largely a function of their bearers' social, economic, and philosophical positions. For instance, at the beginning of the 20th century, there was a powerful group of Jews, many of them magnates of industry and finance, who had liberal and democratic views. They believed in the ultimate democratization of Russia and the integration of its Jewish citizens; despite their lack of love for the autocracy, they often regarded the revolutionaries as dangerous and harmful to the cause of reform. Jewish religious authorities, for their part, objected to the secular and assimilationist outlook of Jewish revolutionary activists, as well as to their violence. Among the wider Jewish public, however, there were many who applauded revolutionary activity as a means of exacting revenge for the myriad humiliations they endured.

Legal and economic restrictions weighed heavily on the greater part of Russia's Jewish population. True, growing numbers of Jews had been able to find their way into such "forbidden" cities as Moscow and St. Petersburg, entering there into commerce and industry, but residence in these centers, even for those with legal permits, was at best tenuous. Jews who sought higher education also faced obstacles. A numerus clausus imposed in 1887 restricted Jewish enrollment to between 3 and 10 per-

cent of the total student population (the percentage varied, depending on whether the institution was located at the center or the periphery). As a result, there were more Russian Jews studying abroad than in Russia.[13]

The roots of discrimination against Russian Jewry are found in the laws setting up the Pale of Settlement at the start of the 19th century.[14] These laws (which over time became increasingly restrictive) limited Jewish residence to market towns in 11 northwest provinces of the empire. Jews could neither own land nor live in villages. Nor could they engage in agriculture, except in specially designated Jewish agricultural colonies. The greater part of the Russian empire was thus off-limits to Jews, excepting those with special qualifications of capital or skills. Essentially, the Jews were marked as lesser beings, not fit to come into daily contact with the Russian people.

At the same time, Russia as a whole, and the Jews in particular, were undergoing a demographic boom as a result of improvements in diet and rural medical care. Between 1815 and 1917, Russia's annual population growth increased from 600,000 to more than 2,000,000 (in absolute figures, the population grew from 45 million to 170 million). In the same approximate period (1820–1910), the Jewish population of the Russian empire rose from approximately 1,600,000 to 5,600,000.[15] The growing population pressure within the restricted Pale of Settlement ensured deepening poverty. Although the Russian regime after 1881 was reluctant to consider integrationist solutions, it generally allowed free emigration. Consequently, driven by a combination of fear, hunger, and vague hopes of a better life elsewhere, more than 1,500,000 Jews left the Russian empire between 1880 and 1910—vastly more, it should be noted, than the few thousand Jews who took an active role in the revolutionary movement. [16]

Given this social, political, legal, and economic straitjacket, it is not surprising that many Russian Jews were deeply alienated from the Russian regime. Certainly the regime's discrimination against the Jews—along with the direct involvement of numerous officials, particularly at the local level, in anti-Jewish violence—gave young Jews a strong motive for political activism. Thus, Jews joined the revolutionary movement in numbers far exceeding their proportion of the population. The Jewish Bund, the first mass revolutionary party in the Russian empire, was far larger than the other Russian groupings with which it joined in 1898 to form the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Russia, and it remained one of the largest parties in Russia up until the First World War. In Bialystok, Jews formed the majority of the Black Banner anarchists, a small but active group dedicated to violent revolutionary struggle.[17] In Lodz, when widespread rioting broke out against the government in June 1905, police and soldiers killed 561 people—of whom 341 were Jews.[18] And of 167 anarchists and anarchist sympathizers who stood trial in Odessa in 1906–1907, one third bore distinctly Jewish names.[19]

Discrimination and violence against the Jews are not, however, the full explanation of the heavy Jewish involvement in violent revolutionary activity. Another important factor was secularism, which began to penetrate the Jewish Pale of Settlement in the latter half of the 19th century. As more and more young Jews studied in Russian *gymnasii* rather than in *yeshivot*, contact with the Russian intelligentsia increased. The universalism and secularism typical of Russian social thought in the late 19th century offered an attractive alternative to those Jewish youth who were frus-

trated and disenchanted not only with their position as a disenfranchised minority but also with what they regarded as the anachronistic demands and restrictions of Judaism. As a rule, Jewish revolutionaries and terrorists, largely estranged from Jewish tradition, sought a broader, more universalistic creed, whereas the more traditional and more conformist majority chose other alternatives such as emigration, business or professional advancement, or Zionism, or else remained passive.

In the last decades of the 19th century, alienated young Jews often turned first to the Russian populist movement, which sought to enlighten the peasants and reform the regime. In the summer of 1874, for instance, a group of young Russians "went to the people" to try and awaken an awareness of civic rights; not only were they unsuccessful, they were arrested and put on trial. Rejected by the peasants and repressed by the regime, many populists eventually turned to revolutionary movements, which generally believed in the necessity of force to bring about change. Thus, for example, in 1891, the chief of gendarmes in Ekaterinoslav province reported that a "S. Ya. Rapoport" had been observed "reading some sort of booklets to the peasants and workers, stories supposedly for the people's development and for the raising of their literacy," but dismissed this as harmless. [20] Rapoport, later to become famous as S. An-ski, the ethnologist and playwright who wrote *The Dybbuk*, was a populist. Subsequently, however, he was a founder of the Union of Socialists Revolutionaries and then a member of the SRs—which, as will be seen, was among the most violent of the revolutionary groups.

Within the Russian revolutionary movement there was an ongoing debate over terrorism and violence. The two categories were quite separate in the minds of Russian revolutionaries, and in almost all the movements there was discussion regarding their permissibility; some groups conceded the need for violence but disapproved of terrorism. By the very nature of revolution, however, even those who rejected both violence and terrorism occasionally made tactical exceptions.

Terrorism was a planned strategy based on an ideology of violence. It was embodied in attacks on institutions and individuals not necessarily for what they were, but as a means of demystifying the regime, removing its aura of sanctity, and undermining whatever confidence or fear might have kept the public obedient to it.[21] Each individual act of terror was part of an ongoing campaign to overturn the regime and the social structure on which it was based.

Terrorism also demanded a certain personality type. The weapons employed by the SR terrorists in the first years of the 20th century shifted from revolvers to bombs (which had already been widely used by the People's Will and by various anarchist groups), whose potential for collateral victims was far greater.[22] Both the choice of weapons and the choice of targets representing power centers of the regime—governors, ministers, police officials, and members of the royal family—meant that the terrorist had to be willing to sacrifice himself in order to assure the death of his target. The terrorist also had to be imbued with a messianic belief in the evil of the existing regime versus the good embodied in the vision of a socialist society: only such belief could justify the indiscriminate murder of those in the vicinity of the targets in the course of attacking the latter. Thus a "humane idealist" such as Ivan Kaliaev (known as the "comrade poet," he composed prayers praising "the Supreme Being" and declared his opposition to harming innocents) was able to grievously wound both the

coachman and himself in the course of his murdering the Grand Duke Sergei in 1905.[23]

The strict conspiracy necessary for the preparation and implementation of terror meant a severing of normal social ties. Jewish youth who joined groups of revolutionary terrorists were already in rebellion against the Russian society and regime, against their own society, and against their parents. Many of them, particularly those who were young and unburdened by family responsibilities, joined groups that offered an atmosphere of close conspiratorial comradeship as well as dramatic challenges. The adoption of terror as a political weapon, it should be noted, was not limited to anarchists or to those seeking to overthrow the tsar, but could be the preference of any group (there were many) among the "wretched of the empire." Jonathan Frankel presents the example of a socialist Zionist student group that openly advocated terror against local administrators, the antisemitic press, and all those who incited, supported, or perpetrated pogroms.[24]

As distinct from terrorism, violence was aimed at more immediate goals, usually within the context of a strike or a demonstration. As noted, although various organizations declared themselves opposed to violence as well as terrorism, they were willing to adopt it in extreme situations, most notably in the form of self-defense groups or the targeted assassination of police agents or traitors. Within the late 19th-century Russian Jewish community, violence and threats of violence by individual community members were not unknown as a means of avenging perceived injustices associated with the wealthy leadership of the *kahal*.[25] In addition, revolutionary violence in the context of strikes or self-defense groups was carried out in the name of social solidarity rather than as the sacrificial suicidal act of a terrorist.

According to Vera Figner, one of the veterans of revolutionary populism, Russian youths were "Bakuninist by temperament, Lavrovist by reason."[26] Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) represented the anarchism of destroying the old world down to its very foundations before laying the cornerstone of the new, and his theories of "direct action" offering immediate and visible results were highly seductive to alienated Russian youth. In contrast, Pyotr Lavrov (1823–1900) laid down the dictum that a well-developed mind was a revolutionary's most important piece of equipment. Lavrov's followers tended to believe in science and enlightenment alongside the use of force in the creation of a socialist society. Both trends were to be found among Russian Jewish revolutionaries as well.

Exemplifying the "Bakuninist" trend was Nissan Farber of Bialystok, who was a member of the *bezmotivniki* faction of the Black Banner anarchists (unlike the *kommunary* faction, which advocated terror as an organized campaign directed against the regime, the *bezmotivniki*, or "motiveless" anarchists, placed bombs in restaurants and hotel lobbies in an attempt to destabilize Russian society). He was a somewhat atypical Jewish revolutionary in that he spoke only Yiddish and knew nothing of Russian language or culture.[27] On one Yom Kippur, Farber stabbed and wounded a Jewish manufacturer, Avram Kogan, on the steps of a synagogue in protest against Kogan's breaking of a strike. The place and timing of the attack, as well as the target, were meant as an ideological statement. Farber was later a victim of one of his own bombs, which he was throwing into a police station to protest police repression of a revolutionary demonstration.[28] In contrast, the young An-ski was guided by a

Lavrovist approach in his summer of reading to the miners and peasants of the Donbass region.[29]

If the anarchists on the whole ardently embraced both violence and terror, declaring that "only enemies of the people can be enemies of terror,"[30] the Marxist Social Democrats came out firmly against terrorism and took a utilitarian attitude toward violence, placing their faith in the primacy of politics and on the need for rallying the masses against the institutions of both capitalism and autocracy.[31] The undisciplined violence (often fuelled by alcohol) of the Russian "peasant in the factory" was the bane of Social Democratic labor organizers.[32] Similarly, the Jewish Bund, a founding constituent of the Social Democratic Workers' Party of Russia in 1898, was strong in its opposition to terrorism despite all pressures and temptations to condone it. At the same time, the Bund's leadership was active in the formation and arming of self-defense units and in the assassination of police spies who had infiltrated the party's ranks.

In 1901, a resolution of the Bund's Fourth Congress banned all terrorist activity on the grounds that it discredited the labor movement, was harmful to the material situation of the workers, and dulled the Social Democratic consciousness of the working class.[33] Here was a clear ideological statement of reliance on education and organization of the masses in preference to the dramatic "propaganda of the deed" proposed by the anarchists. In the brutal context of Russia and in the highly mythologized atmosphere of the revolutionary movement, this was not an easy position to maintain. In fact, when the governor of Vilna, Viktor von Wahle, ordered the flogging of several dozen youths for their participation (as Bund supporters) in a workers' demonstration on May Day 1902, the Bund leadership took half a step back, declaring that individual Bund members' participation in any revenge attempt would be considered their own private affair; that is, not an infringement of movement discipline. Shortly thereafter, a young Jew, Hirsh Leckert, attempted to assassinate the governor, was apprehended, and was executed. In the eyes of Mendel Rosenboim, a Socialist Revolutionary, Leckert's action, though unsuccessful, "removed the stain of shame from the Bund and from the Jews." Numerous Bundists concurred in their hearts, despite the party's ruling. Nonetheless, the next Bund Congress reaffirmed the absolute ban on terror passed in 1901.[34]

The Bund's position did not sit well with many of the younger recruits to its ranks. In some centers, notably Bialystok, anarchist groups benefited from a mass defection of Bundists. Meanwhile, in other Social Democratic circles, a similar debate on terror persisted, despite various official stands on the issue. In 1903, in the New Russia Steel Factory in the settlement of Iuzovka, Rozalia Paperno (a Menshevik) had an ongoing debate with others who advocated using terror against tyrannical foremen and bosses.[35] In Rostov, a letter from the local Social Democratic group to a comrade in prison praised the 1904 assassination of the tsar's hated minister of the interior, Count Vyacheslav von Plehve. "First of all, it will stimulate mass activism, and that is good for the party," the letter-writers (many of whom, judging by their names, were Jewish) wrote. "The comrades are shouting Hurrah!"[36] Although members of this group were nominally Social Democrats and faithfully read every issue of the Bolshevik *Iskra* that reached them, the attitudes expressed in this letter are purely Socialist Revolutionary.

The ebb and flow of the debate on terror depended to no small degree on the politics of the period. Zeev Ivianskii writes that in mid-1906, as the reaction against the democratic gains of the 1905 revolution gathered momentum, a ubiquitous "dynamite craze" swept the revolutionary movement. The Bund Central Committee debated (and rejected) a suggestion by one of its members that the organization should threaten to blow up the entire city of Bialystok—or at least its government buildings.[37]

In addition to its ban on terrorism, the Jewish Bund also opposed the use of spontaneous violence, whether political or economic: in the Marxist view, only the enlightened self-discipline of the working class could give it unity and thus hasten the collapse of the autocracy and capitalism.[38] Yet such rhetoric often could not hold out against the inevitable situations in which strikes became violent. In some places, anarchists would dynamite factories or attempt to sabotage production by such actions as blowing up ovens or pouring kerosene into bread dough.[39] Nor were the workers passive. Strikebreakers were beaten and nonstrikers were often driven from the factories under a hail of stones that smashed the windows, creating an atmosphere of terror.[40] Strikes in Jewish-owned industries with Jewish workers were no different. Here, too, the younger workers joined forces with the less-educated workers (who were most likely to be employed in the lowest-paid, unskilled tasks). Bearing most directly the brunt of employer and regime brutality, they tended to respond in kind, despite the strictures of their leaders. Bund leaders had no choice but to turn a blind eye to the workers' violation of party doctrine, or else run the risk that these new proletarians would defect to competing—and more militant—groups of anarchists or Socialist Revolutionaries.

One of the two exceptions to the Social Democrats' prohibition of violence was the treatment of police agents discovered within their organizations. All groups agreed that informers' lives were forfeit. (A leaflet in Yiddish circulated by Vilna anarchists, for instance, proclaimed: "Down with provocateurs and spies. . . . Long live terror against bourgeois society!"[41]) Perhaps the most notorious of police agents in the Russian revolutionary movement was Yonah Meir Fishelevich Azef, better known under his party name of Yevno (Yevgenii) Azef. The son of an impoverished Jewish family, Azef grew up despising the religious traditions of Judaism.[42] After the arrest of Grigorii Gershuni, the first head of the SR battle group, in 1903, Azef assumed command and remained in that position for five years, simultaneously planning assassinations and denouncing as "dangerous revolutionaries" such comrades as Efim Levitt, a veteran of the "People's Will" who was active in the SR party.[43] Exposed as a police agent in 1908, when he was already a member of the SR Central Committee and privy to all party secrets, Azef was condemned to death by the party, but escaped to Germany, dying of natural causes in 1918.[44]

Another Socialist Revolutionary, Moshe Novomeysky (later founder and head of the Dead Sea potash works in Palestine), found himself under arrest under circumstances that clearly indicated betrayal from within. Saved from jail by the 1905 revolution, he reported his suspicions to the party leaders. When one of the two suspects was shown to be the police agent, the party sent a team led by Boris Savinkov, the future head of the battle group; the agent was stabbed to death in front of his parents in their home in Warsaw.[45] Novomeysky, the son of an engineer, who grew up in Siberia,

saw terror as a legitimate means of political warfare against an autocratic regime that allowed its citizens no other form of protest.[46]

The issue of "self-defense" constituted a different category of violence. Jewish self-defense groups were originally the initiative of a student committee in Odessa in 1881, following the wave of pogroms that swept southern Russia after the assassination of Alexander II.[47] This was followed by the establishment of a similar organization in Balta in southern Ukraine the following year that was (quite naturally) disarmed by the police as soon as its weapons were discovered. Self-defense organizations were essentially an expression of the Jewish perception that there could be no relying on the authorities or the law in Russia to protect Jewish lives and property, and indeed, that the authorities often aided and abetted anti-Jewish violence. For most Jews, Russia was a society in which "might makes right," and the only effective law was the Hobbesian "war of all against all."[48]

Self-defense groups were originally established to safeguard the party's meetings and demonstrations against rival organizations or the authorities, and only later in defense of the community as a whole against pogroms. The latter was problematic, since it involved the uniting of various groups, the illegal acquisition of arms, and the training of youth in the use of these arms. Such activities almost inevitably came to the knowledge of the *Okhrana*, the tsarist security police, spurring the regime's efforts to put down the revolutionaries. In addition, it raised the anxiety level and tone of protest in Russia's antisemitic press. On the eve of the October 1905 Manifesto, when social tension in Russia was at its zenith, the conservative and nationalist newspaper *Novoe vremia* published an article under the headline "Mania of Revolt," accusing the Jews throughout the Pale of Settlement of threatening general bloody revolt against the government. The Jews were said to be learning the use of firearms, preparing bombs, and threatening violent death to Russians.[49]

Solzhenitsyn, for his part, writes of a rumor that 300 Jews of the Zhitomir self-defense force gathered in April 1905 outside the city and practiced their shooting, using a picture of the tsar as a target. Two weeks before the pogrom that took place in May, he adds, the official government newspaper, *Pravitel'stvennyi vestnik*, published this rumor as fact.[50] It was actually the growing fear of pogroms that caused Jews to form defense groups. Yet in periods of extreme tension, given the lack of communication and empathy between the non-Jewish and Jewish populations across Russia, the attempt to enhance the security of the Jewish community sometimes led to tragic results.

Such was the case, for example, in the settlement of Iuzovka in the Donetsk Basin, "the kingdom of coal and of steel." This was a raw and rapidly growing industrial development—a British-owned company town with a population of Russian workers and a Jewish mercantile and service sector.[51] At the time of the 1905 revolution, the population of the settlement was approximately 25,000, of whom some 80 percent were Russians and perhaps 10 percent were Jews. Throughout 1905, tensions had run high in Iuzovka, and during the summer there had been recurrent threats of a pogrom. The threats were staved off by the combined efforts of the factory administration and the commercial and cultural elite of the settlement, all of whom were well aware of the huge losses that the settlement had suffered in a previous pogrom during the cholera epidemic of 1892.[52]

Notwithstanding such efforts, a Jewish self-defense group of 150 people was formed and clandestinely armed. When the October Manifesto was proclaimed, the crowd of 1,000 who gathered for a public celebration was predominantly Jewish and socialist, with flags of the Social Democrats, anarchists, and Poalei Zion. Conspicuous by their absence were the Russian workers of the New Russia steel mill and coal mines. A delegation of young enthusiasts, red banners flying, went to inform the workers that the day was a holiday and that they should be out celebrating. Enraged by what they saw as an assault on the tsar's prerogatives and an insult to his person, the conservative Russian workers bombarded the radical demonstrators with lumps of coal and iron. A member of the Poalei Zion self-defense named Persin drew his revolver and fired into the advancing mass of workers. The response was a three-day pogrom that resulted in a dozen or more deaths (four of them from the self-defense unit), the burning of the synagogue, the destruction of much of the Jewish residential and commercial property in the settlement, and looting by the peasants of nearby villages. Only on the third day, in response to a telegram from the factory director (in which he asked for assistance in putting down "the armed uprising of the Jewish population") did police and army units restore order.[53]

This sequence of events—a pogrom provoked by an act of violence on the part of a Jewish self-defense force—was certainly unusual, though not unknown. The intervention of self-defense units may have restricted property damage, but some scholars have argued that it often led to a higher level of violence in the course of pogroms.[54] The fear of provoking the unrestrained wrath of both the mob and the authorities was foremost in the minds of many, particularly the older, less radical, and more religious Jews, as well as those belonging to commercial elites—who feared not only the hatred of the Russians, but also the impetuous violence of radical Jewish youth. This may be one reason why Jewish self-defense units existed in only a third of the localities devastated by the wave of pogroms that took place between 1903 and 1906.[55] In addition, the presence of a strong Bund or Poalei Zion organization, and preferably both, also appears to have been a prerequisite for the establishment of Jewish self-defense forces, and in many Jewish locales these organizations were either minuscule or nonexistent.

On some occasions, it is true, self-defense proved to be effective. In the summer of 1903, following the Kishinev pogrom, the Bund and Poalei Zion in Gomel organized, armed, and trained a force of 200 fighters for the protection of the local Jewish community. When a pogrom was attempted that autumn, the defense force repelled the rioters, limiting the damage inflicted on the community. Moreover, when the police intervened to disarm them, the Jewish self-defense forces unhesitatingly engaged the army and police as well.[56] In Zhitomir, in May 1905, the Bund-organized self-defense force was able to limit Jewish losses in a pogrom to 29 killed and 150 wounded (significantly less than in Kishinev, where two years earlier, 47 Jews had died).

Perhaps the most successful self-defense force was that organized by the Bund, Poalei Zion, and Jewish students, in full coordination with Russian socialist workers' groups, in Ekaterinoslav during the 1905 revolution. That autumn, a full-scale civil war raged in the city. Along with the Russian socialist groups, the Jewish self-defense forces succeeded, in large measure, in defending both the Jewish areas and the workers' residential quarter from arson and looting, driving off those who incited pogrom

violence, and confiscating booty from those who had succeeded in attacking Jewish property.[57]

Of all the political groups active in Russia in the years between the 1905 and the 1917 revolutions, the Socialist Revolutionaries carried violence and terror furthest. In the years 1906–1907, they were responsible (together with Russian anarchists) for the death of some 4,000 people, although they themselves lost a similar number in the merciless war waged against revolutionaries by Prime Minister Pyotr A. Stolypin, himself later a victim of terrorist assassination.[58] The SR battle group was set up in 1901, after Mendel Rosenboim recruited an expert in explosives, Grigorii Gershuni (who had previously formed his own group, the Workers' Party for the Political Liberation of Russia). Numerous Jews were active in the SR battle group in addition to Gershuni (and later, Azef). Rosenboim recounts his own service as a courier for the group, carrying two pistols and cartridges from Vilna to Dvinsk for the assassination of a provincial governor. It was then, he wrote, that he realized the difference between propagandizing the ideology of terror and actually taking part in a terrorist operation. Nonetheless, he felt no hesitation in carrying out his assignment.[59] Others mentioned in various accounts include Dora Brilliant (who served as a bomb-maker) and such central figures as Abram Rafaelovich Gots, son of a wealthy Moscow merchant, who served 11 years in exile for his activities in the battle group, returning in 1917 to participate in the SR leadership. After the Bolshevik revolution, he helped organize SR resistance to the Soviet government. He was arrested, released to work in Soviet institutions, then rearrested in 1936 and executed a year later.

Perhaps the most interesting of the Jews active in the SR battle group was Pinchas Rutenberg. According to various descriptions, he was a person who exuded strength and passion, with burning eyes, a well-developed physique, and a bull neck that supported a head seemingly chiseled out of granite.[60] Rutenberg was typical of those Jewish youth who had rebelled against the narrow confines of Jewish life in order to dedicate themselves to a cause that seemed larger and more urgent: the freeing of Russia and all its peoples from the yoke of autocracy. As a student in the St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute, and later as an engineer in the huge Putilov Metallurgical Combine, he became involved in various clandestine socialist groups. These were not party-affiliated groups, although they tended to support the Social Democrats. However, a considerable number of the younger members, among them Rutenberg, were attracted by the activism of the SRs and were gradually drawn into that party's terrorist activities.[61]

It was the 26-year-old Rutenberg who, on January 9, 1905, shielded Father Gapon during the protest demonstration that later became known as Bloody Sunday, when police fired into the crowd. Father Gapon, an Orthodox priest, had organized the Union of Russian Workers. He had done this, however, with the blessing of the police; when his police activities became known, the SRs decided to take revenge. On March 28, 1906, Rutenberg and three others strangled Father Gapon. Fleeing Russia, Rutenberg remained in exile until mid-1917, when he returned to Petersburg as an adviser to Alexander Kerensky, who had just been named prime minister. In October 1917, Rutenberg was one of a three-man council of public safety in St. Petersburg who suggested to Kerensky, a few days before the Bolshevik seizure of power, that

both Lenin and Trotsky should be shot immediately, ignoring the fact that Lenin was in hiding at the time.

Rutenberg left Russia soon after the Bolsheviks took power, emigrating to Palestine, where he went on to found the Palestine Electric Company, initiating the building of the first hydroelectric station in the region. "There he showed what he was capable of creating," concludes Solzhenitsyn in his own very particular approach to Russian Jewish history. "In his earlier years in Russia, he did no engineering, but only destroyed. We won't follow the later fate of this 'student of Zion' who irresponsibly stirred up the senseless Sveaborg uprising [Bloody Sunday] while himself successfully slipping out of the mass slaughter."[62]

Although liberal democrats by definition did not directly support terrorism, as time went by, they accorded less and less legitimacy to the autocratic regime. When the tsar violated the spirit of the October Manifesto, they declared civil disobedience, calling on the public to refuse to pay taxes. During the 1905 revolution, moreover, there were instances in which liberal supporters of the Constitutional Democrats participated in workers' actions against factory owners.[63] For Jewish liberals, the crisis came earlier and was even more painful. With the Kishinev pogrom in 1903, both Ahad Ha'am and Simon Dubnow put aside their qualms regarding the illegal acquisition and use of firearms and called publicly for the establishment of Jewish self-defense groups. And when a Jew named Pinchas Dashevsky stabbed the antisemitic publisher Pavolaki Krushevan, whose newspapers had been in large part responsible for inciting the Kishinev pogrom, Menachem Ussishkin—certainly no radical—praised Dashevsky as "one who fought for freedom and justice for the Jews, rather than beseeching or bribing."[64] The brutality and contempt for law of Russian society in general, and the autocratic regime in particular, was such that it shifted the boundaries of normal conduct within which most people led their lives.

The discussion until now has focused on the legal, social and economic conditions that particularly promoted Jewish involvement in terror and violence in all degrees and attitudes—from the anarchist *bezmotivniki* infected by the Bakuninist ethos of nihilist destruction, to liberal democratic condoning of violence carried out by others as a means of avenging outrages perpetrated against the Jews. Along with other subjects of the Russian empire, Jews were swept up in the culture of violence and brutality that existed alongside Russia's flourishing culture of music, ballet and literature.

Yet revolution and violence were largely a passion of youth. With adulthood, there often came a realization of the futility and the evil that accompanied revolutionary struggle. Some, like Emma Goldman, sought a new and purer revolution to support. Others, like Mendel Rosenboim, one of the founders of the Union of Socialists Revolutionaries (forerunner of the party of the same name), looked back wistfully on their youth, musing: "The terrorist war was, after all, in vain. The evil was not uprooted, it remained unchanged."[65] Others were inoculated from earliest childhood against violence whether by state or society. Isaiah Berlin, for example, was a child of eight in March 1917, when he saw a mob dragging away a terrified tsarist policeman. The impression made on the young boy was so deep that even through the interwar years at Oxford, when so many of his contemporaries and colleagues admired Stalin's Soviet

regime, he maintained his abhorrence of physical violence and his preference for regimes that, no matter how compromising, maintained a safe political order.[66]

The majority of revolutionaries went on to a new and different life, each carrying some part of the baggage of an earlier consciousness. Mania Shochet-Wilbushevich, after a revolutionary career and a period of flirtation with the reformist ideas of the tsarist police official Sergei Zubatov, came to Palestine and gained recognition as part of the early Jewish self-defense in the country.[67] (Frankel notes that both the conspiratorial organizational style and the alacrity with which the Bar Giora group and its successor, Hashomer, bore and used firearms, had their roots in the Jewish self-defense groups in the Russian empire.[68]) Pinchas Rutenberg, as noted, came to Palestine and founded the Palestine Electric Company. However, he was also associated with armed resistance to Arab anti-Jewish rioting both in 1920 and 1929; in one reported account, he used a pistol to beat off a Bedouin attack on a group of travelers.[69] The realization of heroic visions was not a universal fate of the young revolutionaries. Emma Ridnik, who had played a leading role in the early Iuzovka revolutionary groups, was jailed after the pharmacist Markovich betrayed her to the police, and "began to have doubts, perhaps of a nationalist character, perhaps other. In America she became a good housewife."[70] A multitude of other revolutionaries also emigrated, either leaving revolution behind them or else transferring their activities to Western Europe or North America. Still others, unable to live without the tension of revolutionary conspiracy, either went mad or committed suicide in exile or in countries to which they had emigrated.[71]

Violence is a social and cultural characteristic that varies with individual personalities along with differing groups and environments. Though attempts have been made to present violence as "American as apple pie," as "Russian as vodka," or as "Jewish as chicken soup," it is none of these. It is conditioned by the life cycle, by education, and by societal circumstances. Because late imperial Russia embraced a high level of arbitrariness and violence, many people in opposition to the regime saw themselves as having no alternative but violent resistance. This perception affected Jews perhaps even more than most Russians, but as we have seen, affected different individuals in different ways, with highly disparate results.

Notes

1. For a description and analysis of the phenomenon of mass brawling, see Daniel R. Brower, "Labor Violence in Russia in the Late 19th Century," *Slavic Review* 41, no. 3 (Fall 1982), 417–431.

2. The full text of the People's Will pamphlet is found in *Katorga i ssylka* 48 (1928), 50–52. The Black Repartition leaflet is cited in Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste* (Moscow: 2001), 190.

3. Mendel M. Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner* (Tel Aviv: 1935), 55; see also Anna Geifman, *Revoliutsionnyi terror v Rossii, 1894–1917* (Moscow: 1997), 66.

4. See Vera Broido, *Apostles into Terrorists: Women and the Revolutionary Movement in the Russia of Alexander II* (New York: 1977), 129. See also Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 215.

5. See Broido, *Apostles into Terrorists*, 142. Gelfman died in prison of peritonitis in February 1882, four months after giving birth to a daughter.

6. See Zeev Ivianskii, *Hateror haishi* (Tel Aviv: 1977), 178.

7. According to Solzhenitsyn, there were 10 to 12 Jews in the People's Will. See idem, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 229.

8. See Yehuda Erez, "Aron Zundelevich: yehudi 'amami bazameret hanarodnikim," in *Yehudim batenu'ot mahapekhaniyot*, ed. Eli Shaltiel (Jerusalem: 1983), 64. According to Erez, Zundelevich was also privy to discussions regarding the possibility of assassinating the tsar.

9. See Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge: 1981), 45, where he names Vladimir Yokhelson, Abram Magot, and Lazer Tsukerman as additional Jewish members of the People's Will movement. Aron Liberman, a pioneer of Jewish socialism who had escaped to London when the police uncovered the group of Jewish revolutionary youth in Vilna, declared at one point that he, too, was returning to Russia to join the People's Will, but never did so. On Liberman, see ibid., 24–48. On Goldenberg's earlier populist activity, see Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, vol. 2, *Politics and Revolution in Russia's Donbass, 1869–1924* (Princeton: 1994), 53.

10. See Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 224–225; Erez, "Yehudi 'amami bazameret hanarodnikim," 60–62. Goldenberg was eventually apprehended by the police while in possession of a large quantity of dynamite, intended for use in an abortive attempt on the tsar's life.

11. Central State Archive of the October Revolution (Moscow) (Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii; hereafter: Ts.GAOR), F.DP, OO, d.4, chast' 18, lit. G, 1898–1904.

12. See Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, throughout which this message is a subtext, esp. ch. 6, and particularly 238–242.

13. See Abram L. Sachar, *A History of the Jews* (New York: 1966), 318. Between 1905 and 1907, the number of Jews enrolled in institutions of higher education doubled, reaching 4,266, and Jews accounted for 12 percent of all the students—an impressive figure. However, this number represented less than 1 in a thousand of Russia's total Jewish population during that time. See *Kratkaia Evreiskaia Entsiklopediia* (Jerusalem: 1994), 7:348.

14. For a detailed discussion of the rationale and development of Russia's laws concerning the Jews, see Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets* (New York: 1987), ch. 2–4.

15. For general population figures, see Nicholas Riazonovsky, *A History of Russia*, 2nd ed. (London: 1969), 383, 498. For Jewish population figures, see Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets*, 64.

16. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets*, 73.

17. See Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* (Princeton: 1967), 44. At its peak, the Black Banner numbered between 200–300 members, who were unusually young—ranging in age from 15–20 years old.

18. See John D. Klier and Shlomo Lambroza (eds.), *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History* (Cambridge: 1992), 223.

19. See Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists*, 68 (n. 120).

20. Ts.GAOR, Fond DP, d. 44, ch. 7, p. 1, 1891.

21. See Ivianskii, *Hateror haishi*, 7, 12ff.

22. See Anna Geifman, *Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution* (Wilmington: 2000), 61, on the decision to employ bombs and other explosive devices in place of revolvers for political assassinations, despite the danger this posed to the assassins as well as to innocent bystanders.

23. Ibid., 71.

24. See Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 280. The embracing of terror is found in the group's program, "Nashie zadachi," which appeared in *Vozrozhdenie*, no. 1 (1904).

25. See Ezra Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the Jewish Workers' Movement in Tsarist Russia* (Cambridge: 1979), 27–28.

26. See Broido, *Apostles into Terrorists*, 101.

27. See Geifman, *Revoliutsionnyi terror v Rossii*, 91.

28. See Avrich, *Russian Anarchists*, 42ff; Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 409 (Solzhenitsyn refers to him as "Nisel' Farber").

The activities of Jewish anarchist groups were not confined to the larger urban centers but encompassed as well the market towns throughout the Pale of Settlement. In these towns, small anarchist circles sprang up, smuggling literature and weapons into Russia and attacking provincial government officials and property owners. Other movements such as the SRs and Poale Zion also enjoyed the support of shtetl youth. For a number of vivid descriptions of border crossings, see Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner*, passim. On anarchist organizations in the shtetl, see Avrich, *Russian Anarchists*, 43. Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste* repeatedly emphasizes the Jewish involvement in smuggling (passim, esp. 222–223).

29. For An-skii's account of his year among the workers and peasants, see the first two issues of the populist publication *Russkoe bogatstvo* (1892).

30. See Avrich, *Russian Anarchists*, 60.

31. For the development of Marxist thought in Russia and its polemics with the People's Will and other populist and anarchist proponents of terror, see Leonard B. Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (London: 1963), 6–16.

32. For a discussion of the Social Democrats' struggle with the phenomenon of workers' riots, see Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, 2:95ff.

33. See Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale*, 131.

34. See Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner*, 219; Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale*, 131–132.

35. See Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, 2:66–67.

36. State Archive of Rostov Region (Rostov on the Don) (Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rostovskoi Oblasti), F. 826, op. 2, d.7 (p. 23). Richter was evidently Jewish, as were a number of the members of the circle. The copy of the letter in the Rostov archive is part of a detailed series of daily reports by a police agent in the group regarding every plan and discussion that the Social Democrats held.

37. See Ivianskii, *Hateror haishi*, 179.

38. For a reasoned exposition of the Bund's opposition to violence in strikes or in political activities, see *Posledniia izvestiia*, no. 162 (Dec. 1904).

39. See Avrich, *Russian Anarchists*, 47.

40. See examples in Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, 2:103–111. For comments on the Jewish labor scene showing it to be essentially the same, see Mendelsohn, *Class Struggle in the Pale*, 102. Attacks on the factory by strikers, such as the smashing of windows, often provided the more timid workers, who were afraid to strike formally, with a legitimate excuse for leaving work.

41. Quoted in Avrich, *Russian Anarchists*, 47.

42. In his memoirs, the rabbi of Moscow, Yaacov Mazeh, relates that he was a neighbor of Azef. When Azef's son was born, the grandfather of the baby asked the rabbi to broach the subject of circumcision. Azef, the rabbi wrote, subjected him to a tirade on the stupidity of such barbaric rituals. See Leonid Praisman, "Fenomen Azefa," in B. Iu. Ivanov and A.B. Roginskii (eds.), *Individual'nyi politicheskii terror v Rossii, XIX-nachalo XX v.* (Moscow: 1996), 65–75.

43. See Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner*, 110. Also see Geifman, *Entangled in Terror*, which presents the argument (present in some of her earlier work as well) that Azef never took part in planning or executing SR terror operations. Others refute her claims; see, for instance, Praisman, "Fenomen Azefa," 65–66.

44. See Moshe A. Novomeysky, *My Siberian Life* (London: 1956), 147.

45. Ibid., 187.

46. Ibid., 124.

47. See Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 54. See also Klier and Lambroza (eds.), *Pogroms*, 192. Klier and Lambroza give the Bund credit for initiating Jewish self-defense after pogroms in Chestokova and Kishinev, but the Bundists must have had a previous model to work from: Frankel's evidence regarding self-defense groups in Odessa and Balta in the early 1880s antedates the Bund's existence by some 14 years.

48. Although there were many different currents of opinion in the Jewish community of Russia in the years under review, a reading of the liberal democratic Jewish newspaper *Novyi*

put, which began to publish after the February 1917 revolution, shows clearly with what abhorrence the tsarist regime was regarded even by nonrevolutionary Jewish groups. Solzhenitsyn finds this a grievous fault bordering on hypocrisy. See *Dvesti let vmeste*, 240.

49. *Novoe vremia*, 2 Sept. 1905.

50. See Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 365.

51. For a detailed analysis of the social, political, and economic development of Iuzovka from its founding in 1869 until the mid-1920s, see Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, vol. 1, *Life and Work in Russia's Donbass, 1869–1924* (Princeton: 1989), and ibid., vol. 2.

52. See Theodore H. Friedgut, "Labor Violence and Regime Brutality in Tsarist Russia: The Iuzovka Cholera Riots of 1892," *Slavic Review* 46, no. 2 (Summer 1987), 245–265.

53. See Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution* 2:150–154. A contemporary source is the newspaper *Voskhod*, nos. 47–48 (1 Dec. 1905).

54. See, for example, Klier and Lambroza (eds.), *Pogroms*, 198–199; see also Charters Wynn, *Workers, Strikes, and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870–1905* (Princeton: 1992), 207.

55. Klier and Lambroza (eds.), *Pogroms*, 218.

56. Ibid., 209, 223, 341. According to Solzhenitsyn, on August 29, 1903, a dispute arose between a Jewish herring vendor and a Russian peasant, at which point a number of Jews attacked the peasant. When his friends came to the rescue, a large crowd of armed Jews carried out a pogrom against the Russians. Only on September 1 did the Russians respond in kind, then found themselves thwarted by the police and by soldiers who separated the warring sides. See Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 340–342.

57. See Mendel Osherovich, *Shtet un Shtetlekh in Ukraine*, vol. 1 (New York: 1948), 106. See also Abraham Ascher, *The Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray* (Stanford: 1988), 218. According to Ascher, barricades were erected in the city's streets; in three days of fighting, 28 people were killed.

58. The figures are given by Avrich in *Russian Anarchists*, 64; he does not differentiate between the two groups.

59. See Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner*, 224–225.

60. See Eli Shaltiel, *Pinḥas Rutenberg: 'aliyato unefilato shel "ish ḥazak" beerez yisrael, 1879–1942* (Tel Aviv: 1990), 1:15. This two-volume work is the definitive biography of Rutenberg.

61. Ibid., 1:24.

62. Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 360.

63. On the participation of an engineer and a doctor—both of them members of the Constitutional Democratic party—in the strike committee of a factory in 1905, see Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution*, 2:158.

64. Quoted in Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 163–164, 278.

65. Rosenboim, *Zikhronotov shel sozialist-revoliuzioner*, 9.

66. See Nicholas Ignatieff, *Isaiah Berlin: A Life* (Toronto: 2000), 24.

67. On the psychologically revealing episode of Zubatov's influence on Wilbushevich, see David Zaslavsky, "Zubatov i Mania Wilbushevich," *Byloe*, no. 3 (31), (March 1918), 110ff.

68. See Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 295.

69. See Shaltiel, *Pinhas Rutenberg*, 1:16.

70. Ts.GAOR, F. 7952, op. 6, d. 120, p. 9 (memoirs of Bondareva). Bondareva notes that Ridnik's family were Zionists. The signature of Ridnik appears on numerous documents of the Iuzovka Zionist group of that time.

71. See Solzhenitsyn, *Dvesti let vmeste*, 224–226, for a long list of Jewish revolutionaries who fell into these categories.

Speaking of the Devil in Yiddish Literature

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The escalation of violence against the Jews of Europe from the closing decades of the 19th century to their mass destruction is coterminous with the rise of modern Yiddish literature. Many of the same circumstances that fueled the one—demographic, political, socioeconomic, ideological—also inspired the other. The result was a literature that reflected the conditions under which it was being created. Yiddish writers were no more eager to confront antisemitism (a term coined at the start of both these developments) than were the rest of the Jews at whom the aggression was aimed, yet the concurrence of these phenomena left the writers no choice but to confront its impact. What distinguished this hostility from other incidents and trends the Yiddish writer might have been expected to deal with was its incursion from the outside as a frightening, foreign imposition. To the extent that one can generalize, Yiddish literature began modestly, confining itself to the spheres it inhabited and knew. Inspired by Jewish life, it did not readily fathom the intentions of those who tried to extinguish it. But willingly or not, it took note of events and reacted in varied ways to the assaults against its speakers. This is an attempt to describe how writers of successive generations admitted the unbidden subject into their work.

Sholem Yankev Abramovitch, commonly regarded as the first major genius of modern Yiddish (and arguably also of Hebrew) prose, began as a critic of Jewish society with no discernible interest in addressing the problems of Russia at large. Abramovitch's early fiction, written under the pen name Mendele Moykher Sforim, moves within an entirely Jewish sphere, whether in village, town, or city. His first fully realized Yiddish novel, *Fishke der krumer: a mayse fun yidishe oreme-layt* (*Fishke the Lame: A Story of Jewish Beggars*; 1869), is a study of Jewish beggary that awakens sympathy for the unfortunates in Russia's Pale of Settlement—along with anger at the Jews who tolerate its conditions.[1] Mendele, the fictitious itinerant bookseller who stands in for the author as narrator of the work, meets up on the road with a colleague, Alter Yaknehoz, who is, like him, trying to peddle his wares in Jewish towns and villages. As the two men trade stories about mismatched couples, Mendele tells of Fishke, a bathhouse attendant, whom the town benefactors married off to a local blind woman because they refused to let the wedding feast they had donated go to waste when her intended husband absconded on the day of the wedding. By the logic of fiction, the two men then meet up with the same Fishke, fleeing from the band of beggar-thieves his wife had persuaded him to join.

From this point on, the frame story of the booksellers is intertwined with the sentimental story of the handicapped beggar. Fishke recounts how he became an unlikely romantic hero in trying to rescue a hunchbacked girl from the same band of beggars. In good melodramatic fashion, this hunchbacked girl whom the beggars shanghaied is revealed to be Alter's abandoned daughter. The novel comes to its formal (and moral) climax when Alter assumes the responsibilities he had once discarded, repenting of his earlier neglect by joining Fishke in the search to rescue his long-suffering child.

The only mention of "goyim" in this original version is a well-known ditty that Mendele sings as he and Alter lie in the meadow: "Af dem grinem barg / af dem hoykhn groz / shteyen a por daytshn / mit di lange baytshn" ("On the green mountain / in the tall grass / stand a pair of Germans / with long whips").[2] Apart from that single reference, the narrative moves through an all-Jewish landscape, including Odessa, which Fishke reaches in his travels. The dominant theme in this treatment of beggary is the mismanaged institution of marriage, as exemplified both by the stories each man tells and by the revelation that the supposedly respectable Alter is really an unscrupulous runaway husband.

Although Abramovitch's expanded version of the novel (1888)[3] follows the same basic course of action, its landscape is threatening in hitherto unmentioned ways. Thus, Mendele and Alter do not simply meet on the road, but their horses get so entangled that it takes a couple of wagonloads of Gentiles to heave them apart. "The hands of Esau" come to the aid of the children of Jacob—accompanied by mockery and malice. "Look at those skinny Jews in their *labsardaki* [their fringed undershirts], a curse on their mothers!" After clearing the road, the Ukrainians make the sign of pigs' ears with the corners of their jackets, cursing the Jew-pigs for good measure. Mendele responds to this indignity with wonderful ambivalence: he comments on the ineptitude of Jews like himself in handling any physical matters, and in that vein is even grateful for the advent of the peasants. Abramovitch conveys through Mendele his impatience with Jews who are impractical and not self-sufficient. But Mendele also flinches at the aggression of the Gentiles, mourning their unearned dislike. "Almighty God," he urges, "Open Thine eyes, look down from Thy habitation on high and see how Thy worshipful Jews are mocked for Thy Name's sake." The hot-blooded Alter, for his part, merely shrugs, "Look who we have to deal with!"[4]

Much harsher is Mendele's later encounter with tsarist officialdom. It is nighttime, and Mendele has had a little too much to drink on an empty stomach after a day of fasting (it is the seventeenth day of the Hebrew month of Tammuz, which begins the three-week period of mourning for the fall of Jerusalem in 70 CE). In a phantasmagoric scene, he helps himself to cucumbers in someone's garden and is nabbed by a watchman who brings him to the local constabulary. He soon sobers up under the questioning of a "Red-collar" with brass buttons, whose cursing is invested with the power of the state:

> It was my sidecurls that had his attention now, and he was giving them the eye, sneering at them in disgust. Then in anger he swept up the scissors from off the writing table, and in a trice he had one of the pair shorn clean off. It was only the work of a moment, and the lock of hair lay already at my feet. I observed that it was gray, and thought how from

> my youngest infancy I had had it, and it was grown old even as I had done; and I wept for the shame which had been done to me.[5]

The shorn *paye* awakens such an outpouring of tears that Red-collar is touched by pity, and takes out his anger on the watchman who had hauled the old Jew into court. Mendele quits the scene with his cheek bound up, the threat having passed, but not the humiliation, nor the knowledge that the Jew is subject to capricious authorities who hold his life in their hands.

In neither of these two scenes does Mendele show any anger. An elderly and traditional Jew, he is disinclined to confront hostility, but rather succumbs to his sorrow and tries to regain his moral equilibrium without inquiring into the nature or motives of his inquisitor. Such restraint contrasts sharply with the charged portrayal of Jewish iniquities in the rest of the book, and in the rest of the author's work. Through Mendele, Abramovitch shows his own disinclination to confront the gratuitous aggression of the Gentiles, either because he could not accept it emotionally, did not fathom it intellectually, could not represent it artistically, or did not want to admit it ideologically. It is also hard to know whether official censorship inhibited his treatment of this subject. What is clear is that as long as he was working within the framework of literary realism, which purports to show society as it exists, Abramovitch vented his outrage on the Jewish community while muting his emotional response to the offenses against it. He championed inductive reasoning as a means to genuine self-improvement. Literary realism was the vehicle of his impatience with whatever stood in the way of analytic reason. Getting Mendele drunk was a way of introducing his character to a situation beyond his own artistic control. Realism sufficed for the small-scale vices and the large-scale miseries of beggary and cruelty, but it could not explain the behavior of the peasants or the government's malevolence against some of its subjects.

Just a few years later, Abramovitch broke through the bounds of literary realism to express his altered view of the Jewish political condition in Russia. Though Abramovitch was no fantasist—his art pointed in quite the opposite direction, warning against the belief in wishing rings and supernatural interventions—he reached to fantasy to convey what he could not otherwise portray.[6] In *Di kliatshe* (*The Mare*; 1873), he offered an image of Russian Jewry as the mythic embodiment of diaspora existence. On the realistic level, a young Jew, Isrolik, wants to study medicine in defiance of his mother's wish that he marry and settle down in his native town. Once he realizes that his Gentile examiners are deliberately thwarting his attempts to enter "their" university, he suffers a mental breakdown.The rest of the novel transpires in a state of hallucination, with only brief chapters of recovery in the middle and at the end. Under the veil of his "madness" Isrolik encounters a mare who reveals herself to him as the representation of the Jewish people in its diaspora mutation. And when Isrolik reproaches the mare, saying "the devil's gotten into you," the evil one himself, Ashmedai, appears to tell *his* story. As the book moves from realistic narrative through the allegory of the mare into flights of fantasy, the author is able to portray the power of hatred of the Jews.

The flight over a landscape of carnage and horror was a common trope of European

literature and art: Goya's image of Asmodeus is a striking counterpart to Ashmedai, who takes little Israel on an overview of the continent.[7] But Abramovitch's devil specializes in baiting the Jews, and he spares Isrolik no images of that particular evil. Open spigots send rivers of ink to regiments of antisemitic scribblers, who denounce the Jews with "words like spears." Jews who try to defend themselves are found guilty of provocation. In Romania, mobs run wild, "attacking houses like locusts, hurling rocks through windows, breaking down doors, chopping, crushing, tearing, yanking, beating murderously, worse than any wild beasts, killing young and old, ruthlessly."[8] Most compelling is the demonic *enjoyment* of this sport: "Demons laughed, devils jeered. They mocked, they jabbered, it was maddening."[9] While Abramovitch also exploits the devil's voice to denounce some of his usual internal Jewish abuses, he lets us feel the delight of those who enjoy their power over the cringing Jews. The devil has Isrolik in the palm of his hand; he can squash him like a flea, he can mock him like a fool. If the first part of the book gives us the young maskil's perspective, and the mare speaks in the second for the Jewish people, Ashmedai brings into Yiddish the unwelcome passion of those who live to do them harm.

Abramovitch's recourse to the fantastic corresponds to Isrolik's fall into madness, in that each manifests the collapse of a rational assessment of his situation. In creating Mendele, Abramovitch conceived a literary mediator who would travel among the Jews of the Pale of Settlement, bringing forms of entertainment that would open their eyes to their defects, their malefactions, and their opportunities for change. Abramovitch's encounter with Jew-hatred was a blow not only to his dignity and peace of mind, but also to the maskilic scheme for rational self-improvement, which depended on equally rational self-interest on the part of the surrounding population. Hence, by summoning the devil, the author was surrendering the optimism of his earlier satire. Ashmedai travels much farther and faster than Mendele, and holds sway over a much larger part of reality.

By the standards of things to come, Abramovitch had seen relatively little mob violence or state-induced antisemitism. But it is likely that the 1871 pogrom in Odessa had shaken him profoundly, because two years earlier he had dedicated a satire to its mayor (on the assumption, so common to the early Russian Jewish enlighteners, that the government was its ally in the forcible reform of the Jews).[10] Between 1869 and 1873, Abramovitch had apparently come to doubt the benevolence of Russia's rulers.[11] Isrolik's madness—a literary device to allow for new modes of representation—registers as well the author's awareness that history is driven by forces over which reason exerts no control. Antisemitism exemplifies history's defiance of progress: the devil is having too much fun tormenting the Jews to allow for the improvement of humankind.

Common to the generations of the "classic" Yiddish writers—Abramovitch-Mendele, Sholem Aleichem, and Yitzhok Leybush Peretz—was the traditional view that violence was a manifestation of evil. Whatever the status of their religious conviction, they continued to observe Judaism's distinction between goodness and wickedness, with violence unequivocally in the latter domain. The leader of the beggar gang in *Fishke der krumer* is cast in the mode of Fagin in *Oliver Twist*: he threatens to rape and even to murder. The Gentile ruffians are more dangerous than he is only because their culture seems to be so much more prone to violence, and because

they are abetted by the tsar's regime. And in *The Mare*, the violence that Jews do to one another is eclipsed by the anti-Jewish prejudice that is sweeping the continent.

In contrast, Sholem Aleichem situates the pogrom at a sufficiently comic remove so that it may threaten the body politic without affecting the moral boundaries between right and wrong. His pattern of response to pogroms admits the evil of the violence while "laughing off the trauma of history" by showing the discrepancy between the Jewish and the anti-Jewish points of view.[12] In "The Wedding that Came without Its Band," the local train, dubbed the Slowpoke Express, becomes the unwitting savior of the town when it fails to arrive with the would-be-pogromists.[13] The story's title further reduces the threat by discrediting the pogrom as a spoiled celebration. Similarly, in "The Miracle of Hoshana Rabbah," a clever Jew gets the better of a hostile priest when he attributes the slowdown of their runaway engine to the intervention of his Jewish God rather than to its declining supply of coal. The story's title picks up on the wit of the Jew by casting the entire incident as a religious miracle. Like the tardy train and the waning fuel, humor saves the day by turning handicap to advantage.

Hayim Nahman Bialik appears to be breaking with this Yiddish tradition in "Be'ir haharigah" when he insists that his readers witness the pogrom wreckage.[14] His walking tour through "the city of slaughter" shows the full scope of the damage that Sholem Aleichem obscured. Yet he, too, reconfigures the pogrom within a Jewish moral vision, flaying the Jews for not *resisting* the violence against them. Bialik's poem—perhaps the most influential work of modern Hebrew and Yiddish literature—stirred a generation of Jews into greater action on their own behalf. However, in urging an end to passivity and acquiescence, it in no way questioned the evil of violence itself.

Peretz's neo-folktale, "The Three Gifts," may be read as his rumination on the challenge of violence to traditional Jewish values. A suspended Jewish soul is told that it will be admitted to heaven only if it brings three acceptable gifts: "If you see any deed that is perfectly good, take it and bring it back to heaven."[15] The mediocrity of the world is such that it takes the poor soul untold years to find the requisite symbols of perfection. But when he does find them, one by one, they are what his tradition has taught him to value. One Jew has been killed for the sack of earth from Eretz Israel that robbers mistook for his ultimate treasure; a Jewish woman condemned to public execution has protected her modesty by pinning her dress to her flesh; and a Jew goes back to run the gauntlet a second time in order to retrieve the skullcap that a whip had knocked off his head. The three blood-stained gifts of earth, pin, and head-covering —representing the national, moral, and religious spheres of Judaism—satisfy the heavenly tribunal. But the story questions their "useless" perfection as well as the corruption of a heaven that would desire them. While Peretz's story continues to honor the readiness of Jews to make spectacular sacrifices for their beliefs, it exposes a problematic scheme of values that encourages martyrdom to no ascertainable end.

Peretz's story bridges competing views of Jewish victimhood as the tragic byproduct of Gentile aggression or the consequence of misguided Jewish priorities. The most dialectical of modern Jewish writers, Peretz defended Jewish values but not their basis in religion. His younger followers, however, took up a more radical stance, particularly with regard to physical violence. Portraiture of Jewish "toughs" became a

subspecialty of Yiddish and Hebrew writing, as though the literature were out to redeem Jewish manhood by demonstrating that Jews could fight. Writers introduced into Yiddish literature a cast of thieves, smugglers, thugs, and "pigeon fliers"; sons ready to beat up their fathers, Jews ready to trade punches as well as goods. Jewish writers began to accommodate violence as a natural portion of, rather than an aberration from, common reality. For instance, in I.M. Weissenberg's novella *A Shtetl* (1906), the violence begins with a pre-Passover fist fight in the synagogue over importing flour for baking matzohs and escalates steadily through the spring and summer, in pace with the revolutionary movement of which such violence forms a tiny but representative part.[16]

There were several ideological avenues of support for physical might at the beginning of the 20th century, going all the way back to the maskilic appeal to "nature." In maskilic literature, the *ḥeder* and yeshiva students who long to join the animals out in the fields seek a healthier life of integrated body and soul. Positivism's emphasis on productive labor encouraged tangible rather than spiritual contributions to progress. The revolutionary movement called for radical reform of government, society, and existing institutions, and for such forceful efforts as would be required to bring about these necessary changes. Nationalism promoted the ideal of self-liberation and imagined a "new man" capable of winning his freedom. The aim of returning to the soil, with its implied shift to a newly virile Judaism, informed movements in Russia, Palestine, and America. Paramount in the world of ideas was Nietzsche's argument for the transvaluation of Jewish and Christian values, an argument that called into question the very ideals of religious discipline, inviting people to acknowledge their will to power instead of deferring to the will of God.

Contrary to popular opinion, Jews were not a passive people. Essentially dynamic in their adaptation to ever-changing political conditions, their literature integrated many of the "muscular" ideals that were rapidly changing the course of Jewish life. But Yiddish literature faced a problem unique to the Jews, in that the contemporaneous support for muscularity resulted in much more violent action against *them*. The same calls for national renaissance, revolutionary action, self-determination, and the will to power were received in all too many Gentile and Christian circles as invitations to assault the Jews. Thus, Weissenberg in his various stories seems to enjoy describing the internal battles of Jew pitched against Jew with fists and clubs until the point at which the Gentiles appear on the horizon with a power that threatens his entire fictional world. Whenever that happens, he brings the action to a close. It is one thing to call for freeing male energy within an overly repressive or rigid Jewish society, and quite another to contemplate the released energies of Christian enthusiasts or reveling peasants.

Lamed Shapiro sets out these very considerations in his story of 1909, "Der tseylem" ("The Cross"), which remains an intellectual-literary Jewish landmark in the treatment of violence.[17] Shapiro was the first Yiddish writer to portray physical aggression through the prism of Nietzsche's promotion of Dionysian passion as a necessary counterpart to Apollonian harmony. Shapiro did much more than introduce the ruffian, or *ba'al guf*, into Yiddish literature as part of the reality of Jewish society. He also championed violence as an elemental force to be creatively integrated as well as politically resisted. The pogrom represented a special challenge to this "transvalua-

tion of values," since its unleashed energy was directed at himself, his family, and his community. "The Cross" was Shapiro's attempt to confront the pogrom not as something counter to Jewish experience, but as a form of energy that would have to be assimilated if Jews were ever to escape its fury.

"The Cross" is situated in America, far enough away from the events it chronicles to insulate the narrator from the consequences of describing them. Two Russian Jews, formerly strangers, are riding the trains in hobo fashion, and one gets the other to tell him how he got the cross-shaped scar that is prominent on his forehead. The unnamed man with the cross says he lost his father almost at birth and was raised very harshly by his widowed mother: she only stopped beating him when he hit her back at the age of 12, and relations between them remained cold thereafter. He later joins a cell of Russian revolutionaries (sometime before 1905), and volunteers for a dramatic suicide mission, presumably to impress Mina, their leader, herself the daughter of a Russian official. However, a pogrom intervenes before he can execute his mission. Although his underground cell had gotten wind of impending attacks against the Jews, it failed to take any preemptive action. The rampaging pogromists who break into the man's flat find him defenseless, alone with his mother. He fights but is overcome, tied to the bedpost, and forced to witness his mother's torture. The chief pogromist then carves a cross into his forehead "to save his kike soul from hell," and leaves him to watch his mother expire.[18]

Until this point, the Jew has been the butt of the action. The dramatic shift occurs once he pries himself loose and puts his mother out of her agony with a final blow. From then on, like a cinematographer following the hero through a battle, Shapiro accompanies his protagonist into the street where the pogrom still rages and watches him wandering in a daze, wondering how to respond to the events that have branded him. First, he comes upon his mother's torturer but deliberately refrains from taking revenge, while making it clear that he could have done so. Next, he sees a young hoodlum splitting the head of an old Jew with an axe. A Jew "wearing glasses" confronts the hoodlum, but instead of killing him, this intellectual turns his gun on himself to the narrator's (and reader's) disgust. Following all this, the narrator goes to Mina's home, where he rapes and strangles her, an act that leaves him "refreshed, energetic, and composed." He decides to wear the scar "as a frontlet between [his] eyes," having turned it from a mark of shame into the brand of a new order of faith.[19]

Shapiro's line of moral reasoning cuts through the chaos of the pogrom. Refraining from killing his attacker, the narrator dismisses as inadequate the goal of personal "justice"; whereas the intellectual who shoots himself instead of the hoodlum evinces the pathology of Jewish self-blame. These serial incidents reveal that the Jew has been lacking the Dionysian spirit. Until he becomes capable of perpetrating violence, he will never be free, let alone secure. The real god that so-called Christians serve is the god of violence that releases itself in pursuit of the Jews. By violating Mina, the branded Jew is accepting the challenge of *that* cross, determined to join the world on equal terms.

The father's death in this story has left the infant son in the charge of a woman who expects him to become her selfless protector (much as Abramovitch's Isrolik, in a very different context, is urged by his mother to fulfil her own ideas of Jewish achievement). Similarly, Mina expects the protagonist to sacrifice himself for her revolu-

tionary cause. As though answering the charge of the philosopher Otto Weininger that Jewish men are corrupted by their feminine nature, Shapiro has his protagonist fight free from the domination of women: this Samson must liberate himself from Woman as well as from the God who had claimed to be the source of his strength. He kills both his mother and Mina with his own hands, albeit out of opposite impulses of mercy and rage, and makes explicit the connection between the events, saying of Mina: "She defended herself, like my mother."[20] Of course it is possible to interpret the murder of Mina as a form of revenge for the death of his mother, on the grounds that she had failed to take action against the impending pogrom. But the real source of his deformity, Shapiro implies, is the neurotic relationship between mother and son from childhood on. By repeatedly linking the women in their wish to control his destiny, the narrator suggests that, however the pogrom may complicate his struggle with his mother, he had to free himself from both alike.

Shapiro was in America from 1907–1909, and then returned there to live in 1911. Although he sets his pogrom story within the land of the free, it is clear that the true fight for autonomy must be waged back in Europe, where Jews remain crippled both by their beliefs and by their neighbors. Indeed, the other man in the frame story, after hearing the narrator out, offers something very much like a moral endorsement: "*A generation of iron men will arise. And they will rebuild what we allowed to be destroyed.*"[21] The Jew turns into iron not through acts of self-defense or by championing a revolution for greater political equality, but by being able to master what for him is most difficult—the art of violence. Were all Jews to act like the Jew in the story, they would not have to set out for new lands but could rebuild what *they allowed to be destroyed,* their lives in Europe.

Because of its title, Shapiro's story was assumed to address the problem of Christianity. By branding his victim with the sign of Christianity, the pogromist appears to make it responsible for his deeds. Hayim Zhitlowsky, the editor of *Dos naye lebn*, reinforced this reading when he paired the story with Sholem Asch's "In a karnival nakht" ("On a Carnival Night") in an essay on the subject of "We and the Cross."[22] Asch's modernist story, as discussed later, tries to exalt the Jews and Jesus in their capacity for martyrdom. His tale was thus a foil for Shapiro's story, which links the Jews with pogromists in their capacity for violence. But in the Nietzschian terms of the story, the pogromist was violating Christianity no less than he was violating the Jews. The story's closing reference to "iron men" suggests that what Shapiro had in mind as a sign of redemptive power was something like the *iron* cross, the Maltese cross that Germany awarded for distinguished service in war. True, the attackers of Jews were Christians, but at issue in the story was their elemental aggression, not its spiritual camouflage, so that use of the Christian symbol set the story askew, as Shapiro himself later realized. In none of his subsequent pogrom stories did Christianity play a major role. The pogrom in "Di yidishe melukhe" ("The Jewish Government"; 1919), for instance, occurs three weeks after Sukkot, independent of the Christian calendar or any obvious instigation by the Church.[23] Vasil, the simple peasant of "Vayse khale" ("White Challeh"), who is gradually transformed into a cannibal and rapist, is identified not as the "priest" of Christianity, but of a god "as eternal as the Eternal God."[24] Shapiro challenges the teachings of Sinai from the standpoint of a prehistoric jungle regimen that, because it follows its own ultimate

rules of nature, he is no longer willing to regard as evil. Jewish irony and obedience-to-duty merely play into its hands.

To be sure, Shapiro's advocacy of violence was always qualified, if not contradicted, by the manner of his exposition. Though he seemed to sense that the Yiddish writer no less than the Jew in his story had to come to terms with physical aggression, he could not so easily accomplish this literary goal. The very structure of "The Cross," which is arranged as an episodic, logical polemic within a symmetrical frame, belies the thematic insistence on irrational passion. When the pogromists break down the door, the narrator says:

> I am a strong man. But until that night, I had never seriously fought anyone, in a rage. Until that night I had never known the true rage that intoxicates you like strong wine, rage that suddenly boils in the blood, courses through the body, rushes into the head, drowning all thought.[25]

The sudden flood of feeling is rendered by such poetic devices as repetition, parallelism, and simile, which check the rhythm and the pace of the prose. The voice of Jacob directs the hands of Esau. For the assault on his mother, the narrator affects an ironic detachment:

> Imagine:
>
> What's a hair—one single grey hair—plucked from the head? Nothing. Absolutely nothing. And two hairs? And a skein of hair, torn from the scalp? And many skeins of long grey hair? Tsk! Nothing at all.
>
> When bones are broken, they obviously crack. But when twigs are broken, or dry sticks and whatever else, they also crack. "A natural phenomenon."[26]

This strategy of removal focuses attention on the man's state of mind rather than on the perpetrators of the violence. Forced to witness his mother's torture, the man recalls it in a manner that abstracts and objectifies his experience. So, too, the very point the story is trying to make about the spontaneous release of negative energy is controverted throughout by the narrative style, resulting in something very different from its apparent intention. Zarathustra's utterances convey his untrammeled mind; the energy of Nietzsche's prose drives its ideas. By contrast, the tension between subject and form in every one of Shapiro's pogrom stories has the effect of reining in the violence within an aesthetic of harmony and logic. The art does not experience the "liberation" of its characters.

And indeed, in later years, Shapiro not only repudiated his use of the Christian symbol as "forced and contrived" but also reversed his earlier attitude toward the subject. He explained that he had written about pogroms in deference to friends who had urged him to treat the subject, both after 1903 and in 1914.[27] The real purpose of literature, he wrote in the 1930s, was not to deal with such aberrations as "pogroms, revolutions, wars [that] come and go," but rather with the long course of human life that was calm, even-breathed and "normal."[28] As for Hitler, Shapiro says that his advent cast the whole subject of violence into a grotesque form, "as though in a crooked mirror that reflects a monster-face—my own."[29] Reminiscent of the scene in "The Cross" where the intellectual puts the gun to his own head instead of shooting the criminal he has apprehended, Shapiro's response to the Jew-hatred that Hitler was spewing is to list instances of *Jewish* wrongdoing.

This about-face can be explained only in a critical biography that has yet to be written, in which Shapiro's literary development will be traced in relation to his actions, his health, and his state of mind. The projection of anxiety about his own sinfulness appears to have been the result of a general breakdown, of which there is abundant evidence in the biographical information concerning the treatments he was undergoing for alcohol addiction and mounting paranoia. Coinciding with this decline, Shapiro had become an active Communist sympathizer, and Communists objected to singling out the subject of attacks on the Jews lest this reinforce ideas of Jewish solidarity or Jewish resistance. Since the author himself applies the term "grotesque" to his response to Hitler, it only remains to compare his breakdown with that of Abramovitch's fictional Isrolik upon his realizing that the world was so much worse than he could have imagined.

Shapiro's attempt to demonstrate that the Jew is a mirror image of Hitler includes an item of particular literary and psychological interest. When he lists the Jewish crimes that presumably remind him of the Nazis, he begins with the very example that Asch had dramatized in his 1909 "On a Carnival Night"—the story that had been featured as the *contrast* to his.[30] Set in 16th-century Rome, Asch's story tells of the humiliations Jews were subjected to as part of the annual papal carnival, including the sadistic chase of eight hoary elders through the streets before masked Christian merrymakers. In a mixture of the supernatural with the historical to betoken the story's blurring of religious boundaries, Jesus climbs down from his cross to join the runners, and Mother Rachel weeps with Mary for both sets of children. Linking Jew and Christian through their common martyrdom and messianic expectations, Asch tries to draw a parallel as well between their faults. So he inserts into the story a reference (that would have been familiar to contemporary Jewish readers) to an event in the Ukrainian town of Troyanov in 1905.[31] Upon receiving news of an impending pogrom in Zhitomir, five young Jews had set out from Chudnow to join the Jewish self-defense in the neighboring city. Ukrainians who saw them passing through Troyanov demanded their surrender, threatening the local Jews with a pogrom of their own if they failed to hand them over. The Jews capitulated to the demand, disarmed the youths, and gave them over to the Ukrainians. The scene of their butchered bodies is what Asch evokes in an attempt to establish some kind of moral parity between Jews and Christians.

Thus, in repudiating "The Cross," Shapiro recalls Asch's story—and then outdoes him in drawing a moral equivalence between Jewish and Christian depravity. In addition to the incident in Troyanov, Shapiro calls to mind a Jew who had escaped from the 1903 Kishinev pogrom, then participated in a pogrom against Negroes in Springfield five years later, as well as other Jewish thugs (*banditn*) who allegedly participated in the Ukrainian pogroms of 1919–1920. On the basis of this evidence, Shapiro cries, "Our fate has conspired to rob us not just of the security of life and human dignity, but also of the illusion and the pretense that we are a *pure offering*."[32] The term I have highlighted, *'olah temimah*, with its biblical overtones of ritual purity, anticipates the later use of the English term, Holocaust, which is similarly drawn from the vocabulary of sacrifice.[33] These Jewish offenses—most committed in reaction to mass violence against the Jews—make Shapiro recoil from the claim that Jews are pure victims, as though that were a vocation worth aspiring to. Need I point out

the perversity of this comparison between assaults against the Jews and this handful of aberrant, some of them responsive, actions? Or of Shapiro's regret that the offering is not "pure" when what we are talking about is the slaughter of whole communities of Jews?[34] That the Yiddish "Nietzschian" should have reached this end points up the problem Yiddish writers had in confronting Gentile violence.

Yiddish readers seemed to mute some of the radicalism of the story in order to grant its merit. Typical of those who praised it, Shmuel Niger, the dean of Yiddish critics, hailed the man with the cross as "the strongest and weirdest (*meshunedikster*) hero in modern Yiddish literature." Yet instead of dwelling on the implications of the hero's new ethic that credits savagery as an unexceptional part of human behavior, Niger considers the story as the answer to Bialik, as though Shapiro had been arguing merely for Jewish self-defense. "The future historian of Jewish suffering and shame will know that the dark bitter truth that Bialik speaks in 'Maase Nemirov' [the subtitle of "Be'ir haharigah"] is not the whole truth."[35] Niger appreciates that unlike Bialik who thundered from the mountain, Shapiro was reporting from the depths, revealing the gritty minority of fighters that was hidden from the dominant historical perspective. Niger credits the story to the extent that it shows the fighting spirit of the Jews, ignoring its much more essential challenges to Jewish civilization. Probably for the same reason, because of its ideological foreignness, Shapiro's story had none of the historical impact of Bialik's poem: it remained a literary curiosity. The harshest judgment was the one the author pronounced on himself. In a story of 1930, Shapiro has one of his characters, a Yiddish writer in America somewhat reminiscent of himself, declare that "Der tseylem" was always "a false, bombastic thing written in a falsetto," which allowed Shapiro to mistake himself for "the conscience of the Jews."[36]

From the beginning of the 20th century until the late 1930s, Yiddish literature became a virtual referendum on violence, as writers, poets, and dramatists looked for ways of depicting escalating attacks on the Jews. The First World War and the pogroms in the Ukraine triggered an explosion of expressionist verse on apocalyptic themes. Many writers conscripted messianic figures—Shabbetai Zvi, Shlomo Molkho, Jacob Frank—to convey typologies of doomed striving. The Bolshevik Revolution rehabilitated violence for those who justified its use of force, or otherwise believed that any messianic project must be accompanied by bloody birth pangs. In the period between the world wars, violence figured prominently in Yiddish fiction as a familiar of Jewish experience. Demobbed and AWOL Jewish soldiers appeared as coarsened products of the European battlefields. Shimon Horonczyk's *Shtarke mentshn* (*Tough People*; 1936) projected the image of a thuggish Jewry.

But as against the need to admit brutality into representations of Jewish life, ideological antisemitism and the hooliganism it fostered made violence increasingly unattractive. The rise of fascism with its championship of military force led to the kind of recoil displayed by Lamed Shapiro. Once again, the forces of cruelty were cast as a demonic threat to the quieter ways of the Jews. The equation between violence and evil tightened as the dangers and the injustices increased.

Both the heightened tension and the restored moral equilibrium figure in M. Burshtyn's gentle, almost old-fashioned novel, *Bay di taykhn fun mazovye* (*By the Rivers of Mazovie*; 1937). The hero's name, Hersh Lustig, Hersh the Jolly, signals the author's generally hopeful outlook. In the first 35 chapters of the book, the Jews of

Smolin live and interact with their Polish neighbors. The next chapter opens with this twist:

> You might think that Sa-ma-lin is located somewhere in Byelorussia, Lithuania, or Bohemia.
>
> Those who think so would be fooling themselves and the author of this narrative would not be responsible in the least.
>
> Sa-ma-lin is located not in Lithuania, not in Byelorussia, and certainly not in Bohemia.
>
> —Where then *is* Sa-ma-lin?[37]

After flirting with various possibilities—Mexico, Pennsylvania, and the ancient Ophir—the narrator volunteers that Sa-ma-lin is actually in China, near the river Hong Kong. By changing the relation of consonants to vowels, the narrator transports us to a make-believe location that is in every other respect identical with the place in which the rest of the novel is situated. The clumsy intervention of the narrator conveys the change that is about to occur. The Jewish physician Gabriel Priver, walking contentedly to his work in what was yesterday Smolin, runs across a lad he recently cured of a near-fatal illness. When he calls out "Sa-ta-shek" (the Chinese version of the Polish Stashek) the child, instead of responding, shouts at him, "Jew, Jew, Jew!" The doctor is tempted to laugh (not unlike the reader, who thinks he must be party to some authorial mischief) but then his spirit is daunted by "the sultry air of the approaching typhoon." The usual euphemism for pogrom, the Russian storm, has been "easternized" along with Stashek's name. As the day proceeds, local "coolies" gather in the "Japanese restaurant" to fortify themselves for the violence they intend to wreak, and by its end the doctor's wife is a twisted corpse on the kitchen floor of their plundered home. If Burshtyn was trying to dodge the censor by transferring the action to a place concocted to draw attention to its absurdity, in fact he compounded the anxiety of the reader, who experiences disorientation along with the character.

Burshtyn's transparent device of camouflaging Smolin for the duration of the pogrom is symptomatic of the literature in which it figures. The shock of the pogrom, its excesses, its ubiquitous yet always unexpected recurrence—these required novel techniques of representation. Burshtyn gives a simultaneously comic and frightful description of an event that comes out of nowhere yet transforms reality forevermore. He registers the narrator's sense that the subject does not really belong to him, typically finding in Yiddish no viable political language through which the injury could be described. The very word "pogrom" signifies not war—not the standard exchange of violence between competing nations—but a unilateral assault on a people with no reciprocal recourse to force. The Jewish literary tradition of responses to catastrophe was exactly that: a literary tradition not of engagement in violence but of reaction to it. The event might as well have been happening in China for all that Burshtyn or his characters knew how to deal with it.

The subject of violence in Yiddish literature obviously requires much more thoroughgoing treatment than it receives in this essay, but I think that the sequence of engagement is as I have sketched it. Bashevis Singer would merit a special section for the way he "imports" evil through the medium of the Devil. Some of Chaim Grade's irascible rabbis and wives are harsh—if not violent—in their natures and words. The Soviet Jewish writers came closest to mustering moral support for repressive force,

though in support of Communism, not of Jewish society. David Bergelson's *Midas hadin* (*Letter of the Law*; 1929) justified the full measure of an oppressive law in the name of Bolshevism. To my knowledge, no modern Yiddish writer ever did so in the name of Judaism or the Jews.

Yiddish literature of the late 19th century was part of the Jewish engagement with modernity that hoped for close interaction with the surrounding Gentile society. Ideologically unprepared for the political assaults on the Jews, its writers dealt with violence as an unwelcome evil. This began to change around the turn of the 20th century under the pressure of various ideas and ideologies that championed force either as a moral good or as a temporary or permanent means to higher ends. Yiddish writers then sought to demonstrate Jewish muscularity by exploring Jewish physicality or, in the case of Lamed Shapiro, by forcing Nietszche's ideas into the framework of Jewish life. What was new to modern literature was the writer's confrontation of the national trauma through individual experience, and the search for an artistically convincing way of registering the danger. But when violence and the call for violence against the Jews consolidated into fascist politics, Yiddish writers were once more confronted with a political process for which they had no political vocabulary. The tone of moral bewilderment and political unreadiness that characterizes Burshtyn's novel continued into the diaries and fiction of the Second World War.

At the start of Moishe Leib Halpern's 1916 poem, "A Nakht" ("A Night"), his visionary response to the First World War, a warrior leader comes rushing down the mountain crying "O Hi, O Ho— — —." As the torches of his followers sweep through the night like wild birds in flight, their cries echo among the hills: "O Hi, O Ho— — —O Hi, O Ho— — —." This seems to me the cry of violence descending on Yiddish literature. It is never anticipated no matter how often it comes.

Notes

1. Mendele Moykher Sforim [Sholem Yankev Abramovitch], *Ksovim beibom: dos vintshfingerl un fishke der krumer*, trans. and ed. Sholem Luria (Haifa: 1994). Luria provides a critical edition of the 1869 version, along with a full account of the history of composition and an exhaustive study of many aspects of the novel.

2. Ibid., 137. It may be that these "Germans" are really Jewish Germans, that is, enlightened Jews who have adopted Western ways.

3. Although a second missing version was registered with the censor in 1876, we have only the published revision of 1888, included in Mendele Moykher Sforim, *Ale verk*, vol. 11 (Warsaw: 1911–1913). See idem, *Kesovim beibom*, 93.

4. Mendele, *Ale verk*, 11:15; cited in English in idem, *Fishke the Lame*, trans. Ted Gorelick in *Tales of Mendele the Book Peddler*, ed. Dan Miron and Ken Frieden (New York: 1996).

5. Mendele, *Ale verk*, 11:54; in English version in *Tales of Mendele the Book Peddler*, 91.

6. Would Isrolik's flight with the devil qualify as fantastic according to the influential definition of Tzvetan Todorov? One of its conditions is that the reader reject allegorical as well as "poetic" interpretations, that is, feel suspended between the world of living persons and a supernatural explanation of the events described without trying to explain the latter in terms of the former. (See Todorov, *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre*, trans. Richard Howard [Cleveland: 1973]). Although Ashmedai is a composite of identifiable anti-Jewish attitudes, I think this part of the text exceeds allegorical interpretation. Joachim Neugroschel (see below) included this work in a collection of works of "fantasy and the occult."

7. This subject is treated exhaustively in Shmuel Werses, "Motivim dimonologiyim be*Susati* shel Mendele umekoroteihem," in idem, *MiMendele 'ad Hazaz: sugiyot behitpaṭhut hasiporet ha'ivrit* (Jerusalem: 1987), 70–86.

8. Mendele Moykher Sforim, *Di kliatshe* (Vilna: 1873). Trans. as *The Mare* in *Yenne Velt: The Great Works of Jewish Fantasy and Occult*, comp. and trans. Joachim Neugroschel (Woodstock, N.Y.: 1986), 632.

9. Ibid., 628.

10. Dedication quoted by I. Nusinov, "Fun bukh tsu bukh," *Tsaytshrift*, vols. 2–3 (Minsk: 1928), 431.

11. On Abramovitch's change of attitude and other related items, see Ruth R. Wisse, "The Jewish Intellectual and the Jews: The Case of *Di kliatshe* by Mendele Mocher Sforim," Daniel Koshland Memorial Lecture of Congregation Emanu-el, San Fransisco, 1992.

12. See David G. Roskies, *Against the Apocalypse: Responses to Catastrophe in Modern Jewish Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: 1984), ch. 7. This book and its companion anthology, *The Literature of Destruction* (Philadelphia: 1988), are indispensable guides to our subject.

13. Sholem Aleichem, "A khasene on klezmer," (1909) in idem, *Ayznban geshikhtes, Ale verk fun Sholem Aleykhem* (New York: 1917–1925), 28:127–137. The English version, "The Wedding that Came without its Band," appears in *Tevye the Dairyman and The Railroad Stories*, trans. Hillel Halkin (New York: 1987), 194–199.

14. Hayim Nahman Bialik, "Be'ir haharegah," in idem, *Shirim* (Tel Aviv: 1966), 250–260.

15. Y.L. Peretz "Di dray matones," in idem, *Folkstimlekhe geshikhtn* (Warsaw: 1911[?]), 13–24. The English version, "The Three Gifts," trans. Hillel Halkin, appears in *The I. L. Peretz Reader*, ed. Ruth R. Wisse (New York: 1990), 224. In the original, "un derzestu epes azoyns vos iz oysterlish sheyn un gut, khap es un fli dermit aruf." Basing his interpretation on the Hebrew version, which demands that the gifts be simply *yafot* ("beautiful," without the "good"), Reuven Kritz sees a swipe at aestheticism as part of the story. See Reuven Kritz, "Leha'arakhat sipurei ha'am shel Perez uleha'arakhat hazhanr hadidakti," *Karmelit* 17–18 (1973–1974), 198, passim.

16. See I[tshe] M[eir] Weissenberg, "A Shtetl," trans. Ruth R. Wisse, in *A Shtetl and Other Yiddish Novellas*, ed. Ruth R. Wisse (New York: 1973), 29–78.

17. L(amed) Shapiro, "*Der tseylem*," *Dos naye lebn* 1, no. 6 (May 1909), 15–30. Reprinted in idem, *Di yidishe melukhe un andere zakhn* (New York: 1919), 139–161.

18. Lamed Shapiro, "The Cross" in *The Jewish Government and Other Stories*, ed. and trans. Curt Leviant (New York: 1971), 123. All quotations are taken from this edition, with slight alterations to correspond more closely to the original.

19. Ibid., 129.

20. Ibid., 128.

21. Ibid., 130.

22. H(ayim) Zhitlowsky, "*Sholem Ash's 'In a karnival nakht' un L. Shapiro's 'Der tseylem*,'" *Dos naye lebn* 1, no. 7 (June 1909), 36–46 and no. 8 (July 1909), 36–45. Although he proposes the theme "Mir un der tseylem" in part 1 (p. 39), Zhitlowsky makes it clear that he is referring, in the case of Shapiro's story, to relations between Jews and the entire Gentile world.

23. Lamed Shapiro, "Di yidishe melukhe," in idem, *Di yidishe melukhe*, 7–63.

24. Lamed Shapiro, "Vayse khale," in ibid., 82.

25. Shapiro, "The Cross," 120.

26. Ibid., 121.

27. Lamed Shapiro, *Der shrayber geyt in kheyder* (Los Angeles: 1945), 26–30.

28. Ibid., 32.

29. Ibid., 36; passim.

30. Sholem Asch, "In a karnival nakht," *Dos naye lebn* 1, no. 7 (June 1909), 8–16.

31. For alerting me to this incident, I am indebted to Eugene Orenstein.

32. Shapiro, *Der shrayber geyt in kheyder*, 37.

33. In his story "White Challeh," Shapiro designated the Jews killed in the pogroms by the word *korbones* (Heb. sing. *korban*), which means both victims and sacrifices, thus merging the two perspectives of the time-bound and the historically resonant to create the semantic equiv-

alent of a double exposure. There, irony superimposes the imperative of violence on the traditional view of Jewish victimhood. In this passage, Shapiro seems nostalgic for the purity of the image he once so richly complicated.

34. In a review of Shapiro's book, Jacob Glatstein voices the same incredulity: "Is this a time to recall the ghosts of Jewish 'bandits' of 1905 and 1920? Should we now seek artistic redemption for a single Jewish soul when the entire murdered Jewish people is one huge, pure, clean soul?" See Yankev Glatshteyn, *In tokh genumen: 1945–7* (New York: 1947), 123.

35. Shmuel Niger, "Lamed Shapiro," *Vegn yidishe shrayber: kritishe artiklen*, vol. 2 (Warsaw: n.d.) 98, 101.

36. Lamed Shapiro, "Doc," in his *Nyu yorkish un andere zakhn* (New York: 1930), 179.

37. M[ikhel] Burshtyn, *Bay di taykhn fun mazovye* in idem, *Erev khurbm*, ed. Shmuel Rozhanski (Buenos Aires: 1970), 195.

The Use of Military Force in the Religious Zionist Ideology of Rabbi Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines and His Successors

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For many generations, the possibility that the Jewish people would fight its own wars was perceived by traditional Jews as totally unrealistic, little more than a memory of the distant past or perhaps a desire relating to a utopian, messianic future. Zionist ideology's affirmation of political activism brought about a profound change in this ethos of passivity. In time, moreover, the ability—and sometimes the need—of the collective to resort to military power became one of the most extreme expressions of this activist ethos.[1] The historical reality of the 20th century revived the idea of a Jewish fighting force, transplanting it from its utopian context into historical reality. How did religious Zionist ideology, which was committed to an activist ethos, yet bound to traditional modes of thinking, adapt to this new reality?

Several studies have discussed aspects of this question as it pertains to the ideology deriving its inspiration from the teachings of R. Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook, the rabbinic authority and philosopher who became the first Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Eretz Israel.[2] This essay explores the attitude toward the renewed use of military force of another important ideological stream in religious Zionism, whose conceptual roots lie in the teachings of R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines, the founder of the Mizrachi movement.[3] R. Reines died in 1915, long before it was widely understood that an autonomous Jewish polity would not arise without a violent, military confrontation. Consequently, I shall seek to trace the development of R. Reines' ideas by other religious Zionist leaders, both in the 1930s (by which time the political situation in Eretz Israel had become violent) and in the period following the establishment of the state of Israel, when military violence and confrontations were the order of the day.

R. Reines' basic conception was based on a combination of realist and ethical principles. The realist principle recognized the necessity of a political and practical solution for the plight of the Jewish people. As will be shown, this conception entailed commitment to, and responsibility for, the Jewish collectivity (*kelal yisrael*). As such, it permitted political activism, so long as this could provide a solution for some of the Jewish people's real problems. At the same time, R. Reines and those who followed him were deeply committed to what they regarded as binding religious and moral

principles. Thus, together with an internalization of the need for full-scale political activism, one also finds in R. Reines an opposition to the use of force in general and later, in his ideological successors, an acceptance of its necessity only for purposes of self-defense.

Several matters pertaining to R. Reines and his ideological successors must be noted at the outset. First, not all of the latter developed systematic, comprehensive ideological viewpoints. Moreover, in setting out their own thoughts on the subject of violence, only some of them referred explicitly to R. Reines. Overall, the positive attitude of R. Reines' successors toward military organization and self-defense initiatives (particularly in the 1930s and thereafter) were dictated by changing historical circumstances. Despite this, however, their disquisitions on the use of force were informed by R. Reines' basic ideological principles.

The position held by R. Reines and his successors differed significantly from that of R. Kook, and, even more so from the ideas developed by his son, R. Zvi Yehudah Kook (and by the latter's disciples). Systematic comparison of these two schools of thought is beyond the scope of this essay, but some points of contrast will be noted in the discussion that follows.[4]

People of the Book versus People of the Sword

R. Reines' attitude toward war, peace, and the use of force need to be set in the context of his historiosophic and messianic thought. According to R. Reines, the Jewish people's premessianic calling was to be the bearer of a culture that was based on spirituality and morality—one utterly opposed to the use of force, or what R. Reines termed the culture of "the Sword." How could such uncompromising views be reconciled with his support of Zionism and political activism? R. Reines resolves this dilemma by emphasizing that the essence of Torah is *tikun*, or ethical improvement, which aims ultimately to eradicate the culture of the Sword. Thus,

> insofar as Israel attends to disseminating the divine Torah throughout the world, the world will come to abolish the dominion of force and violence, for it is one of the fundamentals and main tenets of the Torah that man's conduct should be purely rational, [guided by] the rule of Torah and not by the rule of fist and physical power.[5]

It follows that the election and existence of the Jewish people has an ethical-religiuos objective. Interestingly, in order to demonstrate his point, R. Reines makes special mention of the prevalence of bloodshed and force in the ancient world. Abraham's attributes of kindness (*ḥesed*) and compassion, he argues, were foreign to most people of his time; the Patriarch was unique in that he proposed an alternative understanding of the values that should govern interpersonal and international relations.[6]

R. Reines also taught that the laws of the Torah were essentially human laws—that is, only by studying and observing the laws, does man become "Man."[7] And on the national level, the Jewish people was chosen in order "to be a unique treasure [*segulah*] among all the nations," specifically in the sense of "its pure opinions, its pristine thoughts and its lofty ideas."[8]

Unlike R. Kook, R. Reines did not favor the realization of religious and ethical

goals by political means. His teachings concentrate, first and foremost, on the ethical improvement of the individual. Hence, it is not surprising that, in his view,

> one of the most important goals for the End of Days is the elimination of evil and malice, and the abolition of wars—which is to say, the abolition of the dominion of will and ultimate domination by brute force (which is the essence of war)—and the promise of the dominion of reason.[9]

According to Aviezer Ravitzky, R. Reines' model of redemption, which he had drawn from earlier Jewish sources, was a "paradoxical conception": it held that history may be divided into two dichotomous eras: exile (*galut*), in which the world experiences no development and progress, and a redeemed world (*geulah*) in which humankind achieves ethical and spiritual perfection.[10] The transition from galut to geulah is accomplished by divine intervention, rather than by human action.[11] The Jewish people, as bearer of the "culture of the Book," fulfills this function until the End of Days when, "in the blink of an eye," the culture of the Book will become a universal phenomenon. Put somewhat differently, the fact that humankind is steeped in the culture of the Sword is an indication that the world as a whole is in exile.

It is in this spirit that R. Reines interprets the midrashic statement of R. Eliezer that "Sword and Book came down from heaven intertwined. [God] said to them: If you do what is written in this Book, you will be saved from this Sword; if not, you will be slain by this Sword."[12] In a similar vein, R. Reines interprets the talmudic maxim found in Sanhedrin 82a ("one should not enter the house of study [*bet midrash*] with one's weapons"), by noting that "the house of study and weapons are two opposites, between which there is no middle road." In both cases, R. Reines finds the same message: the world can be ruled either by the Sword or by the Book, but the two cannot possibly rule in tandem.[13]

The image of the house of study as a place where "Man" is nurtured goes back to R. Reines' assumptions concerning the mission of the Torah in relation to the ethical improvement of the world. The house of study is the place where the culture of the Book is cultivated, in contrast to the culture of the Sword that is rampant in the outside world. In his words, the bet midrash is

> a manifest protest against wars and warriors, against instruments of destruction and weapons; the whole purpose and desire of such a house is to smash swords into pieces, to shatter spears and all other weapons into smithereens, to melt them down and use them to make pens—pens with which scribes may write the fundamentals of Torah and wisdom, spread peace, and make salvation bloom in the land. . . . There is no greater blasphemy than to bring instruments of destruction into the house of Torah and wisdom.[14]

Hence the transition from galut to geulah marks not only a point in time but, more significantly, a radical shift of world culture. In the transition between the culture of the Book and the culture of the Sword, there is no middle ground. This is true, according to R. Reines, both existentially and historically:

> The dominion of the sword and the spear and the dominion of Torah and wisdom are like nonbeing and being, as being always follows close upon nonbeing; and when nonbeing comes to an end, being and reality always come straight after, separated only by the blink of an eye. . . . And when the dominion of the sword and destruction disappear from the world, the dominion of Torah and wisdom will take its place.[15]

In effect, R. Reines' messianic thought is a regulatory-moral idea in the light of which the gap may be measured between the world's past and present situation, and what it will be in the future. In his view, wars can never herald redemption; on the contrary, they demonstrate how distant it is. "How far the world still is from the realization of its goal," he writes, "and how hopeless it is that it should achieve its goal without heavenly intervention; and that intervention will take place only at the time of geulah . . . and through the spreading of Torah and its dissemination all over the world."[16]

Clearly, then, according to R. Reines, it is inconceivable that the Jewish people should take up arms prior to the messianic era. Just as there is no historical period between galut and geulah, so there can be no religious or cultural situation in which it is destined to embrace the culture of the Sword.[17] As will be shown, this idea is also expressed in R. Reines' discussion of the midrashic "three oaths"—upon which other halakhic thinkers based their opposition to Jewish political activism.

Moreover, in his view, only after the Jewish people have been perfected ethically and religiously, and only after world culture has been radically transformed and ruled universally by the culture of the Book, will the Jews return to, and reside permanently, in the land of Israel. He explicitly stresses this sequence of events:

> . . . it is obvious that as long as His dominion has not become known throughout the world, the real purpose of the Temple has not been achieved; and that real purpose will come to light when His glory is revealed throughout the world, which will take place through the Torah and the people of Israel. *Then* the children of Israel will return to reside in their land permanently and eternally, just as the Temple will then be eternal. . . . Until that time, the children of Israel's residence in their land cannot be complete, and similarly, it will not be possible for the Temple to be an eternal structure, since it will not yet have fulfilled its purpose in relation to God's universal dominion.[18]

The picture that emerges is not only that the Jewish people are the bearers of the culture of the Book, but that its national redemption is contingent upon the coming of the Redeemer for all of humanity. This seems to be a normative position that, at first sight, leaves no room for political activism of the kind advocated by political Zionism.[19]

How, then, can one explain R. Reines' role as the founder of political religious Zionism? Did this not represent a return to political activism, and was not the attempt to gather the Jewish people in the land of Israel an attempt at political messianic activism? Was he not at all apprehensive that the turn to political activity might bring in its wake the adoption of the culture of the Sword?

The Realist Principle

Here is where the realist, this-worldly aspect of R. Reines' approach comes into play. R. Reines did not view Zionism through a metaphysical or messianic prism. Instead, it was a practical way of addressing the problems of the Jewish people. So long as it could be shown that political Zionism was dedicated, first and foremost, to the good of *kelal yisrael*, he was willing to cooperate with it.[20]

This realist approach is clearly expressed in R. Reines' support for political activism. Unlike those who identified life in the diaspora with political passivity,

R. Reines had no objection to political or historical activism, so long as it was aimed at realist and this-worldly (as opposed to messianic) goals. As he explained:

> There is no doubt that not only are we permitted, but indeed we are required to attempt to improve our very [grave] situation by secure and legitimate means according to the laws of Judaism, for indeed the population transfer to which the Zionist movement aspires is far from general, and at best one can hope only to transfer a large part of our people to Zion—so why should we not take up this task? Hopes of redemption should not obstruct the path of searching and political activity [*hishtadlut*], and people who think that wherever there is hope there is no room for action show that they do not understand the meaning of the word "hope" and its underlying concept. . . . Surely, the struggle for survival by legitimate means is permitted according to the Torah, and it is a mitzvah, even a duty, to engage in it.[21]

R. Reines expresses three basic assumptions in this statement. First, activism in the cause of improving the lot of the Jewish people is a duty even during the era of galut, so long as such activism is carried out through "secure and legitimate means"—namely, without recourse to violence. Second, Zionism's goal is not total: it seeks a solution for only part of the Jewish people.[22] From this follows R. Reines' third assumption, that Zionist activism and messianic goals have nothing in common.

R. Reines contrasts "hopes of redemption" with "the path of searching and political activity." In his view, the terms refer to two distinct spheres: redemption being the future, messianic state of the world, and political activity belonging to the world of exile. R. Reines believes that one is not barred from acting politically to improve the lot of the Jewish people. However, such endeavors are always limited in scope: they cannot bring the entire Jewish people back to the land of Israel. Put somewhat differently, the Zionist effort is always subject to the demands of historical reality, and R. Reines supports Zionism as a realist, not as a messianist.

In this, R. Reines differs sharply from R. Kook. According to the latter, the process of redemption has already begun: this, in fact, is what provides theological justification for political and historical activism.[23] R. Reines takes the opposite point of view. For him, the fact that redemption is *not* imminent is what lends political activism its legitimacy as a means toward certain ends, namely, the Jewish people's enhanced safety and well-being.[24]

Hence the radical separation in R. Reines' thought between the messianic idea, on the one hand, and the religious meaning of political Zionism, on the other. As he explains:

> The Zionist idea bears not a single sign or mark of the idea of redemption, and it has nothing to do with anything relating to that concept. Nowhere in the actions and endeavors of the Zionists is there any hint or mention of future redemption, their sole intention being to improve the condition of the Jewish people, to enhance its honor and to accustom it to a life of happiness.[25]

R. Reines' concept was to guide him in situations that obliged him to reach difficult decisions, notably that concerning the "Uganda scheme" (according to which Jews would colonize part of eastern Africa as a temporary alternative to Palestine). At the Sixth Zionist Congress of 1903, a large group of East European Jews walked

out in protest when the Uganda proposal was presented. R. Reines abstained in the final vote, [26] but he later wrote to Theodor Herzl that,

> nevertheless, we have acceded to the African proposal, because we are attentive to the needs of the people, which are more precious to us than the land; and the needs of the people, whose situation increasingly deteriorates materially and spiritually, require a safe refuge, wherever it may be. . . . If there is no Israel in the world, there is no Zion in the world.[27]

R. Reines was at pains to point out that "by our agreement to Africa we do not mean to divert our attention for one minute, heaven forbid, from Zion, our holy city."[28] He rejected the territorialist approach, which "denied the sanctity and value of the land of Israel," arguing that "the hope of returning to the land of Israel, and its value in general, are among the foundations of Judaism."[29] Nonetheless, he noted, "the Mizrachi party *as a religious party* places the existence of the Jewish people above the mitzvah and the desire to return to the land of Israel."[30] This is a prime example of the central value underlying his approach (the survival of the Jewish people), which overcomes another value (return to the land of Israel). As such, it demonstrates his clear distinction between two levels: one of pure and ideal religious principles and values that are unrealizable in the period of exile, and another of the imperfect human reality of the era of exile, in which acting pragmatically to attain the defined goals also represents the realization of an important value.

The Ethical-Religious Principle

In R. Reines' view, the diaspora serves an important role in enriching the nation's ethical and spiritual character, in this way preparing it for its premessianic mission.[31] Thus, according to him, the Jews' exile from their homeland and the loss of their national polity created a situation in which feelings of national honor and pride needed new outlets of expression in the realm of faith and religion. Understanding that they could neither ignore nor suppress such feelings, the Sages of the Great Assembly (*anshei keneset hagedolah*) knowingly reshaped the national ethos by endowing terms of political and military significance with ethical and spiritual meaning.[32] Concepts and expressions with military or forceful connotations (bravery, heroism, and the like) were given *spiritual* meaning in the world of Torah study, in which scholarly battles and halakhic negotiations took pride of place over military craft and fighting skills.[33] In R. Reines' words,

> the object of [the Sages'] actions was to raise the entire nation to a level at which they would invest all of their feelings and talents in their "minor sanctuaries"—the houses of prayer and houses of study—*and in this way would also save their humanity*, for by so doing they would find scope for all the feelings and talents unique to humans as humans . . . [34]

In other words, exile was a means of spiritual purification—one of whose manifestations was the transformation of militarism into far more exalted attitudes and modes of behavior. The "spiritualizing" tendency that R. Reines praises is apparent in his

own teachings. Commenting, for example, on the morning benediction, "Blessed are You, . . . Who girds Israel with might [*gevurah*]," he writes that "there is no end to the might of this nation in its struggle for existence in the face of trouble and labor, human disease, and all kinds of calamities that have befallen it in this galut; and it is still very much alive!"[35] As do other commentators, R. Reines here transforms "might" into the capacity to suffer affliction and nevertheless to go on living. It is a spiritual strength: one that sets Israel apart from nations that take pride in military prowess. Indeed, R. Reines' claim is that "a nation that exalts itself through victories in battle . . . cannot claim to possess greatness."[36]

Similarly, R. Reines (again, like other commentators) interprets the biblical commandment to "blot out the memory of Amalek" (Deut. 25:19) in a psychological rather than historical sense. According to R. Reines, Amalek's hatred of Israel is the Gentiles' hatred of the (messianic) idea of "love, brotherhood, and companionship in human society," as exemplified by the Jewish people. Accordingly, the Israelites' victory over Amalek (Exod. 17:8–16) represents the future victory of Jewish ideas, and the commandment to "blot out the memory of Amalek" is essentially a call "to blot out false opinions and corrupt qualities."[37]

R. Reines never expresses regret concerning this particular development of life in the diaspora. Indeed, the ethical-religious improvement attained by the Jewish people in exile is a clear expression of what R. Reines calls the "culture of the Book." As noted, galut (dominated by the "culture of the Sword") and geulah (characterized by the "culture of the Book") are defined by the ethical condition of humanity, not by the geographical location of the Jewish people. As long as humanity is living in conditions of galut, the manifest role of the Jewish people is to serve as bearers of the culture of the Book. At the same time, R. Reines also justifies political activism and participation in the Zionist endeavor. How did he envision the coexistence of these two principles, ethical-religious, on the one hand, and realist, on the other? Part of the answer can be found in his nuanced approach toward the "three oaths," upon which other religious thinkers based their opposition to political Zionism.

The "Three Oaths" and Their Ethical Interpretation

The Zionist movement, as is well known, led to schism in the religious camp. At issue was a fundamental question: were Jews as a nation allowed to return to Zion before the coming of the Messiah? One of the prooftexts discussed in this connection was a midrashic reading of three passages in the Song of Songs (2:7, 3:5, and 8:4) where the same (or, in the case of the third verse, almost the same) phrase is repeated. According to the midrash, the phrase "I adjure you, O daughters of Jerusalem . . . that you waken not, nor excite love till it pleases [to come of itself]" is a reference to three oaths demanded by God of Israel:

1. that the nation not ascend "on the wall" (*baḥomah:* interpreted by Rashi to mean ascending to the land of Israel by force);
2. that it not rebel against the nations of the world;
3. that it not attempt to "force the End" by attempting to bring the Messiah before the proper time.

Taken together, the oaths appear to be a clear endorsement of historical passivity—or, alternatively, a midrashic expression of an already existing historical consciousness. In any event, it is evident from the talmudic discussion (in Ketubot 111a) that the second oath, not to rebel against the nations of the world, refers primarily to confrontation that might occur should the Jews attempt to return en masse to their homeland.[38]

Two 19th-century forerunners of modern religious Zionism, R. Yehudah Alkalai and R. Zvi Hirsch Kalischer, each addressed the issue of confrontation by allowing for the possibility of Gentile agreement to the Jews' return to their homeland. Such an agreement, each of them argued, would assure the Jews' peaceful return to Zion and in this way would abrogate the prohibition created by the oaths.[39] R. Reines also saw agreement of the nations as abrogating the three oaths. Nevertheless, in placing emphasis on international agreement, he also set obligatory, normative limits on the actions of political Zionism. In other words, whereas agreement of the Gentiles is necessary in order to neutralize the proscription against mass immigration to the land of Israel, the oaths nonetheless remain valid with regard to certain forbidden *modes of operation* in the realization of Zionist goals.

R. Reines expressed this view on various occasions.[40] Thus, for example, he notes that as long as galut continues, the Jewish people are assured of continued existence, albeit under difficult conditions. But certain actions are ruled out during that period:

> They should not attempt on their own to take the road to Zion, their city of refuge, as long as that road is considered dangerous; they should await only the miraculous end, when the Lord will make His voice heard from Mount Zion like a great ram's horn, and the redeemed shall pass and come with song to Zion.[41]

Yet he adds: "There is no doubt that not only are we permitted, but indeed we are required to attempt to improve our very [grave] situation by secure and legitimate means according to the laws of Judaism."[42] "Secure means" (*emẓaim betuḥim*) most likely refers to agreement on the part of the Gentile nations to the Jews' resettlement in Zion, which then cancels out the prohibition against traveling on a road that "is considered dangerous." Nonetheless, the means must also be "legitimate according to the laws of Judaism," that is, nonviolent in nature.

It appears that, for R. Reines, the main import of the three oaths is ethical: their purpose is not to neutralize historical or political activism per se, but rather to prohibit the use of force. In R. Reines' innovative interpretation, the oaths are not a divine decree demanding political passivity and avoidance of violence, but a *condition* for the fulfillment of the national ethical-religious mission. As such, they express the Jews' ethical and historical mission as bearers of the culture of the Book, which is not nullified by changing historical circumstances. Unlike religious opponents of Zionism, R. Reines does not use the three oaths as a basis for banning political activism. Yet unlike R. Alkalai and R. Kalischer, he sees the oaths as limiting the scope of allowable Zionist activity.

R. Reines could perfectly well have adopted the interpretive approach of these two predecessors, according to which the force of the three oaths would be neutralized by international agreement to the political organization of the Jewish people. Indeed, such an interpretation would have been natural, given Herzl's wide-ranging efforts to

gain international support for Zionism. R. Reines, however, preferred to maintain the ethical thrust of the oaths, in this way distinguishing between legitimate activism and forbidden (that is, violent) modes of operation.

In R. Reines' writings, discussion of the three oaths also comes into play in the context of an important halakhic debate regarding the mitzvah of settling in the land of Israel. Maimondes (among others) omitted this mitzvah in his list of the 613 biblical commandments, but Nahmanides—criticizing his predecessor—included it in his own list. Basing himself on such phrases as "you shall take possession of the land" (Num. 33:53), he ruled that "we have been commanded to conquer it and settle therein."[43] Centuries later, R. Zvi Yehudah Kook and his disciples used this text as a justification for settling the land by any (including forceful) means.[44] Earlier religious Zionist leaders, however, referred back to the three oaths in providing a more limited interpretation of Nachmanides' position. According to R. Shmuel Mohilever, for example,

> Possession [of the land] cannot be secured by war, for we cannot, nor are we permitted to engage in war at this time, as explained in Ketubot 111. . . . Hence the act of possession valid at this time is only that we should endeavor to buy the land from its owners, and with every plot of land that we buy, we thereby observe the commandment to take possession.[45]

Similarly, whereas R. Reines agrees with Nahmanides that the commandment of settling the land is still valid during the era of exile, he sees two distinct elements in Nahmanides' ruling: "conquest" and "settlement." "Conquest," R. Reines explains, should be interpreted broadly to include any means by which Jews are enabled to settle the land. In fact, it cannot be interpreted in the literal sense:

> it is also quite clear that [Nahmanides] did not intend to say that conquest through war is a commandment, *for surely the Jews are still adjured, throughout the exile, to distance themselves from all thought of rebellion*, heaven forbid; and we should entertain no doubt that he is referring to voluntary purchase.[46]

For R. Reines, in sum, the three oaths are a metahalakhic concept: other rulings, such as that of Nachmanides, must be read in their light. Hence, although Nachmanides quite deliberately uses the term "conquest" (*kibush*)—since it is the term used in the Bible—R. Reines chooses to "spiritualize" this militant term in line with his religious outlook.[47]

At first glance, it may be hard to reconcile R. Reines' pragmatism with his belief that Zionism must achieve its goals exclusively through nonviolent means. What must be recalled, however, is that other early leaders of political Zionism, including Herzl, gave little thought to the possibility of violent opposition to the Jews' return to Palestine. In his *Altneuland*, for example, Herzl seems to have envisaged something like a foreign protectorate in Palestine that would maintain a small standing army or police force. It never seemed to have occurred to him that "conquest" of the land of Israel might involve military action, or that the Arab presence in the country might constitute a serious security problem.[48]

Over time, however, the political reality evolved into a situation of potential and then actual confrontation. As noted, R. Reines died in 1915, at a time when Palestine was still under Ottoman rule and before violence had become a major problem be-

tween Arabs and Jews. For this reason, he was never asked to rule on specific questions concerning self-defense in the Jewish community of Palestine (the Yishuv). Later, however, the basic principle R. Reines had proposed as a justification for Zionism—guaranteeing the physical welfare of the Jewish people—began to dictate the necessity of self-defensive military action. As will be seen, R. Reines' ideological successors internalized the need for activism, in the form of self-defense, in order to secure the welfare and continued existence of the Jewish people, while at the same time holding fast to the concept of the Jews' ethical-religious mission.

Between Realism and Morality: "Self-Defense" in the Eyes of R. Reines' Ideological Successors

By the second half of the 1930s, when violence had become the reality of Mandatory Palestine, a number of central figures in religious Zionism had come into their own, including rabbinical leaders and thinkers from within the ranks of Hapo'el Hamizrachi (the Mizrachi's labor faction) and the religious kibbutz movement. As noted, R. Reines' ideas were not always explicitly cited by them. Nonetheless, a certain ideological continuity is evident in many of their ideas—especially those that grapple with the intertwining of realist and ethical-religious principles.

By this time, it had become obvious that without proper military preparation the establishment of a Jewish state would be highly unlikely. In the wake of the riots, the Yishuv leadership adopted a policy of restraint (*havlagah*), intending to refrain from violent response and to demand instead that British forces take responsibility for quelling the Arab militants.[49] On the whole, the religious leadership went along with this policy.[50] At the same time, it was clear to all that the idea of self-defense and readiness for appropriate action had to be promoted. Consequently, the religious leadership was obliged to consider various distinctions in the use of force.

A discussion of the complex relationship between the Mizrachi, on the one hand, and the Irgun Zevai Leumi (IZL) and the Lehi, on the other, is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it to say, that whereas the Mizrachi officially concurred with the policies of the Haganah military organization, it maintained a variety of contacts (some close and some less so), with the two rival underground organizations.[51] Understandably, there were those in the Mizrachi who challenged the policy of restraint and supported the more aggressive retaliatory actions of the IZL and the Lehi. At the end of the 1930s, debate on the IZL and Lehi primarily focused on the issue of force against Arabs. Several years later, however, the British had become the main targets of violence, which greatly complicated the matter: To what extent was "retaliatory deterrence"—even at the cost of killing innocent persons—justified in order to achieve political gains? And how could violence directed against a ruling power, as opposed to acts of self-defense against armed attackers, be countenanced by Jewish sources?

In the discussion that follows, an attempt will be made to trace R. Reines' influence in the arguments advanced by those in the Mizrachi movement who were opposed to IZL and Lehi activities.

Although (like R. Reines) most religious Zionists judged issues concerning the use

of force from the dual perspective of realist and ethical-religious principles, emphasis was naturally given to one or the other side. In general, rabbinical figures and members of Hapo'el Hamizrachi tended to stress ethical-religious arguments against IZL or Lehi activities, whereas representatives of the Mizrachi were more inclined toward a pragmatic approach.[52] Of course, it is not surprising that rabbis would tend to favor spiritual matters while politicians would be more interested in pragmatic considerations such as how best to halt Arab terror or influence British government policies. Hapo'el Hamizrachi, for its part, prided itself on its spiritual adherence both to Jewish sources and to humanistic and socialist values, such that ethical-religious issues were its major concern.[53]

Ethical-Religious Arguments

In opposing the indiscriminate use of force, religious Zionists (as did R. Reines) often resorted to metahalakhic arguments. Consider, for instance, an editorial that appeared in the Mizrachi newspaper *Hazofeh* in June 1939. The editorial protested against actions that harmed innocent people, declaring: "We shall not follow the path of evil . . . even if it is advantageous. We do not desire a land of Israel built on murder and bloodshed. . . . We desire our land of Israel . . . built on justice and honesty, on the purity of Jewish morality, the morality of Judaism, the morality of the Torah."[54] In this editorial, metaconcepts such as "Jewish morality, the morality of Judaism, [and] the morality of the Torah" are invoked without definition and without biblical prooftexts. Similarly, a leader of Hapo'el Hamizrachi, Yeshayahu Bernstein, condemned indiscriminate acts of Arab terror in an article in the same issue of *Hazofeh*: "Heaven forbid that the seed of Israel should repudiate [both] the Rock from which they were hewn and the Torah of their God. It was we who heard and accepted [the commandment] 'thou shalt not kill,' and for generations it has been absorbed in our blood and our flesh."[55]

Neither article, it should be noted, carries any implied criticism of Zionist ideology per se (which, according to some, cultivated an ethos of force that ultimately led to the death of innocents).[56] Indeed, there is unequivocal support for the use of force in matters of self-defense, as Bernstein makes clear: "We are not commanded by our Torah to leave ourselves unprotected, without defending ourselves and fighting for our lives. The other's blood is no redder than ours." And yet, "neither is our blood redder than that of others. Everything that is permitted to us in such situations is from lack of choice, of necessity, that which cannot be avoided without suicide."[57]

Members of the rabbinical establishment also drew a distinction between self-defense and other forms of violence. The Ashkenazic chief rabbi, Yitzhak Herzog, wrote in 1938 that "the voice is the voice of Jacob, yet the hands are the hands of Esau. Hands, yes—the hands of defense. To defend us, defend our lives, and to fight for our homeland and the cities of our God. Legitimate defense, such is the action of the hands of Jacob. Thus did our forefathers act."[58] And in condemning the blind terror of the 1930s and demanding greater care and sensitivity with regard to bloodshed, R. Ben-Zion Uziel (the Sephardic chief rabbi) used the motif of the biblical expiatory ceremony that was to be carried out whenever an unidentified body was found in a field (Deut. 21: 1–10). Another source quoted by Uziel and others was the midrash

according to which the Patriarch Jacob was apprehensive of killing no less than of being killed.[59] "This stern commandment" [not to kill], R. Uziel wrote, "has been observed by Israel in its pristine purity since it became a nation and in all situations in which it has found itself."[60]

Detailed halakhic discussion of specific issues concerning violence was quite rare in the 1930s and 1940s. Just as it was clear to R. Reines that some modes of action "cannot be admitted to the congregation of Israel,"[61] so too R. Uziel and others took a metahalakhic moral stance as their point of departure in any discussion concerning the use of force. R. Reines expressed his moral position in terms of the three oaths, whereas others made use of more general terms such as the "spirit of the Torah" or the "morality of the Torah"[62] (which, R. Uziel, pointed out, needed no further proof or clarification)[63] in urging self-restraint.

All of this calls to mind R. Reines' ethical-religious arguments concerning the "rule of the Book" versus the "rule of the Sword." Even more evocative are repeated statements made by Bernstein, for instance, that Jews "bear aloft God's banner in the world" and thus are duty-bound to protest murderous deeds wherever they occur.[64] Notwithstanding, Bernstein and others were well aware that a Jewish state would not arise without the use of force. Unwilling to renounce Zionism's goals, they struggled to reconcile these goals with the need for military action. As Bernstein wrote in relation to self-defense: " 'Neither by power, nor by might, but by My spirit, thus saith the Lord of Hosts' [Zech. 6:4]. This pacifistic text [*mikra*] is in fact the very basis of our struggle."[65]

In R. Reines' view, as has been seen, the "culture of the Book" was characterized by the subordination of violent emotions to the dictates of reason, in contrast to the rampant violence evident in the "culture of the Sword." Although they did not use R. Reines' terminology, later figures in the religious Zionist movement also stressed the importance of self-restraint. In one instance, R. Moshe Ostrovsky even called on Jews to emulate the self-restraint practiced by "civilized nations," although he also made it clear that "Torah morality, on which we have been reared, decries these repulsive acts [of military retaliation]," citing as well a number of specific Jewish sources, from Jacob's rebuke of his sons Simeon and Levi ("cursed be their anger, for it is fierce") (Gen. 49:7), to the declaration in the Ethics of the Fathers (4:1) that the true hero is one who "subdues his evil impulse." Ostrovsky concluded with an exhortation to Jewish militants: "Do not desecrate God's name with your actions, lest it be said that the House of Israel is like all the other nations. . . . Subordinate emotion to reason! Sanctify God's name in public!"[66]

Realist and Pragmatic Arguments

Akin to religious objections to violence that made use of general concepts such as "the honor of the Jewish people," pragmatic objections were often stated as a matter of political necessity, leaving certain important halakhic issues quite vague. How was the concept of "the good of the Jewish people" to be defined? What were the precise limits of self-defense, such that actions going beyond them were to be considered illegitimate acts of terror? These issues were rarely dealt with. Instead, more general statements of principle were made, such as the manifesto issued by the two chief rab-

bis in 1947, which declared that, since the Yishuv was opposed to fighting the British, "any killing of persons, whoever they might be—policemen, officials, soldiers" was to be considered the spilling of innocent blood,[67] or a policy statement by Hapo'el Hamizrachi that rejected "murderous terror" from both a religious and a political point of view.[68]

Practical objections, it appeared, were sometimes necessary to make the argument against terrorism more convincing. Moshe Shapira, a leader of Hapo'el Hamizrachi and later a minister in the Israeli government, presented moral arguments against terrorism at a meeting of the Zionist Executive in October 1944 but also declared that "political calculations" were an additional factor.[69] Several months later, in an article in *Haẓofeh*, he made the point more explicitly: "We must ask ourselves if such acts are beneficial to us or not, without consideration of British rule."[70] Shapira in fact was adamantly opposed to acts of terrorism on moral grounds; the fact that he cited practical considerations indicates something about the more militant views held by many members of the Mizrachi movement.[71] Representing these views, albeit in an unofficial capacity, was R. Yehudah Leib Hakohen Maimon, the head of Mizrachi, who consistently refused to denounce those involved in IZL and Lehi retaliatory raids. Maimon disagreed with the policy of *havlagah*, believing it to be defeatist.[72] But he, too, took exception to actions that violated official Yishuv policy, believing above all in the need for unity. This view was shared by the most vehement opponents of terrorism, such as Chief Rabbi Herzog, who declared in 1938 that "the minority must give in" for the sake of unity among the Jewish people.[73]

Toward the end of the Mandate period, a number of religious Zionist thinkers began to consider issues beyond the need for self-defense and concomitant limitations on the use of force. To some, it had become clear that broader issues were also involved—namely, the confrontation between different sets of values: national, political, ethical, and religious. One of the first to consider the matter was Moshe Unna, a former Mizrachi leader in Germany who had become a spokesman for Hapo'el Hamizrachi and the religious kibbutz movement.[74] In 1947, Unna took part in a written debate with Yeshayahu Bernstein. Like others, Unna claimed, Bernstein refused to acknowledge that the Zionist endeavor was marked by a clash "between the divine promise and our moral situation." Circumstances in the real world had given rise to a situation in which "conquering" the land had become morally problematic. Yet this "boundary between the religious aspect of our problem, on the one hand, and the moral and political aspect, on the other" had become blurred, such that the inherent problem had not been addressed.[75]

Unna's argument calls to mind the earlier dilemma faced by R. Reines when the Uganda proposal was presented to the Zionist Congress in 1903. This proposal had essentially presented a conflict between what Unna would later term "the religious aspect" (settlement in the land of Israel) and the "political aspect" (the possibility of obtaining a refuge for Jews located elsewhere). R. Reines, it will be recalled, had opted for the latter, convinced that the welfare of the Jewish people had to be given top priority. Unna argued not only that realities in the Holy Land had produced a conflict between religious obligation and political possibility, but that both had to be considered in conjunction with the ethical principle. Unna demanded that the contradic-

tions between these elements of reality be acknowledged and urged that precedence be given to political realities and ethical claims over religious obligation.

Years later, Unna's ideas found political expression in groups such as Oz Veshalom, Netivot Shalom, and Meimad, which favored negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict even at the cost of returning territories that were considered part of the biblical land of Israel. But in the years following Israel's establishment in 1948 until the Six-Day War of 1967, such ideas for the most part lay dormant. During this period, the dominant trend in religious Zionism was ideological pragmatism. It was universally believed, for example, that the state of Israel was fighting for its life, hence little systematic attention was devoted to justifying the use of force. One exception was the opposition aroused by an Israeli army attack on the village of Qibya in October 1953, which resulted in the deaths of 69 civilians, including women and children. At a cabinet meeting following the raid, the most passionate denunciation came from Moshe Shapira of Hapo'el Hamizrachi:

> I do not wish to discuss the matter from a political point of view, I want to discuss it from an ethical point of view. We cannot accept such retaliation by any means. Throughout the years, we have opposed this. . . . We have never said "let the innocent be swept away with the guilty". . . . We know what happened at Deir Yassin. That happened in the heat of war, but nevertheless, we were . . . incensed. . . . We said then that such a path is forbidden from a Jewish point of view. . . . Jews cannot act in such a way.[76]

Indeed, in the election campaign of 1955, Hapo'el Hamizrachi apologized for the government-approved raid on Qibya, insisting that it had expressed opposition from the outset.[77]

The basic principles of a religious Zionist approach were outlined in 1952 in a draft platform for the Mizrachi party (expressing the views of Hapo'el Hamizrachi) that was submitted by Moshe Unna. The platform begins with a declaration that, whereas the land of Israel is the promised land from a religious point of view, "the state of Israel with its present boundaries [is] the realistic basis of our policy in the world."[78] Moreover, in contrast to the religious view according to which the state of Israel represented the beginning of the redemptive process, Unna's proposed platform defined Israel as "the factor guaranteeing the existence of the Jewish people in the present and in the future"—an expression of the realist principle.[79]

Like R. Reines, Unna (and others) did not believe that a sovereign Jewish state would become a refuge or home for the entire Jewish population. As eager as they were to endow the state with religious significance, they were unwilling to delegitimize the diaspora, which they saw as having religious significance of its own. They understood, moreover, that halakhic innovation would be necessary in the new Jewish state (an issue R. Reines never dealt with).[80] In short, the reality of Israel posed complex problems for those who identified themselves as both religious and Zionist.

Another of R. Reines' ideological successors was Prof. Ephraim E. Urbach, who in 1964 founded a short-lived movement known as the Movement for Torah and Judaism. Small in size, this movement set itself the ambitious goal of closing two gaps: that between the nation and its Torah, and that between halakhah and political, economic, and social realities. [81] In an article written for the movement, Urbach also

addressed the issue of the use of force, basing himself on the concept of gevurah. Interestingly, Urbach quoted not R. Reines, but R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook:

> What is might? Might is not expressed in extreme phraseology or in saber-rattling. R. Kook, who is frequently quoted, explains the blessing, "Who girds Israel with might" as follows: Israel's might is a special kind of might, a might that excels not in conquest of others, but relates mainly to a person's conquest of himself. That is the might with which Israel is girded, which subordinates itself to the element of pure morality and the elevation of man as superior to beast.[82]

This quote reflects as well R. Reines' own views—along with those who followed his line of thinking, albeit in varying ways.

R. Reines' ideology can be seen as an attempt to occupy the middle ground between traditional Jewish thinking and the activist ethos promoted by political Zionism. Fully acquiescing to the need for political activism, R. Reines nonetheless believed in stringent limitations on the use of force—in this way seeking to maintain an ethical-religious ethos that had evolved over centuries of Jewish existence in the diaspora. Until the Six-Day War, similar principles were enunciated by key figures in the religious Zionist movement. In the wake of the Six-Day War, however, a profound shift occurred within mainstream religious Zionism. This shift was signaled by the ascendancy of Gush Emunim, whose supporters successfully challenged the veteran Mizrachi leadership in 1974.

Influenced to a large degree by the messianic doctrine of R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook (as further developed by his son, R. Zvi Yehudah), the new approach perceived the use of force as an indication of ongoing national and religious redemption.[83] In R. Zvi Yehudah's radically different reading of R. Eliezer's midrashic statement:

> Sword and Book came down intertwined from heaven, for a sublime blessing and for eternal glory. . . . For the people of the Sword cannot be cut off from and free of the Book, which is the might of our life and the length of our life; while the people of the Book cannot be cut off and exempt from the Sword, it being a required part of [the people's] source of life and sanctity.[84]

Reading these words, one is struck by the profound difference between this view and R. Reines' worldview. The difference represents two sides of a fundamental transformation in the Jewish national ethos—namely, the return to political and military activism. Within the religious Zionist camp, the debate concerning the implications of this transformation is far from being concluded.

Notes

1. See Anita Shapira, *Hahalikhah 'al kav ha'ofek* (Tel Aviv: 1989); idem, *Ḥerev hayonah: haẓiyonut vehakoaḥ 1881–1948* (Tel Aviv: 1992); Ehud Luz, "The Moral Price of Sovereignty: The Dispute About the Use of Military Power within Zionism," *Modern Judaism* 7, no. 1 (1987), 51–98.

2. See Aviezer Ravitzky, *Hakeẓ hameguleh umdinat hayehudim: meshiḥiyut, ẓiyonut veradikalizm dati beyisrael* (Tel Aviv: 1993); Uriel Tal, *Mitos utvunah beyahadut zemanenu* (Tel Aviv: 1987); Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "The Book and the Sword: The Nationalist Yeshivot and

Political Radicalism in Israel," in *Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamic Character of Movements*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: 1994), 264–302; Gideon Aran, "A Mystic-Messianic Interpretation of Modern Israeli History: The Six Day War as a Key Event in the Development of the Original Religious Culture of Gush Emunim," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 7, *Jews and Messianism in the Modern Era: Metaphor and Meaning*, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York: 1988), 263–275; Uriel Tal, "The Land and the State of Israel in Israeli Religious Life," in *Proceedings of the Rabbinical Assembly, 76th Annual Convention*, vol. 38 (New York: 1977), 1–22; idem, "Historical and Metahistorical Self-views in Religious Zionism," in *Self-views in Historical Perspective in Egypt and Israel*, ed. Shimon Shamir (Tel-Aviv: 1981), 89–99.

3. R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines (1839–1915) studied at the Volozhin Yeshiva and was the rabbi of various Russian towns, in particular Lida, where he established one of the first East European *yeshivot* combining religious and secular learning. The Mizrachi movement, which he founded, brought together those members of the religious community who supported the Zionist movement. R. Reines was a central figure in the Mizrachi until his death. For a biography see Yehudah Leib Fishman (Maimon), *Zekhor zot leYa'akov: toledot harav Y. Y. Reines* (Jerusalem: 1932). For a partial summary of R. Reines' views see Joseph Wanefsky, *Rabbi Jacob Reines: His Life and Thought* (New York: 1970). See also Eliezer Schweid, "Teologiyah leumit-ẓiyonit bereshitah—'al mishnato shel harav Y. Y. Reines," in *Meḥkarim bekabalah, befilosofiyah yehudit uvesifrut hamusar vehehagut, mugashim leY. Tishbi bimlot lo 75 shanim*, ed. Yosef Dan and Yosef Hacker (Jerusalem: 1986), 689–720.

4. For a systematic analysis of attitudes to the use of force in the teachings of R. Kook and his ideological successors, see Elie Holzer, "Leumiyut umusar: hashkafot 'al hashimush bekhoaḥ bizramim ideologiyim bekerev ẓiyonim datiyim" (Ph.d. diss., The Hebrew University, 1999), 12–142.

5. R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines, *Sefer ha'arakhim*, vol. 1 (New York: 1926), 283–285; see also idem, *Sefer orah vesimḥah* (Vilna: 1898), 42.

6. See *Sefer orah vesimḥah*, 33–34.

7. Ibid., 58.

8. *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1:98.

9. Ibid., 283–285. Apart from the abolition of war, the messianic era would also be characterized by ethical-religious and intellectual perfection (*tikun*); see ibid., 132–133 and R. Yitzhak Ya'akov Reines, *Sha'arei orah* (Vilna: 1886), 35.

10. See Aviezer Ravitzky, "Haẓafuy—vehareshut netunah: meshiḥiyut, ẓiyonut, ve'atidah shel yisrael bahashkafot hadatiyot haḥalukot beyisrael," in *Yisrael likrat hameah ha-21*, ed. Aluf Hareven (Jerusalem: 1984), 178–179.

11. On the paradoxical conception of *galut* and *geulah* in R. Reines' writings, see, for example, *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1:90, 285. On the difference between R. Reines' approach and that of Kook, see Ravitzky, "Haẓafuy—vehareshut netunah," 146–158; Michael Zvi Nehorai, "Harav Reines veharav Kook: shetei gishot laẓiyonut," in *Yovel orot: haguto shel Avraham Yiẓhak Hakohen Kook*, ed. Benyamin Ish-Shalom and Shalom Rosenberg (Jerusalem: 1985), 25–34; idem, "Limhutah shel haẓiyonut hadatit," in *Bishvilei hateḥiyah*, vol. 3, *Meḥkarim baẓiyonut hadatit*, ed. Mordechai Eliav (Ramat Gan: 1988), 25–38.

12. Devarim rabah 4:2. R. Reines' commentary appears in *Sefer orah vesimḥah*, 42.

13. Reines, *Sefer orah vesimḥah*, 42; cf. R. Zvi Yehudah Kook's comment on the sanctity of weaponry:

> For when we remember that God gives us this power to act valiantly, it is not "my own power and the might of my own hand" in its negative aspect, but learning and fulfillment of Torah; we learn that we must perform the commandment incumbent upon us with this power—the conquest of the Land. . . . everything pertaining to it, all and every kind of weapon, whether of our own manufacture or that of the Gentiles, everything pertaining to that day of the revival of the kingdom of Israel—it is all holy!

Zvi Yehudah Kook, *Ereẓ haẓevi: rabenu bama'arakhah 'al shelemut haareẓ* (Bet-El: 1995), 4.

14. *Sefer orah vesimḥah*, 43.

15. Ibid., 42, 44.

16. Ibid., 46. This dualistic approach, in other words, commits itself to realization of the philosophical and ethical ideal of the Torah in an empirical context that does not realize such ideals. Scholars have dubbed this approach "halakhic"; see Ravitzky, "Haẓafuy—vehareshut netunah," 185–195.

17. R. Reines' position on the geulah is different from that of R. Kook, who believed that the process of redemption had already begun—and for this reason, the Jewish people would be able to return to political life and reestablish a Jewish kingdom without the need to resort to force. See R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook, *Orot* (Jerusalem: 1993), 14.

18. *Sefer orah vesimḥah*, 77 (emphasis added).

19. On the apparent inconsistency of R. Reines' views, see Ehud Luz, *Makbilim nifgashim: dat umedinah batnu'ah haẓiyonit bemizraḥ eiropah bereshitah (1882–1904)* (Tel Aviv: 1985), 310.

20. R. Yitzkak Ya'akov Reines, *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon* (Vilna 1902), 128. R. Reines writes here of his indecision, over a period of two years, as to whether he should espouse political Zionism. Also see idem, *Nod shel dema'ot* (Jerusalem: 1934), 16; Yosef Salmon, "Dat umdinah baleumiyut hayehudit hamodernit uvamedinah shebaderekh: haẓiyonut hadatit," in *Kehunah umlukhah: yaḥasei dat umedinah beyisrael uva'amim*, ed. Yishayahu Gafni and Gavriel Motzkin (Jerusalem: 1987), 277–284. Herzl's conception of political Zionism left room for an approach that did not dictate shared values, worldview, or lifestyle; see Eliezer Schweid, "Ye'udah hayehudi shel medinat Yisrael," in *Haḥalom vehagshamato: hagut uma'as baẓiyonut*, ed. Yehiam Padan (Tel Aviv: 1979), 178. See also Ehud Luz, "The Limits of Cooperation: The Challenge of Cooperation between the Observant and the Nonobservant during the Hibbat Zion period, 1882–1895," in *Zionism and Religion*, ed. Shmuel Almog, Jehuda Reinhartz, and Anita Shapira (Hanover, N.H.: 1994), 44–54; idem, *Makbilim nifgashim*, 83.

21. *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon*, 116.

22. *Sefer sha'arei orah vesimḥah* (Vilna: 1899), 25. Cf. R. Reines' letter to Herzl, 9 Dec. 1903: " . . . because thereby [by agreeing to the Uganda scheme] we hope to save one *large part* of our people to make it whole in body and spirit" (emphasis added). The letter is found in *Minutes of the Zionist General Council: The Uganda Controversy*, vol. 1, ed. Michael Heymann (Jerusalem: 1970–1977), 180.

23. See Ravitzky, *Hakeẓ hameguleh umdinat hayehudim*, ch. 3.

24. R. Reines believed, for example, in the necessity of effecting a radical change in Jewish lifestyle, from dependence on charity to agriculture and industry; see his 1883 sermon quoted in Yosef Shapira, "Hagut vahalakhah bitfisato shel harav Y. Y. Reines" (Ph.d. diss., The Hebrew University, 1994), 33–34.

25. *Sefer sha'arei orah vesimḥah*, 25; R. Reines is here criticizing the view that Zionism heralds the realization of geulah. Similarly, "if there are any preachers or sermonizers who, when preaching of Zion, also speak of geulah and the coming of the Messiah, giving reason to believe in such an unholy idea, infringing, as it were, on the territory of genuine geulah, who is to blame? They are merely expressing their own fancy" (manifesto by Rabbis Reines, Dov Baer Hakohen Lapp, Nahum Greenhaus, and Pinhas Rozavsky, *Hameliẓ* 78 [1900]). This statement, however, needs to be qualified. As Shapira shows, R. Reines does at times associate Zionism with redemption. Cf. Dov Schwartz, *Haẓiyonut hadatit bein higayon limshiḥiyut* (Tel Aviv: 1999), 65–66, who attributes the apparent contradiction to R. Reines' deliberate distinction between what he was willing to say in public (given the political situation), and what he really thought and expressed only in limited circles. Also see Holzer, "Leumiyut umusar," 169–171, where I take exception to Shapira's conclusions. I believe that there is a common denominator to all the sources Shapira cites: they all relate to R. Reines' enthusiasm for the *human* effort associated with Zionist activism. I doubt whether his statements were meant to be viewed as a metaphysical comment on the historical situation.

26. On R. Reines' abstention, see Geulah Bat-Yehudah, *Ish hameorot* (Jerusalem: 1985), 214; Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Ideologiyah umdiniyut baẓiyonut hadatit: haguto haẓiyonit shel harav Reines umdiniyut ha 'Mizraḥi' behanhagato," *Haẓiyonut* 8 (1983), 121–126.

27. R. Reines to Herzl, 9 Dec. 1903, in Heiman (ed.) *Minutes of the Zionist General Council*,

1:180–181; Bat Yehudah, *Ish hameorot*, 209. It is instructive to compare R. Reines' position with that of his opponents, such as R. Ya'akov Harlap, a disciple of R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook. During the debate over partition in 1937, R. Harlap took the position that it was preferable to endanger Jewish lives rather than give up any part of the land of Israel; see *Hazofeh*, 18 Aug. 1937, quoted in Zvi Ra'anan, *Gush Emunim* (Tel Aviv: 1980), 94; Shmuel Dothan, *Pulmus hahalukah bitkufat hamandat* (Jerusalem: 1980), 180.

28. R. Reines to Herzl, 9 Dec. 1903. To my mind, R. Reines' flexibility and readiness to accept a solution such as the Uganda scheme stemmed from two ideological positions: (1) the crucial distinction in his thought between the meaning of Zionism and the messianic idea; and (2) his definition of the Zionist idea as the quest for a safe refuge. Secular Zionist circles, in contrast, injected weighty ideological elements into their brand of Zionism, seeing it as the earthly fulfillment of the redemption of the Jewish people in its homeland. Consequently, they could not consider any country other than the land of Israel as a venue for implementation of the Zionist idea. For a late manifestation of the tension between the goal of establishing a state and that of establishing it exclusively in the land of Israel, see Yeshayahu Liebman, "Hamusag 'medinat Yisrael' utfisotav bahevrah hayisreelit," in *Medinah, mimshal veyahasim beinleumiyim* 30 (Jerusalem: 1989), 51–60.

29. From "Lifnei hakongres," *Hazeman*, no. 119 (1905), cited in Bat-Yehudah, *Ish hame'orot*, 268.

30. Ibid. I agree with Eliezer Don-Yehiya that R. Reines' attitude to the Uganda debate clearly expresses his sense of the compelling need to find a solution for the predicament of the Jewish people; see Don-Yehiya, "Ideologiyah umdiniyut," 105; cf. Bat Yehudah, *Ish hameorot*, 71. It was undoubtedly because of ideological affinity that R. Reines felt so close to Herzl. See Shlomo Avineri, "Zemihatah shel haziyonut," in *Halom vehagshamato*, ed. Padan, 41.

31. *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1:132–133; *Sefer orah vesimhah*, 108. On the diverse meanings attributed to life in exile, see Shalom Rosenberg, "Galut veerez yisrael behagut hayehudit bameah ha-16," in *Erez yisrael behagut hayehudit biymei habeinayim*, ed. Aviezer Ravitzky and Moshe Halamish (Jerusalem: 1991), 166–191. Also see Yehoshua Amir, "Gishot lera'yon behirat yisrael ba'et hahadashah," in *Ra'yon habehirah: beyisrael uva'amim*, ed. Shmuel Almog and Michael Heyd (Jerusalem: 1991), 273–285; Shmuel Almog, "Normalizaziyah ve'or lagoyim' baziyonut," ibid., 287–298.

32. See *Sefer orah vesimhah*, 94. For a contrasting view, see, for example, Ahad Ha'am, "Divrei shalom," in *Kol kitvei Ahad Ha'am* (Tel Aviv: 1947), 59–60. R. Reines, an "Orthodox" rabbi, insists that the changes were instituted in a systematic, deliberate manner, whereas the "secularist" Ahad Ha'am wrote that the changes were unconscious, resulting from the evolution of ethical tendencies.

33. I have borrowed the concept of "spiritualization" of sources from Aviezer Ravitzky, "Hashalom kemusag kosmi, utopi vehistori bahagut hayehudit bimei habeinayim," *Da'at* 17 (1986), 11–12. Ravitzky points out that the sages of the Talmud frequently seem to favor a spiritualistic interpretation of warlike passages in the Bible. On the phenomenon of spiritualization in religion generally, see William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature* (New York: 1974), 359.

34. R. Reines, *Sefer orah vesimhah*, 97.

35. R. Reines, *Or hadash 'al ziyon*, 204. Contrast this with R. Zvi Yehudah Kook's interpretation of the same words (in 1974): "This land, to which we have returned and which we have liberated through the love of Him Who girds with might and crowns with glory, Who gives us strength to be victorious" in his "Berur hadevarim," *Erez hazevi*, 23.

36. R. Reines, *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1: 243.

37. R. Reines, *Sefer orah vesimhah*, 67. For the broad spectrum of interpretations of the commandment regarding Amalek see Avi Sagui, "The Punishment of Amalek in Jewish Tradition: Coping with the Moral Problem," *Harvard Theological Review* 87, no. 3 (1994), 323–346; Yonah Hadari, *'Osim hoshevim* (Ramat Ef'al: 1995), 601–612.

38. The talmudic discussion focuses on whether the obligation to immigrate to the land of Israel was binding during the Babylonian exile. This midrash, and others like it, is generally seen as a reaction to the Bar-Kokhba revolt, in that it reflects the tendency to discourage any

national awakening on the part of the Jewish people, lest such an attempt end in bloodshed. For a comprehensive discussion of the role of the three oaths in history see Ravitzky, *Hakeẓ hameguleh umdinat hayehudim*, 277–306. Also see Elie Holzer, "Gilgulo shel ra'yon 'shelosh hashevu'ot' bahagut shel hazerem haẓiyoni-dati," *Da'at* 47 (2001), 129–146.

39. See Ravitzky, *Hakeẓ hameguleh umdinat hayehudim*, 49–50. On R. Alkalai and R. Kalischer, see, for example, Jacob Katz, "Leverur hamusag 'mevasrei haẓiyonut," in his *Leumiyut yehudit* (Jerusalem: 1979); idem, "Demuto hahistorit shel harav Ẓvi Hirsch Kalischer," in ibid; idem, "Meshiḥiyut ulumiyut bemishnato shel harav Yehudah Alkalai," in ibid.; Shlomo Avineri, *Hara'yon haẓiyoni ligvanav* (Tel Aviv: 1980), 61–78.

40. See, for example, R. Reines' discussion of Hanukah in *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon*, 240, 248. A similar theoretical position had already been taken by R. Shmuel Mohilever in his *Sefer shivat ẓiyon*, vol. 1 (Warsaw: 1891), 9.

41. *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon*, 230–231.

42. Ibid., 116.

43. See Nahmanides, *Sefer hamiẓvot*, positive commandment no. 4.

44. See, for example, R. Kook, *Ereẓ haẓevi*, 5. R. Zvi Yehudah cites this passage of Nahmanides quite frequently; see also idem, "Kibush ereẓ yisrael," in *Mitokh hatorah hago'elet*, vol. 4, ed. Hayim Avihu Schwartz (Jerusalem: 1991), 26–27; Shlomo Aviner, "Velo shikarnu bivritekha," *Arẓi* 1 (1982), 38; idem, "Yerushat haareẓ vehabe'ayah hamusarit," *Arẓi* 2 (1982), 7.

45. R. Shmuel Mohilever, *Sefer shivat ẓiyon*, 9, cited in Bat-Yehudah, *Ish hameorot*, 85. R. Mohilever (1824–1898) was born in Vilna, studied at the Volozhin yeshiva, and officiated as a rabbi in several places. He favored cooperation with the maskilim, and after the pogroms of 1881, he called for immigration to the land of Israel. In 1882, he founded the Hovevei Zion movement; in 1884, he was appointed leader of the religious faction at the Katowice conference. Most of his writings were destroyed during the Bialystok pogrom of 1906.

46. *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon*, 36; and more generally, part 7, ch. 3; see also idem, *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1:298. For another attempt to read Nahmanides in a more "pacifistic" vein, see Michael Zvi Nehorai, "Ereẓ yisrael betoratam shel haRambam vehaRamban," in *Ereẓ yisra'el behagut hayehudit bimei habeinayim*, ed. Ravitzky and Halamish, 123ff.

47. See *Or ḥadash 'al ẓiyon*, 19; and *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1: 298. R. Reines also discusses the possible tension between the awakening of national feelings, on the one hand, and ethical norms, on the other. In this context, too, the three oaths are seen to limit nationalistic action to nonviolent means (*Sefer ha'arakhim*, 152).

48. See Shapira, *Ḥerev hayonah*, 27. Even publications by opponents of Zionism illustrate how remote the idea of military action was from people's thoughts. For instance, Rabbi Hermann Adler, the British chief rabbi at the time, considered political Zionism to be an adventure that would not likely succeed, given the fact that the state-to-be would have neither army nor navy. See Yosef Salmon, " 'Emdatah shel haḥevrah haharedit berusiyah-polin laẓiyonut bashanim 1896–1900," *Eshel Beersheva* 1 (1976), 289.

49. For the historical background of the *havlagah*, see Ya'akov Shavit, *Havlagah o teguvah: havikuaḥ bayishuv hayehudi, tar"ẓav-tar"ẓat* (Ramat Gan: 1983), 7–28.

50. On the status and political function of the chief rabbinate at this time see Shulamit Eliash, "The Political Role of the Chief Rabbinate of Palestine during the Mandate," *Jewish Social Studies* 47 (1985), 33–50. It has been argued that the public position of the rabbinical establishment in the 1930s did not reflect the rabbis' real views, but was rather a necessary lip service to the British authorities. I agree, however, with Don-Yehiya's dissenting opinion as expressed in his article "Dat veteror politi: hayahadut hadatit ufe'ulot hagemul bitkufat hameora'ot," *Haẓiyonut* 17 (1993), 163–164. At this time there were formal contacts between the Mizrachi and the Haganah. In time, moreover, religious units were established in the Haganah. See Hilda Schatzberger, *Meri umasoret* (Ramat Gan: 1985), 100.

51. The most prominent rabbinical advocate of such contacts was R. Yehudah Leib Hakohen Maimon (1875–1962). R. Maimon, who was strongly influenced by R. Reines in his youth, came to Palestine in 1913, where he worked vigorously for the establishment of a national religious educational system and for the primacy of the Hebrew language in religious institu-

tions. From 1919 onwards, he headed the Mizrachi movement. He later was a signatory to Israel's declaration of independence and served until 1951 as Israel's first minister of religious affairs.

52. See Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi," 189–190.

53. For a discussion of the ideological roots of Hapo'el Hamizrachi, see Ya'akov Zur, "Torah 'im derekh erez ve'torah va'avodah,' " in *Torah 'im derekh erez: hatenu'ah, isheha, ra'yonoteha*, ed. Mordechai Breuer (Ramat Gan: 1987), 102–103.

54. *Hazofeh*, 19 June 1939; Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi," 171. Another example is this statement against acts of terrorism by the Histadrut Hapo'el Hamizrachi: "Let us not defile this holy war by shedding the blood of innocents, neither shall we walk in the paths of the nations around us. We shall not thwart our holy war by murdering innocent people, nor shall we pollute the land with impure blood" (ibid., 94–95).

55. *Hazofeh*, 19 June 1939 (p. 37). Other reactions evinced more understanding of Jewish terrorism, though they too were aware of the moral harm incurred by acts of murder; see Schatzberger, *Meri umasoret*, 76ff.

56. Such criticism appears, for example, in the work of R. Aaron Shmuel Tamares, R. Moshe Avigdor Amiel and Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz; see Holzer, "Le'umiyut umusar," 226–347.

57. *Hazofeh*, 19 June 1939. Also see Haim Genizi (ed.), *Dat umahteret beerez yisrael bitkufat hamandat* (Tel Aviv: 1995); Naomi Gal-Or, *Hamahteret hayehudit: terorizm shelanu* (Israel: 1990), 23–30; Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi."

58. Yitzhak Herzog, "Nahpesah derakhenu," in *Neged hateror: maamarim, reshimot, neumim vegiluyei da'at*, ed. Binyamin and Ya'akov Peterseil (Ramat Gan: 1939), 42; see also his colleague, R. Ben-Zion Hai Uziel, the Sephardic chief rabbi in the 1930s: "Judaism says 'thou shalt not kill,' unconditionally. This 'thou shalt not kill' goes so far that, if it is possible to save a congregation of thousands by killing one innocent person, it is forbidden to kill that innocent person. There is no question here of rabbis, but a question of Judaism" (Uziel, "Lo yishafekh dam bekerev arzekha," in ibid., 69).

59. Bereishit raba, "Vayishlakh," sec. 76.

60. Uziel, "Lo yishafekh dam bekerev arzekha," 69.

61. *Sefer ha'arakhim*, 1:152.

62. See, for instance, *Ha'aretz*, 19 Nov. 1937, cited in Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi," 162, where the prooftext offered in support of the havlagah policy was "Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace" (Prov. 3:17). Similar concepts were invoked when other issues, such as the partition of Palestine, came up for discussion during the 1930s; see Dothan, *Pulmus hahalukah bitkufat hamandat*, 174; see also Schatzberger, *Meri umasoret*, 95; idem, "Mekorot ra'yoniyim litnu'at hamahteret bamasoret hahilkhatit," in *Dat umahteret beerez yisrael bitkufat hamandat*, ed. Genizi, 15.

63. See R. Uziel's comments, quoted in Shavit, *Havlagah o teguvah*, 149.

64. *Hazofeh*, 19 June 1939. See also the quote by R. Yeshayahu Shapira in *Hazofeh*, 14 July 1939 ("There are among us errant sons who wish to realize the goals of the redemption of the Jewish people, that great and sacred vision, through bloodshed.") Shapira was one of the leaders of the Torah Va'avodah movement.

65. *Hazofeh*, 16 Aug. 1946. In an earlier article, Bernstein argued that acts of terrorism led to a situation in which those responsible became accustomed to solving problems by means of violence (ibid., 27 Oct. 1944).

66. *Hazofeh*, 18 July 1939, cited in Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi, 172–173. Also see the remarks of Yishayah Wolfsberg (later Aviad) in *Hazofeh*, 27 April 1947. As they relate to the Jewish people's sovereignty over the land of Israel, the terms *hilul hashem* (desecration of God's name) and *kidush hashem* (sanctification of God's name) are understood differently by R. Zvi Yehudah Kook and his followers; see Kook, *Erez hazevi*, 73; Shlomo Aviner, "Velo shikarnu bivritekha," 44.

67. "Kol kore shel harabanim harashiyim," 15 *Shevat* 5707, archives of the chief rabbinate, "dissident organizations," cited in Schatzberger, *Meri umasoret*, 104.

68. Quoted in ibid.

69. Statement at a meeting of the Zionist Executive, 1 Oct. 1944, cited in ibid., 105.

70. *Hazofeh*, 31 Jan. 1945. Shapira (1902–1970), a prominent politician and leader of Hapo'el Hamizrachi, studied at R. Shimon Shkop's yeshiva in Warsaw and later at the Hildesheimer Rabbinical Seminary in Berlin. Known for his moderate leadership, he worked to reconcile various ideological movements in Israel. He was later a leading figure in the National Religious Party.

71. Given the fact that statements made by Shapira and others appeared in newspapers and journals, it is difficult to determine whether they represented deeply held views or were more in the nature of arguments put forward in the heat of debate. My assumption is that, looked at as a whole, such statements do indicate a spectrum of opinion held by the religious Zionist public.

72. For R. Maimon's views on unauthorized acts of violence undertaken by the opposition movements, see Schatzberger, *Meri umasoret*, 105–107; Don-Yehiya, "Dat veteror politi," 173–174.

73. R. Herzog, "Naḥpesah derakhenu," 42.

74. Until Hitler's rise to power in 1933 Moshe Unna was responsible for agricultural training in Germany of would-be pioneers in preparation for immigration to the land of Israel. He later became a member of the Israeli Knesset. See Zur, "Torah 'im derekh erez," 102.

75. Moshe Unna, "Mediniyut umusar," in *Yisrael baumot* (n.p.: 1971), 43.

76. Complete minutes of the cabinet meeting were released in April 1997. See *Ha'aretz*, 18 April 1997.

77. Ibid.

78. Moshe Unna, *Haza'ah letokhnit hamiflagah (si'at lamifneh)*, 1952 (p. 5). As in R. Reines' writings, there is a conscious gap between religious ideals and their partial realization. As Unna put it: "Hapo'el Hamizrachi distinguishes between problems of immediate policy and religious problems that have political aspects. The promised boundaries of the land in the Torah by no means impose upon us political commitments" (ibid.).

79. Ibid., 13. Other positions outlined in the platform expressed the ethical-religious principle, such as opposition to "acts of discrimination against the Arab minority" and a call for the state "to make a constructive contribution to solving the Arab refugee problem"—not only because it was "undoubtedly a cause of political instability" but also because the "humanitarian aspect should not be foreign to the people of Israel" (ibid., 8, 13).

80. See, for example, Moshe Unna, "Mashma'utah hadatit shel hagalut bahoveh," in *Yisra'el ba'umot*, 49, 55.

81. See the pamphlet written by Ephraim E. Urbach on behalf of the Movement for Torah Judaism, *Leshorsham shel devarim* (Jerusalem: 1966), 10. On the movement in general, see Meir Rot and Yoel Yarden, "Hatenu'ah leyahadut shel Torah: utopiyah shel maskilim yirei shamayim, " *Gilyon neemnei Torah va'avodah* (Elul 5756 [1996]), 17–40.

82. Urbach, *Leshorsham shel devarim*, 9; see also David Hartman, "Power and Responsibility: A Response to our Political Vulnerability," *Forum* 44 (Spring 1982), 53–58.

83. See Holzer, "Leumiyut umusar," ch. 1.

84. Zvi Yehudah Kook, *Lintivot Yisrael* (Jerusalem: 1967), 108.

Crime and Redemption? American Jewish Gangsters, Violence, and the Fight against Nazism

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In August 2001, the *New Yorker* published a lengthy memoir by Eric Konigsberg about his granduncle, Harold (a.k.a. "Heshy" and "Kayo") Konigsberg, a Jewish gangster whose handiwork includes at least 20 contract killings.[1] Imprisoned at the Auburn penitentiary in upstate New York, Harold got in touch with his grandnephew in 1997 (until then they had never met) in order to ask his assistance. Harold wanted Eric to use his connections to help him sell his tale "to those Weinstein brothers at Miramar [*sic*]," that is, to turn his life story into a feature film.[2] Eric confesses that after being approached by his granduncle, "I felt a detached thrill to know we had a criminal in the family, but I didn't expect others to see it that way, and I haven't brought myself to tell most of my friends. Early on my feelings alternated between perverse pride and something not quite its opposite."[3]

As an American Jew in the public eye, Konigsberg's admission that there is a convict in his family tree is actually far from unique. In a recent profile in the *Guardian*, Noam Chomsky recalled his mother's relatives

> "who included communists, were unemployed and involved in a rich, vibrant intellectual life—ranging from music and art to political activity. Most had little formal education, but it was a lively working-class culture that happened to be Jewish." One uncle in New York, "a hunchback with a background in crime," ran a newsstand on the corner of 72nd and Broadway.[4]

In a similar vein, a biography of artist Ben Shahn begins with this account of the artist's origins:

> In 1906, shortly after Ben Shahn arrived in the United States from Lithuania, he became aware of what he later called "the whole business of the Mayflower and ancestry." He was eight years old and had been taught that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the great biblical figures, were his ancestors, and they seemed unquestionably more directly related to him than did Columbus and the Pilgrims. It was puzzling. He recognized that he had parents and two sets of grandparents and many aunts and uncles, but he knew nothing of the kind of ancestry that appeared valued in his new country. In an attempt to establish this

> lineage, he nagged his father incessantly. He knew that his father was a woodcarver, as were his father's father and his father's grandfather, but he wanted to know more. Finally, exasperated, the young boy's father answered by drawing a picture of a man on a gibbet. When Ben wanted to know who that was, his father angrily answered that the man was an ancestor, a horse thief, adding, "If I ever catch you asking about ancestors . . . ! Only what *you* do counts, not what your ancestors did."[5]

Konigsberg, for his part, encountered something quite different from a distant horse thief or a crooked hunchback: a septuagenarian, hulking mass of a man who terrified him and whose very mention shamed many in his family.

Complementing the work of scholars such as Alan Block, Arthur Goren, Albert Fried, Daniel Bell, and Jenna Weissman Joselit, all of whom have studied American Jewish gangsters, Konigsberg's essay subtly probes the unfolding of an ambivalent relationship with his granduncle.[6] In some respects, his description is consistent with the stereotype of Jewish criminals relying more on brains than brawn and concentrating on vice rather than on violence.[7] Harold Konigsberg's fame stems, at least in part, from his savvy in evading authorities for decades and in successfully defending himself in court without the benefit of legal training or formal higher education. At the same time, he is distinctive for having perpetrated hundreds of violent offenses, including numerous murders. The offspring of another noted Jewish mobster, who insisted that her "father's work . . . wasn't a source of shame," distanced herself from Eric Konigsberg by saying: "Don't take this the wrong way, but I mean, I don't think my father killed anybody."[8]

To be sure, the image of the Jewish gangster is primarily that of an "organizer," a behind-the-scenes tactician and expert in money matters, as exemplified by Arnold Rothstein and Meyer Lansky. This myth persists despite the nonapologetic scholarly efforts of Block, Goren, Joselit, and Fried, as well as more popular works such as Burton Turkus and Sid Feder's *Murder, Inc.* and Malcolm Johnson's *Crime on the Labor Front*. All of these detail criminal networks in which murder and maiming were variously plotted and carried out by Jews, Italians, Irish, Scots, and even WASPs, although there was also a "distinct ethnic sequence"—periods in which Italians and Jews predominated.[9] There is no question that all of these men (and occasionally women) thought of themselves, first and foremost, as "American."[10] Yet because Jewish criminals are remembered mainly for so-called victimless crimes, they have been easier to accommodate, if not actually embrace, in Jewish family and ethnic lore.[11] Perhaps Eric Konigsberg is able to take solace in the knowledge that two of the world's leading Jewish families, the Bronfmans and the Annenbergs, have fortunes partially derived from underworld connections, and that brute violence was at the forefront of the Annenbergs' rise and consolidation of power.[12]

In his classic essay "Crime as an American Way of Life," sociologist Daniel Bell obscures the involvement of Jews in violent crime by sharply differentiating between gambling and other crimes. Notably, he places Moses ("Moe") Annenberg, father of multibillionaire and Jewish philanthropist Walter Annenberg, in the category of "gambler." Although it is true that Annenberg amassed the bulk of his fortune through racetrack information wires and betting sheets, he had originally established himself (along with his brother Max) as a henchman for William Randolph Hearst. But whenever his unsavory past is brought up, Annenberg is typically remembered for nothing

worse than providing a service for bookie joints. According to one account (which borrows from Bell without attribution), Annenberg even comes off as something of a martyr:

> In 1939, while under investigation by the Justice Department, Annenberg divested himself of all his interests in the racing wire service. He did not attempt to sell it to anyone or realize any salvage from it; he simply walked out. Nevertheless, he was convicted of tax evasion, fined eight million dollars, and sentenced to three years in prison. Shortly after his release he died.[13]

Other accounts, however, speculate that he was also guilty of scores of crimes for which he was never called to account—including murder.[14]

Ferdinand Lundberg's muckraking biography of Hearst (published in 1936) details the exploits of the brothers Max and Moses Annenberg.[15] After establishing themselves as "sluggers" in the service of Hearst, the brothers secured an interest in a rival newspaper, the Chicago *Tribune*, and utilized the same methods by which they had ascended the Hearst ladder. The following incident is described as "a typical newsboy slugging":

> On August 22, 1911, Charles Gallantry, a newsboy at Chicago Avenue and Robey Street, refused to take thirty additional *Tribune*s, which he knew he could not sell. Bob Holbrook, one of Annenberg's men, applying the Hearst method, smashed him in the face and knocked him down. When the boy rose he was knocked down again.
>
> This was repeated several times, with horrified spectators watching but deterred from interfering by Holbrook's assistants. Holbrook then tried to drag the newsboy into an alley, there to finish his work in privacy. The newsboy desperately clutched a weighing machine. He was then knocked unconscious and kicked repeatedly as he lay on the ground, blood pouring from his mouth.[16]

The Annenbergs, it was said, were also not above using their own fists and firearms: "On June 20, 1912, C.D. Ray, a newsboy, swore out a warrant that Max Annenberg had jumped from a truck and knocked him to the street, there kicking him repeatedly, in the presence of two unconcerned detectives. Annenberg was exonerated."[17]

In addition, the Annenbergs' violence was said to extend to competing newspapers and to those who ordered them. According to Lundberg, an attempt was made "to create the impression that lawless union members [of rival papers] were responsible for the deaths and injuries that followed." In one incident, reported in the *Daily Socialist* on May 6, 1912:

> Sluggers employed by the trust newspapers this morning beat into unconsciousness Alexander Hickey, a newsdriver, who was delivering the Chicago *Daily World*, and then kidnapped him in an automobile under the pretense of taking him to a hospital. The assault and kidnapping occurred in front of the elevated station at Wilson and Evanston Avenues. Guns were used by Max Annenberg, circulation manager of the *Tribune*, who rode to the station in an automobile . . . .
>
> A warrant will be sworn out charging Annenberg and his accomplices with attempted murder. Annenberg was dressed as a typical tenderloin representative. He wore a flaming red sweater and over his low brow was pulled a soft cap. With a malicious leer upon his countenance he swaggered around the elevated station . . . using foul language in the presence of women . . . . Carrying in his pocket a commission of deputy sheriff he kept raging around the elevated station . . . flourishing and brandishing his revolver like a maniac.[18]

Some time later, Max Annenberg was indicted by a grand jury for murder. Although he was acquitted, there were widespread allegations that the trial had been rigged.[19] Moe, for his part, was rumored to have beaten to death a newsboy in 1913.[20]

Finally, although it is often acknowledged that Moses Annenberg developed a system that was dependent on the crime syndicate of Al Capone and other mobsters,[21] it is less known that Annenberg persisted in his "slugger" mode even after the racing wire became one of his chief concerns:

> With Hearst's "Go ahead," Moe bought up distribution companies in larger cities throughout the country. Growth of magazine circulation had made this business most profitable. Sales of racing publications added to these profits. Through his control of the metropolitan newsstands, Moe took over the *Daily Racing Form*, a tip sheet, in 1922, and later the *Morning Telegraph* sports daily. Then he acquired the wire services to bookmakers and horse parlors and had a monopoly on race-track information. To maintain that monopoly, it was reputed that the Al Capone mob received an annual retainer of $1,000,000. Whenever a rival race-track tip-sheet was started, someone broke into the printing plant and wrecked the machinery.[22]

As noted, the Annenbergs' violent legacy has been transformed in today's Jewish world by means of the son/nephew's massive philanthropy. Walter Annenberg, moreover, is known for his concern for Jewish causes in the United States and in Britain. (His father had shown little interest or sympathy for the plight of Jews locally or worldwide; in terms of politics, Moe was an isolationist who opposed President Franklin D. Roosevelt, in contrast to most American Jews.) Edgar Bronfman, whose family was never linked directly to violent crime, has also donated huge sums of money to Jewish and non-Jewish institutions and has additionally taken on the role of a pan-national Jewish advocate. Walter Annenberg may not be able to contemplate such prominent leadership in the Jewish world, given the lingering shame of his family's past.

Eric Konigsberg's effort to record and analyze his granduncle's career is the polar opposite of the Annenbergs' endeavors to obliterate, or at least to minimize, the memory of their family's wrongdoing.[23] Indeed, Konigsberg has embarked on a mission of "finding where the bodies are buried"—and there are quite a few of them. Even in the decades before Prohibition, Alan Block has shown, Jewish "gunmen were as plentiful as were gunfights. Shoot-em-ups in the streets, in saloons, [and] in whorehouses were not uncommon."[24] Moreover, the role of Jewish strongmen in the realm of racketeering, especially under the auspices of Louis ("Lepke") Buchalter and Jacob ("Gurrah") Shapiro, is well represented in the historical literature, notwithstanding conflicting interpretations about the degree to which unions condoned the use of gangsters to further their aims.[25]

Although Bell argues that racketeering acted to "stabilize" relations between factory owners and their employees, a U.S. Senate report's definition of the term ("the obtaining of money or property from another with his consent, induced by the wrongful use of force or fear") emphasizes the activity's inherent violence. [26] During the 1930s and 1940s, more than a thousand murders were attributed to Murder, Inc.; according to Block, Jewish participation in the syndicate reached a peak in 1935.[27] "There was no method of murder their fiendish ingenuity overlooked," wrote Turkus and Feder:

> They used the gun, the strangling rope, the ice pick—commonplace tools for homicide. There was the unimaginative mob-style ride, the shotgun blast on the lonely street. And there were the bizarre touches, too. Dozens were dropped into quicklime pits. Others were buried alive, cremated, roped up in such a way that they strangled themselves by their own struggles for life. The killers thought they had come up with an especially appropriate effect the night they tied a slot machine to the body of a pinball operator who was "cheating," and dropped him into a resort lake.[28]

Among the killers was Harry Strauss (a.k.a. "Big Harry," "Pep," and "Pittsburgh Phil"), who stabbed Al Silverman, an "ex-convict and bootlegger," leaving him "dangling from a barbed-wire fence in Somers, Connecticut."[29] In the vicinity of Scranton, Pennsylvania, case files include the deaths of Lew Macowitz (a ride job), Jack Steinberg (shotgun), and Sam Wichner (stuffed in an automobile luggage compartment).[30] Racketeering, which was prevalent throughout the United States and not just in areas of Jewish population concentration, counted a disproportionate number of Jews among its victims, especially in Northeastern and Midwestern metropolitan areas.[31] This vignette from *Crime on the Labor Front* illustrates how the threat of violence through racketeering affected thousands of Jews:

> The late and notorious Dutch Schultz was a perfect example of the big-time gangster who found labor racketeering a profitable sideline. Schultz was a giant in the bootlegging business, a kingpin in the numbers game, and also boss of a union and trade association racket in the restaurant business in Manhattan. Schultz used what might be called the direct approach to "organize" the restaurant business into a multi-million-a-year racket. In 1932 he sent a gun-waving henchman, Julie Martin, to take over Local 16 of the Waiters Union. Next Martin commandeered Local 302 of the Cafeteria Workers Union by asking its Business agent, one Irving Epstein, "How do you think you'd look without any ears?". . . . Ironically, Martin was murdered after a quarrel with Schultz over the "take" from the restaurant racket, and Schultz himself was killed by rival gangsters afterwards.[32]

Such memories of Jews killing other Jews as well as Gentiles have not been totally erased over time, and the impulse to explore the Jewish/criminal nexus thrives in many forms. Literature and film, for instance, have together played a huge role in spreading and mediating the legacy of Jewish gangsterism. Rachel Rubin argues that in the realm of literature, Jewish gangsters have played a largely subversive role—exposing and undermining the contradictions of capitalism as the means by which Jews and other outsiders were "successfully" integrated into the American dream.[33] Although he was no doubt aware of the presence of Jewish criminals in popular culture, Gershom Scholem noted in 1976 that "the Jewish element in gangsterdom" had not been seriously investigated as the important factor it indeed was in American Jewish history and consciousness.[34]

To some extent, the distorted and softened image of American Jewish gangsters can be traced to the widespread myth that Jewish gangsters came to the defense of their Jewish brethren by subduing the threat of Nazism in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. More generally, Jewish violence has been viewed positively for its providing an appropriate riposte to home-grown fascism, "in the spirit of 'gib ehm a finstern sof,' " as Yankel Kurtzman put it.[35] American Nazis and other enemies of the Jews, it was felt, deserved nothing better than "a dark death" at the hands of those

they had derided as weaklings. Who but Jewish gangsters could do the necessary (if necessarily illegal) work of bloodying the noses and breaking the bones of those who threatened their fellow Jews?

The partially redeeming image of the Jewish gangster as defender and guardian of the group appears prominently in Rockaway's *But He was Good to His Mother* (which is primarily concerned with the folkloric memory of Jewish gangsters), as well as in oral history accounts and reports in the popular press.[36] In a nod to Rockaway's work, the American Jewish Historical Society's *Chapters in American Jewish History* includes a section on Jewish gangsters titled "But They were Good to Their People." "There are few excuses for the behavior of Jewish gangsters in the 1920s and 1930s," this chapter notes. "They were not nice men. . . . However, at crucial moments, they protected other Jews in America and around the world."[37]

When "Nails" Morton (né Samuel J. Markovitz) was killed at the age of 29 in a bizarre riding accident (a horse stomped on him) in 1923, it was reported that, in Chicago, "five thousand Jews paid tribute to [him] as the man who made the West Side safe for his race."[38] To this day, pilgrimages are made to Morton's grave in Chicago's Waldheim Cemetery, and the Chicago Jewish Archives notes a steady stream of interest in his life. Even the general Chicago press continues to carry features on this early 20th-century murderer and goon—though the emphasis tends to be more on Morton the proud Jew and highly decorated American soldier:

> Surrounded by hostile ethnics on all sides—Polish, Italian, Irish, Russian—the Maxwell Street Jews faced an almost daily struggle not only for territorial rights, but for survival. Racist gangs took delight in going down to "sheeny town" and beating up on the "mockie" kids, or stealing from the pushcarts and busting up things in general.
>
> By the time Nails was a teenager, the other Jewish boys in the settlement began looking to him for leadership in their gang fights with outsiders. In the growing West Side Jewish community, his leadership soon earned him a reputation not only as a street brawler but as a gambler . . . a tough bastard open to any proposition.

After an incident that became known as the "Battle of Humboldt Park" (in which Morton, armed with a knife and a baseball bat, took on a gang of Polish youths), the young tough was offered, according to one account, the choice between going to jail and "volunteering" to fight in the First World War. Morton chose the latter, enlisted in the 131st Infantry, and rose to the rank of sergeant:

> In one engagement, with his company pinned down by heavy fire, Sgt. Morton led a party into no-man's land. In hand-to-hand fighting, despite two wounds—a bullet in his arm and shrapnel in his leg—he captured a whole German trench. For this the French awarded him the croix de guerre, or Cross of War, their highest decoration for bravery. After being wounded a third time, he was honorably discharged a first lieutenant, and came back to Maxwell Street a hero covered with medals.[39]

Another Chicago Jew, Davey Miller, became famous as a boxing referee. Miller is credited with discovering and backing Barney Ross, who became one of the leading boxers of all time. Known too as a defender of victimized Chicago Jews, Miller headed his own criminal gang but was also a "member of the Elks . . . a Zionist and a Mason"—credentials in which any upstanding Chicagoan and Jew could take pride.[40]

In New York, "Kid Twist" Zweilbach, Jack Zelig, Abner ("Longie") Zwillman, and "Puddy" Hinkes were all revered for defending fellow Jews, especially pushcart owners who were continually harassed as they plied their wares. As late as 1992, according to Rockaway, "the Synagogue of the Suburban Torah Center in Livingston, New Jersey, sponsored a dinner to honor Puddy Hinkes as a man who 'wreaked havoc and destruction' on those 'that would wish to do harm to Jewish lives.' "[41] Similarly, Zelig was admired as a champion of the Jews despite the fact that his efforts were focused on defending other Jewish criminals against the incursions of Italians.[42] In a thoughtful analysis of Zelig's career, historian Arthur Goren quotes a private investigator working for the New York Kehillah, who reported that "if ever a man has done real good work for the East Side unknowingly, it was he. Outlaw he may be classed but he has done one thing and that is, he has rid the East Side of Italian pimps and thieves." Moreover,

> What Shoenfeld [the investigator] said in private, the popular press on occasion stated openly. It humanized Zelig, ascribed American virtues to him, and identified him as a proud Jew. Fifty years after the death of Zelig, this writer [Goren] asked Judge Jonah Goldstein, who had been a young lawyer at the time and involved in local politics, why so many attended his funeral. Did the East Side look upon him as a hero? The judge replied: " . . . These fellows made it possible for the Jews not to get tossed around."[43]

Such behavior and attitudes were not confined to the United States. In Britain in the late 1930s, Jack Spot—the kingpin of London crime before the emergence of the notorious Kray twins—is said to have been frustrated for having been forcibly prevented from utilizing his talents against British fascists, even after he had distinguished himself in the famed "Battle for Cable Street." "If the Government had given me and my mob a few rifles, we'd have cleaned up the Fascists once and for all," he is reported to have said:

> But no. The government had to put me in jail and then wait a few years before following the lead I'd given them. That delay cost a few billion pounds, a few million deaths, and they made such a mess of things that the whole world nowadays is once again on the brink of global destruction. Knowing that the government too, at long last, had lined up against the Fascists was poor comfort for me. There isn't a Jew alive who wouldn't fight Fascism in one way or another until he draws his last breath. [44]

Across the ocean, however, Spot's American counterparts enjoyed the privilege of being able to flex their muscles against Nazi sympathizers, albeit with the tacit consent of non-Jewish authorities, in what may have been the only genuine "Jewish crime wave" ever to occur in the United States.[45] Rockaway writes that in the late 1930s, Jewish mobsters were hired to break up meetings of the German-American Bund, a pro-Nazi organization. At one meeting in Yorkville, New York, in mere minutes, the Jewish mobsters left a scene of "dislocated limbs, bloodied heads and noses, and damage requiring dental work." Meyer Lansky, one of those who took part, recalled:

> We got there in the evening and found several hundred people dressed in their brown shirts. . . . The stage was decorated with a swastika and pictures of Hitler. The speakers started ranting. There were only fifteen of us but we went into action. . . . We attacked them in the hall and threw some of them out the windows. There were fist fights all over the place. Most of the Nazis panicked and ran out. We chased them and beat them up, and some of them were out of action for months.

Lansky ends his account with a denunciation of the hypocrisy of the official Jewish community, which persisted in calling him a gangster even when he was expressly acting on its behalf.[46]

Robert Lacey, Lansky's most thorough biographer, details how Lansky's expertise and connections were exploited during the Second World War. Lansky "was the man to whom the U.S. Navy went in 1942 when naval intelligence wanted underworld help to combat the U-boats operating off Long Island. Then the Navy turned to him again in 1943, when it was wondering how the Italian Mafia's cousins in America might be able to help with the forthcoming invasion of Sicily."[47] Lansky is credited as well with supplying essential arms and funds to Israel during its War of Independence.[48]

In New Jersey in the late 1930s, Rockaway writes, the intimacy between the police and Jewish mobsters enabled the latter to find out when and where pro-Nazi meetings were being held and, more particularly, when such meetings would be "unguarded." In places where the Jewish "Minute Men" could not gain entry with their bats and iron bars, they "smashed windows and destroyed . . . cars."[49] Meanwhile, in Minnesota—home of the pro-Nazi "Silver Shirt Legion"—Davie Berman, the city's gambling tsar, used a "fleet of Cadillacs as personnel carriers and thrashed the local Nazis with clubs and brass knuckles."[50] Perhaps the most audacious action was one that was never carried out; between May and September 1933, according to Rockaway and others, a group of New York rabbis and gangsters were involved in a plan to assassinate Adolf Hitler.[51]

Although the veracity of the incidents related by Rockaway and Lacey need not be questioned, their accounts ignore the broader context. Thus, on the one hand, it is important to be aware of the scale of the pro-Nazi threat in the United States; on the other, the extent of the opposition to Nazi sympathizers went far beyond the sporadic actions of a number of Jewish gangsters.

According to contemporary reports, the Silver Shirts were perceived and feared as a " 'quasi-military force' " with "over 25,000 members extending through 47 states." On the East Coast, the Bund counted "26 local chapters, a middle western department with over 14 local chapters, and a western department with over 10 local chapters, sponsoring four newspapers in Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles."[52] Although the size of chapters and meetings varied greatly, gatherings could attract as many as several hundred people, as was the case with "a party in honor of Hitler's birthday" in New York City in 1940 that was attended by some "700 revelers."[53] In Los Angeles, a "Summary Report of Activities of Nazi Groups and their Allies in Southern California," covering the period of 1938 to 1941, fills more than 30 folders.[54] Most ominously (at the time), the Bund established training camps in Grafton (Wisconsin), St. Louis (Missouri), Long Island (New York), Salisbury (Connecticut), Andover (New Jersey), Croyden (Pennsylvania), and Buffalo (New York), with plans for additional camps in Bridgman (Michigan) and Cleveland (Ohio), as well as a site purchased in South Bend, Indiana. While it was an exaggeration to see these phenomena as a "preliminary Nazi invasion of the United States," they were not taken lightly by U.S. authorities.[55]

The United States was of only minor importance in the Nazis' overall anti-Jewish strategy. Nonetheless, they were not oblivious to their American supporters. Nazis in

the German Reich took an interest in the Bund[56] even as they sought to fan U.S. antisemitism in their own, rather convoluted, way. Documents, for instance, were forged in order to prove that Benjamin Franklin was a rabid antisemite, and reports were concocted about President Roosevelt's supposed Jewish ancestry.[57] Even more interesting was the Nazis' attempt to sow antisemitic fervor in the United States by pointing to the menace of Jewish gangsters. Unfortunately (for them), their targets were not always well chosen: over a period of several months, various Nazi ministries and security services attempted to substantiate the "fact" that Al Capone was "a Polish Jew" and "Legs" Diamond, a "racial Jew."[58]

But all of this activity was not allowed to operate in a vacuum. The opposition to the Nazis went far beyond that of the Jews—or Jewish gangsters, for that matter. Although it has been largely overlooked in the historical literature, the opposition to American Nazis and their sympathizers was in fact broad-based, and overwhelmed the activities of Lansky and other "defenders of their people."[59]

One of the largest and most ferocious anti-Nazi demonstrations took place in Union City, New Jersey on October 2, 1938, at the site of a German-American Bund meeting. More than 5,000 people gathered with the intent not only to protest, but to disrupt the meeting. Leaders of the protest were "flying squadrons of [First] World War veterans," "the German-American League for Culture," and "the League for Peace and Democracy, many of whose leaders are avowed Communists."[60] Some among the demonstrators (probably a few dozen) were "threatening in their conduct and disorderly. A number of bricks, estimated as between 3 and 7, were thrown."[61] But in a different account carried by a Chicago newspaper, it was reported that Fritz Julius Kuhn, the leader of the Bund, faced a barrage of 2,000 people throwing stones.[62]

The Union City protest caused concern at the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which was keen to document what it perceived to be violations of the right of free speech and assembly.[63] The protest had followed "closely on others of similar character in Hudson County"; in Trenton, 1,300 protesters had disrupted a Bund rally, as had an almost identical number in Elizabeth, New Jersey.[64] Several months later, in February 1939, a Bund meeting held at Madison Square Garden—attended by 20,000 pro-Nazis, including 3,000 people dressed in Storm Trooper uniforms—was picketed by a crowd of 50,000.[65] The closest reference one can find to Jewish gangsters in the ACLU archives is a report of October 8, 1938, which states that in Hudson County, New Jersey, "an outdoor meeting addressed by a representative of the Workers Defense League was broken up by hoodlums; and now an indoor meeting arranged by the Nazis is broken up and under threats of violence."[66]

Protest rallies were not confined to the New York metropolitan area. In Syracuse, New York, police officers "brandishing nightsticks" had to pass an angry crowd of 2,000 people in order to "escort uniformed [Bund] members from a meeting." In Oakland, California, the Bund was "ousted" from its headquarters by the German Pioneer House, from whom the office had been leased.[67] German Americans also took the lead in closing down the Bund's Camp Nordland in Andover Township, New Jersey.[68]

Not all of these confrontations ended in victory for the protesters. On occasion, smaller groups of demonstrators found themselves outmatched and attacked by Nazi sympathizers. In a different incident in Yorkville (where, as will be recalled, Lansky

and his friends had routed a group of Bund members), a group of 100 protesters, most of them members of the Jewish War Veterans, came up against 3,500 Nazis who had gathered to celebrate Hitler's birthday; in the resulting fray, several of the protesters were seriously injured.[69] Similarly, in Philadelphia in March 1938, "unarmed American veterans . . . representing 16 posts of the American Legion, as well as posts of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Spanish-American War Veterans and Jewish War Veterans . . . were set upon and brutally beaten by uniformed Storm Troopers of the German-American Bund."[70]

The terror visited on cartoonist Charles Weiss was not often repeated, but it burned into the memory of many who read about it and has recently been fictionalized as a critical episode in Michael Chabon's best-selling novel, *The Amazing Adventures of Kavalier and Clay* (2000). Weiss, the physically handicapped editor of the vehemently anti-Nazi *Uncle Sam* comic series,

> was typing a letter about the Yorkville incident when . . . four men entered. All were in their twenties and appeared to be six feet or taller. They caught Weiss by the arms and demanded that he kiss a small swastika flag.
>
> When Weiss refused they beat him and kicked him. One of the men beat him with the standard of an American flag. Then they tore off his shirt and with a swab made of cotton on a stick they painted the emblem on him with ink, scratching him in the process.[71]

Far more typical, however, were symbolic attacks on American Jewry in the form of vandalism: in New York City schools, in synagogues, and in public buildings. Such vandalism often involved (as did the beating of Weiss) the desecration of the American flag, which suggests not so much a gesture against the United States as scorn for those Jews who so proudly identified themselves as Americans.[72]

"The American way" of combating such actions—recourse to the rule of law (interpreted broadly, in many instances) and nonviolent means of protest—proved to be more effective than the disruption of Bund meetings and the harassment of Nazi supporters. Over time, the ACLU reoriented its activities by defining Nazis as subversives and by focusing on the denial of rights of fascism's intended victims. Its assistance in combating pro-Nazis was rarely needed, however. Local communities more frequently took the initiative in forbidding the Bund (and less vociferous right-wing groups) from meeting and propagating their views.[73] In the summer of 1938, for instance, a coalition including the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and "Jewish organizations and German groups" stopped a meeting in Chicago. A "deluge of protests" inundated local authorities, accompanied by "hundreds of telephone calls." All of this prompted leaders of the Disabled American Veterans of the World War to begin a "national campaign to drive the Nazis and their camps out of every state in the union."[74]

Within the context of Jewish communal bodies, approximately 100 Jewish community relations committees (CRCs) emerged across the United States after 1933, in response to the Nazi rise to power and the threat of antisemitism. In Los Angeles, for example, the CRC organized a network of informants that, between 1933 and 1945, "often proved highly successful in infiltrating and exposing Nazi and other fascist and antisemitic organizations." The information it gathered was disseminated in a variety of ways, including a news research service.[75]

In numerical terms, the Nazi threat in America was never very great.[76] Far more dangerous was the movement's potential both to spread antisemitism and to strengthen existing isolationist tendencies, with the aim of keeping America out of the Second World War.[77] Responding to both threats, a coalition made up of a wide array of groups, including Communists (particularly through the American League against War and Fascism), organized labor, Jews, and Americans from all walks of life, utilized a variety of means against the Nazis, including peaceful protests, threats, the violation of the Nazis' constitutionally protected rights of free speech and assembly, and, on occasion, violence. Notwithstanding these broad-based yet relatively unknown and unresearched efforts, the myth developed—at least among Jews—that the role of Jewish gangsters in combating the specter of American Nazism was somehow exceptional. This myth, in turn, helped to soften the violent legacy of Jews in organized crime. In fact, the "good" use of violence as wielded by American Jewish gangsters was part of a more generalized, yet intense, American response to Nazism.

In line with Daniel Bell's assessment of Jewish criminals as proud Americans, it appears that their anti-Nazi activity was as much indicative of American patriotism as of Jewish solidarity. The paradox for Jewish criminals was that "success" in their careers required integration into the larger, non-Jewish world. By being highly identified with this legacy of anti-Nazism, Jewish gangsters lay claim to some of the moral high ground both as Jews *and* as Americans. But such a posture became possible only because they were a small segment of a much larger and highly popular mass movement against Nazism, which in the course of time became virtually forgotten. Not surprisingly, Jewish criminals were never punctilious about setting the record straight. This is another one they got away with.

Notes

The support of the Littauer Foundation, the University of London, the Arts and Humanities Research Board of Great Britain, and St. John's College, Oxford is gratefully acknowledged.

1. See Eric Konigsberg, "Personal History: Blood Relation: Getting to Know the Family Hitman," *New Yorker* (6 Aug. 2001), 46–59.
2. Ibid., 50.
3. Ibid., 48.
4. Maya Jaggi, "Noam Chomsky: Conscience of a Nation," *Guardian* (20 Jan. 2001), 8.
5. Howard Greenfeld, *Ben Shahn: An Artist's Life* (New York: 1998), 3.
6. See Alan Block, *Space, Time and Organized Crime*, 2nd ed. (New York: 1994); idem, *East Side, West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950* (Cardiff: 1980); Arthur A. Goren, "Saints and Sinners: The Underside of American Jewish History," *Brochure Series of the American Jewish Archives*, vol. 7, ed. Jacob R. Marcus and Abraham J. Peck (Cincinnati: 1988); Albert Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America*, rev. ed. (New York: 1993); Daniel Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life: A Queer Ladder of Social Mobility," in *The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties* (Glencoe, Ill.: 1966), 115–136; Jenna Weissman Joselit, *Our Gang: Jewish Crime and the New York Jewish Community, 1900–1940* (Bloomington: 1983). For a more sensationalist account, see Rich Cohen's best-selling work, *Tough Jews: Fathers, Sons, and Gangster Dreams* (London: 1998).
7. In *East Side, West Side,* Alan Block argues that this is a myth: "Both groups [Jews and Italians] were involved in vice activities and both were well represented in the ranks of violent entrepreneurs" (p. 131). Block provides convincing evidence for this argument (ibid., 219–235).

8. Konigsberg, "Getting to Know the Family Hitman," 59.
9. See Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 133.
10. Ibid. See also Burton Turkus and Sid Feder, *Murder, Inc.: The Story of "the Syndicate"* (New York: 1992), 4–5; Malcolm Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front* (New York: 1950).
11. See Block, *East Side, West Side*, 25.
12. On the Bronfmans, see Michael Marrus, *Samuel Bronfman: The Life and Times of Seagram's Mr. Sam* (Hanover, N.H.: 1991). Cf. Christopher Ogden's fawning *Legacy: A Biography of Moses and Walter Annenberg* (New York: 1999), which seeks to excise the family demons.
13. See David E. Lipman, "Jewish Gangsters," in *Gates to Jewish Heritage*, at www.jewishgates.org/personalities/gangster/stm (p. 2).
14. See Robert Rockaway, *But—He was Good to His Mother: The Lives and Crimes of Jewish Gangsters*, 6th ed. (Jerusalem: 1993), 201.
15. See Ferdinand Lundberg, *Imperial Hearst: A Social Biography* (New York: 1936).
16. Ibid., 155–156.
17. Ibid., 156.
18. Quoted in ibid., 158–159.
19. Ibid., 161.
20. See Elizabeth Bernstein, "Jewish Chicago Story: A Nostalgic Look Back at Some Kosher-Style Capones," *JUF News of Chicago* (June 1993), 68.
21. See Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America*, 117.
22. See J. David Stern, *Memoirs of a Maverick Publisher* (New York: 1962), 238.
23. For instance, copies of the *JUF News of Chicago* supplement of June 1993, which contains Bernstein's "Jewish Chicago Story" (see. n. 20), were mysteriously pulped. In the article, Bernstein repeats allegations of Moe Annenberg's crimes, including murder.
24. Block, *Space, Time and Organized Crime*, 55.
25. See Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America*, 129–174; cf. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 119.
26. Bell, "Crime as an American Way of Life," 131; 75th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report no. 1189, "Crime and Criminal Practices" (9 Aug. 1937), 3.
27. See Block, *East Side, West Side*, 226.
28. Turkus and Feder, *Murder, Inc.*, 4–5.
29. Ibid., 9.
30. Ibid., 15.
31. See Fried, *The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America*, 199n., 129–228; Murray Gurfein, "The Racket Defined," in *Organized Crime in America*, ed. Gus Tyler (Ann Arbor: 1962), 181–188.
32. Johnson, *Crime on the Labor Front*, 6–7.
33. See Rachel Rubin, *Jewish Gangsters of Modern Literature* (Urbana: 2000).
34. Gershom Scholem, *Und alles ist Kabbala: Gershom Scholem im Gesprach mit Jorg Drews* (Munich: 1980), 9.
35. Yankel Kurtzman, "a finstern sof," www.ibiblio.org/pub/academic/languages/yiddish/mendele/vo108.034.txt (p. 4); also see comments of Avrum-Yankev Amkraut, Isak Steyn, and Mel Poretz regarding "a finstern sof" on the "Mendele" discussion list.
36. See, for example, Rebecca G. Weiner, "Gangster Recalled as Generous to Jews," *New Jersey Jewish News*, 17 June 1999, found at www.njjewishnews.com/issues/6_17_99/mw/loc/article10.html; "An Interview with Elliott Bartner, for the Rutgers Oral History Archives of World War II," at http://fas-history.rutgers.edu.oralhistory/bartner.htm (p. 19ff).
37. "But They were Good to Their Nation," at www.ajhs.org/publications/chapters (ch. 70).
38. Irving Cutler, *The Jews of Chicago: From Shtetl to Suburb* (Urbana: 1996), 108.
39. Bill Reilly, "'Nails' Morton: The White Knight Gangster," *Inside Chicago* (March/April 1990), 30–31.
40. Bernstein, "Jewish Chicago Story," 65. According to Bernstein, Ross was another "Jewish boy from the Maxwell Street ghetto." In fact, he grew up on the Lower East Side, where his father owned a dairy. For more on Ross, see Elliott Horowitz's essay in this volume, "'They

Fought Because They were Fighters and They Fought Because They were Jews': Violence and the Construction of Modern Jewish Identity," 24–25, 32–34.

41. Rockaway, *But—He was Good to His Mother*, 224.
42. See Block, *Space, Time and Organized Crime*, 55.
43. Goren, "Saints and Sinners," 14–17.
44. See Hank Jensen, *Jack Spot: The Man of a Thousand Cuts* (London: 1958), 54. This is a sensationalized biography that purports to be based on conversations with Spot; also see Tony Kushner and Nadia Valman (eds.), *Remembering Cable Street: Fascism and Anti-Fascism in British Society* (London: 1999).
45. See Jenna Weissman Joselit's definition of "Jewish crime" in *Our Gang*, 33ff.
46. Quoted in Rockaway, *But—He was Good to His Mother*, 227.
47. Robert Lacey, *Little Man: Meyer Lansky and the Gangster Life* (Boston: 1991), 5–6.
48. See Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau, *Meyer Lansky: Mogul of the Mob* (New York: 1979), 295–297, 319–320.
49. Rockaway, *But—He was Good to His Mother*, 229.
50. Ibid., 230–231.
51. Ibid., 233–234.
52. Norman Littel, "Shadows of the Crooked Cross," in *The Disgrace of Anti-Semitism* (London: 1944), 14–15. Little was an assistant U.S. attorney general; this booklet was published by the World Jewish Congress.
53. Carly Evans, "Goosestepping at the Garden," *Waterfront Week History*, at www.h20week.com/history/19981203/hist/hist.html
54. Los Angeles Community Relations Council Records, at www.huc.edu/aja/La-crc.htm (p. 2).
55. Littel, "Shadows of the Crooked Cross," 14–15.
56. Evidence of the Nazis' interest in the German-American Bund can be found in the Institut der NSDAP zur Erforschung der Judenfrage (Frankfurt), Records, 1930–1945, RG 222, Berlin Collection, YIVO Archives, New York (hereafter: B-C, YIVO), folder 99. In this folder is an article from the *New York World-Telegram*, 19 July 1937 with a retouched photograph. The article is titled "American Nazis Open New Jersey Camp in Sussex Hills" and the photograph caption reads:

> Nearly 1,000 uniformed men, wearing swastika armbands and led by swastika banners and American flags, paraded at the opening of the 100-acre camp of the New Jersey division of the German-American Bund in the Sussex hills yesterday. Spokesmen for a group of Italian-American "Blackshirts," who were guests at the opening hailed the bund members as 'Nazi friends.' Spectators give the Nazi salute.

See also folder 100, which includes a photograph from a mass meeting from 1936 and propaganda from the American Gentile Youth Movement. And see Sander Diamond, *The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924–1941* (Ithaca: 1974), passim.

57. Ibid., folders 102 and 104. The latter includes a flysheet of article titles, including "How Roosevelt is Following Marx" and "Destruction of U.S. Constitution via Supreme Court 'Packing' and Legislation"; it also includes a very amateurish family tree that supposedly uncovers Roosevelt's Jewish ancestry.
58. See RG 215, and RG65, B-C, YIVO. Among the letters in these files are one from the Politzeipräsident in Aachen in August 1935 ("not able to confirm that Diamond is Jewish but he is a member of a Freemason lodge") and an item from the German consulate in New York that reports that Capone is "American-Italian."
59. The phrase "defenders of their people" is used by Rockaway in *But—He was Good to His Mother*. See also Sander Diamond, *The Nazi Movement in the United States*. Diamond's unique and overlooked study makes no mention of Jewish gangsters playing a role in fighting Nazism. See also Philip Jenkins, *Hoods and Shirts: The Extreme Right in Pennsylvania, 1925–1950* (Chapel Hill: 1997) and David Bennett, *Demagogues in the Depression: American Radicals and the Union Party, 1932–1936* (New Brunswick: 1969).
60. *New York Post*, 4 Oct. 1938; Report of the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union (NJCLU)

to the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], submitted by Francis McKee, 12 Oct. 1938, ACLU Collection, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (hereafter: MML).

61. Ibid. (report of the NJCLU).

62. See "Thomas Assails Stoning of Kuhn," *Chicago Illinois Examiner*, 4 Oct. 1938, MML.

63. Letter from the ACLU to the NYCLU, 3 Oct. 1938, MML.

64. See "Jersey Anti-Nazis Halt Bund Rally in Elizabeth Hall," *Daily Worker* (New York), 16 Sept. 1938, MML.

65. See Evans, "Goosestepping at the Garden."

66. Letter from the ACLU to the NJCLU.

67. See "Crowd Menaces Syracuse Bund: Police Escort Uniformed Member from Meeting as 2,000 Jeer and Threaten," and "Oakland, California Group Ousted from Quarters—Reported Drilling with Rifles," *New York Times*, 16 Oct. 1938, MML.

68. See "Germans Rally to Attack Bund; Camp Nordland Assailed for Its Influence on American Youth," *New York Post*, 29 Aug. 1938, MML.

69. See "Veterans Fight City's Nazis on Hitler's Birthday; Yorkville Rally Ousts Men in Overseas Caps Asking for a Speech in English; 7 of Them Severely Hurt," *New York Herald Tribune*, 21 April 1938, MML.

70. See "Nazis Attack U.S. Veterans in Phila.; Storm Troopers Blackjack American Vets at Bund Meeting," *Daily Worker*, 25 March 1938, MML.

71. "Four Thugs Raid Anti-Nazi Magazine Here; Beat Editor, Scratch Swastikas on His Body," *New York Times*, 23 April 1938.

72. See "City Probes Coughlin Hoodlum Outbreaks," *Daily Worker*, 17 Nov. 1942, MML.

73. See Reverend L.M. Birkhead, "Hundreds of Native Groups Drive for 'Fascist U.S.'; Many German Fundamentalist Churches Join Movement," *The New Leader*, 18 March 1939, MML.

74. "Ban Nazi Rally in Chicago as Protest Grows," *Jersey City Journal*, 13 July 1938, MML.

75. Los Angeles Community Relations Council Records, 1.

76. See "Says Kuhn's Bund had 6,617 in 1937; Report of Justice Department Reduces 'Fuhrer's' Claim to 200,000 Membership," *New York Times*, 4 April 1939, MML.

77. See "Hearst Accused in Court of Aiding Nazis," *In Fact*, 6 April 1942; "Henry Ford and the Jews," *New Leader*, 17 Jan. 1942, MML.

Reflections on Jewish Resistance under the Nazi German Occupation

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There are few historical overviews and even fewer analytical and comparative studies of the Jewish resistance movement in the Second World War. Rather, the focus of research has been on the question of why the Jews were such easy prey for the Nazis and their accomplices. In most cases, this is interpreted in terms of an innate passivity that is anchored both in Jewish culture and values and in patterns of submissiveness that became internalized over time in response to continuing rejection, oppression, and physical violence. In examining Jewish resistance in comparative perspective, this essay both sets straight the historical record with regard to Jewish behavior during the Second World War, and raises serious doubts about, if not undermines, the concept of Jewish passivity.

In the aftermath of the Holocaust, it seemed only natural to ask why European Jews allowed themselves to be led to death despite their innocence of wrongdoing. As Hannah Arendt put it, never were there more innocent victims than these, yet they neither rebelled nor attacked their murderers—which is particularly surprising, given fundamental Jewish teachings regarding the right (and even duty) of preemptive self-defense. This question prompted scholars such as Henri Michel to conclude that "for a number of reasons, mostly rooted in the past, the Jews were not predisposed to fight." Such historical reasons had earlier been spelled out by Philip Friedman in an essay first published in 1960. In it, he contrasted other nations' "legacies of heroism involving physical and military prowess" with the "Orthodox Jewish tradition," in which the

> concept of heroism is inextricably identified with the idea of spiritual courage. This is not an empty ideal but one requiring sacrifice for the sake of religion. . . . The ideal of "bravery with holiness," known in Hebrew as *kiddush ha-Shem* (lit., "sanctification of God's name") [is what] characterized the resistance carried out by Orthodox Jews during the Nazi domination . . . and can be epitomized by the saying: "Not by force but by strength of the spirit."[1]

Highly significant in this context is the view expounded by one of the best-known Holocaust scholars, Raul Hilberg, in the first edition of *The Destruction of the European Jews*:

> The reaction pattern of the Jews is characterized by almost complete lack of resistance. In marked contrast to German propaganda, the documentary evidence of Jewish resistance, overt or submerged, is very slight. On a European-wide scale, the Jews had no resistance organization, no blueprint for armed action, no plan even for psychological warfare.

This he attributes to the fact that even after their long history of persecution, "the Jewish victims managed to repress their awareness of catastrophe and to substitute for that knowledge a mere illusion." According to Hilberg,

> after surveying the damage, the survivors had always proclaimed in affirmation of their strategy the triumphant slogan, "The Jewish people lives". . . . This experience was so ingrained in the Jewish consciousness as to achieve the force of law. . . . A two-thousand-year-old lesson could not be unlearned; the Jews could not make the switch. They were helpless.[2]

Hilberg, however, did not say how the Jews could or should have responded to their inescapable doom. Rather, his focus on reconstructing the plans for and the implementation of the Final Solution, and the techniques and bureaucracy of the killings, led him to view the Jews as an integrated link in the machinery of their own annihilation. Moreover, in focusing, mainly via German sources, on the "masses of Jews [who] . . . reacted to every German order by complying with it automatically,"[3] Hilberg missed the evidence of the variety of Jewish responses as portrayed in Jewish sources and documentation.

Similarly, in Palestine and later in Israel, simplistic and distorted explanations concerning the lack of Jewish resistance during the Holocaust were mostly founded on a fundamental lack of knowledge. One commonly expressed point of view was the Zionist explanation of Jewish passivity as an inevitable outcome of exile. Distinguished Jewish historians and Zionist political leaders elaborated the conceptions of exile (*galut*). In an essay written during the Second World War titled "*Galuyot* and Their Destruction," Benzion Dinur (both a historian and a prominent public figure in Palestine and Israel) analyzed the cyclical nature of diaspora communities and their recurring devastation. Of particular importance in this ongoing history of destruction, according to Dinur, was the tension arising from the inherent contradiction between the flourishing of Jews and Jewish life in periods of relative stability, and the reactions to that flourishing—both latent and manifest—on the part of others. Applying this insight to the contemporary period, Dinur noted that "never before had the Jews been so deeply integrated politically, economically, and socially, or flourished so demonstratively in so many spheres of life. The convergence of these factors," he concluded, "created ripe conditions for the 'destruction of *galuyot*' in our own time."[4] Yitzhak Baer, a German-born historian of Spanish Jewry who later moved to Palestine, addressed the concept of galut in an eponymous work published in Germany in 1936. In his judgment: "Galut has returned to its point of departure. It has reverted to what it has always been and what it will continue to be: a political enslavement that has no remedy save its outright abolition."[5]

Echoing these views in a bitter article titled "From Destruction to Destruction," Yitzhak Gruenbaum (a prominent interwar Zionist leader of Polish Jewry) wrote in Palestine in 1943:

> The history of galut is in fact the history of destructions and periods of reemergence between destruction and destruction. Each and every period in the history of our exile has ended in disaster [*shoah*], all-out and all-embracing devastation. . . . It is as though there were a law in our people's lives in exile, that our communities have no permanence and are doomed, all of them, to extirpation. And if we thought this law applied only in eras of ignorance and its concomitant cruelty, the current war came along and showed us how wrong we were.[6]

After the war, this view—that exile and destruction were inextricably linked—was expressed by many Holocaust survivors as they went about the task of rehabilitation. Having confronted the Holocaust, they believed that the Jewish people's only chance of avoiding future annihilation was to achieve independence in the land of Israel.

Jewish Strategies for Survival

Framing the issues in terms of innate Jewish passivity and the inevitability of the destruction of Jewish life in galut both obscures the reality of, and precludes the need to study the Jews' struggle for survival during the Second World War. Indeed, by rephrasing the issue in terms of the struggle to survive, Jewish behavior is placed in a very different light. Any discussion of Jewish strategies for survival must begin with an examination of the questions of what the Jews in Europe knew about their fate, and if and when they became aware of the parameters of the Final Solution *at the time*—which is very different from viewing matters in retrospect, when the end of the process of destruction is clear.

This is particularly so in the case of the Jews herded into the ghettos in Poland soon after the Nazi occupation, whose physical liquidation in fact unfolded gradually. By and large, those who had more resources (savings, property, and valuables) that could be bartered for basic food items were able to hold on longer than others. Did such utilization of resources constitute a form of acquiescence by Jews to their harsh treatment by the Nazis—what Hilberg characterized as "a priori pacifism"? One insight is offered by Chaim Aharon Kaplan, who kept a diary in the Warsaw ghetto:

> Whence do all these people make a living? All forms of business and vocation are forbidden to them . . . all stations that provided for well-being and livelihood have been obliterated . . . the informal institutions have been destroyed . . . everything is closed and shuttered, broken and shattered. . . . Nevertheless, the masses are alive, the masses are alert, the masses dismiss utterly all the tyrant's decrees . . . and do everything they can do to outwit him, delude him surreptitiously and indirectly, and God promises his basic needs. . . . Everything is forbidden and we do everything! We make our living from what is forbidden.[7]

It goes without saying that the Jews did not recognize the legitimacy of the Nazi-controlled regimes under which they were held, nor, with few exceptions, was there any real cooperation with the Germans. Rather, solidarity and circumvention of official directives united all levels of Jewish society. In this regard, the role of the Judenräte, the institutions set up by the Nazis to represent the Jews, needs to be examined. In the years following the war, the Judenräte were often viewed as tainted by collaboration.

On the basis of expanded documentation, such wholesale condemnation now seems unjustified. To begin with, there were differences of approach and patterns of operation. Moreover, the Judenräte were responsible for many essential services, such as labor, distribution of food and coal, sanitation and health, and education—sometimes dealing as well with issues involving housing and aid for refugees, orphans, and the destitute. The tragedy of this institution lay in its thankless role, located between the hammer and the anvil. For the Germans, the Judenräte were administrative instruments that were beholden to them, whereas for the Jews, they were the sole Jewish public body that dealt with the authorities. In the light of current knowledge, a more complex picture emerges of an institution whose leaders generally followed orders under duress, and were guided mainly by a Sisyphean effort to faithfully serve and defend the Jewish community.[8]

Thus, Jewish life in the ghettos was characterized not so much by passivity and pacifism as by the defiant struggle for survival. The main and constant emphasis was on obtaining food and maintaining a clandestine production for barter. Smuggling provided the Warsaw ghetto with most of its food. Goods were smuggled out via the wall and the gates and bartered for food and raw materials for manufacturing, which were smuggled back in. Although those caught were severely punished—and often killed—smuggling remained the Warsaw ghetto's main lifeline.

In contrast, the Lodz ghetto, the second largest in occupied Poland, was sealed hermetically, and smuggling was virtually impossible. This ghetto was inhabited mainly by impoverished Jews, many of the more affluent having left the city before the final stage of ghettoization; those who remained maintained an existence by providing the Germans with skilled and factory labor. Other, smaller ghettos were not necessarily cut off from their non-Jewish environs. In some small towns and rural localities, Jewish merchants and artisans—tailors, shoemakers, carpenters, and the like—were at various times able to maintain some trade and manufacturing connections with their immediate surroundings.

Other areas of life (mutual assistance, education and culture, children's lodgings and orphanages, the organization of residents' committees, soup kitchens, religious services, and clandestine study) operated in the gray zone between what was tolerated and what was forbidden by the Nazi regime. At the grassroots, individuals who were hitherto inexperienced in communal affairs became active in the day to day struggle against distress and despair.

At the same time, a political underground made up mainly of political activists and hardcore members of youth movements came into being. Continuing their prewar work, these groups held meetings both to discuss the war and the local situation and to listen to illegal radios. They also published mimeographed newspapers that kept people informed about developments on the military front and in other parts of the world, and which provided a forum for free discussion. Clandestine archives were established by Emanuel Ringelblum in the Warsaw ghetto and later by Mordechai Tenenbaum and Zvi Mersik in the Bialystok ghetto. Youth movement couriers, mainly girls, traveled illegally by train between cities and were the major link between the ghettos and party nuclei and underground resistance groups outside them. Early on, tenuous postal links were set up with the external world by means of seemingly innocuous letters containing various code words and phrases. Later, during the period

of mass killings, broadcast messages were transmitted via the channels of the Polish underground.

The best-known leaders of Polish Jewry—representatives in parliament and municipal councils, heads of the large Jewish communities, and leading figures in the various political parties and public and cultural institutions, had left Poland (and later, Lithuania) with the initial waves of those who fled to the east and to other points abroad. For this reason, it was mostly youth group members and lower-level welfare workers who took up the slack in establishing an organizational framework to cope with the worsening crisis. While a number of key youth group activists had also fled earlier, they quickly realized the demoralizing effect their absence would have on the young people remaining under German occupation, and select individuals were thus sent back to lead them. Among them were Mordechai Anielewicz, Yitzhak (Antek) Zuckerman, Zivia Lubetkin, and Yosef Kaplan, all of whom later became leaders of the fighting organization and the Warsaw ghetto uprising.

Meeting in small groups, these youths created for themselves spiritual enclaves and patterns of close comradeship that were inspired by sources and values far removed from the harsh daily realities enveloping their parents and elders. In the nature of things, as young people without immediate family responsibilities, they were more directly focused on the changes and turmoil about them and more readily available for being molded into a cohesive unit willing to take risks.[9] It is little wonder, then, that when the time came, these Zionist, Bundist, and Communist youth constituted the bulk of the organized Jewish resistance.

In contrast with the patriotic national resistance movements in occupied Europe that opposed the Germans in the hope of postwar gains and to promote national and ideological goals, the aspirations of the Jews in the ghettos were summed up in the struggle to keep themselves and their families alive until the storm blew over and they could return to a state of normalcy. Even the members of the Jewish underground did not think much about fighting at the initial stage, but rather were concerned with setting up mutual aid, assisting the weak, maintaining a semblance of humanity, and upholding values to which their spirit and ideology committed them.

At a later stage, many Jews—among them Judenräte chairmen—came to the conclusion that the only chance for the Jews to stay alive was to produce goods useful to the German war effort. (This approach, of course, was also integral to the concentration camp regime.) "It is a tragic nexus," Ringelblum wrote in May 1942. "The Jews have the right to live only when they toil for the needs of the German army. It is a tragedy unparalleled in history."[10] Nevertheless, Jews (and non-Jews) exploited opportunities to sabotage the products of their labor. The slogan "work slow" was common coin in the Lodz ghetto and in the camps. Sometimes, due to lack of materials or tools in the plants, work was a pretense. At the same time, it was understood that a general boycott would be disastrous, as it would destroy the only basis upon which the Germans had permitted these Jews to live.

In fact, Jewish labor in the ghettos was a source of ongoing friction between the SS and the leadership of the General-Gouvernement. The latter insisted that both the organization and the benefits of this labor were in its domain. With the launching of the Final Solution in 1942, a conflict of interests developed between the Wehrmacht and private manufacturers who employed Jews, on the one hand, and the SS, on the

other. Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, was obliged to come to terms with the fact that the labor shortage in the Reich made it necessary to allow some Jewish workers a temporary lease of life; the rest he endeavored to concentrate in camps under SS control.

While devoid of any sense of humanitarianism or aversion to killing, Nazi interest in Jewish labor was nonetheless ambivalent in nature, as reflected in the contradictory views held by Hans Frank, the head of the General-Gouvernement. Whereas in his diary and in a lecture at the University of Berlin in 1941 he declared that it was worthwhile for the Germans to employ Jewish artisans and craftsmen in return for elementary existential needs, in the fall of the following year, he indicated that it might be necessary to actively hasten the killing of the Jews: "We are sentencing 1.2 million Jews to death, [and if they do not] starve to death it will be necessary to expedite anti-Jewish edicts, and we hope that this will be so."[11] Yet less than three months later, on December 9, 1942, Frank reverted to his previous line of thinking. "We have been deprived of considerable labor potential among Jews with [work] experience," he informed the General-Gouvernement's ministerial body. "Clearly the labor process suffers when in the midst of fulfilling the war plan, an order is handed down that all the Jews have to be exterminated [*alle Juden sind der Vernichtung anheim zu stellen*]. The responsibility for this does not lie with the General-Gouvernement. The order to exterminate the Jews came from a higher echelon."[12]

That this was a struggle by the Jews for survival was conceived as such at the time. Thus R. Yitzhak Nissenbaum, a leading religious Zionist, is reported to have said: "This is a time for *kidush haḥayim* [the sanctification of life], not *kidush hashem* [sanctification of God's name by willingness to die for it]." Whereas in the past, he pointed out, their enemies had demanded the Jews' souls, now the tyrant had come to take their bodies. Consequently the Jews were enjoined by R. Nissenbaum to protect their physical, corporeal lives. Ringelblum, who kept a finger on the pulse of ghetto life, affirmed this concept. In late March 1941, he wrote, "The aspiration to maintain the existence of the Jewish population is today the expression of *kidush hashem*."[13]

From the outset, the Jews were aware that the struggle to survive was no easy one, as was poignantly expressed in the opening words of Ringelblum's diary (penned on November 15, 1940, around the time the Warsaw ghetto was sealed): "People are assuming that no more than half will remain alive."[14] The harsh realities of that struggle were soon evident in the ghettos, especially the larger ones, which quickly became what the Germans called "death chambers" as the Jews' material resources became depleted and their physical and moral stamina declined apace. Cohesion among family units persisted until the end, with women and mothers, in particular, showing resilience and resourcefulness. Within the community, there were also many instances of selfishness and greed. At the same time, a guiding kernel of humanity was apparent in the varied forms of mutual assistance that were provided.

On the margins were a number of individuals and groups that overtly served the Nazis, forming a fifth column within the midst of Jewish society. Many members of the Jewish police, for example, at times acted brutally and cold-heartedly in assisting the Nazis to hunt down Jews, and were condemned as traitors. Nevertheless, collaborators' reports on what was going on in the ghettos seem to have focused mainly on accounts of deprivation and descriptions of its economic life. From the scanty evi-

dence at our disposal, it appears that these informers did not systematically report on the underground or on the efforts to maintain communal solidarity.[15] There is no way of knowing whether this reluctance to disclose the ghetto's deepest secrets stemmed from a fear of revenge or from a sense of group responsibility. The former had a basis in reality: shortly before the uprising in the Warsaw ghetto, the Jewish fighting organizations executed a number of Nazi collaborators. As a result, during the last months of its existence, the ghetto was free of informers and foreign agents.

What and When Did the Jews in the Ghettos Learn about the Final Solution?

Vague and fragmentary rumors about the mass killings by the Einsatzgruppen from the beginning of the German anti-Soviet military campaigns in the middle of 1941; liquidations of Jews in the General-Gouvernement areas in Operation Reinhardt; and the deportation of Jews in other European countries eventually reached those in the ghettos—but no one knew what this information meant for them. Even some Jewish communal leaders, presumably better informed, believed that the mass killings in the Soviet areas were local outbursts that reflected the general chaos of war or else were targeted against Jews suspected of supporting the Soviet regime. Similarly, the mass deportations of Jews from Poland that began in the spring of 1942 were thought to herald an intensification of the process of Jewish population transfer that had been going on in occupied Poland since the outbreak of the war—made necessary, according to the Germans, to better utilize Jewish labor. Although the Jews' fears were never fully lulled by the Germans' explanations, the turn to a policy of mass killing was not fully comprehended or absorbed by many Jews.

Clearly, what made the truth difficult to comprehend and absorb was the inability to imagine that a state and an army were rounding up ordinary people in order to kill them. But beyond that, the evidence indicates that during 1942, conditions eased slightly in several ghettos, including that of Warsaw. Epidemics and mortality rates declined, more people found temporary employment and therefore a scanty source of livelihood, and the population that remained (following a considerable decline in the numbers of refugees and the destitute) now displayed greater resilience and adaptability. Nevertheless, there were manifest indicators of the German deception—among them, the fact that the first groups rounded up for deportation were children, the elderly, and those unfit for labor. In addition, credible reports about the death camps in Chelmno, Belzec, Treblinka, and Sobibor began to appear in a bulletin published by the Ringelblum archives staff and in the underground press. The Bund newspaper, *Oyf di vakh*, reported on the fate of those transported from Warsaw in the mass expulsion of summer 1942.[16] Even though these reports did not reach all of the ghettos, let alone all of the people, and were often met with disbelief, there was still a growing anxiety.

The critical issue in this context is how the Jews understood and interpreted what was happening. Both the reports concerning deportations to unknown destinations and the rumors about death camps lacked one vital piece of information: that this fate awaited all the Jews. Today we know all too well about the Germans' policy toward

the Jews and, in the final stage, the implementation of a program of total extermination. At the time, however, the truth was hard to internalize. An individual who "knows" something terrible can (consciously or not) repress this information, particularly if he or she is helpless to act upon it. More to the point, although many Jews knew some of the truth, they were unaware of its main substance. They gathered that those expelled from different places in the course of Nazi round-ups (*Aktionen*) were being sent to death camps, but noted as well that a certain number of people were left behind; moreover, Jews on occasion were sent to labor camps. In brief, it was not clear that the death sentence applied to all Jews—workers and nonworkers alike—throughout the entire area under German control.

From Knowledge to Armed Resistance

The first public call to armed resistance, based on an awareness that the Nazis planned to exterminate all Jews in their hands, was made in a manifesto by Abba Kovner that was read at a meeting of Zionist youth group members in Vilna on the night of December 31, 1941. The manifesto was brief and decisive: "Hitler is scheming to exterminate all of European Jewry. It is the fate of the Lithuanian Jewry to be first in line. . . . No one taken out through the gates of the ghetto has returned. . . . True, we are weak and defenseless, but the only answer to the enemy is resistance!"[17]

Lacking solid information of the Final Solution, Kovner and his comrades arrived at their conclusion by guesswork and bold intuition. Nevertheless, the pronouncement steadily gained in credence—in large part because Vilna ghetto residents were well aware of mass killings that had recently occurred. Of the 57,000 Jewish residents of Vilna when the Germans occupied the city in June 1941, only 20,000 now remained: in the interim, some 35,000 had perished in the course of Einsatzgruppen killing operations at Ponar, on the city's outskirts. Thus, Kovner's call did not go unanswered. In January 1942, the United Partisan Organization (Fareynegte Partizaner Organizatsye [FPO]), the first Jewish military resistance organization in the occupied areas, was established in Vilna.

As the manifesto circulated surreptitiously, alarming reports of what had occurred in Vilna and in the death camps in Chelmno finally reached the ghettos in central Poland; within a few months, contacts and attempts to establish a fighting organization in Warsaw were initiated. However, because of initial hesitation on the part of some of these underground groups, it took until the first week of the great deportation in July 1942 before the combined fighting organization in Warsaw was actually set up by members of three Zionist youth movements: Hashomer Hazair, Dror, and Akiva. Further coalescence of the various active underground groups in the ghetto (including the Bund, Poale Zion, and the Communists) into the Jewish Fighting Organization (Zydowska Organizacja Bojowa [ZOB]) took place between November 1942 and January 1943. (The Revisionists and Betar, however, remained outside the ZOB and established a separate organization, the Jewish Military Union [Zydowski Zwiazek Wojskowy (ZZW)], which later took an active role in the fighting.) The ZOB saw itself as the focus of countrywide initiative and organization, and indeed, its in-

spiration and influence spawned organizations and core groups in other cities such as Bialystok, Krakow, Czestochowa, Tarnow, and in the region of Zaglembie.

What took so long for resistance groups to mobilize? Why did they begin to emerge only during the last stages of the war, at the beginning of the final deportations? Part of the answer has already been given: the truth of the Final Solution became apparent to Jews only over an extended period of time. Moreover, the truth was so terrible that it was beyond belief. This, of course, was true as well for the leaders and the general non-Jewish population, who also had difficulty in accepting the full extent of the Nazi evil. But once the truth became known to the Jews in the ghettos, did resistance become the norm?

Initiating and organizing for armed resistance, as occurred at the beginning of the final deportation when the last ghetto inhabitants were expelled and all hope was lost, would seem to be a predictable response. Yet research on human behavior under totalitarian regimes has shown that manifestations of resistance and of individual and group rebellion are actually the exception rather than the rule. Under both Nazi and Soviet rule, those sections of the population subjected to repression, massive incarcerations, and death, and who stood no real chance of improving their lot by physical resistance, hardly ever took up arms. In his study of anti-Nazi resistance, for example, Henri Michel came to the seemingly puzzling conclusion that the most severely oppressed groups—those who faced total humiliation and death, such as concentration camp prisoners, Soviet prisoners of war, and slave laborers taken to Germany from various countries—did not defend themselves and rarely rebelled.[18]

Many active members of underground and radical political groups from Germany, Poland, Yugoslavia, France, Belgium, and elsewhere were interned in concentration camps, but no instances of uprising among them were recorded. Similarly, about three million Soviet prisoners of war, many of them toughened combat veterans, died or were killed in German captivity, yet despite their extreme situation, uprisings among them were few and far between. In Auschwitz, where several of the most prominent members of the Polish resistance perished or were murdered, an uprising took place in October 1944 among the Sonderkommando (a unit of prisoners that worked in the crematorium and gas chamber area). But nearly all members of this detail were Jews. Other Jews engaged in forced labor in the Treblinka and Sobibor death camps also rose up. Meticulously planned by a nucleus of prisoners, these uprisings were aimed mainly at organizing a breakout and escape from the camp, and were nurtured by the slim hope that a few prisoners might in fact be saved.

Essentially, however, it seems that persons deprived of an orderly society, stricken with despair, and unable to save their lives or envisage a future for themselves did not revolt or fight hopeless battles. In this regard, the case of the Poles who rebelled against the Germans in Warsaw in August 1944 is instructive. They launched their uprising (when it appeared to them that the Soviet forces were about to liberate the city) in the belief that they would make a distinct contribution to their own freedom and independence and, in consequence, become part of the victorious forces that would benefit after the liberation. Tragically, however, they miscalculated, and their battle resulted in a massive loss of life and the destruction of the city.

The issue of the efficacy of resistance was one that Ringelblum wrestled with. On

June 17, 1942, as the deportations in the occupied areas were in full swing (and about five weeks before the great deportation from the Warsaw ghetto began), he conversed with an individual who, as head of the social assistance organization in Biala Podlaska, had been involved in the deportation of Jews to the Sobibor death camp. Evidently aware of the fate that awaited the deportees, this man vented his rage and bitterness in a series of questions: How long will we continue to go like lambs to the slaughter? Why are we being silent? Why do we not sound the call to go to the forests, to resist? According to Ringelblum:

> This question perturbs everyone but has no answer—because everyone knows that any resistance, and especially if it results in the killing of even one German, is liable to result in the slaughter of the entire community or even the extermination of many communities. . . . Nowhere have the Jews resisted massacre. . . . It is evidently an innate mass survival instinct; no explanation will be of use here. One cannot battle mass opinion; one must come to terms with it.[19]

Later, however, after the establishment of the ZOB and the Warsaw ghetto uprising in 1943, Ringelblum—the historian whose emotional sympathies lay with the people—gave clear expression, in what turned out to be his last diary entries, to his identification with the fighters.

Following the great deportation that took away 85 percent of Warsaw's remaining Jews, those who were left behind, many of them youths, were tormented by loneliness, guilt, and grief. It was then that a powerful desire for revenge and readiness for resistance burst forth: in Warsaw, as in Vilna, the change occurred precisely because of the enormity of the bloodletting. Mordechai Lansky, a ghetto doctor, captured the changed mood in his postwar memoirs:

> If we compare the mood of the Jewish populace during the summer *Aktionen* and after them, it is easy to establish that the Jewish psyche was transformed. The bewilderment, helplessness, and misinterpretation of the general situation disappeared completely. Deep down, every man and woman, and even every child, decided not to submit to the Germans' demands, to defend themselves by all available means, and not to go to Treblinka.[20]

Ringelblum, for his part, noted in September 1942 (in the midst of, or immediately after, the great deportation), that "they taught the youth political economy instead of strategy—the people of the book. They educated the youth to literature instead of strategy—the people of the book. They need to shoot, to shoot!"[21] Later on, in the enthusiastic and admiring biographical sketch of Anielewicz that he penned as he hid in a bunker on the Aryan side,[22] Ringelblum wrote:

> Mordechai and his comrades from the young generation know little about the history of wars of liberation. Had they been cognizant of that history, it would have been clear to them that, in tumultuous times, less consideration should be given to the decisions of committees and executive bodies and greater reliance should be placed on themselves and their healthy instincts. Regrettably, our youth was too disciplined, and consequently, the death of 300,000 Jews cost the Germans very little, not even one German. Our youth first understood this too late—only after most of the Jews of Warsaw had already been sent to Treblinka.[23]

Faced with a murderous Nazi resolve until the last few months of the war, and national underground movements that hardly cared about or became involved in their tragedy, Jews were isolated, confused, and helpless. Paramilitary organizations that arose in several ghettos were composed mainly of youth from underground Zionist movements and political parties such as the Bund and the Jewish Communists. The organizations covered a broad spectrum of political and ideological trends from the Right and the Left, a rare phenomenon in the highly fragmented situation among Jews. Only among the Orthodox was there no underground resistance organization.

However, there was a marked gap between the organization and the realization of military activities. The fighting organizations sought to focus their resistance on the ghetto, where the Jews had lived for generations. One of the fighters from the Krakow ghetto expressed this idea in an underground paper in August 1943:

> Broken and alone—there is not much we can expect of life. Dying together with Polish Jewry, we must clearly visualize for ourselves the historical character of this time and tell ourselves with courage that our death does not spell the end of the world. . . . As we had not been allowed to make our contribution to the creative work of building, we shall at least fulfill our historic duty here. It is we who must rise up in the name of the lost people, to wipe away the mark of shame of slavery, and to place it among the ranks of people free in spirit.[24]

To emphasize this historical message, they also determined that the uprising would be launched at the time of the final deportation, after all prospects of staying alive had vanished. It was impossible, however, to know just when that final deportation would occur. Meanwhile, opposition surfaced in the form of the Judenräte. As has been seen, leaders such as Jacob Gens in Vilna and Efraim Barasz in Bialystok took the view that Jewish labor offered the only chance for at least some ghetto residents to survive. Moreover, within the underground movement itself, there was no unanimity of opinion regarding what was to be done. Experienced communal leaders were reluctant to have fateful decisions left in the hands of young people whom they suspected of adventurism. Doubts also arose due to the difficulties the underground encountered in obtaining weapons and in finding an outside non-Jewish organization on which it could rely.

A different dilemma arose concerning the Soviet-commanded partisan units located in the dense forests around Kovno, Minsk, Vilna, and Bialystok, which were now willing to accept some Jews into their ranks. Was not forest combat, which left these fighters in a position to survive, preferable to a ghetto uprising that would inevitably end in crushing defeat and certain death? Opinions were divided. In some ghettos such as Kovno and Minsk, the forest was perceived to offer the only chance of survival. In other places, resistance fighters who chose to stay in the ghettos were painfully disappointed in, if not hindered by, other ghetto residents. Although the fighters were admired, they often found themselves alone in times of crisis. Thus when the Germans in June 1943 identified the Vilna Communist leader as Yitzhak Wittenberg (although remaining unaware that he was also the commander of the fighting organization) and ordered the Judenrat to hand him over, an open confrontation ensued between the Judenrat and the fighters. In a standoff known as "Wittenberg

day," the ghetto population aligned itself with Jacob Gens against the fighters, and Wittenberg was turned in.[25] So, too, when the uprising broke out in Bialystok in August 1943, the ghetto population did not join forces with the rebels, and on the day of the rebellion, the fighters found themselves alone. The painful reality was that it was not possible to mobilize the masses to an armed struggle that offered no future. Given the circumstances, most of those remaining in the ghetto preferred to spend their last days with their families.

In Warsaw, matters developed differently, resulting in a ghetto uprising in the full sense of the term, with tens of thousands of Jews taking part. The process, however, was slow and painful. During the great deportation from Warsaw, which lasted from July 22 until mid-September 1942, nearly 300,000 Jews were uprooted from the ghetto and transported to the death camp in Treblinka. As noted, for the remaining 50,000–60,000 mostly young people, those few months of ghetto existence were a period of particularly intense soul-searching.

Established at the very beginning of the great deportation, the ZOB had little initial impact. The atmosphere after the deportation, however, accelerated the broadening of the organization by the inclusion of additional resistance groups, including the non-Zionists. Anielewicz was elected commander of the ZOB, and later led the uprising. The ZOB's key problem, as noted, was how to arm the fighters. Most of their weapons were handguns acquired on the Aryan side of the Warsaw ghetto wall: apart from those who voluntarily donated funds, others who still had some means at their disposal were taxed by a communal body known as the National Committee, which was set up by the ZOB. A small quantity of arms was also received from Polish resistance organizations.

Soon after its establishment, the ZOB became the ruling force in the ghetto, the Judenrat at this point being completely paralyzed. The Jewish police were ostracized and their commanders—known collaborators—were sentenced and put to death. Meanwhile, the ghetto, which had essentially been turned into a labor camp following the great deportation, was transformed. Uniformed, armed Germans no longer roamed its streets after curfew. A significant breakthrough was achieved when the Armia Krajowa, the government-in-exile's underground army, extended official recognition and patronage to the ZOB, and later supplied it with some arms. One factor behind the ZOB's success in gaining such recognition was its establishment of the National Committee, in which leading figures, including Yitzhak Giterman, Lipa Bloch, and Aleksander Landau participated. Following efforts made by Abrasha Blum, the Bund joined this framework and took on the role of maintaining coordination with the Polish underground.

However, the basis of the popular ghetto uprising—the first urban uprising in Nazi-occupied countries—lay first and foremost in the fact that the ghetto inhabitants joined and took an active part in resistance activities in their sector, alongside the hundreds of fighters prepared for battle. How did it happen that the Warsaw ghetto responded differently from other ghettos in which similar organizations had also arisen? Did the despair and rage overcome the inhibitions and hesitations of tens of thousands of Jews, transforming them into supporters of, and in some ways partners in the uprising? To a large extent, the recognition of the sobering reality was part of it. How-

ever, this was not the primary factor that tipped the scales and set the masses on the path of resistance.

By this stage it was reasonably clear that other strategies had not worked. Thus, some of the Jews in Warsaw had sought to test the possibility of being swallowed up within the Polish population, either by posing as non-Jews or by being hidden among them. A priori, this option was limited to a narrow stratum of assimilated individuals who had Polish acquaintances or friends willing to take risks, and to the handful of affluent Jews who could pay for a hideout. Each one of these stratagems was fraught with danger for Jews and Poles alike, and because of the inherent obstacles, very few Jews could contemplate such a means of escape. In all, it is estimated that only 30,000–40,000 Jews from different places across Poland (or perhaps more, as some claim) managed to avail themselves of this option. Among them were several thousand children who were handed over to families and convents. There were also thousands of Jews who found refuge in employment in factories owned by Germans; the latter had an interest in protecting them so that production could be maintained. This did not usually work out, however, because all Jews, including those most needed as workers, were eventually sentenced to death. For example, Jews from the Warsaw ghetto who had been sent to the last remaining camps in Poniatow and Trawniki (near Lublin), where some of these "safe factories" had been relocated, were among the 45,000 persons murdered in Operation Erntefest in November 1943.

Although the Germans periodically promised that no harm, including deportation, would befall the few Jews remaining in the ghetto after the great deportation, the Jews were no longer deluded and knew that little time remained before the next deportation. All of those in the ghetto were convinced that the second deportation would be the last. The second round-up began on January 18, 1943, but on that day, an unexpected event occurred. A group of armed fighters led by Anielewicz joined a convoy of people being led to the deportation point (the *Umschlagplatz*) and, when given the signal, fired on the accompanying German police. While most of the group of fighters perished, Anielewicz survived, and those in the convoy escaped. On the same day, a group of Dror members under Yitzhak Zuckerman battled Germans who had come to Zamenhof Street.

These initial armed skirmishes were not coordinated or organized in advance, but rather were a spontaneous eruption that had results of far-reaching importance. Immediately, the Jews began to go into hiding and to disobey German orders. The Germans, in turn, terminated the deportation after four days. This was widely but wrongly interpreted as a German failure in the face of Jewish resistance, as today we know from official documentation that in fact the "second deportation" was never planned to be anything more than a partial round-up.

This change of approach and belief in German hesitation in the face of resistance in the ghetto transformed the Jewish populace into a camp ready for the risk of military confrontation. In addition, reports of the fall of Stalingrad on the eastern front added a glimmer of hope that the war would soon end. In other words, the ghetto as a whole embarked on the path of resistance because it was perceived to offer a chance of saving lives. Consequently, in the brief period prior to April 19, some three months in all, feverish preparations were made for confrontation—the fighters were concen-

trated in designated positions, the ghetto was divided into zones, a strategic defense plan was drawn up, and the fighters were ordered into disciplined and trained combat units. All fighters were armed and the ghetto began to produce its own grenades.

The masses' hopes for survival were not shared by the fighters and their commanders. For them, a German round-up was inevitable, as was their death in the ensuing battle, but this did not lessen their resolve. Thus, when the Polish resistance tried to dissuade the fighters from such a battle, which it regarded as premature, and offered to arrange their safe transfer to the east, where partisans were active in the forests, it met with a categorical refusal.

In keeping with their hopes, the ghetto inhabitants made preparations of their own, beginning with the construction of a network of bunkers and underground canals throughout the ghetto, and especially in the center. The work was carried out at night. As each bunker was excavated, the soil was removed and piled in secret locations. Some bunkers were dug out and prepared by trained workers, and others were fashioned out of cellars. Generally, their entrances and exits were camouflaged, provisions were made for ventilation shafts and connection to the water supply, sleeping bunks were installed, and food was stockpiled. Construction was in the hands of groups of residents who both paid to secure places in their building's bunker and who took part in the actual work. The bunkers had commanders and security officers; several of them also had a quantity of handguns. Medicines were provided and large bunkers had their own doctor. Thought was also given to the question of how long such a bunker could hold out; the prevailing opinion was three months.

The two groups, residents and fighters, grew close in spirit, even though the latter did not have such bunkers. Beyond the hope offered by armed resistance, the ghetto inhabitants were proud of the fighters. Many sought to join them, but the shortage of weapons and time precluded this. Moreover, the commanders preferred to retain the disciplined and intimate framework of the original underground organization, with its few members who could be relied upon implicitly.

When German forces entered the ghetto on April 19, 1943, they found no one in the streets, in the buildings, or in the workplaces. All of the inhabitants had barricaded themselves in the bunkers. The fighters launched an offensive from positions at the junctions of the main routes from the ghetto gates. The ghetto revolt evolved into an armed battle that lasted nearly a month. Unable to discover the bunkers, the Germans began to detonate, torch, and destroy the ghetto section of Warsaw systematically, building by building and street by street. The fighters suffered many losses and eventually descended to the bunkers. At this point, all chances for survival had evaporated. The Jews in the bunkers refused to leave, although conditions there had become intolerable even before the Germans sought to force the trapped Jews to emerge by lobbing gas canisters into them. In the event, thanks to courageous external assistance, a small group of fighters did manage to escape from the bunkers and make it to the other side of the wall, but most died inside or else were captured. As fate would have it, the vast majority of the latter were transported to various concentration camps, in particular Majdanek, rather than to the death camps. Some few remained hidden in the ruins of the ghetto for several months. All in all, however, only a few hundred of those who had been in the ghetto during the uprising managed to survive until the end of the war.

The activities of the resistance movement against the Nazi conquest in occupied Europe were generally not directed or orchestrated by a unifying central body with an overall and shared plan of action. Rather, the multiplicity of rival political trends and ideological camps in the occupied countries gave rise to a number of separate organizations, and usually more than one overall body. Moreover, with the exception of the partisan fighters in the forests and mountainous regions of Yugoslavia and in the territories captured by the Germans in the Soviet state, the armed struggles in the various countries did not take the form of guerilla warfare. Thus, in countries that collaborated with the Reich, such as Hungary, Romania, and Croatia, there were no active centers of resistance seeking to undermine and sabotage the regime's foundations. Even in those occupied countries in which the political and military resistance was somewhat more organized, it was concentrated, according to one historian, in only a few areas:

> As resistance became more corporate it became more active: the flying of forbidden flags, the singing of national anthems, demonstrations, the enthusiasm for news and information accessible on radio (especially the BBC) and the organization of escapes to Allied territory. It also became more offensive, or potentially so, with the building up of secret stores often picked up from recent battlefields, the growth of clandestine presses, and minor acts of sabotage such as the cutting of telephone wires and isolated attacks on individual enemy soldiers or officials. [26]

Later in the war, bolder and more weighty military actions and sabotage campaigns against enemy forces became more frequent. Operational coordination with Allied intelligence services facilitated attacks on enemy installations and plants in certain countries (France and Norway), alongside the establishment of partisan units. Toward the end of the war, larger-scale actions were undertaken by local forces who sought to make their own contribution to the military effort as the Germans retreated, either to gain future political advantages from fighting as a nation (which, as was seen, was the case with the Polish uprising in Warsaw in 1944), or to dissociate themselves from a pattern of rule based on collaboration with the Nazi regime (as, for instance, the Slovak revolt in August 1944).

For a variety of reasons, the Jews did not and could not have played any organized military role against the Nazis. To be sure, in some East European countries Jews took part in national uprisings and partisan movements, both as individuals and in groups. Yet overall, the situation of the Jews as an ethnic group was characterized by an absence of means and a lack of logistical support from Allied governments, both of which were prerequisites for military organization. As has been shown, the battle for physical survival was the Jews' most vital and primary task. So long as this struggle for minimal means of survival and mutual assistance was the focal point of their efforts, the Jews, especially those trapped in the ghettos, concentrated on attaining those means, in a variety of forbidden and illegal ways, without any effective help from outside. The underground that sprang up among the Jews published and distributed clandestine newspapers, listened to banned radio broadcasts, smuggled individuals across boundaries, and maintained an illegal economy that served not only the Jewish populace but also non-Jews outside the ghetto.

Both the mass murder of Jews and their expulsion to the death camps began before

the anti-German and anti-Nazi struggle in occupied Europe turned to armed combat. At that stage, the Jews were not able to act to save themselves, and it was clear that any attempt to resist or rise up would only hasten destruction and be met with sweeping collective punishment. Even later, no help was forthcoming from the free world in terms of sabotaging the means of expulsion or the rail routes used to transport the Jews across Europe in freight cars. Neither did local resistance movements extend the Jews effective assistance. In fact, in most countries, those few (albeit symbolically significant) non-Jews who sought to help Jews literally put their freedom and lives at risk, and indeed, individuals and families who committed such heroic humanitarian acts were later recognized by the Jewish state as *ḥasidei umot ha'olam*, "the righteous of the nations." So too, in Poland, the most daring and devoted members of Zegota (the general Polish resistance authority's body for assisting Jews, which operated from the end of 1942) were mainly volunteers.

In sum, the situation of the Jews was unlike that of other nations and ethnic groups. Indeed, if there is any suitable basis for comparison with the case of the Jews, it is supplied by concentration camp inmates and Soviet prisoners of war. As has been seen, these condemned captives, who represented the elites committed to liberal and revolutionary ideas and with few or no chances of staying alive, as a rule did not revolt, but rather took part only in spontaneous outbursts. Among the Jews, however, toward the end of the extermination process, the youth of various political persuasions in a number of ghettos began to organize, and this led in Warsaw to a general revolt in April 1943 in which tens of thousands of Jews participated.

Influenced to some extent by the Warsaw ghetto uprising and by the partisan activity in the forests, groups of Jewish temporary forced laborers in Treblinka and Sobibor decided to revolt, and in the ensuing uprising, approximately 120 Jewish inmates escaped. However, in most of the ghettos in which fighting cells similar to that of Warsaw had been organized, no such uprising came about, or else was extremely limited in scope. Indeed, in its very nature, the idea of uprising and of revolt—which gave expression, on the one hand, to despair and to coming to terms with death and, on the other hand, to an intensity of will to convey to the free world the message that there was another way to die—is capable of mobilizing only the few. In the Warsaw ghetto, things developed differently as a result of the chain of events that has been described. There, the few and the many came together, despite fundamentally different starting-points and motivations, to a shared battle.

Notes

1. See Henri Michel, *The Shadow War: European Resistance 1939–1945*, trans. Richard Barry (New York: 1972), 177; Philip Friedman, *Roads to Extinction: Essays on the Holocaust*, ed. Ada Jane Friedman (New York: 1980), 392–393. Friedman's reference paraphrases Zech. 4:6.
2. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (London: 1961), 662, 666, 667.
3. Ibid., 666.
4. Benzion Dinur, "Galuyot veḥurbanan," in *Dorot ureshumot, meḥkarim ve'iyunim behistoriografiyah hayisreelit, beva'ayoteha uvetoldoteha* (Jerusalem: 1978), 190–192.
5. Yitzhak Baer, *Galut* (Jerusalem: 1980), 107.
6. Yitzhak Gruenbaum, "Miḥurban leḥurban," in idem, *Biymei ḥurban veshoah* (Jerusalem:

1946), 99. Twenty years after the war, Hilberg expressed an extreme view on the matter: "Every hypothesis which is focused on Jewry contains an assumption of provocation: the Jews had brought their fate upon themselves; they had, in a sense, invited the blow. Provocation is implied by the very shape of Jewish life in the diaspora, the durability of hostility toward the Jews and the uniformity of reactions against them." See his article "German Motivations for the Destruction of the Jews," *Midstream* 11, no. 2 (June 1965), 27.

7. Chaim A. Kaplan, *Megilat yisurim, yoman geto Varshah* (Tel Aviv: n.d.), Sept. 1, 1939–Aug. 4, 1942 (pp. 221, 350).

8. On the Judenräte, see Isaiah Trunk, *Judenrat: The Jewish Councils in Eastern Europe under Nazi Occupation* (New York: 1972); Cynthia J. Haft and Yisrael Gutman (eds.), *Patterns of Jewish Leadership in Nazi Europe 1933–1945*, Proceedings of the Third Yad Vashem International Conference (Jerusalem: 1979); Yisrael Gutman, "Hayudenrat kehanhagah," in *Meḥkarim betoledot yisrael be'et haḥadashah*, vol. 2, comp. Yerahmiel Cohen (Jerusalem: 1998).

9. See Yitzhak (Antek) Zuckerman, *A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising*, trans. and ed. Barbara Harshav (Berkeley: 1993); Yisrael Gutman, *The Jews of Warsaw 1939–1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt*, trans. Ina Friedman (Bloomington: 1982).

10. Emanuel Ringelblum, *Yoman ureshumot mitkufat hamilḥamah, geto Varshah, september 1939–dezember 1942* (Jerusalem: 1992), 356.

11. Hans Frank, *Okupacja Ruoh Oporu w dzienniku Hansa Franka 1939–1942* (Warsaw: 1972), 249, 403–404.

12. Quoted in Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (eds.), *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945* (Stuttgart: 1975), 588.

13. See Nathan Eck, *Hato'im bedarkhei hamavet* (Jerusalem: 1960), 37; Ringelblum, *Yoman ureshumot*, 254.

14. Ringelblum, *Yoman ureshumot*, 184.

15. See Christopher Browning and Yisrael Gutman, "The Report of 'Jewish' Informers in the Warsaw Ghetto," *Yad Vashem Studies* 17 (Jerusalem: 1986), 247–293.

16. *Oyf di vakh*, 30 Sept. 1942, reprinted in *'Itonut hamaḥteret hayehudit beVarshah*, vol. 6, *mars 1942 'ad yuli 1944*, ed. Yisrael Shaham (Jerusalem: 1987), 525–529.

17. See Yitzhak Arad, Yisrael Gutman and Avraham Margaliot (eds.), *Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland and the Soviet Union*, 5th ed. (Jerusalem: 1993), 433–434.

18. See Henri Michel, "Jewish Resistance and the European Resistance Movement," in *Jewish Resistance during the Holocaust: Proceedings of the International Yad Vashem Conference on Jewish Resistance* (Jerusalem: 1971), 365–375.

19. Ringelblum, *Yoman ureshumot*, 382–383.

20. Mordechai Lansky, "Ḥayei hayehudim begeto Varshah," in idem, *Zikhronot shel rofe*, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: 1961), 239.

21. Ringelblum, *Yoman ureshumot*, 402.

22. Ringelblum was spirited out of the ghetto shortly before the uprising began. Together with his wife, their son, about 30 other Jews, and the Poles who sought to save them, he was captured in March 1943. Ringelblum and all of those with him—including those Poles who offered shelter—were killed.

23. Emanuel Ringelblum, *Ketavim aḥaronim: yaḥasei polanim-yehudiyim, yanuar 1943—april 1944* (Jerusalem: 1994), 51.

24. This call is found in *Heḥaluẓ* 29, reprinted in *Documents of the Holocaust*, 362–364.

25. See Yitzhak Arad, *Vilnah hayehudit bema'avak uvekhilyon* (Tel Aviv: 1976), 305–320.

26. Ralph White, "The Unity and Diversity of European Resistance," in *Resistance in Europe, 1939–1945*, ed. Stephen Hawes and Ralph White (London: 1975), 9.

Violence in Israeli Society: Its Relation to Social Stress

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Even before the outbreak of Palestinian-Israeli violence in September 2000, the subjective feeling of many Israelis was that their country had become a much more dangerous place in which to live. Indeed, violence seemed to have become one of the most widely discussed topics on the public agenda. However, in addressing this problem, we have to ask whether this feeling was the result of exaggerated media coverage or whether it reflected a real increase in violence in Israeli society. Answering this question is not simple, since it depends, to a large extent, on the definition of violence and how it is measured.

Before going any further, it should be noted that the problem of violence in Israel is compounded by the presence of politically motivated terrorist acts alongside "regular" acts of violence such as homicides, robberies, sexual assaults, family violence, and violence in schools. My basic thesis is that various aspects of violence in Israel are closely related to a variety of societal stress factors. I begin my analysis by outlining general trends in violent crime in Israel over time and enumerating some of the most prominent stress factors experienced by Israelis. This is followed by a brief descriptive account of trends in violent crime against the background of significant events in Israel's short history. I then introduce and discuss a number of conceptual models relating stress and violence, including my own stress-support model.[1] Empirical evidence in support of these models is presented, together with a brief account of some unique measures of stress developed in the course of my research on violence in Israel (objective/subjective indicators of stress and social support). I then provide a brief outline of the major social divisions within Israeli society and their contribution to violence. Some aspects of the brutalization of interpersonal relations in Israeli society are discussed, followed by comments regarding the renewed Palestinian-Israeli violence in the region. The article concludes with a few general remarks on Jewishness and criminality within the Israeli context.

General Trends of Violent Crime in Israel

The two main sources of information on the extent of criminal behavior, including violent crime, are official criminal statistics and "victim surveys" in which representa-

tive samples of the population are interviewed over a particular time period (usually the previous year). Because very few victim surveys have been conducted in Israel, the present analysis will be based mainly on reported criminal statistics.[2]

"Violent crime" is a general label covering a variety of unlawful behaviors. Quite a number of these crimes are notoriously underrepresented in criminal statistics. Among these are rape (and other forms of sexual assault), assault against family members, and intragroup violence. This analysis will focus mainly on homicide (including attempted homicide) and robbery. Homicide is universally considered to be the most severe of violent crimes, and robbery combines personal violence with threat to property. The seriousness of these two crimes of violence, coupled with their high visibility, make them the most reliably reported crimes. Therefore, they can be used as a relatively accurate indicator of the level of violence in a given society.

As collected from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, the data cover a period of 50 years, from 1949 (the first year for which annual statistics are available) to 1999. Figure 1 presents the annual rates of homicide (including attempted homicide). As can be seen, several distinct trends in homicide rates are discernible. The first years after the establishment of the state of Israel were marked by a sharp increase in the incidence of homicide, which peaked in 1952 and 1953. This was followed by a consistent decline lasting 16 years, down to 1.9 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants in 1969. During the 1970s, homicide rates rose again to 6.3 such incidents in 1979. A gradual decrease from 1980 onwards was interrupted by a relatively sharp upward trend in 1989 and 1990 (5.6 and 6.4 incidents per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively). Since 1994, these rates have been quite stable (about 4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants).

The annual rates of robbery, presented in figure 2, reveal that the general trend of this violent crime between 1949 and 1995 was very similar to that of homicide. The

Figure 1. Annual rates of homicide in Israel, 1949–1999 (per 100,000 population)



Figure 2. Annual rates of robbery in Israel, 1949–1999 (per 100,000 population)

overall pattern of robbery rates is manifested in a U-shaped curve during the years 1949–1980, followed by a smaller J-shaped curve during the years 1980–1999. The U-shaped curve starts at 18.5 robberies per 100,000 inhabitants in 1949, followed by a fairly consistent decline, reaching a low of 1.8 in 1965. From 1966, a fairly stable upward trend is observed, reaching its highest point (15.3) in 1980. The slight decrease in robbery between 1980 and 1987 (to 11.7) was followed by a consistent increase (with the exception of 1991), to an all time high of 29.5 in 1999.

Finally, it should be noted that trends in violent crimes are quite different from the trend of all offenses (mainly offenses against property), which show a constant (almost linear) increase over the years—from 16.0 offenses per 100,000 population in 1949, to 62.6 in 1999.

What is the relative incidence of violent and general crime in Israel compared with that of other countries? In conducting cross-national comparisons of crime rates, one should bear in mind the methodological problems stemming from different legal definitions of crimes, as well as differences in reporting and recording procedures across countries. In addition, comparisons pertaining to a specific point in time do not take into account the fluctuations in crime rates over time. This was clearly exemplified in the description of homicide and robbery trends in Israel.

Giora Rahav's comparison of general crime rates in 11 industrialized countries for 1992 placed Israel higher than the United States, Belgium, and Spain, and lower than England and Wales, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, France, and Austria.[3] With regard to crimes of violence, the picture is somewhat different. Freda Adler, Gerhard Mueller, and William Laufer compared homicide rates among young males (15 to 24 years old) in 22 industrialized countries for 1986–1987. In this comparison, the highest rates were found in the United States (21.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), followed by Scotland (5.0), New Zealand (4.4), and Israel (3.7). All of the remaining

18 countries, mainly West European, plus Canada, Australia, and Japan, had lower homicide rates (in this age group) than Israel.[4] In a more recent U.N. study, which compared rates of homicide and attempted homicide in 22 states for 1993, Israel ranked eighth (4.9 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants), much above such countries as Japan (0.9), Canada (1.9), Austria (2.29), and Greece (2.45), but considerably lower than countries such as Estonia (21.6), the Russian Federation (19.7), Latvia (16.6), Bulgaria (10.8), and Finland (8.3).[5]

Acts of violence (like any other human behavior) have their immediate causes or explanations on the individual level. This analysis, however, focuses on the aggregate level, and I will attempt to analyze and explain the patterns of violence in Israel from a wider social perspective. My basic thesis is that the patterns of violent crime just outlined relate closely to a number of stress factors in Israeli society. A short review of these factors is provided in the following section.

Stress Factors in Israeli Society

Israeli society can justifiably be described as an ideal natural laboratory for the study of effects of stress on individuals. In addition to the usual types of stress experienced in all modern societies, Israelis are exposed to a number of additional stressors.

The foremost of these stressors is the continuous concern of Israelis with security, both on the national and on the individual level. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has been involved in five major wars and in endless hostilities with neighboring Arab countries, as well as with the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which were occupied in the Six-Day War of 1967. The need to take precautions and to be on guard keeps men, women, and children aware of the constant threat to their daily routine. The continuous threat of war, coupled with compulsory military service and call-ups to reserve duty, have had a considerable effect on Israeli society. Indeed, belligerence has been the most stable aspect of Israeli history, and Israel has come to regard itself as a society at war, if not a society of warriors. Periodic national surveys have shown that the fear of war and related issues (fear of terrorism, prolonged army service) were the most salient concern of Israelis from 1968 onwards.[6]

A number of Israeli studies have investigated various effects of war as well as more prolonged security-related stress. These studies have examined soldiers on the front-line and the more general effects of security-related stress on public morale, children, psychopathology, gender roles, and levels of emigration from Israel.[7] It should be noted that the number of casualties caused by wars, terrorist acts, and the like, far exceeds the number of casualties caused by "regular" crimes of violence.

Economic hardship (recession, unemployment, and high rates of inflation) is another important source of stress in Israel. Over the last three decades, Israel's economy has witnessed times of prosperity and development during which the standard of living rose to unprecedented heights, as well as times of economic hardship and recession, high inflation rates, and increased unemployment. The detrimental effects of economic stress factors have been widely discussed in the literature.[8] A number of studies conducted in the United States found that economic stress factors such as unemployment, inflation, and lowered per capita income have a substantial bearing on

physical health, mental health, and criminal aggression.[9] In a cross-cultural study covering 14 different countries, it was reported that, in most countries, increased inflation rates were accompanied by parallel increases in homicide, robbery, and general criminal activity.[10]

A third, more general stress-related factor has to do with the extreme social and demographic changes that have taken place in Israel over a relatively short period. Israel is basically a society of immigrants, with the majority of its members either born elsewhere or born to immigrant parents. In the space of five decades, the Jewish population in the country grew more than sevenfold, from 650,000 in 1948 to 4,785,100 in 1998. During this period, 2,611,000 immigrants were absorbed (about one million of these were immigrants from the former Soviet Union who arrived during the 1990s).[11] Another important social-demographic change, closely related to the security situation, is the inclusion of a sizable Arab population under Israeli rule in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.

Violent Crime and Significant Events in Israel's History

Unfortunately, the most salient landmarks in Israel's history are provided by the major wars in which the country has been involved. The War of Independence broke out even before the official declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel on May 15, 1948 and had total casualties amounting to about 1 percent of the total Jewish population (more than 6,000 killed out of 650,000). The first few years of Israel's existence were undoubtedly the most turbulent in the country's history. The period immediately following independence was characterized by an enormous influx of Jewish immigrants from Europe (survivors of the Holocaust) as well as from Arab and other countries. Between 1948 and 1951, the Jewish population more than doubled as Israel absorbed 688,000 immigrants.[12] During these years, Israelis experienced serious economic hardship resulting from the national priority given to immigrant absorption.

As can be seen in figures 1 and 2, these highly stressful early years were marked by very high rates of both homicide and robbery. Thereafter, a steady decline in violent crime can be observed—except for 1956, the year of the Sinai Campaign, during which there was an increase in the homicide rate.

The decade between 1957 and 1967 (between the Sinai Campaign and the Six-Day War) was the most peaceful period in Israel's history. Military clashes with neighboring countries were at a very low level, the standard of living improved, and immigration slowed down considerably. Note also that the level of violent crime during this decade was, on the whole, very low. However, robbery began to increase in 1966 (a year of severe economic recession) and especially after 1967, following the Six-Day War. The increase in homicide started a little later, between 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

As previously noted, security-related stress became a matter of daily concern following the military occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967. There was a sharp increase in both homicide and robbery during the 1970s, particularly after the Yom Kippur War. This war and its heavy casualties proved to be a major turn-

ing point in Israel's history, being followed by severe political, economic, and social upheaval. According to the thesis presented here, the sharp increase in violent crime is an indicator of the high level of stress experienced by Israelis during those years.

The late 1970s witnessed the historic peace agreement between Israel and its strongest enemy, Egypt, which culminated in the peace treaty signed in March 1979. As can be seen in figures 1 and 2, during most of the 1980s, there was a consistent decline in homicide and robbery. During this period (beginning in 1982), Israel was involved in the controversial Lebanon War. However, the most significant turning point in the 1980s was the outbreak of the first Palestinian intifada in December 1987. As can be seen in the two figures, the years following the outbreak of the intifada were marked by a considerable increase in homicide and robbery. The decrease in these crimes in 1991 may well be related to the Persian Gulf War, during which Israel's population was under serious threat from Iraqi missiles. For the duration of this war, there was a lull in the intifada, largely because of the curfews imposed on the occupied territories and partly because the Palestinian population also felt threatened by Iraqi missiles.

In 1993, a political breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict led to the signing of a Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in Oslo. Consequently the Palestinian Authority (PA) was established, and extensive parts of Israeli-occupied territories were gradually transferred to the PA's control. The existence of Palestinian autonomous areas adjacent to densely populated Israeli areas has been shown to be related to the steady and salient increase in robbery and motor vehicle theft, particularly during the second half of the 1990s.[13]

The most recent outbreak of military and political conflict, which began in September 2000 and is current at the time of writing, is discussed briefly in the last section of this essay. However, it is still too early to assess its effects on regular crimes of violence.

Although this overview of the most significant events in Israel's history is somewhat selective, it most certainly provides clues regarding general trends of violent crime in Israel. What it does not do is to establish a relationship between violent crime and the various stress factors. For such a relationship to be established, research has to demonstrate that these stress factors have a measurable effect on violent crime. Before presenting such empirical evidence, two major conceptual frameworks will be outlined, one specifically relating violence to warfare and the other relating violence to stress in general.

Warfare, Societal Stress, and Violent Crime

Two opposing hypotheses have been proposed regarding the effect of war and security-related stress on violent crime. The first is the cohesion hypothesis, based on works by Lewis A. Coser and Georg Simmel, which posits that outside pressures and threats serve to unify the community and thus reduce internal conflict, including in-group violence. According to this model, when the external threat is over, the level of in-group violence returns to its pre-emergency level.[14]

In contrast, the legitimation-habituation hypothesis put forward by Dane Archer

and Rosemary Gartner holds that the sanctioned killing that takes place during war leads to a depreciation of the value of human life. War not only legitimates acts of aggression but also promotes the perception of violence as a habitual way of behavior. Hence, one should expect an increase in homicide after war.[15]

In their cross-national study of 80 nations, Archer and Gartner confirmed their hypothesis by showing that combatant nations were more likely to experience substantially higher homicide rates in the postwar period. No such parallel increase was found for noncombatant nations. Postwar increases in homicide rates were most frequently found in nations suffering a high death toll in combat.[16] Similarly, Marc H. Ross' study of 90 preindustrial societies revealed a positive relationship between internal and external conflict. According to Ross, societies that tend to be violent express this violence both internally and externally; teaching citizens to fight external enemies has the effect of increasing what Ross terms "internal warfare," or the violence within society.[17]

Building on the frustration-aggression hypothesis developed several decades ago by a number of social scientists—which focuses on the individual level—Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi and I created a stress-support model for the explanation of violent crime. Our model, which examines crime among whole populations, postulates that the prevalence of violent crime is positively related to the intensity of stress factors and negatively related to the intensity of social support systems.[18] In line with recent theoretical and empirical studies, this model conceives stress in terms of negative affect.[19] It incorporates two important elements (instead of one) for the explanation of violence and aggression: social stressors and social support systems.

Aggression is a response to stress which, in turn, can arise from a variety of sources (both external and internal to the individual).[20] In a study based on self-report measures of delinquency among adolescents, Robert Agnew and Helen R. White found that "strain variables" were significantly correlated with violent and nonviolent offenses such as fighting, robbery, larceny, burglary, and vandalism. Similarly, Raymond Paternoster and Paul Mazerolle, using data from the National Youth Survey, reported that problematic relations with adults, as well as feelings of dissatisfaction with friends and with school life, were positively related to delinquency.[21]

For the societal level, Michael Haas presented a conceptual model in which economic stressors (unemployment and modernization) were positively associated with homicide and suicide (conceived by him as indicators of social strain).[22] These indicators, in turn, were linked to "national aggressiveness"—war. In a comparative analysis of social stress across the United States, Arnold Linsky and Murray Straus reported that "stressful life events" based on objective aggregate measures were positively correlated with seven different crimes. The higher each state's "stress level," the higher its crime rates.[23]

All of these studies, however, ignore an important mediating factor: social support systems, such as strong family ties and stable social networks at the individual level,[24] and a sense of national solidarity at the macro level, help to mitigate societal stress. By and large, the greater the strength and stability of social support systems, the greater the ability of the individual and society to cope with stressful events and situations. As will be seen, such social support systems help ease the endemic stresses within Israeli society.

Stress and Violence in Israel: The Empirical Evidence

Objective Stress Indicators

The sharp increase in crime (including violent crime) after the 1967 Six-Day War triggered criminological research into the relationship between wars and war-like situations and crime in Israeli society.

Yael Hassin and Menachem Amir were the first to investigate the impact of war on crime in Israel. In their analysis of crime patterns during the Yom Kippur War, they found a decrease in the amount of crime during the first 11 days of the war. From the 12th day on, there was an increase in all types of reported crime.[25] In a similar study conducted on juveniles referred to the probation service in the Tel Aviv area, Haim Segev found that there was a considerable increase in male juvenile delinquency during the war, compared with the equivalent immediate prewar period. Moreover, the level of delinquency after the war did not return to the immediate prewar level.[26]

Gideon Fishman compared crime rates in the months before and after the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War. Following the Six-Day War (characterized by the acquisition of large enemy territories and very few casualties), there was a sharp increase in crimes against property, whereas after the Yom Kippur War (characterized by a very high combat death toll), there was a large increase in homicide, attempted homicide, and other crimes against the person.[27] Similarly, a study focusing on juvenile crime in the city of Rehovot reported an increase in the level of violent offenses during the three years following the Yom Kippur War, compared with the equivalent prewar period.[28]

In a study I conducted with Danny Pfeffermann, the focus was shifted away from the major short wars to the more prolonged security-related stress (measured by security-related casualties and incidents) suffered by Israelis. Examining the effects of such stress on patterns of violent crime over a period of 15 years (1967–1982), we determined that the number of casualties had a marginal positive effect on homicide—a finding that supported the legitimation-habituation model. In the long run, it seems, violence resulting from conflicts with out-groups ("enemies") is generalized and directed toward in-group members of society.[29]

Objective economic stress factors have also been found to be related to violent crime in Israel. In an analysis of crime trends between 1951 and 1976, Gideon Fishman and Mordechai Argov found a positive relationship between unemployment and homicide.[30] In a multivariate analysis for the period of 1950 to 1981 that I carried out with Adi Raveh, we reported that increases in inflation and population density (two components of a unified stress measure) were related to increases in the rates of homicide, robbery, and total criminal activity, whereas an increase in unemployment contributed to rising homicide rates.[31] Similarly, in the Landau-Pfeffermann study published a year later, we found that increases in the inflation rate had a significant positive effect on both homicide and robbery, and monthly relative changes in the unemployment rate had a significant positive effect on robbery.

Immigration is another stress factor found to be related to violent crime. A recent study on "intimate femicide"—that is, the murder of wives or live-in female partners—in Israel during 1990–1995 reported that the two social groups with the high-

est representation in this violent crime were immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia (58 percent and 922 percent higher than their proportion in the population, respectively).[32] The extremely high representation of Ethiopian immigrants clearly reflects the difficulties entailed in their transition from a rural, traditional country of origin to Israel's modern and western-oriented society.

The Intifada and the Gulf War

During what is now known as the first intifada, there was much public debate about its effects on Israeli society. In the first five years of the intifada (1988–1992), 2,631 people were killed within Israel's pre-1967 borders and the territories under its control.[33] Of these, only 17.7 percent (458 cases) were defined as "regular" (that is, non-politically motivated) criminal homicides. Interestingly, the incidence of politically motivated ("terrorist") homicides and "regular" criminal homicides followed similar trends. In addition, after the onset of the intifada, there was a sizable increase in homicides resulting from domestic conflict. These findings are not coincidental, but are clearly related to the increased exposure of Israelis to violence in the territories, as postulated by the legitimation-habituation model.

In a 1990 article about the intifada, Moshe Lissak writes of the "banality of brutalization."[34] Indeed, frequent experience of violence and exposure to media reports on violent confrontations and casualties have become so routine in Israeli life that public opinion has become increasingly inured, and news about Palestinian casualties tends to be pushed to the margins of personal and collective consciousness.

The process of habituation and desensitization to violence on the personal level is clearly exemplified by a soldier on reserve duty during the intifada who was quoted as saying: "We start viewing Palestinians as puppets, beat them here, beat them there, and boast to one another as to how many noses we have broken today. This makes us more violent when we go back to civilian life." Another soldier in the same newspaper report had a similar experience: "In the first month I didn't touch anyone, in the second month I started to beat people, and in the third month I wanted to kill them all. If someone were to come to me now and give me the order, I would be ready to kill them all."[35]

Of special significance in this context are the violent confrontations that have taken place between Jewish settlers and Palestinians in the territories occupied after the Six-Day War. In 1984, for instance, the existence of a Jewish underground whose members were involved in the killings of Palestinians and in the planning of large-scale terrorist acts was uncovered. During the intifada, 62 Palestinians were killed by Jewish settlers; according to B'tzelem, a human rights group, in only four cases was the killing a clear matter of self-defense.[36] The worst single incident of this type was committed in 1994 by Baruch Goldstein, a settler who massacred 29 Palestinians (and wounded many others) while they were at prayer in the mosque of the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. In addition to these horrific cases, settlers have been involved in numerous incidents in which Palestinians have been wounded or their property damaged.[37] As will be seen, the lenient approach taken by Israeli authorities (the military, the police, and the courts) in such cases has had the effect of undermining the

principles of the rule of law and equality before the law in Israel—and, in so doing, has contributed to the brutalization of Israeli society.

In contrast to what occurred during the first intifada, accumulated stresses of the Persian Gulf War were expressed in violent behavior only after the war ended in March 1991. At that point, an alarming rise in domestic violence in Israel was reported. Between February and August 1991, more than a dozen Israeli women were killed by their husbands. According to an article in *Newsweek*, the increase in family violence could be attributed to psychological stress triggered by the war:

> Men trained to lead tank columns and infantry units were forced to sit at home with their families while coalition forces took on the job of defeating Iraq. With many businesses closed, people could not work or shop. Shut up in tiny, sealed rooms under threat of Scud missile attacks, family tensions escalated. . . . There was an emasculation of the Israeli male. . . . They felt fear and helplessness. Their anger built up.[38]

Subjective Perception of Stress and Support

The great majority of studies relating stress factors to crime on the aggregate level have attempted to find a link between two types of objectively defined sets of data: the stress factors (serving as independent variables), on the one hand, and various types of crime (the dependent variables), on the other. The "gap" between these two sets of objective data is usually "filled" with hypothetical intervening variables (such as frustration, relative deprivation, and blocked opportunities), which are based on a variety of assumptions as to how these external stressors affect the populations encountering them. However, this line of research has tended to neglect a crucial link between the two sets of data, namely, the subjective perception of stress factors.[39] The main reason for the lack of research in this area is the scarcity of repeated comparable survey data over prolonged periods and over large population units.

In a study published in 1988, I addressed this problem by turning to a series of public opinion surveys that were carried out in Israel starting in 1967.[40] These surveys highlighted several stress indicators related to people's perception of the security, economic, and political situation in Israel. Solidarity indicators were those relating mainly to the relationship between various groups in society—for instance, Jews of Eastern (Middle Eastern or North African) versus Western (European or North American) origin, religious versus secular groups, and new immigrants versus veteran Israelis.

The analysis was based on monthly data for the years 1967–1979. As predicted by the Landau–Beit-Hallahmi stress-support model, violent crime (homicide and robbery) was positively related to most of the subjective stress indicators and negatively related to the subjective perception of national solidarity. For example, the higher the level of economic or security stress, the higher the monthly robbery and homicide rates. But the higher the level of solidarity (good relations) between, say, Western and Eastern Israelis, the lower the rates of these violent crimes.

Another different study using the same approach and research methods yielded similar results with regard to suicidal behavior, which was positively related to subjective stress indicators and negatively related to perceptions of social solidarity.[41]

For example, the higher the level of security concern in the population, the higher the monthly suicide rate among males. Similarly, the higher the level of concern regarding terrorism, the higher the attempted suicide rates among both males and females. In contrast, higher levels of solidarity between ethnic groups and between religious and secular groups were shown to be significantly related to lower suicide rates among both genders. In another study, it was established that objective economic stressors (inflation and unemployment) were systematically and positively related to both subjective economic worries and dissatisfaction.[42] Finally, objective security-related stressors (that is, security-related casualties and incidents) were found to be positively related to the population's subjective worries and dissatisfaction regarding their country's security.[43] Overall, these findings validate the subjective stress indicators, and legitimate the use of such direct expressions of stress in the population in preference to objective indicators.

In a follow-up study on homicide for the years 1979–1993, the stress-support model received partial support regarding stress indicators and substantial support regarding solidarity indicators.[44] Among the findings of this study was an inverse relationship between homicide rates and the population's mood and coping ability. Perception of improved coping with (or adaptation to) the current situation, and improved mood, are both related to lower homicide rates. Similarly, satisfaction with the government's handling of the general or economic situation was correlated with fewer homicides. Increased solidarity among ethnic groups and between religious and secular groups was strongly related to lower homicide rates.

Comparison between this study and the first study published in 1988 reveals that economic stress had the most permanent and consistent effect over time on homicide. The effect of social solidarity on homicide was also stable over time, although it changed in intensity. At the same time, the effects of political and security-related stress on homicide were found to be inconsistent over time. Cumulative results of the two studies show that for more than 26 years (1967–1993), subjective indicators of stress and social solidarity were significantly related to homicide rates in Israeli society.

In three more recent studies on subjective indicators and crime (for the years 1967–1979), property offenses were added to the analysis, and the effects of subjective stress and support indicators on crime patterns were analyzed separately along the variables of gender, ethnic origin, and level of education.[45] The results of these studies indicate that the stress-support model also applies to property offenses. With regard to gender, it was found that women's perceptions of stress and support were better predictors of violent and property crime rates than those of males.[46] Economic stress indicators had a greater effect on crime rates than security-related indicators, especially among respondents of Eastern origin. Also differing in accordance with respondents' ethnic origin was the link between solidarity indicators and crime: the perception of a high level of solidarity between ethnic groups was significantly related to fewer homicides only among respondents of Eastern origin.[47] In the study on educational levels, it was found that the relationship between subjective indicators and robbery and property offenses was stronger in low-education groups than in the medium- and high- education groups. For example, dissatisfaction with personal economic situation (insufficient family income) among respondents with 10 or fewer years of education was more strongly and positively related to the number of rob-

beries than it was among more highly educated respondents.[48] The findings regarding respondents of Eastern origin and those of low educational level indicate that for these segments of society—whose contribution to criminality is disproportionately higher than their share in the population—economic hardship and lack of social support/solidarity have a greater effect than does security-related stress.

Social Divisions and Violence

The Jewish-Arab Division

Any understanding of violence in Israel must take into account the major social divisions in Israel's multicultural society, since cultural norms have long been recognized as a key concept in understanding and explaining human behavior in general and violent behavior in particular.[49] The main ethnic division in Israeli society is between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. In 1998, Arabs (mostly Suni Moslems) constituted about one-fifth (20.8 percent) of the Israeli population.[50] Comparison between the Jewish and Arab population reveals that the prevalence of violence among Arabs is considerably higher than among Jews. The norms of traditional Arab culture "dictate" or "prescribe" violent actions in certain well-defined interpersonal situations or circumstances. For instance, killing to maintain family honor is culturally mandated in the case of alleged sexual misconduct of a female family member. Similarly, there is an obligation to participate in blood feuds and other individual or collective acts of violence between extended families.[51] From 1950 to 1964, the homicide rate in the Israeli Arab population (4.00 incidents per 100,000 population) was almost four times higher than that of Eastern Jews (1.07 incidents) and almost seven times higher than among Western Jews (0.59 incidents).[52] More recent data reveal that the gap between the homicide rates of Jews and Arabs has remained quite similar: for the years 1981–1992, the average conviction rate for homicide and attempted homicide in the Arab population (3.37 incidents per 100,000 population) was more than three times higher than in the Jewish population (1.1 per 100,000 population). Similarly, in 1997, the rate of conviction for homicide in the Arab population (6.9 per 100,000 individuals) was more than four times higher than in the Jewish population (1.7 per 100,000 individuals).[53] With regard to general criminal activity (all recorded offenses), a smaller albeit still significant gap exists between the two populations. In 1989, for instance, the respective conviction rates among Arabs and Jews were 14.8 and 7.0 per 1,000 population.[54]

On the collective level, the Israeli Arab population faces a serious dilemma. The sense of loyalty to their brethren in the neighboring Arab countries and the occupied territories puts them in conflict with their required civic loyalty to the Jewish state. The problematic situation of Israel's Arab citizens has a number of practical consequences (for example, most Israeli Arabs do not serve in the army) that prevent them from being fully integrated in Israeli society. As a result, they enjoy less favorable social, educational, and occupational opportunities.[55]

Given the gravity of the division between Israeli Jews and Arabs, the relatively peaceful coexistence of the two groups is quite surprising. There are several struc-

tural explanations for this. First, the two communities live in almost total residential segregation. Second, the full political participation of the Israeli Arabs on both the national and the municipal levels allows them access to legitimate means to improve their situation and to achieve greater equality. However, in spite of these regulatory mechanisms, the conflict between Jews and Arabs in Israel does erupt on occasion. One case in point is the Land Day demonstrations of 1976, which began as a protest against the government confiscation of Arab-owned land and developed into a violent confrontation that claimed a number of casualties. More recently, widespread violent demonstrations by Israeli Arabs during the outbreak of the current (as of the time of writing) Palestinian uprising (the "El Aqsa" intifada) claimed the lives of 13 demonstrators in October 2000. This traumatic event, which subsequently led to a judicial committee of inquiry, was a turning point in Jewish-Arab relations in Israel and will most likely cast a shadow for a long time to come.

The Division between Eastern and Western Jews

As noted, Israel's Jewish population can be divided into two major ethnic groups: Eastern and Western. In 1998, one-third (33 percent) of Israeli Jews were of Eastern origin, about two-fifths (39.8 percent) were of Western origin, and more than a quarter (27.2 percent) were second-generation Israelis—that is, born in Israel to an Israeli-born father.[56]

Comparison between Eastern and Western Jews reveals that the great majority of criminal offenders (both violent and nonviolent) and prisoners are of Eastern—especially North African—origin.[57] In 1990, for example, juveniles of Eastern origin comprised 67.5 percent of the Jewish delinquent population, compared with 12.5 percent of those of Western origin. This gap is partly explained by demography: since the birthrate among Eastern Jews is higher, there are proportionally more juveniles of Eastern origin. Yet the gap remains even when a per capita measurement is used. In 1992, the delinquency rate among juveniles (aged 15–16) of Eastern origin was 17.3 per 1,000 population—more than double that of their Western counterparts (8.2), and a third higher than among Arab youths in this age group (13.1).[58]

The higher incidence of violence among Israeli Jews of Eastern origin is closely related to the inferior socioeconomic position of this ethnic group. These findings, however, also reflect distinctive traditional cultural norms regarding violent behavior that prevail in these more traditional social groups.

As with Israeli Jews and Arabs, the structural social division between Eastern and Western Jews carries the potential for violence on the collective level. Historically, this was demonstrated in the riots of 1959 in Wadi Salib (a North African slum area in Haifa) and the violent protests of the Black Panther movement in Jerusalem's Musrara neighborhood in 1971.[59] However, the increased integration of Eastern Jews in Israeli society has meant that this division is primarily dealt with by legal rather than violent means.[60]

Significantly, the "criminality gap" between Eastern and Western Jews has narrowed since the 1990s—a decade marked by mass immigration to Israel, mainly from the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. In 2000, 24 percent of juvenile delinquents in Israel were new immigrants (mainly from the former Soviet Union), more than twice the

new immigrant delinquent rate in 1995 (11.7 percent). New immigrants also constituted more than one-third of all young drug offenders and 40 percent of the Jewish inmates in Israeli's main juvenile prison.[61] The higher prevalence of crime among the new immigrants can be attributed largely to the economic, cultural, and social difficulties facing them in adjusting to their new country.

The Religious-Secular Divide

Israeli Jews can be classified roughly along a continuum of religious ritual observance: secular, traditional, Orthodox, and ultra-Orthodox (haredi). The main normative conflict is between the two ends of this spectrum, namely, the nonreligious majority and the ultra-Orthodox minority. The secular-religious conflict is very high on the public agenda and the internal political arena; it is rated higher than the ethnic conflict between Eastern and Western Jews.[62] Because Israel's major political parties are usually forced to rely on ultra-Orthodox support in order to form a coalition government, the ultra-Orthodox parties enjoy disproportionate influence and power. As a result, there is a general feeling among the secular segment that its lifestyle is being threatened by concessions to the religious parties. These feelings lead to expressions of aggressive sentiment toward the latter.[63]

As with ethnic divisions, this normative division is mainly dealt with nonviolently. The only exception to this rule relates to a very small splinter group of ultrareligious zealots (Neturei Karta) who, over a long period of time, have on certain issues indulged in individual and organized violence such as throwing rocks at vehicles traveling on the Sabbath, blocking roads, and burning down bus shelters displaying advertisements of women perceived to be dressed immodestly.

Considerable overlap exists between the secular-religious and the Left-Right divisions, with most of the religious parties and their electorate located on the right of the political map. The potential for violence of the Left-Right division is discussed in the next section.

The Brutalization of Interpersonal Relations

Not all of the possible effects of social stress on life in Israel can be quantified or scientifically studied and analyzed. Over the years, stress has become such an integral part of the Israeli identity and daily routine that sometimes it takes outsiders to make Israelis aware of this connection. I will focus here on what I consider to be the most salient aspects of the process of increased brutalization experienced by Israelis in recent years: the proliferation of firearms, everyday violence in the street and behind the steering wheel, and political violence.

The Proliferation of Firearms

First-time visitors to Israel are usually shocked by the large number of armed soldiers and other security forces on the streets, as well as by the many civilians carrying firearms. These sights quickly make the outsider aware of the security problems fac-

ing Israeli citizens. The more than ten-fold increase in legal ownership of firearms in Israel—from 38,000 in 1969 to about 400,000 in 1996—is clearly a by-product of growing concern about personal security and fear of terrorism.[64]

No matter how understandable or even justified the proliferation of firearms, its cumulative brutalizing effect is indubitable. Clearly, the greater the total number of firearms, the greater the probability of their misuse. Statistics confirm this assumption. Between 1978 and 1985, the use of firearms increased 4.2 times in instances of grievous bodily harm, and 2.5 times in cases of armed robbery. Simultaneously, there was a 2.4 times increase in illegal possession of firearms, although, as Avirama Golan reported in *Ha'aretz*, most homicides in recent years were committed by licensed firearms owners. [65]

Public debate regarding firearm licensing policy has often erupted after highly publicized homicide cases in which the lethal weapon was a licensed firearm. Indeed, there are many more innocent victims of licensed firearms than persons protected by them from terrorist or criminal attack.[66] This fact, however, counts for little against officials' deeply rooted beliefs and ideological values. For example, in October 1996, Eliyahu Suissa, the newly elected minister of the interior, decided to ease the criteria for obtaining firearm licenses. This decision went against the recommendations of a professional committee that had been established in 1992 following the killing of four women at a mental health clinic by a mentally disturbed licensed firearm owner. In recommending a far stricter licensing policy, members of the committee had cited the growing violence within Israeli society. Suissa, however, justified his decision on security grounds. "When peace comes," he explained, "we will tighten up the criteria . . . but in the current situation, we should grant licenses to the proper people."[67] More recently, the Ministry of the Interior decided to further liberalize these criteria, especially for residents of towns and settlements vulnerable to Palestinian violence.[68]

The "Ugly" Israeli: In the Street and behind the Steering Wheel

Visitors to Israel are often struck by the blunt manner and lack of courtesy of Israelis in public places. Indeed, compared with other Westerners, Israelis seem to be more inconsiderate and abrasive in everyday social exchanges. In a comparison of Israeli and U.S. college students on measures of aggressiveness and assertiveness, Baruch A. Margalit and Paul A. Mauger reported in 1984 that Israelis scored higher on aggressiveness, had a greater tendency to lose their temper, and were more stubborn and negativistic. Americans, in contrast, scored higher on self-confidence. The authors explained these results in terms of the Israelis' perceived need for security, both on the individual and national level, which led them to respond aggressively in order to protect themselves and their interests.[69] Support for this interpretation is provided by the findings of a national public opinion survey conducted in 1997. When asked, "What frightens you most in Israel?" the highest-ranking items were (in descending order) "terrorism," "the security situation," and "war." When asked, "What annoys you most in Israel?" the highest-ranking answer was "impatience and the Israeli mentality."[70]

An extreme example of the brutalization of Israeli society is provided by the events

of one week in the month of June 2000. Between June 13 and 19, nine Israelis were brutally murdered: two as a result of trivial quarrels (one between drivers on the road, and the other about a deckchair on the beach); four in the course of "domestic" arguments; and two related to other criminal activities (robbery and drug trafficking). The ninth victim was a two-year-old, strangled by his mother's partner because the toddler had disturbed him while he was watching a television soccer match. As would be expected, these homicides received wide media coverage, coupled with calls for collective soul-searching regarding such questions as "What has happened to our society?" and "How have we become such a violent society?"

Less dramatic but no less disturbing are reports on the increase of violence in the Israeli educational system. A survey of junior high school students initiated by the Ministry of Education in 2000 revealed that half of the students had been victims of verbal or physical violence, and that 2.7 percent of them had brought firearms to school.[71] Commenting on these and similar reports, Ofer Shelach of *Yedioth Ahronoth* asked:

> How many Israelis have been involved in the occupation of the territories over the past 30 years? How many of us have been involved in setting up curfews, searching houses, chasing a 12-year-old stone thrower? Tens of thousands? Hundreds of thousands? How many of us have learned that you can violently invade another person's life, humiliate him, take things away from him?[72]

Nowhere in the public domain is the so-called "Israeli mentality" more salient than on the roads and highways. It seems as if all of the various stresses experienced by Israelis find their outlet in rude and reckless driving. During the years 1949–2000, a total of 22,193 Israelis were killed in car accidents—a number far exceeding the casualties of all the wars and terrorist activities. [73] A study examining the increase in road accidents in 1992 as compared with the preceding year confirms the view that drivers (rather than the road) are more often to blame. In order of importance, the three factors most responsible for the increase in accidents were: failure to heed traffic lights, excessive speed, and failure to observe right-of-way signs, which rose by 48, 40, and 35 percent, respectively.[74]

Although the situation in many other countries is worse, Israel lags far behind other industrialized developed countries. In a survey carried out in 1996, Israel ranked 23rd out of 52 countries with regard to the average number of fatalities per vehicle (400 fatalities per million vehicles, compared with less than 300 in most West European countries, 137 in Japan, 215 in the United States, and 166 in Australia). Using the measure of fatalities per billion kilometers traveled, Israel ranked 16th out of 40 countries, with 20 fatalities per billion kilometers—a figure that was much higher than those of other developed countries such as Britain (2 fatalities), the countries of Scandinavia (1–7), the United States (4), Australia (6), or Japan (10).[75]

Security-related incidents with loss of life generally attract major media coverage and high public awareness, whereas similar (or even greater) numbers of road fatalities are more likely to be treated as routine. It seems to be the motive and the perpetrator that count, rather than the mere fact of casualties or loss of life. Security-related incidents are perceived as an external threat to the collective; "internally produced"

loss is perceived as an unavoidable risk of modern life. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in cases of homicide in Israel in which the motive is not immediately apparent, the police pursue both criminal and security leads, and one can almost hear the collective sigh of relief when these turn out to be "regular" crimes.

Political Violence

In recent years, polarization between the political Left and Right in Israel has reached unprecedented heights. Although the two camps differ along a number of ideological lines, the major division relates to the nature of the desired final agreement with the Palestinians. In brief, the various right-wing groups either oppose totally or seek to minimize the return of the territories to non-Israeli rule, whereas the left-wing groups advocate complete or large-scale territorial withdrawal subject to appropriate security arrangements. The incitement (usually against the Left) that accompanies this political conflict has been accompanied—one should add, inevitably—by outbursts of violence. Prominent examples from the pre-Oslo era are the killing of Emil Greenzweig during a "Peace Now" demonstration against the war in Lebanon in 1983 and the violent election campaign of 1983–1984.[76]

The 1993 agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ensuing escalation in terrorist attacks (on both sides) brought the cleavage between Left and Right to the brink of civil war. For the first time, the possibility of armed Jewish resistance to the legitimate government became a feasible danger. The most violent opposition to peace talks came from a nucleus of right-wing, religious-messianic zealots, many of them settlers in the occupied territories, who believed in the ideology of "Greater Israel." In July 1995, a group of right-wing rabbis issued a religious decree that declared any government decision to evacuate Jewish settlements in the occupied territories as illegitimate, and advised their followers and students in the army to disobey orders rather than participate in such actions. This was part of a broader, politically motivated and verbally violent campaign against the government that culminated on November 4, 1995 when a right-wing religious law student, Yigal Amir, assassinated Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at a mass rally in support of the peace process. This shocking event represented a major threat to the very fabric of Israeli society and revealed the extent to which the psychological barriers to extreme political violence had broken down, and how far the brutalization of Israeli society had proceeded.

Effects of Renewed Israeli-Palestinian Violence

The sudden outburst of violent clashes between the Palestinian Authority and Israel in September 2000 will undoubtedly affect Israeli society generally, and the levels of violence within it, in particular. What seemed at first to be spontaneous and sporadic acts of protest by Palestinians now appear to have been a well-planned strategy to resume violence against Israel as part of a political struggle for independence.

The abrupt change from a widely held belief in an imminent peace with the Palestinians to a new reality of belligerence and indiscriminate terrorist attacks has

affected the mutual perceptions of both societies. Yesterday's neighbor and partner for peace has suddenly reverted into the decades-long enemy. Violent clashes between police and Israeli Arabs—particularly those of October 2000—have also had a deeply negative effect on Jewish-Arab relations within Israel.

Public opinion polls accurately reflect this new reality. Asked about their feeling of personal safety at the end of September 2000 (just before the outbreak of the disturbances), only 30 percent of the Israeli population admitted to feeling unsafe. A few weeks later, this proportion had almost tripled, to about 80 percent of the respondents.[77] Public opinion polls conducted at the end of March 2001 indicated that six months of the new intifada had dramatically changed the Israeli Jewish population's perception of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs: a majority (58 percent) reported a negative change regarding the Palestinians and a similar proportion (55 percent) expressed a negative change regarding the Arab population within Israel. Almost two-thirds (63 percent) reported that they had given up on the idea of peace with the Palestinians.[78]

In line with the findings presented in this essay, it can be predicted that this renewed cycle of violence between Israel and its outside (Palestinian) adversary is likely to have a further brutalizing effect on Israeli society. However, the extent and severity of this effect depends on many unknown factors, most importantly, the duration and severity of the current conflict and the way in which it will ultimately be resolved. At the time of writing (July 2001), this remains an open question.

Concluding Remarks: On Jewishness and Violence

Israel's national poet, Hayim Nahman Bialik, is said to have prayed for the day when Jewish society (in what was then Palestine) would have its own thieves and prostitutes as the ultimate proof of being, at last, a normal people. It seems that Bialik's prayer has been answered—too fully.

Yet this somewhat fanciful prayer actually points to the essence of the Zionist movement. Zionism's aspiration was to transform the abnormal structure of Jewish society in the diaspora into the type of social structure required by an independent state. Through almost two millennia of living in the diaspora, the image of "Jewishness" had become synonymous with scholastic achievement and high educational levels, high representation in free professions, and high moral standards—and thus a low degree of criminality. Although reality may not always have matched this image, the Jews' rate of criminality in all countries in which they lived was in fact very low, especially with respect to violent crime. As cross-national comparisons show, this has ceased to be the case in modern-day Israel: although a number of other countries have much higher rates of crime and violence, Israeli society can hardly be typified as nonviolent.

This essay has provided evidence to show how violence and crime are closely related to various stressors in Israeli society. It should be kept in mind, however, that we have dealt here not only with violence among Israeli Jews: about one-fifth of Israel's population is non-Jewish and, as shown, their contribution to the crime figures is disproportionately higher than that of the Jewish population. Are there any "Jewish" aspects to this phenomenon? One could reasonably argue that, given the va-

riety and intensity of stress factors in Israel, much higher rates of criminality might have been expected among the Israeli Jewish population. To some extent, traditional Jewish characteristics that still prevail in Israel help to counter the tendencies toward a higher level of crime. Among these characteristics are the centrality of the family as a major support and control unit and the lower consumption of alcohol. It is true that in Israel, as in many other modern countries, the family unit is weakening, as shown by the increase in the rates of divorce and single-parent families. However, these trends in Israel are still weaker than in other industrialized countries, in part because a significant portion of the Jewish population (about 20 percent) maintains traditional Jewish standards of conduct and patterns of behavior that are conducive to family stability. Official statistics and research findings indicate that recorded criminal activity and violence in the Orthodox Jewish sector of the population is considerably lower than the average.[79]

Overall, the various stress factors described here are likely to be part and parcel of daily life in Israel for the foreseeable future. As such, one can expect the continuation of these detrimental effects on society, especially with regard to the levels of crime and violence.

Notes

The final version of this article was written while I was a Fellow of Pembroke College and a Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Criminology at the University of Cambridge.

1. See Simha F. Landau and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, "Aggression in Israel: A Psychohistorical Perspective," in *Aggression in Global Perspective*, ed. Arnold P. Goldstein and Marshall H. Segall (New York: 1983), 261–286; Simha F. Landau, "Crime Patterns and Their Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators: The Role of Gender," *Journal of Quantitative Criminology* 13 (1997), 29–56.

2. See Simha F. Landau and Leslie Sebba, "Victimological Research in Israel," in *Criminal Justice and Criminology in Israel: Assessing the Knowledge Base Towards the 21st Century*, ed. Robert Friedman (Albany: 1998), 359–387.

3. See Giora Rahav, "Criminal Statistics," in ibid., 65–78.

4. See Freda Adler, Gerhard Mueller, and William S. Laufer, *Criminology* (New York: 1991), 234.

5. United Nations, *Global Report on Crime and Justice* (New York: 1999).

6. See Rachel Katz, "Concerns of the Israeli: Change and Stability from 1962 to 1975," *Human Relations* 35 (1982), 83–100; idem, "Dynamic Patterning of Concerns: A Long-Term Comparison of the Structure of Hopes and Fears of Israelis," *Social Indicators Research* 10 (1982), 359–388; Ofra Mayseles, "Perceived Stress in Israel due to Terrorist Acts and War: A National Survey of High-School Students," paper presented at the Fourth International Conference on Psychological Stress and Adjustment in Time of War, Israel, 1989; Russell A. Stone, *Social Change in Israel: Attitudes and Events, 1967–79*, (New York: 1982).

7. See Simha F. Landau, "Security-related Stress: Its Effects on the Quality of Life in Israel," in *Concerned with Security: Learning from Israel's Experience*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson, and Aharon Klieman (Stamford: 1998), 289–310.

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10. See Simha F. Landau, "Trends in Violence and Aggression: A Cross-Cultural Analysis," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 25 (1984), 133–158.

11. Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1999.*

12. See Sammy Smooha, "Hashpa'ot ha'aliyah hahamonit meḥever hamedinot 'al haḥevrah hayisreelit," *Soẓiyologiyah* 6–7 (1994).

13. See Sergio Herzog, "Motor Vehicle Theft in Israel: An Empirical Analysis of the Offense and the Offenders" (unpublished paper, 2000).

14. See Lewis A. Coser, *The Function of Social Conflict* (New York: 1956); Georg Simmel, *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation* (Illinois: 1955).

15. See Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner, *Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective* (New Haven: 1984).

16. Ibid.

17. See Marc H. Ross, "Internal and External Conflict and Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29 (1985), 547–579.

18. See Landau and Beit-Hallahmi, "Aggression in Israel: A Psychohistorical Perspective." At a later stage, the model was broadened to accommodate nonviolent as well as violent crime. See idem, "Crime Patterns and Their Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators." On the frustration-aggression hypothesis, see John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal M. Miller, Orval H. Mowrer, and Robert F. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression* (New Haven: 1939); Andrew F. Henry and James F. Short, *Suicide and Homicide* (New York: 1954); Carl I. Hovland and Robert B. Sears, "Minor Studies of Aggression: Correlation of Lynching with Economic Indices," *Journal of Psychology* 9 (1940), 301–310.

19. See Robert Agnew, "Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency," *Criminology* 30 (1992), 47–87; idem and Helen R. White, "An Empirical Test of General Strain Theory," *Criminology* 30 (1992), 475–499; Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression: Its Causes, Consequences, and Control* (New York: 1993), 56.

20. See Seymour Halleck, *Psychiatry and the Dilemmas of Crime* (New York: 1967); also see Keith Farrington, "The Application of Stress Theory to the Study of Family Violence," *Journal of Family Violence* 1 (1986), 131–147; Kary E. MacEwen and Julian Barling, "Multiple Stressors, Violence in the Family of Origin, and Marital Aggression: A Longitudinal Investigation," *Journal of Family Violence* 3 (1988), 73–87; Berkowitz, *Aggression;* Agnew, "Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency."

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22. See Michael Haas, "Social Change and National Aggressiveness, 1900–1960," in *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence*, ed. Joel David Singer (New York: 1968), 215–244.

23. See Arnold S. Linsky and Murray A. Straus, *Social Stress in the United States* (Dover, Mass.: 1986). In a more recent study, Linsky, Ronet Bachman, and Straus reported a direct link between objective stress and violence. See their book *Stress, Culture and Aggression* (New Haven: 1995). Paul J. Brantingham and Patricia L. Brantingham present a model in which economic stress (unemployment) is related both to violent crime (because of increased strain) and to property crime (because of real or perceived economic need). See their book *Patterns of Crime* (New York: 1984), 146–148.

24. See Landau, "Crime Patterns and Their Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators." Several previous studies have reported that social support appears to buffer the emergence of health or behavioral problems stemming from stressful life changes. See, for in-

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25. See Yael Hassin and Menachem Amir, "'Business (Crime) as Usual,' in Wartime Conditions among Offenders in Israel," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 66 (1974), 491–495.

26. See Haim Segev, "Patterns of Juvenile Delinquency During the Yom Kippur War in the Tel-Aviv Area" (master's thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1975).

27. See Gideon Fishman, "On War and Crime," in *Stress in Israel*, ed. Shlomo Breznitz (New York: 1983), 165–180.

28. See Efrat Shoham, "Changes in the Behavior Patterns of Minors' Delinquency Before and After the Yom Kippur War" (master's thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1985).

29. See Simha F. Landau and Danny Pfeffermann, "A Time Series Analysis of Violent Crime and its Relation to Prolonged States of Warfare: The Israeli Case," *Criminology* 26 (1988), 489–504.

30. See Gideon Fishman and Mordechai Argov, "Megamot bifshiyah beyisrael: 1951–1976," *'Arvaryanut ustiyah ḥevratit* 8 (1980), 25–35.

31. See Simha F. Landau and Adi Raveh, "Stress Factors, Social Support and Violence in Israeli Society: A Quantitative Analysis," *Aggressive Behavior* 13 (1987), 67–85.

32. See Simha F. Landau and Susan Hattis Rolef, "Intimate Femicide in Israel: Temporal, Social, and Motivational Patterns," *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* 6 (1998), 75–90.

33. See Simha F. Landau, "Violent Crime in a Society at War: Israel and the Intifada," in *Violence—Some Alternatives*, ed. Jesus Martin Ramirez (Madrid: 1994), 63–84.

34. Moshe Lissak, "Haintifadah vehaḥevrah hayisreelit: perspektivah historit upsikhologit," in *Hamilḥamah hashevi'it: hashpa'ot haintifadah 'al haḥevrah beyisrael*, ed. Reuven Gal (Zichron Yaakov: 1990), 17–37.

35. See Landau, "Violent Crime in a Society at War," 72.

36. See B'tzelem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, *Akhifat haḥok 'al ezraḥim yisreelim bashetaḥim* (Jerusalem: 1994).

37. Ibid.

38. Susan H. Greenberg and Theodore Stanger, "Israel's Men on the Verge," *Newsweek* (19 Aug. 1991), 15.

39. Linsky and Straus, *Social Stress in the United States*.

40. See Simha F. Landau, "Violent Crime and its Relation to Subjective Social Stress Indicators: The Case of Israel," *Aggressive Behavior* 14 (1988), 337–362.

41. See Simha F. Landau and Giora Rahav, "Suicide and Attempted Suicide: Their Relation to Subjective Social Stress Indicators," *Genetic, Social and General Psychology Monographs* 115 (1989), 273–294.

42. See Simha F. Landau, "The Relationship Between Objective and Subjective Stress Indicators: Some Israeli Findings," *European Sociological Review* 4 (1988), 249–262.

43. See Simha F. Landau, "The Effect of Objective Social Stress Factors on Subjective Perception of Well-being and Social Solidarity: The Israeli Case," *Human Relations* 42 (1989), 487–508.

44. See Simha F. Landau, "Homicide in Israel: Its Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators on the Macro Level," *Homicide Studies* 1 (1997), 377–400.

45. See Landau, "Crime Patterns and Their Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators"; idem, "Crime, Subjective Stress and Support Indicators, and Ethnic Origin: The Israeli Experience," *Justice Quarterly* 15 (1998), 244–272; idem, "Violent Crime, Social Stress and Solidarity in Israel: The Role of Education," in *Cross-Cultural Approaches to Aggression and Reconciliation*, ed. Jesus Martin Ramirez and Debora R. Richardson (Huntington, N.Y.: 2001), 23–50.

46. See Landau, "Crime Patterns and Their Relation to Subjective Stress and Support Indicators."

47. See Landau, "Crime, Subjective Stress and Support Indicators, and Ethnic Origin."

48. See Landau, "Violent Crime, Social Stress and Solidarity in Israel."

49. See Berkowitz, *Aggression;* Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracut, *The Subculture of Violence* (London: 1967).

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51. See Gideon M. Kressel, "Sororicide/Filiacide: Homicide for Family Honor," *Current Anthropology* 22 (1981), 141–158; Simha F. Landau, Israel Drapkin, and Shlomo Arad, "Homicide Victims and Offenders: An Israeli Study," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 65 (1974), 390–396; Eliza Griswold, "Death and Dishonour," *Sunday Times Magazine*, 8 July 2001.

52. See Simha F. Landau, "Type of Homicide and Pathologies among Homicide Offenders: Some Cultural Profiles," *British Journal of Criminology* 15 (1975), 157–166.

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54. See Rahav, "Criminal Statistics."

55. See Simha F. Landau, "Conflict Resolution in a Highly Stressful Society: The Case of Israel," in *Cultural Variation in Conflict Resolution: Alternatives for Reducing Violence*, ed. Douglas P. Fry and Kaj Bjorkqvist (Mahwah, N.J.: 1997), 123–136.

56. *Statistical Abstract of Israel 1999.*

57. See Simha F. Landau, "Future Time Perspective of Delinquents and Non-delinquents: The Effect of Institutionalization," *Criminal Justice and Behavior* 2 (1975), 22–36; Shlomo Giora-Shoham, Giora Rahav, and Rachel Markovsky, "Family Parameters of Violent Prisoners," *Journal of Social Psychology* 127 (1987), 83–91.

58. Giora Rahav, "Juvenile Delinquency," in Friedman (ed.), *Criminal Justice and Criminology in Israel,* 79–96.

59. Gerald Cromer, "The Israeli Black Panthers: Fighting for Credibility and Cause," *Victimology* 1 (1976), 166–171.

60. See Landau, "Conflict Resolution in a Highly Stressful Society."

61. *Ha'aretz*, 27 Feb. 2001.

62. See Eliezer Ben-Rafael, Haya Shteyer, and Elisa Lewin, "Israel as a Multi-Cleavage Setting," *Plural Societies* 19 (1989), 21–40.

63. See Naomi Struch and Shalom H. Schwartz, "Intergroup Aggression: Its Predictors and Distinctness from In-Group Bias," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 56 (1989), 364–373.

64. *Ha'aretz*, 30 Oct. 1996; *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 4 March 1993; Simha F. Landau, "Possession of Firearms, Psychiatric Hospitalization and Violent Criminal Behavior: The Israeli Experience," *Studies in Crime and Crime Prevention* 5 (1996), 166–181. Together with the official estimate of 100,000 unlicensed firearms, the possession of firearms reaches half a million (See *Ha'aretz*, 31 Oct. 1996). Cf. Daniel Bar-Tal and Dan Jacobson's report (#5) for the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, *Emunat hayisreelim legabei bitaḥon: nituaḥ psikhologi* (Tel Aviv: 1996).

65. *Ha'aretz*, 30 Oct. 1996.

66. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 4 March 1993.

67. *Ha'aretz*, 31 Oct. 1996. As reported in this article, Suissa's decision resulted in a public uproar, especially among women's organizations, who argued that more guns in private homes would lead inevitably to more women being killed by their partners.

68. Ibid., 13 July 2001.
69. See Baruch A. Margalit and Paul A. Mauger, "Cross-cultural Demonstration of Orthogonality of Assertiveness and Aggressiveness: Comparison Between Israel and the United States," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 46 (1984), 1414–1421.
70. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 11 May 1997.
71. *Ha'aretz*, 20 June 2000.
72. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 23 June 2000.
73. See Central Bureau of Statistics, *Teunot derakhim 'im nifga'im 2000,* part 1, *sikumim klaliyim* (Jerusalem: 2000).
74. See Simha F. Landau, "Alimut bakevishim," paper presented at the Na'amat Conference on Road Accidents, Tel Aviv, 19 April 1993.
75. See David Link, *Betiḥut bakevishim beyisrael: medadim 'ikariyim*, published by the Israel Ministry of Transportation (Jerusalem: 1996).
76. See Gerald Cromer, "The Voice of Jacob and the Hands of Esau: Verbal and Physical Violence in Israeli Politics," in this volume, 149–167.
77. *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 20 Oct. 2000.
78. Ibid., 30 March 2001.
79. See Sarah Ben-David and Leonard Weller, "Religiosity, Criminality and Types of Offences of Jewish Male Prisoners," *Medicine and Law* 14 (1995), 509–519.

The Voice of Jacob and the Hands of Esau: Verbal and Physical Violence in Israeli Politics, 1977–1984

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When can an illegal act be defined as a political rather than a conventional crime? Sociologists have tended to differentiate between the two on the basis of offenders' motives rather than on the nature of the given offense. Robert Merton for instance, made a distinction between *aberrant* and *nonconforming* behavior. Building on his earlier dichotomy between rebellion and other forms of adaptation to anomie, he argued that

> nonconformity is not a private dereliction, but a thrust toward a new morality, or a promise of restoring a morality held to have been thrust aside in social practice. In this respect, the nonconformer is far removed from the other major type of social deviant, the aberrant, who has nothing new to propose and nothing old to restore, but seeks only to satisfy his private interests or to express his private cravings.[1]

However, the situation is more complicated than Merton and others would have us believe. As Pat Lauderdale has argued, "political deviance cannot be determined solely by an examination of an actor's intent, because intent is socially negotiated."[2] The nonconformist's claim to have departed from prevailing norms for disinterested reasons is often contested. In the case of riots and violent demonstrations, for instance, those involved are more likely to be accused of using ideological rhetoric as a cover for looting and other offenses, or else are castigated as mere hooligans bent on destruction. Either way, their motives are assumed to be selfish rather than politically oriented.[3]

A different school of thought focuses on nonconformists' behavior as nonvolitional. In certain instances, the metaphor of illness is employed.[4] However, as Jock Young has pointed out, it is difficult to apply the "sick" label to large numbers of individuals engaged in political deviance or violence. Hence, use is made of what he referred to as the corrupter-corrupted model, whereby rioters and demonstrators are seen as having acted not from their free will but rather under the influence of others.[5] According to this conspirational view, large groups of innocents are manipulated by a small group of wicked people. Political violence is attributable to the machiavellianism of the few.[6]

Surprisingly, studies such as Young's deal almost exclusively with the portrayal of the corrupted, with little attention paid to those "foreign infiltrators" or "internal subversives" who allegedly corrupt them. In the corrupter-corrupted model, rioters and demonstrators are not expressing their own views. Rather, having been subjected to alien influences, they have become the instrument of extremist plotters.

Israeli demonstrations, both Jewish and Arab, have been explained in similar terms. For instance, the Wadi Salib "events" in 1959 and the first Land Day strike in 1976 were attributed to the machinations of the right-wing Herut party and the Israeli Communist party, respectively.[7] Although those who allegedly instigated the demonstrations were on opposite sides of the political spectrum, the underlying process was supposedly the same. On both occasions, rioters were thought to have acted under the influence of their more extremist leaders.

But as this essay will show, competing forces can sometimes be traced to the center of the Israeli political spectrum rather than to its periphery. In such instances, emphasis is placed on the verbal incitement of the government or opposition (or both). Time and again, it has been argued that the words of political leaders can lead to violence on the part of more militant followers. Readers will undoubtedly remember the bitter debate about the dangers of incitement that took place both before and after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995. However, this was by no means the only or even the most far-reaching controversy on the subject. The discussion that follows focuses on two earlier debates, both of which took place when the Likud was in power. Before recounting these wars of words, the battlefields on which they took place will be placed in context.

Violence on the Streets

In eight consecutive elections held between 1949 and 1973, the Labor party or coalition variously known as Mapai, Labor, and the Alignment[8] emerged as the victor. Indeed, in a classic example of what Maurice Duverger referred to as a "dominant party" phenomenon, victory was always regarded as a foregone conclusion by Mapai and its opponents alike.[9] This situation changed only in 1977, when the Likud party[10] finally prevailed. Four years later, in June 1981, Israeli voters once again went to the polls. Over the course of the election campaign, an initial (and unprecedented) 30 percent lead held by the Alignment was gradually whittled away. By the beginning of June, the Likud had drawn ahead, although final preelection polls predicted a tie. This in fact proved to be the case: only 10,000 votes, or 0.5 percent of those cast, separated the two major parties in what turned out to be Israel's closest election, with the result being that the Likud barely retained power.

The 1981 elections were marked by the crystallization of ethnic differences in Israeli politics. Two-thirds of Likud voters were of Eastern (North African or Asian) origin, whereas 70 percent of those who voted for the Alignment came from a Western (European or American) background. The polarizing effect of this dichotomy was intensified by the high correlation between ethnicity and three other important variables: class, religion, and political ideology. Likud voters tended to belong to a lower socioeconomic class, were more likely to be religiously observant or traditional in

outlook, and had more right-wing political views than Alignment supporters. In pitting fundamentally different blocs against each other, these elections, not surprisingly, generated a good deal of divisiveness.

The 1981 election campaign was the most violent in Israeli history. The problem emerged at the end of April when Shimon Peres, the Alignment candidate for prime minister, was pelted with tomatoes during a visit to the traditional post-Passover Mimouna celebrations. Two months later, violence had become almost routine. There were disturbances at opposition election rallies, arson attacks on local party headquarters, and assaults on cars bearing (mostly) Alignment stickers and on people wearing party T-shirts. To a large extent, the Alignment's late-campaign comeback represented a reaction against these attacks.[11] Hence, violence was not merely an unfortunate consequence of the elections but also came close to determining their outcome.

To a large degree, political violence subsided following the Knesset elections. It resurfaced, however, in February 1983. In the intervening year and a half, Israel had embarked on the Lebanon War. Also known as Operation Peace for the Galilee, the war had begun as a campaign to destroy PLO bases in southern Lebanon and thereby prevent terrorist bombardment of Israel's northernmost settlements. Over time, it became clear that the Likud government had a much broader aim in mind, namely the creation of a new Lebanese order. As the death toll grew, however, an increasing number of Israelis began to question not only the way in which the war was being waged but also the ends that it was meant to achieve.

Opposition to the war found expression in a variety of protest movements. Small in size, these were the vanguard for increasingly broad-based criticism of "the longest war" and the concomitant demand for an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. One event in particular—the massacre in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in September 1982—catalyzed public protest against the war. According to some estimates, as many as 400,000 people crowded into Tel Aviv's Malkhei Yisrael Square (now known as Rabin Square) to demand the establishment of a commission to investigate Israel's role in the Phalangist massacre of the Palestinian refugees.

The Kahan commission was set up in response to this massive public pressure, and on February 8, 1983, it issued its final report, which found the government indirectly responsible for the events at Sabra and Shatilla.[12] One of its recommendations was that Ariel Sharon, then minister of defense and the architect of the war in Lebanon, should "draw the appropriate conclusions."[13] Sharon, however, refused to resign, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin held off making a decision about whether or not to dismiss him. Three days after publication of the Kahan report, the Peace Now movement organized a rally to try and force the government's hand.

In theory, the demonstration was to be a peaceful march from Zion Square (in Jerusalem's downtown commercial center) to the prime minister's office, about a mile away. From the outset, however, the march was marred by violence. According to Shulamit Hareven, a prominent novelist and newspaper columnist, and one of the leaders of the march:

> Right from the start, when the demonstrators set out . . . they sensed that this was no ordinary clash of ideas. What was in the air was not the familiar level of marginal violence.

> Even before the Peace Now supporters arrived, an organized group of violent hooligans had gathered. . . . All along the route, they broke into the lines of marchers with great force, shouting, whistling, and punching them. Despite the fists, the blows, and the curses, the march moves forward. . . . The marchers show restraint. They are not hitting back. The most overwhelming feeling that we share today is that the street is on the verge of civil war, which has to be stopped at any price. . . . Democracy has some strange faces at this time: to stand under a shower of spit seems to be one of them.[14]

All this was just a prelude to the drama that took place after the march came to an end. As the demonstrators began to disperse, a grenade was thrown into the crowd, killing Emil Greenzweig and injuring nine others. As the victims of the grenade attack were brought to hospital emergency rooms, counterdemonstrators continued to heckle and assault the marchers. Greenzweig's funeral was also disrupted, as was the memorial vigil kept during the traditional week of mourning.

It took almost a year before Greenzweig's assailant—a petty criminal and drug user named Yonah Abrushmi—was apprehended and brought to trial.[15] In the meantime, there was a good deal of speculation not only concerning who had thrown the grenade but who may have encouraged the attack. In this case, as in that of the 1981 campaign, attention was concentrated not so much on perpetrators of the act as on their alleged auxiliaries.

The Hands Are the Hands of Esau

In contrast to the oft-raised contention that the latest trauma blots out the memory of previous ones, Greenzweig's killing in 1983 was perceived as the logical outcome of prior political violence. Throughout the 1981 election campaign, Alignment leaders, the two Alignment-affiliated newspapers, *Davar* and *'Al hamishmar*, and other publications had emphasized the seriousness of the campaign violence by describing specific incidents and drawing attention to their increasing severity, as well as providing up-to-date statistics on the total number of attacks. Concern was voiced that the violence would continue to escalate and would not cease even after the elections. Following the Peace Now rally, Alignment leaders and sympathizers suggested that earlier attacks on property and assaults on individuals and the act of terrorism that had resulted in Greenzweig's death were causally connected. Moreover, they argued, the fatal grenade attack had broken a barrier against intra-Jewish terrorism. The outcome could be even more extreme forms of violence, including political assassinations or, in the worst-case scenario, civil war.

During the campaign, Alignment leaders and political commentators referred to militant Likud supporters in various derogatory ways. Sometimes they were portrayed as mercenaries. On other occasions they were depicted as mentally unstable and in need of psychiatric treatment.[16] Most often, however, they were characterized as hooligans or ruffians who were simply venting their frustrations with Israeli society. The setting did not matter, this argument went; violence broke out whenever (and wherever) the mob got together. During the soccer season, they let off steam at the local stadium, and when there were elections they did so at Alignment rallies.[17]

Crowd psychology rather than political ideology was the source of violence, according to this theory.

The Alignment-affiliated newspapers took this argument a step further, with reporters, columnists, and cartoonists repeatedly referring to those who engaged in violence as "savages" or "barbarians." In a caricature that appeared in *Davar* on June 16, 1981, for instance, a trio of Likud supporters, depicted as cannibals holding various weapons (including shields that appear to have Menachem Begin's face on them), is shown outside the Alignment office. "Get ready, guys," their leader tells them, "I smell people." The cartoon itself is savage—not merely denying opponents the recognition accorded to political actors but impugning their most basic status as humans.

In the case of the Greenzweig killing, the counterdemonstrators were believed to come from the same background as those who had engaged in violence during the 1981 campaign. Consequently, they were portrayed in essentially the same way. Although no mention was made of mercenaries on this occasion, the more violent Likud supporters were again referred to as crazies, criminals, or barbarians. According to Natan Dunevitch of *Ha'aretz*:

> My colleagues and I know many people from the world of crime who claim to have a monopoly on patriotism. . . . Whenever they have the opportunity, they put on a cloak of pure and refined patriotism and unleash their tongues and their fists against those whom they consider to be traitors or enemies of the state. Each one by himself is not a great hero, but when they get together as a mob they can stand up against the country's best fighters and scream "traitors."[18]

If Greenzweig was seen as representing the best Israel had to offer, the person who killed him personified the dark side of the Jewish state.

Finally, both the hooligan and the barbarian images drew attention to what was considered to be the major characteristic of those who resorted to violence: a low level of self-restraint. This, together with the proclivity of crowds to become "a violent entity," made them easy prey for Likud oratory, especially that of their party's leader, "Begin, the king of Israel."

The Voice Is the Voice of Jacob

Throughout the 1981 election campaign, Alignment figures insisted that the violence directed against them was organized by the Likud. Rabble-rousers were being recruited and bused to Alignment rallies, they charged, furnished with appropriate placards and detailed instructions on how best to disrupt the proceedings. In certain instances, local Likud functionaries were accused of organized harassment, but more often the blame was leveled against national leaders—who, being in overall charge of the campaign, were held responsible for its violent turn.

Beyond this, the Likud in general, and Begin in particular, were accused of creating an atmosphere conducive to violence. At best, the leaders had failed to take effective action against violence; at worst, they had encouraged it, albeit in veiled terms.

As an editorial in *Davar* put it: "There is no need to give explicit instructions in order to activate the masses or incite hooligans. The indirect excitement of passions, 'calming people down' while essentially encouraging them to raise their fists, is enough."[19]

Begin, as noted, bore the brunt of the Alignment attack. Time and again, he was criticized for his rabble-rousing and demagoguery.[20] It was the prime minister's "verbal violence,"[21] Peres and other opposition leaders argued, that led to the physical violence against them. The attacks on Alignment property and persons were simply the ugly translation of Begin's words into the language of the street. This point was often driven home by juxtaposing photographs of the prime minister addressing Likud rallies with those depicting disruptive Likud supporters. The message was clear: Begin's words led to their deeds.

Alignment leaders made a similar argument after the Greenzweig killing. Shimon Peres summed up the process as follows: "The first person throws out a word, the second throws a tomato, the third throws a stone, and the fourth throws a grenade."[22] At this point, however, the focus of criticism was shifted from Begin to Ariel Sharon, who was castigated for his denigration of the Kahan report (according to Sharon, the report had "stamped Israel with the mark of Cain"). The morning after the Peace Now demonstration, an editorial in *Davar* drew an analogy to the biblical story of Jacob and Esau, arguing that "the hands are the hands of the person who threw the grenade, but the voice is the voice of Ariel Sharon."[23]

Since 1981, Alignment leaders had regularly cited a "lexicon of incitement" allegedly used against those (including the media, particularly the Israeli television network) who disagreed with the government. Terms such as "foreign agent," "fifth columnist," and "*ashafist*" ("PLO-nik") were commonly employed, with the Likud and its supporters demonstrating a tendency to identify the party with the state: anyone who disagreed with government policy was accused of "stabbing the nation in the back." This in turn led to the demonization of political enemies and, inevitably, to the legitimation of violence against them. As a lead article in *'Al hamishmar* put it:

> There is an iron logic in this madness. . . . A king is someone whose actions one does not question. One does not dare to doubt his judgment, and it does not cross one's mind to examine his decisions. The king is the law . . . and he rules. Anybody who dares to think, to question, or to protest, is clearly a bleeding-heart Ashkenazic, a pursuer of peace, and a traitorous and cursed agent of the PLO. . . . Those who sally forth with such satisfaction at public rallies chanting "king of Israel," those who stigmatize anyone who dares to hold them to account . . . are responsible for the attacks on Jewish victims in the civil war. . . . They are not the result of fate, but the fruit of human action. They have an address, and someone is responsible for them.[24]

More specifically, Begin's oratory was said to have led to a release of primitive passions among his supporters. Those who had a low provocation threshold became part of an "excited mass"—from there, the violence on the streets was almost inevitable. Begin, indeed, was often portrayed as having lost control of the situation. The mob had gone further than expected; in more colorful descriptions, it was a golem rising up against its creator. Alternatively, the relationship between "Begin, king of Israel" and his followers was depicted as mutually reinforcing. According to Dune-

vitch, first "the mass of incited admirers translates Begin's demagoguery into the language of wild violence" and then "the tables are turned and the mob begins to control him. Begin is mesmerized by his own oratory. It's like a life-giving drug that baffles the senses."[25]

Alignment leaders admitted that some of their own party spokespeople engaged at times in verbal attacks. But the Alignment rhetoric, they insisted, was far less extreme than that of the Likud.[26] Speaking on the Knesset floor in February 1983, Alignment member Yossi Sarid turned to members of the Likud and declared that the difference between the two parties was

> very simple. . . . Even when we engage in fierce debate, we never deny the other side's legitimacy. We never deny the integrity of the opposing opinion, even though we are convinced that it is disastrous for the state of Israel. We accept that this is what you really believe. . . . But you do not say that we think such and such, and that we are mistaken. You say that we are insincere, that we are foreign allies or agents, that we are traitors.[27]

Because of this perceived distinction, Alignment leaders rejected a Likud proposal to set up a joint committee to monitor election violence during the 1981 campaign. Following the Greenzweig killing, Likud Knesset member Ronnie Milo proposed a framework for consultation between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. Peres and his colleagues opposed this suggestion as well, arguing that the establishment of such a body would give the impression that the Alignment and the Likud were equally responsible for the atmosphere of political violence. In fact, they claimed, only the Likud was to blame. "It takes a great deal of impudence to come up with such ideas," an editorial in *'Al hamishmar* noted. "It is like suggesting the establishment of a coordinating committee consisting of the attacker and the attacked, the rapist and the raped, or the robber and his victim."[28]

Rather than agreeing to bipartisan activity, Alignment leaders called on Begin to tone down his supporters by means of an unequivocal denunciation of political violence. Having successfully demonized government critics, they argued, Begin now had the task of rehabilitating them by explaining that they were merely political opponents, not enemies of the state. Begin's response, both during the 1981 campaign and following the Peace Now demonstration, was widely perceived to be halfhearted. Consequently, some Alignment supporters called for an escalation in their own party's response—up to and including taking the law into their own hands by meeting force with force. The playwright Yehoshua Sobol, for example, argued that "nice words and self-restraint will not change the situation. . . . It is . . . necessary to respond forcefully to the sadism of hooligans and the mob. . . . The time has come to treat them for their sickness, and not according to some lofty ideals that only serve to intensify their ailment."[29] But others insisted that the Alignment and Peace Now should under no circumstances "descend to the level of the Likud," as they put it, since to do so would simply play into the hands of the hooligans. At the height of the 1981 campaign, Peres had made a public appeal to his supporters to exercise self-restraint. Similarly, Peace Now urged its members in the wake of the grenade attack to "control their anger and not be drawn into a civil war." This, the leadership said, would be the most appropriate way to honor Greenzweig's memory.

Can the Leopard Change Its Spots?

Begin's rhetoric (or "demagoguery") had long been an issue for the Alignment. On various occasions, Alignment leaders had lambasted Begin for his undiplomatic comments both to and about various world leaders. They quoted his uncomplimentary remarks about Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former president of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, among others, and pointed to the deleterious effect of such comments on Israel's relationship with its allies. Begin's frequent evocation of the biblical description of Israel as "a people that dwells alone" had turned into a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Alignment charged. Even Israel's closest friends had distanced themselves from the Likud government and left it completely isolated in the international arena.

During the 1981 campaign, Begin's "demagoguery" was portrayed as a longstanding phenomenon. Alignment leaders recalled vitriolic remarks made by Begin about opponents both within his own party and beyond its ranks. And they referred to past instances in which Begin had allegedly incited his supporters, including the demonstrations against U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that took place during the post-Yom Kippur War negotiations for an interim peace agreement with Egypt. The most frequently mentioned incident was an even earlier event, a mass rally against acceptance of German reparations that had taken place in January 1952. According to another election ad that appeared several times in the *Jerusalem Post*:

> It wasn't by the rioters' initiative that they reached the Knesset esplanade. They had been organized and transported to Jerusalem from all over Israel. A short while earlier, you [Begin] had stood on a platform in Zion Square. You whetted your followers' appetites and voiced the terrible cry: "This will be a war of life or death. Today I will give the order—blood!" Nearly 30 years have passed since that chilling event, but it turns out that you haven't changed. . . . One thread binds [the events of today] to the 1952 riots and [past] scenes of political violence. You, MENACHEM BEGIN. *Victims have come and gone since then. But you, chief agitator, have remained.*

The dangers of what Peres disparagingly referred to as "Beginism" were underscored in other campaign ads by comparisons made with various dictatorships, including Argentina, Libya, and, above all, Iran. Begin's followers were frequently referred to as "Khomeinists," and he himself was likened to the Ayatollah, as in the following ad:

> In Iran, the incited mass hails the elderly leader who vilifies the entire world while the national economy is in ruins and the country is more isolated than ever in the international arena. Under his direct inspiration or with his silent approval, fanatics are trying to stifle the voices of the moderates. Scary, no?[30]

Finally, both *Davar* and *'Al hamishmar* published articles during the campaign that compared the current situation in Israel with Italy and Germany just before the rise of Fascism and Nazism.[31] These articles (some of them guest pieces written by scholars) drew attention to three areas of similarity: socioeconomic conditions such as galloping inflation, rising unemployment, and internal unrest; the exploitation of tensions with neighboring countries in order to foster national chauvinism; and the lack of resolute action against dictatorial elements within the democratic framework. In

Israel as in Europe, it was noted, opponents of the regime denied the gravity of the threat. Following the Greenzweig killing, historical parallels were similarly called upon. The term "fascist" was frequently used in reference to elements within the Likud, and this usage was defended as being a permissible and even obligatory means of drawing attention to the "monopolization of patriotism" within Israeli society.[32]

Spilling the Blood

In the Alignment's more broad-based critique of the Begin government, a major theme was vigilante violence and civil disobedience on the part of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories. At issue was not so much the acts themselves as the government's lack of response. Thus, Mordechai Vershubsky, a member of Knesset for the centrist party Shinui, recalled shortly after the Greenzweig killing that

> for weeks and months, we, the citizens of the state of Israel, saw the heroes of Yamit [who were forced to evacuate in the wake of the Israel-Egypt peace agreement] say that they would break the law and refuse to leave or to be ejected. . . . Not only was no action taken against them; they were regarded as people who experienced the pains of the motherland more acutely than others. . . . The government did nothing until the last minute, until there was absolutely no choice. This evoked a feeling among the public that some things are above the law, and that violence sometimes pays. . . . Once this happens, violence not only becomes permissible, it even generates sympathy. In this way, we gradually weaken the rule of law.[33]

Similarly, the government was attacked for failing to take preventive or punitive action against settlers who assaulted Arabs. Frequent reference was made, for example, to the failure of the police to apprehend those responsible for the bombing attacks on five West Bank mayors in June 1980. This and similar cases pointed to a dual system of justice, where Jews who committed violence against Arabs were less likely to pay for their crimes. If the spilling of Arab blood went unpunished, members of the opposition warned, the lives of Jews would also be endangered.

A number of the opposition members went a step further, arguing that political violence was attributable to the government's use of force in the occupied territories and in Lebanon. Yossi Sarid, for instance, argued that

> those who thought that it was possible to turn a blind eye to injustice on the other side of the Green Line [demarcating Israel's pre-1967 borders] and remain sensitive to iniquity on this side, were mistaken. Those who thought we could gradually become corrupt on the West Bank and retain our innocence here, were wrong. Those who thought that it was possible to belittle the value of a human being there without the same thing happening here, were mistaken. . . . Members of the Knesset, is there anybody who thinks that a state that knocks on doors in the middle of the night there will not act similarly in other places? Perhaps it was possible to believe this in 1967, when we spoke about an "enlightened occupation" . . . but can you still do so now, with everything that is going on?[34]

Writing in *'Al hamishmar*, historian Shlomo Ben-Ami drew attention to the fact that no regime had ever managed to control a large national minority and remain democratic. He warned that Israel was unlikely to be an exception to this "iron rule";

moreover, the lack of physical distance between the occupier and the occupied, plus the fact that the emnity between them was based to a large extent on mystical rather than rational causes, made the threat to democracy even more pronounced.[35] In the same issue, Michael Hersogar placed the government's actions in a more local historical context. He traced the Likud administration's policy in the occupied territories, and its tolerance of the use of violence by nonstate actors, to Revisionist attitudes during the Mandate era—specifically, its militant approach toward the problem of Arab terror and its concomitant disregard of democratically elected institutions. Current attitudes toward the use of violence, Hersogar claimed, were nothing new.[36]

And You Shall Choose Life

Both in 1981 and in 1983, there was a widespread feeling that the struggle between the Likud and the Alignment was akin to a clash between irreconcilable cultures. Some saw it as a battle between two diametrically opposed but legitimate visions of Zionism. For others, however, the opposing camp was clearly beyond the pale. As *'Al hamishmar* put it in the wake of the Greenzweig killing:

> If there are still people who believe that we are fighting against a different but legitimate point of view or against differences of opinion that are acceptable within a democracy, last night made them realize that they were mistaken. We are fighting, literally, against fascism. If the government will not control its hot-tempered supporters, it will bear responsibility for whatever happens.[37]

This dichotomization into two warring camps had also characterized the 1981 campaign, in which Alignment supporters, for instance, were urged to overlook internal party politics and differences of opinion for the sake of defeating a dangerous common enemy. A clear expression of this sentiment was found in a series of articles by two of Israel's most prominent novelists, S. Yizhar and Amos Oz. Several of the articles portrayed the campaign as the latest round in a perennial struggle between Labor and Revisionist Zionism. Others, more apocalyptic in tone, referred to it as a choice between statehood and exile. The essential message was that Israel needed to recapture its former Zionist spirit. As Oz argued:

> In songs and slogans they try to persuade us to continue moving forward. Forward to what? Forward to political and military adventures, arrogant prattle, and empty gestures. Forward to the annexation of more than a million Palestinian Arabs, as a result of which Israel will cease to be a Jewish state. Forward to the destruction of the social and economic structure via mass bribery and the encouragement of profiteering. Forward to ethnic incitement and hatred. Forward to religious coercion in all realms of life. Forward to the ghetto. But this time you have to choose. The time has come to go a little backwards. To return to the movements of building and creation. To return to political moderation, tolerance, and vision. To return to the joy of Zionist fulfillment, to the field and workshop, to the building of the land. To return to the most beautiful years of our lives, the years of creation and growth. To return from the ghetto to the land of Israel.[38]

Significantly, this struggle over the future of Israeli society often revolved around the issue of violence. Some Alignment advertisements insisted that voters had to

choose "between hooliganism and Zionism." Others referred to the problem as a symptom of "the battle between two civilizations, one constructive, the other destructive." The choice, therefore, was "between life and death."

By and large, the Likud avoided this kind of campaign rhetoric. As is common with parties in power, its basic strategy was to point to its achievements in office. One widely publicized Likud advertisement showed a map of the settlements that had been established on both sides of the Green Line during the party's four years in power. According to the accompanying text, the government settlement policy had prevented an "irreversible tragedy [*bekhiyah ledorot*]. The Israeli response that has proven itself over the last hundred years is Jewish settlement! We are on the map. This map cannot be reversed."

The Alignment's response was two-fold. On the one hand, it questioned the government's accomplishments while drawing attention to its own. Thus, Alignment advertisements contended that whereas many of the settlements established by the Likud had either been temporary or else had already been abandoned, those founded by earlier Labor administrations were still in existence, "come rain or shine, and not just before the elections." On the other hand, the Alignment used the Likud settlement map to score points on the issue of demagoguery. In a competing advertisement titled "The Likud is on the Map—the Map of Violence," it listed those places where Likud campaign violence had occurred to date. "This time you really have to choose," the text concluded, "between Beginism and an enlightened government." The choice between hooliganism and Zionism was also illustrated in an advertisement capitalizing on the tomato-throwing incident of April 1981. "Begin be warned, Shimon Peres is waiting for you," the text declared. "You represent those who throw tomatoes. He represents those who grow them, and they are still the majority."[39] The projectiles that had been hurled at the beginning of the campaign had come to represent its major theme: the struggle between those who had built the Jewish state and those who were allegedly destroying it.

Let Him Search His Own Deeds

Not surprisingly, Likud leaders did their utmost to play down the problem of campaign violence. Even the most serious incidents, they argued, were no more than "minor disturbances." Moreover, Prime Minister Begin and other members of his government had not only done their utmost to discourage violence, but had roundly condemned whatever violence had nonetheless occurred. Countering the allegations concerning his demagoguery, Likud ads stressed Begin's decades-long role as a loyal opposition leader, particularly his restraint during the armed struggle against the British Mandate and the subsequent breaking up of the underground movements. Throughout his career, it was argued, Begin had used his oratorical skills in the service of finding common ground between his and other Zionist parties.

Likud campaign managers also went on the offensive, claiming that a "special [Alignment] unit for spreading lies and fabrications" had exaggerated the problem of campaign violence in an attempt to mask the party's lack of a serious political platform. Likud supporters were urged to stand firm in the face of "enemy provocation."

Two years later, the grenade attack on Peace Now demonstrators could not be dismissed as a minor incident. Leaving the prime minister's office minutes after the attack, Ariel Sharon condemned the "maniac or maniacs" who were responsible. In the days that followed, other Likud leaders adopted a similar stance, arguing for the possibility that the killer was either a common criminal or else mentally ill. In no way could rank-and-file Likud supporters be blamed for the attack, they stressed—at worst, this was an isolated act of violence carried out by a political extremist.[40]

Stung by unrelenting criticism on the part of Alignment leaders and supporters, the Likud adopted an additional and more aggressive line of defense, accusing the Alignment of engaging in a blood libel. Fifty years earlier, when Labor Zionist leader Chaim Arlosoroff had been murdered, blame had been cast on the Revisionists despite the lack of any hard evidence.[41] Once again, Likud leaders charged, a murder was being attributed to "right-wing incitement" even though the murderer's identity and motives were unknown. This argument gained in force when Abrushmi was arrested for the crime in January 1984. Likud leaders demanded an apology from those who had blamed their party for incitement, citing Abrushmi's criminal record and lack of party affiliation. Undeterred, Alignment leaders charged that the Likud's incitement had been so far-reaching that even a lone wolf such as Abrushmi had been influenced.

In this atmosphere of mutual name-calling, Begin and his colleagues claimed that the physical attacks on the Alignment (even the killing of Greenzweig) were a response to prior violence of left-wing demonstrators. Political violence was also attributed to accumulated hostility against Labor; after the tomato-throwing incident in 1981, for instance, a Likud campaign spokesperson declared that Alignment leaders should "examine their record during 29 years in power and draw the appropriate conclusions, rather than blaming the negative reaction to them on others."[42] More frequently, however, Likud leaders—in common with their Alignment counterparts—emphasized the perils of verbal incitement. To refer to the Likud rank-and-file as a mob was to encourage them to behave like one, they argued, and labels such as "fascist" and "Khomeinists" only fanned the flames. Statements sympathetic to the Palestinians were seen as having a similar effect. Thus, Elyakim Ha'ezni, a prominent right-wing commentator, declared that

> public expression of understanding and support for the enemy during the course of a war is itself a form of violence. It is, in fact, this kind of violence that gave rise to the disturbances at meetings and demonstrations of the Left. They are attributable to the provocation of the "peace camp" and not to the actions of other parties or of the government.[43]

A more novel claim was made in a series of interviews by Geula Cohen of the right-wing Tehiya party. Cohen criticized members of the Israeli Left for speaking a "beautiful" Hebrew that essentially denigrated those who were less well-educated. Although this mode of speech abjured such epithets as "barbarian" and "fascist," it had exactly the same effect—as part of a more general "violence of condescension," it precluded the possibility of real dialogue and thus led to a steady worsening of relations between the rival camps. Cohen's argument was subsequently repeated by an op-ed contributor to the independent daily *Ha'aretz*. "Nowadays," Hayim Haham wrote:

> violence is not necessarily expressed physically or verbally. . . . The real violence is found in haughtiness and pride. An entire camp believes that it is more equal, more peace-loving, more democratic, and the sole representative of "Israel the beautiful." When they take to the streets they are demonstrating; when others do so, they are hooligans. . . . The verbal and physical violence will only come to an end when a democratic, legitimate, public debate begins on the same rather than on different levels. [Such debate] cannot take place when one side talks as if it is sitting on a dais and the other side, the guilty one, sits below, defending itself. . . . Only when we stop talking in terms of superiority and inferiority will we return to the kind of debate that is essential in any democratic country.[44]

Given the stridency of the Likud counterattack and the unwillingness of party leaders to accept responsibility for political acts of violence, their proposals for dealing with the problem were surprisingly balanced. First, they pointed to the need for leaders on both sides of the political spectrum to set an example from above. Opening the debate on "the criminal act of throwing the grenade outside the prime minister's office," Speaker of the Knesset Menachem Savidor called on members to provide "a model of tolerance and mutual respect, despite the differences of opinion between them." [45] In a similar vein, Likud member Ronnie Milo proposed the establishment of an institutionalized framework for consultations between the prime minister and the leader of the opposition. By engaging in dialogue of this nature, he argued, the two parties would send a clear message to their followers that one could disagree but still respect the other's point of view (as noted, the Alignment rejected this proposal). Government leaders also realized that the problem of political violence had to be dealt with at the grassroots level, and particularly in schools. Thus, following the Greenzweig killing, teachers were directed to discuss the grenade attack and condemn it unequivocally, to point out the dangers inherent in verbal violence, and to explain the need to respect opposing points of view. In this instance, at least, children had to be taught *not* to follow the example of their elders.

Finally, frequent reference was made to the talmudic statement that the Second Temple had been destroyed as a punishment for groundless hatred, and that the Third Temple would be built only when the Jewish people made up for their past misdeeds and acted in unity and brotherhood. Those in both political camps were enjoined to comply with the twofold biblical commandment "not to hate your brother in your heart" and to "love your neighbor as yourself."

Where There Is No Vision

The discussion until now has focused on the debate between the Likud and the Alignment regarding political violence during the 1981 election campaign and following publication of the Kahan commission report in February 1983. As noted, the conflict between the two was often expressed as a clash between two fundamentally different versions of Zionism. In this regard, it is useful to consider the point of view of another set of players in the Israeli political system, the ultra-Orthodox (haredi) parties.

For the ultra-Orthodox, secular Zionism in general, rather than one particular variant of it, was to blame for the upsurge in violence. Hence, both major parties were

found accountable. Symptomatic of the 1981 campaign were the two parties' satirical television commercials, which featured well-known Israeli comedians. Such commercials, according to the haredim, were an expression of spiritual emptiness. No wonder that there were those who turned to violence, the haredim claimed: this was their forlorn attempt to fill the vacuum left by the nation's leaders.

The ultra-Orthodox also cited the essentially negative nature of the campaign, in which both the Likud and the Alignment concentrated their efforts on denigrating opponents rather than highlighting accomplishments or presenting plans for the future. Such an approach inevitably led to mudslinging between the leaders and, in turn, to physical violence on the part of some of their followers. As Avraham Shapira, an Agudat Israel member of the Knesset noted: "Violence does not begin with grenades. It starts with thoughts, continues with words, and ends with deeds."[46] Others (such as Shimon Peres) had said much the same, blaming one side or the other. The haredim, however, blamed both.

At the same time, ultra-Orthodox leaders insisted that the main cause of the upsurge in violence lay elsewhere. In their more expansive critique, it was secular Zionism that was largely to blame; whereas its founding fathers had hoped that the Jewish state would be free of crime and violence, Israel had not only become as bad as other countries but had also become desensitized to the problem. Even the public outcry following the Greenzweig killing was not motivated by moral considerations. Each side was simply trying to make political capital out of a tragic event.

According to the ultra-Orthodox, both the grenade attack and the earlier election violence were the direct result of secularization. As the head of the Agudat Israel faction, Shlomo Lorenz, put it:

> For thousands of years, religious education provided Jews with complete immunity. None of them transgressed or came near to transgressing the commandment "thou shalt not kill." Much to our regret, we now see the consequences, in this and other very serious areas, of the fact that education is no longer based on the Torah. Murder has become an everyday event in the Jewish state.[47]

To emphasize the inevitability of the decline to crime and violence, the ultra-Orthodox press borrowed a number of images from the natural sciences. Metaphors relating to violence as a "cancer" or "wild growth" were also to be found in the secular media. However, the most popular image (that of the vacuum) appeared only in the haredi press and was used to describe the moral and spiritual emptiness of secular Israeli society. Like nature, society could not tolerate a vacuum, the argument went, hence murder and other forms of violence came to fill the void.[48]

The process of secularization was sometimes portrayed as a kind of cultural diffusion, by means of which Israelis had simply taken on certain behavioral patterns from abroad, especially from the United States. More commonly, though, it was conceived as a purposive action on the part of Israel's founding fathers. Secular Zionists had done their utmost to subvert Jewish tradition, especially among the new immigrants of North African and Asian origin who had arrived in Israel during the mass aliyah of the 1950s. In so doing, however, the leaders of the nascent Jewish state had failed to take certain inexorable trends into account. They did not realize that for those who

went beyond the traditional boundaries of Jewish law, there were no limits. In the oft-quoted aphorism of the Book of Proverbs (29:18): where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint.

In common with some of their secular counterparts, ultra-Orthodox politicians called for a much more determined response to violence (of all sorts) on the part of both the police and the judiciary. However, they were also at pains to point out the limitations of this law and order approach. Since the upsurge in violence was due to the bankruptcy of secularism, only a spiritual revolution and a return to Torah observance could prevent a worsening of the situation.

Conclusion

As has been shown, the condemnation of political violence against the Left—both during the 1981 campaign and after the grenade attack—did not usually focus on the perpetrators. Rather, it was directed against those who had allegedly provided encouragement by word or by deed. Critics of the government differed as to whether political violence was an intended or unintended consequence of verbal incitement. Without exception, however, they took Begin, Sharon, and other Likud leaders to task for "denying" the victims.[49] By denigrating individuals who disagreed with the government as "traitors" or "saboteurs," it was charged, the Likud had turned them into legitimate targets in the eyes of their more volatile supporters.

Politicians and the media tried to drive this message home by showing how the current situation formed part of a larger pattern of incitement. For instance, Begin's oratory (demagoguery, in the eyes of critics) was regarded as a longstanding mode of behavior that characterized his entire political career. Engaging in a process of what John Kitsuse terms "retrospective interpretation,"[50] critics attempted to show that Begin had always engaged in ad hominem attacks both at home and abroad. Alternatively, the rhetoric of Begin, Sharon, and other Likud leaders was linked to a militant Revisionist ideology that encouraged rabble-rousing and political violence. Finally, and most radically, opposition spokespeople (and especially the two Alignment-affiliated newspapers) made invidious comparisons between the Likud government and various dictatorial regimes. Only rarely was it argued directly that Likud attitudes and behavior were fascistic or antidemocratic, but concern was often voiced about worrisome trends that could threaten Israeli democracy.

Although Likud leaders completely rejected the opposition's allegations concerning political violence, they could not remain oblivious to the issue. Their basic response to accusations concerning past incidents of incitement was to invoke what Barry Schlenker has termed "the defense of non-occurrence"—a denial that a given event or events had ever occurred.[51] Thus, answering charges that Begin had incited demonstrators at the mass rally against German reparations in 1952, Likud spokespeople argued that Begin had in fact helped to restrain the demonstrators; had he not, they may well have resorted to violence as a response to Labor provocation. In the case of violence during the 1981 campaign and against Peace Now demonstrators, "the defense of non-causation" was invoked, and Begin and his colleagues invariably

took the argument a step further and placed the blame on the Alignment and its extraparliamentary allies. Time and again, Begin and other Likud leaders claimed that political violence was a reaction to prior violence, whether verbal or physical, on the part of the Israeli Left. Having precipitated the attacks, the Left had only itself to blame.

Reviewing these allegations and counterallegations draws attention to the way in which this debate differs from those concerning other instances of violent street demonstrations or political assault. Previous studies of the corrupter-corrupted model have shown how the "machiavellianism of the few" constitutes the basis for the depoliticization of the many. This essay, in contrast, suggests that the violent behavior of demonstrators in the streets was used to stigmatize "the few" in the corridors of power. The "corrupted," in other words, provided the grounds for the delegitimation of those considered to be the "corrupters."

Clearly these two applications of the corrupter-corrupted model have very different consequences for the society in which they occur. Whereas the delegitimation of the "corrupted" leads to a more or less united front against the perpetrators of violence, the delegitimation of the "corrupters" causes a deepening of divisions within the body politic. The former, in other words, generates widespread consensus; the latter sharpens the conflict between society's constituent parts.

The corrupter-corrupted model described here reflects not so much the cause of the conflict within Israeli society as the exacerbation of existing divisions. The contours of the debate regarding who was responsible for political violence in 1981 and 1983 mirrored cleavages between different camps—Right and Left, religious and secular—that have characterized the Israeli body politic ever since the establishment of the state, and especially since the ascension to power of the Likud in 1977. As Sidney Verba noted in the aftermath of the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, crises can have a major integrative or disintegrative effect, but in most cases they reinforce the prevailing tendency in a given society.[52]

Conceiving of society as a cultural space, Kai Erikson suggested that deviant behavior exists at exactly those points where it is most feared.[53] Every community, he contended, has its own special boundaries that must be defended and, in consequence, its own characteristic style of deviance. This idea of perceived threat can be extended. It is relevant not only to *which* boundaries are maintained, but also to *where* they are drawn. The emphasis given to the delegitimation of the perpetrators of violence versus the delegitimation of their alleged auxiliaries thus depends on which group is considered more threatening at a particular time. In this way, as in so many others, the response to violence both mirrors and influences the society in which it occurs.

Notes

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1. See Robert K. Merton, "Social Problems and Sociological Theory," in *Contemporary Social Problems*, ed. Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (New York: 1966), 810. In his classic essay of 1938 on social structure and anomie, Merton pointed out that rebellion is markedly different from all the other responses because it constitutes an attempt to "*change* the existing cultural and social structure, rather than to accommodate efforts *within* this structure."

See Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological* Review 3, no. 5 (1938), 676.

2. Pat Lauderdale, "A Power and Process Approach to the Definition of Deviance," in *A Political Analysis of Deviance*, ed. Pat Lauderdale (Minneapolis: 1980), 5.

3. See, for instance, Joe R. Feagin and Harlan Hahn, *Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of Violence in American Cities* (New York: 1973), 6–12; Alison Young, *Femininity in Dissent* (London: 1990), 45–55; Stanley Cohen, "Protest, Unrest, and Delinquency: Convergences in Labels and Behavior," *International Journal of Criminology and Penology* 1, no. 2 (1973), 123–125.

4. See Susan Sontag, *Illness as Metaphor* (New York: 1978).

5. See Jock Young, "Mass Media, Drugs and Deviance," in *Deviance and Social Control*, ed. Paul Rock and Mary McIntosh (London: 1974), 247–251.

6. See Jock Young, *The Drugtakers: The Social Meaning of Drug Use* (London: 1971), 61–62.

7. See Ada Yurman, "The Social Reaction to the Wadi Salib Riots" (master's thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1994), 37–38; Alina Koren, "The Coverage of Land Day in the Israeli Press," *Patuaḥ* 2 (1994), 10–11.

8. At the beginning of 1968, Mapai merged with Ahdut Ha'avodah and Rafi to form the United Labor party. Later that year they joined forces with Mapam to create a new parliamentary bloc called the Alignment (Ma'arakh). This union lasted until after the elections to the 11th Knesset in 1984, when Mapam decided to break ranks rather than participate in a national unity government with the Likud.

9. See Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: 1964), 208–209.

10. The Herut movement joined forces with the more moderate Liberal party in 1965 to form the Gahal parliamentary bloc. Eight years later, this alliance was broadened to include two other small parties, the State List and the Free Center. Together they formed the Likud under the leadership of Menachem Begin.

11. According to Judith Elizur, the issue of violence receded in the final week of the campaign; had it peaked a bit later, the Alignment might have won. See her article "The Role of the Media in the 1981 Knesset Elections," in *Israel at the Polls 1981: A Study of the Knesset Elections*, ed. Howard R. Penniman and Daniel J. Elazar (Washington, D.C.: 1986), 186–212.

12. State of Israel, *Commission of Inquiry into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut: Final Report* (Jerusalem: 1983).

13. Ibid., 105–106.

14. Shulamit Hareven, "'Edut," *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 14 Feb. 1983.

15. Abrushmi was subsequently found guilty of Greenzweig's murder and the attempted murder of nine other demonstrators. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.

16. The common feature of both these descriptions (mercenary and mentally ill) is that they pertain to people whose motives are essentially apolitical. See Joseph R. Gusfield, "Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance," *Social Problems* 15, no. 2 (1967), 180–182.

17. Moshe Shahal, the head of the Alignment faction in the Knesset, introduced a private member's bill in June 1981 that would invoke sanctions on political parties whose supporters engaged in violence. An article published in *Ha'aretz* on June 21, 1981 noted that a similar arrangement existed with regard to soccer clubs.

18. Natan Dunevitch, "Kolot haasafsuf," *Ha'aretz*, 27 Feb. 1983.

19. *Davar*, 17 June 1981.

20. Other Likud leaders were criticized for referring to their party and its coalition partners as the "national camp," thereby implying that the Alignment and its allies were less patriotic/Zionist. The term "maḥane leumi," however, was (and is) also widely used by the Israeli media.

21. The Hebrew term for verbal incitement is "alimut milulit," literally "verbal violence." Some opposition leaders objected to the use of this expression, either on the grounds that it was essentially a contradiction in terms or because the phrase was too vague. In the interests of pre-

venting undesirable restrictions on the freedom of speech, it was suggested that more precise legal terminology, such as "incitement to murder," be used.

22. *Davar*, 11 Feb. 1983.
23. Ibid.
24. *'Al hamishmar*, 11 Feb. 1983.
25. Natan Dunevitch, "Begin, red mehagag," *Ha'aretz*, 16 June 1981.
26. Alignment leaders also claimed that those concerned always apologized for their deprecating remarks and were also publicly reprimanded for having made them. Consequently, their verbal incitement had never led to physical attacks on Likud leaders or on their supporters.
27. *Divrei hakeneset* 96 (1983), 1369. Sarid argued that these allegations were particularly wicked because no one believed them. Those concerned were simply engaged in "cynical incitement in an attempt to gain votes."
28. *'Al hamishmar*, 17 June 1983.
29. Yehoshua Sobol, "Hamaḥalah vekeẓad letapel bah," ibid., 17 Feb. 1983.
30. Campaign flyer in my possession.
31. See, for example, Yehuda Gothelf, "Ha'im zeh 'alul likrot eẓlenu? Hapotenẓial shel leumaniyut antidemokratit beyisrael," *Davar*, 26 June 1981. Begin, for his part, frequently invoked the Holocaust in defending his government's foreign policy, specifically as it pertained to the threat posed by the Arabs.
32. This term was first coined by Daniel Bar-Tal. See "The Monopoly of Patriotism," in *Patriotism in the Lives of Individuals and Nations*, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub (Chicago: 1977), 246–270.
33. *Divrei hakeneset* 96 (1983), 1372.
34. Ibid., 1368–1369.
35. Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Lo beḥalal rek," *'Al hamishmar*, 18 Feb. 1983.
36. Michael Hersogar, "Arik, melekh yisrael," ibid.
37. *'Al hamishmar*, 11 Feb. 1983.
38. Amos Oz, "Hapa'am atah ḥayav livḥor—ken, ḥozrim leaḥor," *Davar*, 24 June 1981.
39. Campaign fliers in my possession.
40. There were also those who suggested that an Arab had thrown the grenade.
41. Three Revisionist Zionists had been charged with the murder. Two were released in the course of the trial; the third was convicted, but the conviction was later overturned on appeal.
42. *Ma'ariv*, 28 April 1981.
43. Elyakim Ha'ezni, "Ashmat hasemol," *Nekudah*, 27 Feb. 1983. According to Ha'ezni, Gush Emunim was blamed by the Left for Greenzweig's death in the same way that it was held responsible for the plight of the slums and the failure to achieve peace, among other problems. In fact, he contended, the settler movement filled an "indispensable role"—that of the scapegoat "Jew."
44. Hayim Haham, "Alimut miṭhasedet," *Ha'aretz*, 23 Feb. 1983. Haham argued that the "violence of condescension" had begun during the 1981 campaign with the kinds of advertisements discussed in this essay.
45. *Divrei hakeneset*, 96 (1983), 1307.
46. Ibid., 1417.
47. *Hamodia*, 11 Feb. 1983.
48. For a detailed analysis of this argument, see Gerald Cromer, "Secularism is the Root of all Evil: The Haredi Response to Crime and Delinquency," *International Journal of Group Tensions* 26, no. 6 (1996), 109–121.
49. On "denying" victims, see Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency," *American Sociological Review* 22, no. 6 (1957), 668.
50. John I. Kitsuse, "Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method," *Social Problems* 9, no. 3 (1962), 253.
51. Barry R. Schlenker, *Impression Management: The Self-Concept, Social Identity and Interpersonal Relations* (Monterey: 1980), 138.

52. See Sidney Verba, "The Kennedy Assassination and the Nature of Political Commitment," in *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis*, ed. Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker (Stanford: 1965), 357.

53. Kai T. Erikson, *Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance* (New York: 1966), 19–23.

Corporal Punishment in Jewish Education: A Philosophical-Educational Exploration

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[Karl] Popper considered it a waste of time for a thinker to address himself merely to a topic. If he does so, anything whatsoever that he then chooses to say about it is relevant. At the end there is often a feeling of so-whatness hanging in the air, since no problem has been solved, or question answered. . . . So Popper suggests as a general principle that a thinker should address himself not to a topic but to a problem, which he chooses for its practical importance or intrinsic interest, and which he tries to formulate as clearly and consequentially as he can. His task is then manifest, namely to solve this problem, or at least to contribute to its better understanding—Bryan Magee[1]

Corporal punishment in Jewish as well as in non-Jewish education has always been a focus of discussion and deliberation, and never more so than in the contemporary world. Is it merely a blatant form of violence, reflecting the perennial status of children as victims of assault? Does not a tradition that sanctions it deserve condemnation? Conversely, dare one condemn a practice—"spanking"—that is said to embody divinely inspired instruction, that is "normatively" administered without malice or anger, and that is meant purely for the sake of the child and his moral development? What can be said against an educational practice urged by society on those required to lead children to the highest possible religious and moral level?

In the contemporary age, rhetorical questions that seem to smile at spanking or worse do not represent either the prevalent attitude or the thrust of enlightened legislation. For instance, the Israeli Supreme Court recently issued a blanket ban on corporal punishment, whether by teachers or by parents. [2] Although this occasioned a flurry of indignation in present-day Israel, particularly within certain segments of the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) and neo-conservative communities, overall there is a good deal of sympathy for efforts made to consign corporal punishment to a benighted past. In the United States, contemporary writers such as Philip Greven and Alice Miller have created a climate in which hitting children is readily identified with child abuse.[3]

In this climate of educational reform, we now find widespread acceptance of the view that violence is part and parcel of a historical tradition of contempt for children, who, like women, are seen as perennial victims of Western culture and its prejudices.[4] Yet there can be no doubt that, since the 19th century, change has been taking place.

Perhaps a landmark is to be found in the statement of a British justice by the name of Stuart (1856) on the relationship between the lifting of humiliation for some groups and its ramifications for others:

> The husband can no longer moderately chastise his wife, nor, according to the most recent authorities, the master his servant or apprentice. Even the degrading cruelties of the naval service have been arrested. Why the person of the schoolboy with his shining morning face should be less sacred in the eyes of the law than that of apprentice or the sailor is not easily explained.[5]

Not only historical consciousness but psychological research have contributed to the climate of opposition to the practice of beating children. It is today viewed as common knowledge that "educational correction" breeds violence in those who have suffered it, such that former victims are likely to be current perpetrators of aggressive behavior.[6] Research also indicates that children who are struck and who live in fear of corporal punishment, whether in school or at home, are more likely than other children to suffer from brain lesions; moreover, the omnipresent fear of pain inhibits their later learning. Educational and psychological scholars, on the basis of diverse research, insist that "spanking" humiliates children and corrodes their self-esteem. It can also lead to sexual disorders and neuroses—and, in more extreme cases, to psychotic cruelty,[7] especially when punishment is applied to the allegedly "safe" buttocks (ostensibly created especially for spanking), where intentionally administered pain and unintended sexual stimulation can combine to create patterns of sadomasochism. Assuming, for the United States alone, some 180,000 mentally and emotionally disturbed teachers who have the legal right to dispense corporal punishment to some 4,500,000 children,[8] Rich deduces that large numbers of children are routinely and "righteously" exposed to the clear and present danger of initiation into pathological personality patterns.

Given such findings and the passions they generate, it need not surprise us that the indubitable historical fact of corporal punishment in ancient, medieval, and even modern Jewish education occasions some discomfort among modern historians. Sometimes we find it referred to in the context of violence and abuse suffered by children in the larger civilization, where generally it can be favorably compared with attitudes and practices within Christendom. Alternatively, it is often presented as being mild and well intentioned. A century ago, when physical punishment was still generally assumed to have value in moral education but violence against children was already an issue, one historian, Israel Abrahams, simply noted that corporal punishment in the Middle Ages "was generally, though not quite universally approved." The approval is formulated in the words of the *Maḥzor Vitry*, a code and text of prayer written by R. Simhah of Vitry, a 12th-century disciple of Rashi: "At first the child is allured, in the end the strap is laid to his back." But Abrahams also mentions the opposition of *Sefer haḥasidim* to corporal punishment (which stands out, it must be noted, as idiosyncratic among pietistic tracts). Abrahams assures us that "the punishment was not severe. . . . No teacher was allowed to punish a child with sufficient vigor to leave marks or cause other injurious effects. A teacher with a violent temper was at once superseded."[9]

The literature now at our disposal suggests that this relatively humane state of af-

fairs was more a normative-halakhic ideal than a description of actual practice.[10] In the 1930s, Nathan Morris approached the subject gingerly by noting that even the renowned theologian and educator Comenius (1592–1670), a lover of children and a humanist who hated violence, nevertheless insisted that "punishment should be employed towards those who err." The humanistic Comenius listed not only blasphemy and obscenity among the "crimes" that deserved harsh punishment but also envy, idleness, and "disobeying the master's orders." Only after discussing Comenius and after supplying the social and economic backdrop of the time, did Morris go on to describe Jewish schools in which the rod was seldom spared, although its use was tempered by some sporadic parental supervision.[11]

This relatively detached and serene view of beating and "spanking" children for educational purposes, it was previously noted, contrasts sharply with contemporary sensibilities. As corporal punishment becomes less acceptable at school and even in the home, such that an increasing number of legislatures and school districts throughout the world ban it, the outspoken stalwarts of spanking tend increasingly to be religious educators, for the most part Christian fundamentalists, who consider humans naturally corrupt and who urge that "the devil" be "beaten out of them." Distressingly for Jews, these educators are apt to cite chapter and verse mainly from the Old Testament.[12] Though spiced with images of (religious) compassion and love, their rhetoric often seems to have been taken from manuals of torture. Punishment is seen to be both the demand of God and the remedy for avoiding the eternal torments of hell.

There are also Jewish exponents of corporal punishment, especially among haredi thinkers and educators. To the best of my knowledge, however, these lack the vindictiveness that characterizes Christian fundamentalist writings on the subject. For example, R. Eliyahu E. Dessler, an ultra-Orthodox leader, sage, and educator, decries the theories of social scientists who misunderstand the nature of man and corrupt children by manifestations of friendship for them instead of educating them to a fear of heaven.[13] Similarly, in a book on correct educational practice, the director of a *kolel* (graduate yeshiva) in Bnei Brak devoted an entire chapter to the importance of corporal punishment. Though he insists that sound education requires psychological support for children and the cultivation of a warm home atmosphere characterized by love and compassion, he nevertheless argues that parents who on principle oppose use of the rod for educational purposes may one day find themselves striking their (adolescent) children in self-defense.[14]

As elsewhere, the subject of corporal punishment in Jewish education has taken on the character of an embarrassment or a battle cry. Among liberals, it is judged to be cruel and primitive; among ultra-traditionalists it has become part and parcel of a comprehensive ideological approach to tradition and its archenemy, permissive modernity. In Israel, both the Ministry of Education and the courts have taken strong positions against corporal punishment; in the diaspora, because of the general humanistic educational climate and the fact that children are viewed as clients to be attracted into a voluntaristic system of Jewish education, one is likely to find it unequivocally and unquestioningly condemned, except in some haredi communities. Such condemnation, while reflecting current cultural norms, can also work to make certain aspects of the Jewish tradition embarrassing or simply unacceptable. For lib-

erals, then, support for corporal punishment in Jewish sources threatens to undermine the moral value and verity of Jewish teachings in general, and their authority in educational matters in particular. At the same time, the ancient practice of physical "correction" in school and in the home continues to be accepted by traditionalists as part of the spiritual package of Judaism.

The problem is thus two-fold. For some, the issue at hand further dilutes the value of Jewish tradition; for others, it highlights the alleged irrelevance of modernity and its values. Are these approaches the only options available for parents, teachers, and spokespeople for Jewish values?

To examine this question in as much depth as a brief study will permit, I will present corporal punishment in the Jewish tradition as an issue in educational thought. My assumption is that this issue, like all principled educational matters, both reflects and illuminates wide social, philosophical, and spiritual issues in the lives of contemporary Jews and non-Jews, and that its examination can influence both educational policy and curriculum. My methodological approach will be to view corporal punishment through the prism of what are often termed "the four elements" or "commonplaces" of education: 1) the *subject matter*, that is, the data being presented within the educational situation for understanding and acquisition; 2) the *teacher*; 3) the *learner*; and 4) the *environment*. Each of these elements is open to diverse theoretical understandings and interpretations, which in turn suggest diverse practice.

To illustrate: following Zvi Lamm, one may view teachers as (socializing) agents of society, or as (philosophically oriented) emissaries of culture, or as (psychological) experts on child development.[15] Clearly each theoretical model of the "good teacher" will present a different profile, will suggest the use of different subject matter, and will perceive the "well-educated" child differently. Similarly, the environment may be seen as supportive, indifferent, or as uncomprehending or even hostile. Each view of the environment will suggest distinct prescriptions for creating a school atmosphere or cultivating, respectively, a protective, supportive, or militant home environment, or else encouraging or forbidding specific social contacts and activities. In general, we may say that the ways we understand each commonplace and the prescribed interactions among them determines what we have in mind when speaking of "good" (and "bad") education.

Educational philosophers and theorists also make certain assumptions about what is *constant and uniform* in educational discourse and what is *varied and diverse*. What they find to be constant and uniform are the commonplaces—that is, for there to be education, there must be some kind of subject matter, a teacher, a learner, and a historical, social, and ideological context (the environment) in which learning takes place. What is diverse are the understandings of worthwhile subject matter, of "good" teachers and teaching, of educated pupils, and of environments that support or, alternatively, sabotage the teachers' educational vision.

The Classic Subject Matter of Jewish Education

Jewish education looks to "Judaism" or to the "Jewish tradition" as the heart of its subject matter. Thus, its theoreticians and practitioners may well see the question of

Judaism's position(s) with regard to violence and its attitude(s) toward children and their education to be of crucial importance. We live in an era of open inquiry and choice in which traditions once accepted as naturally authoritative must now solicit conscious appropriation. Educational advocates of the tradition must live with the possibility that their pupils will overtly reject it. Indeed, the allegedly negative and even cruel relationship of the Torah and its tradition to the child and to corporal punishment—for example, the extreme case of the Bible's advocating that the "rebellious son" be put to death—may speak powerfully against acceptance of this tradition.

In looking at the corpus of Jewish subject matter, we must bear in mind that the Jewish tradition presents itself for study and inquiry in two distinct ways. On the one hand, the corpus of Torah is divided into distinct historical corpora: biblical, rabbinic (talmudic and midrashic), and halakhic (medieval and modern), alongside other trends such as the mystic, the pietistic, and the philosophical; these distinctions sustain diverse areas of academic Jewish studies. Yet on the other hand, traditional (halakhic and aggadic) discourse intentionally blurs and even denies these distinctions, for "Torah," in its traditional mode, corresponds to an ongoing and largely ahistorical conversation. Because of the first way of viewing the tradition, we could plausibly speak of "the Bible and violence" or "the Rabbis and violence," but doing so academically, without regard to the unity of all parts of the heritage in the consciousness of the tradition, is likely to give us a distorted picture of what teachers generally bring into the classroom and of what children learn there. Teachers of Jewish studies, even those trained in academic institutions, still feel and broadcast an affinity for the second, ahistorical approach.

The tradition that constitutes our subject matter is ambivalent and even dialectical with regard to violence. Violence is certainly present, sometimes ruthlessly so, yet through exegesis and deliberation, it is placed within a normative framework whose thrust is peace. Thus, for example, the narrative of Pinhas, whose zealous act in slaying an Israelite man and a Midianite woman is praised by Scripture, is concluded when God makes a "covenant of peace" with him (Num. 25:7–15)—a covenant interpreted by one commentator as assuring Pinhas that he would not be corrupted by the violent act he had committed. Moreover, lengthy talmudic discussions explore whether Pinhas acted according to the halakhah, and under which (severely restricted circumstances) such violence would not entail a murder charge.[16]

For the Jewish teacher for whom Torah, however interpreted, is a prime subject matter, at least four instances of biblical violence (whether threatened or actually implemented) present themselves for normative discussion. These are the binding and near sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham (Gen. 22); the episode of the prophet Elisha, who causes two she-bears to tear apart 42 children who have insulted him (II Kings 2:23–24); the law of the rebellious son (Deut. 21:18–21); and the educational prescriptions of the book of Proverbs (10:13, 13:24, 19:18, 23:13–14, and 26:1).[17] Each of these texts appear to be paradigmatic. The first seems to model unlimited and potentially murderous parental authority; the second, violence and viciousness toward children from a prophetic personage who speaks in God's name; the third, an apparently absolute authority on the part of parents to "correct" their children and to draw the harshest consequences from their own educational failures; and the fourth, a set of directives intended to make people feel good about themselves when not "sparing the rod."

However paradoxical it may seem, the four sources above have been presented in ascending order of problematics. Although the binding of Isaac can be understood from a psychological and psychoanalytic perspective as the culmination of parental control, ownership, and abuse, this is a secular and reductionist standpoint. From within the specific *religious* context in which it appears, the problem is not so much the father who may kill his son but the God who demands the act. Moreover, the reader will note that the pedagogic intention of the narrative—namely, that God does *not* command or desire parents to kill their children—appears in the very first verse of the narrative. There we are informed, at the expense of the literary suspense the story would otherwise invite, that "God tested Abraham," that is, He had no intention of demanding a human sacrifice and is in fact opposed to such an act.[18]

The second instance, that of Elisha and the "little lads" (*ne'arim ketanim*), seems unambiguously cruel. The self-same Elisha who has just begun his prophetic career by sweetening the waters at Jericho is subsequently mocked by a group of children for his baldness, whereupon he curses them in the name of God and causes bears to emerge from a forest to attack them. In the Talmud, however, the story is presented in a radically different light. In the most extensive discussion of the matter, found in tractate Sotah (47a), the rabbinic interpreters ingeniously neutralize this unsavory and violent episode by means of unlikely word plays and the conjuring up of ludicrous circumstances. What could possibly have been behind this (unlikely) story, they ask. They conjecture, among other things, that the *ne'arim* were not children at all but rather adults who were empty (*ne'urim*) of observance of the commandments, who are described as "little" because they had little faith. It is suggested that Elisha saw that no good would come out of any of them, for all generations to come. To add insult to injury: his prophetic vision informed him that they were all conceived on Yom Kippur (when sexual relations are forbidden). More startlingly, the sages go on to claim that there was no forest for bears to come out of—nor were there any bears ("lo dubim velo ya'ar," which in contemporary Hebrew has come to mean an utterly far-fetched claim). In other words, both the forest and the bears were miraculously created, perhaps merely "virtually" created. In any event, recognizing that all of these explanations do not completely take away the bad taste in the reader's mouth, the sages also suggest that Elisha was punished by illness for his harsh action. In sum, no normative significance remains in the story once the rabbis have subjected it to their reading.

The third instance, that of the rebellious son who is taken to the elders to be put to death for being "stubborn and rebellious . . . a glutton and a drunkard," seems to pose a different order of problems. After all, this is not a story but an outright commandment to execute "bad children," which can and has been taken as a straightforward prescription for a God-fearing society; indeed, two 17th-century American colonies, Connecticut and Massachusetts, incorporated this law into their statutes.[19]

May parents suggest a judicial killing of their sons? Are stubbornness and gluttony capital crimes? The talmudic masters dealt with the problems raised by such questions in several ways, most prominently by delineating and expanding upon the crimes such a son had to commit, in addition to outlining the warnings and chastisements he needed to receive, prior to being proclaimed a "rebellious son."[20] More radically, two sages, R. Yehudah and R. Shimon, insist that "there never was and never

will be a rebellious son." R. Yehudah rules that a son could not be branded as rebellious unless both father and mother were alike in voice, appearance, and stature (on the basis of the verse "he does not hearken to our voice"—"our voice" being written in the singular form), which made the matter absurdly unlikely. R. Shimon poses a question that presents a different principle: "[Can it be that] because one eats a *tartemar* (a measure corresponding to two portions) of meat and drinks half a *log* (equivalent to the liquid contents of three eggs) of Italian wine, his father and mother shall have him stoned?" He agrees with R. Yehudah's suggestion that such a thing never happened and never will, but offers another reason: in his view, the Torah does not give us enough information about such a son's wrong-doings to enable us to pass judgment.[21] And although another sage, R. Natan, declares that he once "sat on [a rebellious son's] grave," the response is that one case is not sufficient to establish a rule.

It is in the book of Proverbs that the issue of corporal punishment appears to be most specific. There, much attention is paid to correcting children, the prescriptions appear to be sensible, and they are justified in the texts themselves by the favorable consequences they are said to produce. Thus the famous adage "He who holds back his rod hates his son, but he who loves him disciplines him early" (13:24)—alongside the rather off-putting comments of several exegetes that "early" should be understood to mean "he chastises him every morning." These no-nonsense prescriptions hardly become more palatable to the modern consciousness through the late 17th-century commentary *Mezudat David*, in which it is declared that the father should chastise his son in his youth when the son is malleable. On the one hand, this commentator admits that blows are designed for fools and that "the humility caused by the rebuke of an understanding person [is more effective] than a hundred blows to a fool" (Prov. 17:10). On the other hand, children may be expected to be fools until they are trained, hence "a rod and reproof give wisdom, but the child left free brings shame to his mother" (29:15). *Mezudat David* explains that the shame is attributed to the mother because it is her pity that spares the son from discipline and ultimately leads her to remorse. The matter of physical punishment is most clearly and succinctly explained and justified in the following verse: "Do not withhold discipline from a child; when you strike him with a rod, he will not die. You shall strike him with a rod and you shall save his soul from the grave" (23:13–14). To this the *Mezudat David* remarks that "he will not die" refers to the "little pain" the child experiences, which is the way to save him from the pain of hell (*gehinom*).

Whether because this matter was self-understood in the world they lived in or because they trusted the wisdom of Solomon, the talmudic sages seem to have taken corporal punishment as part of the moral order of things. Yet much in the same way as they moved the scriptural narratives—by all the exegetical means at their disposal—in the direction of certain moral principles assumed to be the underpinnings of biblical law and narrative, so too the sages sought to cushion the halakhic rulings on corporal punishment with qualifications and restrictions. Thus we find the Babylonian sage Rav telling R. Shmuel bar-Shelat (his disciple and a teacher of children) that he should "accept children from the age of six [younger children being too frail for serious study] and then cram them with Torah," even if they seem unwilling. Rav adds, "when you strike a child, hit him only with a shoe band [which is relatively painless]. If he still doesn't seem to be learning, seat him with his comrades and even-

tually he will learn" (Baba batra 21a). This benign approach, interpreted by Rashi to mean that teachers might administer no more than "a light blow that does no harm," is codified by Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah. Maimonides rules that it is permissible for the teacher (or parent) to strike the children when necessary, but "he shall not do this in the manner of an enemy, in a cruel way, and he shall not strike them with either a whip or a rod but only with a small strap." Further, "a person should not act the tyrant or be overly solicitous of his dignity with regard to his children, lest he set up an impediment before them," that is, provoke them to transgression (for example, cursing their parents). Moreover, both the Mishneh Torah and later the Shulhan Arukh rule that one who strikes an adolescent child—that is, one past the age of bar mitzvah—is to be excommunicated.[22]

Notwithstanding, there is an obverse side to this moralizing tendency: according to the Talmud, the father or teacher who inadvertently kills a child is not obliged to go into exile (to a city of refuge), as must others who commit unintentional manslaughter. Why? Because "he was engaged in performing a mitzvah."[23] And according to the halakhic opinion of the 9th-century Natronai, a *gaon* of Babylonia, R. Shmuel bar-Shilat's ruling regarding the hitting of children with no more than a shoe strap only applies to frail or ill children; healthy children may be struck more forcefully. The cruel teacher is one who hits weak or sick children forcefully. Such a person "is to be warned once, twice, and even three times, and [if he persists in his cruelty] he is dismissed."[24] Popular tracts and correspondence both express horror at the excesses of punishment by teachers,[25] yet insist that pupils be "properly" chastised. Community leaders and the moralistic tracts that guided them protected the teachers' right to punish children for what might be considered ludicrous crimes, and in some cases demanded that parents refrain from interference.[26] We even find educational writers and community leaders insisting that parents demonstrate their support for the teacher by having their child bring him gifts—a kind of "thank you" for having been struck! At the same time, halakhic authorities forbade the teacher to hit the child "with the assault of an enemy or ill-wisher, God forbid, nor with rods nor whips, but with a small strap, without wrath or viciousness or anger."[27]

The argument about the value of corporal punishment and its halakhic qualifications extends into the 20th century. An influential contemporary view is that of R. Moshe Feinstein, who forbade corporal punishment for any misbehavior that was not substantiated by the testimony of witnesses; if punishment was warranted, nothing more than a light strap could be used.[28] On the basis of such rulings, Shmuel Glick maintains that the tendency of halakhic rulings and "the spirit of the halakhah" suggest that there should have been a complete ban on corporal punishment. That this did not happen, he suggests, is because halakhic authorities were not strict with teachers who acted against halakhic principles by unduly punishing their charges. Glick's thesis is that, while moralistic texts are, with few exceptions, unequivocal with regard to the benefits of chastisement, halakhic sources contextualize and restrict it.[29]

There seems, however, to have been an additional reason not to forego the principle of corporal punishment. Assuming that all motivation for learning is external and that there is no internal and inherently valuable "world" inhabited by children that suggests its own reasons for learning, then every means to "bring them to Torah" seems justifiable. If the teaching of Torah is considered as equivalent to granting life,

and the unwillingness to learn Torah is tantamount to turning one's back on life, these measures may be utilized to prevent such a catastrophe.

Notwithstanding, the halakhic restrictions on corporal punishment were numerous and complex. The halakhic norm was that hitting had to be done without malice, it had to be "for the sake of Heaven," it was not to be excessive, and it had to take into account the child's age and physical condition. The Talmud relates that a servant woman—certainly not an authority—who observed a teacher exercising undue force was judged (by R. Aha) as morally empowered to place a ban on him.[30] Teachers (and parents) were not to provoke children to further delinquent behavior. They had to be aware that "one lash beyond the permitted" removed their "instruction" of chastisement from the realm of the "mitzvah" of education into the realm of the forbidden, making them liable to the payment of damages as in any other case of assault.[31] As mentioned, Rav and his disciples throughout the generations prohibited the use of the rod and permitted only a small strap. There were regions of the body that were out of bounds,[32] and no hitting was permitted during the three-week interval between the 17th of Tamuz and the 9th of Av—a time of mourning for the destruction of the Temple that was considered to be fraught with cosmic danger.[33]

Thus, whether the thrust of the halakhah was toward abolishing all corporal punishment or not, it certainly formulated and articulated the tradition in a manner that took into consideration the principle expressed in the book of Proverbs that the Torah's ways "are the ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are [the paths of] peace" (3:16)—even in the face of explicitly contrary passages from this book. Perhaps it is justified to say that, in the process of making the mansion of tradition livable over the course of generations, halakhic authorities felt empowered to move the furniture around and, at times, to renovate the rooms.

The Teacher: Between Child and Community

There are a number of humane and wise exhortations in classic Jewish literature on the good and worthy teacher, most prominently in the aforementioned *Sefer haḥasidim* of the pietistic R. Yehudah the Hasid (12th–13th century). R. Yehudah urges parents to find mentors for their children who will neither get angry at them nor hit them, who will teach fear of heaven (that is, genuine piety) rather than mere texts, and above all, who will teach by the example of their own noble and God-fearing character. The work of teachers, R. Yehudah urges, should be informed by educational principles that touch on issues of moral integrity. Teachers who are good at Bible should not teach Talmud, and vice versa. The teacher must always keep in mind the biblical injunction to "instruct the child according to his own way" (Prov. 22:6), which he takes to mean that the child who is drawn to midrash should not be forced into mastering halakhic niceties. Finally, teachers should understand both that children need friends and that they must play.[34]

Reality, however, was often at loggerheads with the theories proposed by such master teachers as R. Yehudah. The position of the teacher of young children was difficult and often pathetic. He was not considered a *talmid ḥakham*, worthy of sitting with the great or teaching the gifted.[35] Rather, he was often an itinerant in search of par-

ents and communities that would have him; and in many cases, these did not always know what it was they wanted or expected of him. One Italian Jewish writer, in his introduction to a translation of several books of the Bible, expresses this well: "A teacher [who] hits the children and imposes fear upon them continually is called [in the community] a murderer of children. But if he is a good man and does not hit the children, and the children are unruly and have no respect for [or fear of] him, they say that he sins in taking their money and should spend it in bad health."[36]

Physical conditions were also poor. The room in which the teacher taught was generally small, crowded, and bare of furniture. Children of all ages and abilities were taught in the same class, and they were often tired and bored. Nathan Morris notes that discipline in such a place would tax the powers of even the most gifted of teachers: "It could hardly be maintained without making, in the words of Comenius, 'the school resound with shrieks and blows.' " Moreover, hitting children corresponded to the spirit of the times—schools reflected the norms that applied to adults as well as children. "We are therefore not surprised to find the birch or the strap . . . the supreme arbiter in the school wherever that might be situated, in Athens or Rome or Alexandria or Jerusalem," Morris concludes. "More humane views of discipline were voiced from time to time by enlightened educationalists," but these "made little headway down to our own days."[37]

Finally, the teacher in premodern societies stood under constant and far more acute scrutiny and judgment than that experienced by contemporary teachers in open societies. Although parents sometimes complained about corporal punishment (partly, it may be suspected, because they had contempt for the teacher), community supervisors (*gabaim*) often promulgated ludicrously severe regulations regarding punishments. A Polish writer relates how such supervisors would test the children at the end of each week, and those who failed were hit and cursed.[38] We read of communities that insisted on administering to children so-and-so many blows for speaking during prayers or for leaving tefillin on the table in the synagogue (where they might be stolen!).[39] Elsewhere, parents are ordered not to complain to the teacher about punishment but rather to praise him for faithfully (we might say, forcefully) educating their children.[40] Conversely, we hear of children who knew that their parents frowned on hitting and who, encouraged by the teacher's lack of authority, "pulled at his beard" while the poor man, afraid of being fired, could do nothing.[41]

From all of this, it is obvious that the commonplace of the "teacher" cannot be separated from that of the environment. Nevertheless, there is an inherent element of frustration in the plight of *all* teachers, good as well as bad, in modern as well as in medieval or ancient times. It may be expressed as follows: teachers believe their task is to teach, yet live in fear that their pupils are not learning; that their teaching, therefore, is a mockery. This fear is heightened when the teacher, like the surrounding society, lacks a working concept of internal motivation for learning that "speaks" to children, assuming that the latter are merely inadequate adults who must be moved in the direction of adulthood as quickly as possible.[42]

This anxiety of teachers, which is occasioned by the understanding that there is no necessary correspondence between the task of having to teach and the willingness or ability of pupils to learn, is immeasurably heightened when the subject matter is not only instrumental but absolute, being regarded as no less than the key to life in both

this world and the next. This is the predicament of the ancient, medieval and, in pious communities, the contemporary teacher of Judaism. He or she is required to initiate children into a religious life of transcendence, to guide them in the direction of a world of meaning wherein they place God continually before themselves. Yet all this must be done—at least until modern times, and sometimes beyond—within an organic and intensely demanding community. Teachers are advised by authorities who set community norms that education must be accomplished in a manner that reflects decent and dignified relations. The writers on corporal punishment, who often address teachers directly, list the good attributes of the educated Jewish child: he will not raise his hand against his fellow or, God forbid, strike him; he has no contempt for others; like the good teacher himself, he does not waste time that might be devoted to Torah study on trivialities; he knows the order of Jewish life; and he strives with all his might to understand the Torah being studied. Finally, the well-educated Jewish child should be humble and aspire to be righteous, "finding favor in the sight of God and man." There are a number of humanistic values contained in these prescriptions that are aimed at making individuals flourish as well as become deserving of life in the world to come. But in medieval life, as evident from its terminology, such humanistic values come in very heavy wrappings of transcendence.[43]

An instructive example: We read that children frequently demand to go to the toilet, partly because it constitutes a break from the boredom of the classroom. But teachers are warned not to let boys go in pairs, lest one of them "immodestly" look at the "sign of the covenant" (*brit*) of the other, leading, "God forbid," to forbidden thoughts and arousal. For the same reason, the child is taught not to touch his genitals directly. From here, one derives the rule that one may not hit a child there: what the child may not touch is barred as well to the teacher or parent. Indeed, one may hit a child upon the bare skin only in regions that are not required to be kept covered according to the rules of modesty; for example, in the case of males (though not females), the shoulders.[44] Here, clearly, we are in the domain of transcendence. The individual stands within an existential situation—of the body, of dignified and "modest" relations with others, of his belonging to a people of covenant—all of which make demands that place him before God. There is mystery but also identity; danger but also holiness.[45] There is the "do not touch" of the Tree of Knowledge but also, beckoning to the obedient and restrained, the Tree of Life promising eternal significance and harmony. The teacher must initiate the child into that transcendence and also into what we might call the humanistic behavior that flows from it. Not to touch means not invading the privacy associated with the prohibition, which reflects a modicum of respect for the child and his world, certainly some courtesy, and perhaps even empathy.

The teacher is likely to articulate all of this as "bringing the child to Torah and fear of God [*yirat shamayim*]." But how is the teacher to accomplish this weighty task? He is not a *talmid ḥakham* nor is he likely to have opportunities to consult with colleagues. It is easy to imagine him lonely and frustrated. Given the harsh standards by which the community judges him, given the violence that so often characterizes the time in which he lives, given the inadequacy of the physical conditions in which he works, the tenuous hold he most likely has on the subject matter and his inability to read this subject matter with dialectical-moral sophistication; given also the fickleness of his clients and their petty devices and cruelties, one need not be surprised that

the teacher's temptation to hit children, to maintain a semblance of order in his world, is great. Moreover, we need not wonder that the times and ways in which such teachers hit children are not necessarily in accordance with the refined and sophisticated halakhic standards of scholars.

Understandings of the Child

In the Jewish community, as in the larger social and cultural world, there are diverse ways of understanding "the child." Indeed, the categories of teacher as agent of socialization, philosophically oriented emissary of culture, or psychological expert on (inner) child development[46] have their parallels in discrete views of the child/learner. Are children those who must be made into useful and well-adjusted members of society, those who will value what adults value and who will be competent to carry out adult tasks and functions? Are they to be initiated into a culture by means of presenting them with increasingly complex and challenging subject matter in an environment of cultural learning, in the hope that they will reach a level permitting them to contribute and innovate as well as participate? Or, alternatively, are children capable of "making themselves" with a mere assist from those teachers who can present age-appropriate and experience-appropriate subject matter in a congenial environment?

Each model has different conceptions, cognitive and moral, both of the child and of the adult world. For example, the paradigm of imitation and socialization is often coupled with contempt for individualism (seen as egotistic) and suspicion of those who appear to scorn social conventions. In terms of physical punishment, we may expect rigidly social and imitative conceptions of education to go hand in hand with getting the child not to step out of line. In the second model, of cultural initiation, corporal punishment may serve the teacher who is frustrated with the bright pupil who refuses to learn, or it may be considered appropriate for "fools" who are not yet (and perhaps never will be) accessible to reasoning. In contrast, adherents of the developmental model of education, the most pristinely modern one, are likely to view corporal punishment as a criminal act that cripples children. The "spanking" teacher prevents the child from being educated. Instead of aiding young brains in making new connections, spanking leaves brain lesions; it mutilates learning.

But here it must be stressed again that Jewish education—indeed all education—is concerned with moral no less than cognitive development. Hence in addition to Zvi Lamm's theory of cognitive development, a moral-philosophical paradigm of human nature is also necessary.

John Kekes, the moral philosopher, suggests three views of human nature, each of which seems congenial to a discrete mode of education.[47] According to Kekes, human nature may be considered 1) fundamentally benevolent; 2) irremediably tragic; or 3) inherently problematic, yet amenable to improvement and refinement. In the first instance, education must merely foster the natural goodness of children, albeit taking into account the possibility of "pathological" events that correspond to illness in normally healthy persons. Education in tune with this model, I suggest, will consider corporal punishment to be either pernicious or extremely risky. It is pernicious to "beat the hell" out of children when there is no hell in them; it is risky to assume

that teachers are wise diagnosticians in identifying (temporary) illness in their charges and determining that physical punishment is the cure for it. Of course, there are given social contexts in which teachers may declare that a light spanking cannot do any harm, since the naturally healthy soul of the child knows that no malice was intended. Such a "healthy" soul will process the spanking and then forget it.

The second, tragic view of human nature holds that the evil within us is inherent to our nature, so much so that, in one sense, we are not guilty for our misdeeds—though to minimize their evil effects, we must be punished for them. By extension, it would appear that, since not only our problems but also our solutions are tainted by inherent malignancy, we can never trust any given solution. Such a non-judgmental moral position, however, is beyond the moral capabilities of most people. Thus, fundamentalist educators who are engaged in making "proper, God-fearing people" out of hapless and victimized children may be suspected more of sadism than of the impeccable righteousness to which they lay claim. Even in the tragic view, punishment is automatic only if one believes that the injunction to administer it derives from a supernatural source untainted by human evil. Indeed, most champions of corporal punishment do view it in this divinely sanctioned light.

The problem appears to be most acute for those maintaining the third position, namely, that children are naturally tainted but not devoid of godly elements that can and must be nourished in order to rein in the evil impulse. While there are sources in Judaism that support the first "naturally good" position and perhaps others that seem close to a tragic view,[48] this third position rests on more ample sources in the Jewish tradition. According to this view, the evil impulse is inherent in human existence; as the talmudic sages taught, it expresses itself forcefully even before birth. In his previously noted pietistic work, R. Eliyahu Dessler reminds us of the midrashic teaching that Esau tried to leave his mother's womb every time she walked by houses of idolatry, whereas Jacob (anachronistically) sought to do the same whenever she passed "houses of [Torah] study." Lest the reader assume that the case of Jacob demonstrates that the good impulse is also a force to be reckoned with even before birth, Dessler quickly notes that the patriarchs are not accessible models for us. Our nature is that of Esau—surely a tragic feature of our existence. [49]

On the basis of biblical, midrashic, and talmudic sources that he believes unequivocally to represent God's teaching about human nature and the proper treatment of its infirmities, Dessler finds that corporal punishment is indeed one of the solutions for the consequences of human frailty. Should we neglect or reject such punishment on the basis of (impious) contemporary research, we will find ourselves cultivating "little Hitlers" even among Jews. Dessler warns against adopting the views of modern researchers who disseminate the false doctrine that children are basically good and should be befriended by their parents. Similarly, he rejects as erroneous the notion that striking children is harmful because it makes them more aggressive. This, he argues, is simply not the case for children brought up in the proper pious framework: they would never dream of raising a finger against parents or teachers, these individuals being as far above children in understanding and authority as is the king from his lowly servants.

Here, then, is one way of interpreting the third model: the evil impulse (*yeẓer hara'*), while powerful, can be overcome "with God's help" and with the accumu-

lated wisdom and goodness that can be inculcated in young hearts. Of course, if one takes the findings of "modern researchers" seriously, one may anticipate different conclusions within the parameters of this model. One is likely to examine, for instance, whether corporal punishment is a necessary or desirable element even of an education constructed on the foundations of restraint, order, and discipline.

Corporal Punishment and Educating for Values

In the contemporary environment, it is hard to disagree with opposition to corporal punishment aimed at humiliating children and diminishing their self-esteem. Corporal punishment is not only "not nice" from a humanistic perspective, it is also an assault upon the transcendence that dwells within children. At the same time, any abolition of corporal punishment that is facilely equated with the demise of *all* discipline, with the failure to impart some culture and some operative conception of human limitations, of mystery, and of responsibility to the child, is hazardous and ill considered. Viewing educational laissez-faire as the only alternative to cruelty leads inevitably to behavior that gives rise to nostalgic laments on "the good old days" when children knew their place and became morally sober adults (a pleasant description that conveniently screens out petty sadism, institutionalized cruelty, and violence).

Indeed, there is an additional, related reason to dispense with corporal punishment that is directly related to the subject matter of Jewish education—and, for that matter, to any education that seeks to inculcate values. I suggest that the educator is charged with cultivating *all three* of the modes of instruction that Lamm presents mainly as alternatives. Within the framework of education, there is room for initiation into the patterns of the community, for acculturation into the classic sources of tradition, and for the development and self-actualization of each individual, "according to his [or her] own way." Needless to say, each of these modes points to a world of values: the first, to participation and loyalty; the second, to love of wisdom and its pursuit; and the third, to courage of conviction and openness, both intellectual and spiritual.

Those who are entrusted with this complicated enterprise have always deserved more respect and status than that traditionally accorded to teachers of "mere" children. If anything, the task is even more complex in our own generation. For, certainly in religious education, teachers and parents seek to transmit absolute values, expounding Jewish sources largely to examine how these values operate, how they instruct, and how they are to be interpreted in their diverse contexts and interactions.

By "absolute," I refer not only to the status of these values as demanding something (or everything) of people, but also to the sense of their being self-understood: predating each individual's appearance on the stage of life, they are perceived, through the medium of community, to be eternal. In the religious idiom, we call these absolute values *holy*, and they become both accessible and inescapable by virtue of their source in the divine.

The modern situation is characterized by a debate not only with regard to the existence of "absolute values" in education and life, but also concerning the manner in which such values come to exercise authority. I would suggest that contemporary peo-

ple who live by absolute values do so not simply because they were born into them but *because they have chosen them*. This state of affairs, inherent in modernity, is of course a paradox, for, as noted, the values have actually preceded us. As absolute values they are not ours; we are theirs. Notwithstanding, this state of absolute values is a dead letter for the contemporary person until he or she has chosen them.

Although this state of affairs may seem like a reversal or even a denial of tradition, the notion of this kind of choice may be found within Jewish tradition itself. According to a well-known midrash, the Israelites were not the first to be offered the Torah. Rather, God went to various other nations; only after being rejected by them was the Torah offered to Israel. Hearing the voice of the living God, the Jews were nonetheless presented with a choice: to obey or to disobey.[50] Another midrash takes the matter even further. On the verse "and you shall observe My commandments and do [lit. "make"] them":

> R. Hama, the son of R. Hanina, said: If you observe the [commandments of] the Torah, I [God] shall account it for you as though you had made them. Said R. Hanina bar-Pappa: [God] said to them, if you observe the Torah, I shall account it as though you had *made yourselves* [*va'asitem atem* instead of *va'asitem otam*] (Vayikra raba 38:7).

For those charged with cultivating Jewish continuity and commitment, the ramifications for contemporary Jewish education of this notion of choice are profound and far-reaching. Children are indeed initiated into the life of Judaism by parents and teachers who hope, through Judaism, to show them a path toward self-actualization and transcendence. At the same time, they realize (unless they have not made their peace with modernity) that a time will come when each child will have to choose. Those children who have been massively injured by violence and paralyzed by fear will not be able to choose. In that case, although they may stay with those absolute values that have informed their education, they will know them, alas, as that which ties them into knots of fear, shame, and humiliation. Either that, or they can hope for a successful rebellion against their tormentors—a choice that will anger their elders and perhaps even untie some of the knots, but at the possible cost of spiritual impoverishment.

How can an approach that reconciles absolute value and choice be reconciled as well with the normative language of Jewish tradition? Let us return for a moment to the discussion of the "rebellious son" who is ostensibly deserving of death. As noted, R. Shimon ruled that "there never was and never will be" such a person: in telling us only of his devouring of meat and his guzzling of wine, the Torah gives us criteria of rebelliousness that are clearly not the whole story. According to David Weiss-Halivni, what R. Shimon is saying is that we must possess other criteria that the Torah, for whatever reason, does not choose to tell; we need to learn much more in order to formulate adequate criteria by which to fathom how we should act when children misbehave in a seemingly hopeless manner.[51] I would like to suggest that our accumulating knowledge of the halakhic tradition with regard to hitting children—its development, notwithstanding certain moralistic traditions, in the direction of neutralizing and abolishing physical punishment—is something "new" that we have learned. Clearly the fact that "beating the hell" out of children is increasingly identified with religious fundamentalism of the most unsavory sort, any similarity to which

makes of Jewish practice a desecration of God's name (*ḥilul hashem*), is a new element in contemporary Jewish educational discourse.[52] What we have learned from sociological and psychological studies about the causes of violence and the consequences of beating children is also something new. On the basis of all these, we can well imagine R. Shimon declaring that the new evidence solidifies his original conclusion that there never was and never will be a "rebellious son."

But what about the admonitions of Proverbs? Are these not divine instruction for good education? Here, so it seems to me, we must place matters in their historical and social context. There was, so it appears, a time when "everybody" chastised with the rod except for parents who could be accused of indifference to the moral rectitude of their children. But the context has changed. Parents who know their children and who live in a relationship of mutual trust and love may still consider a small smack in certain situations as harmless and useful, but the words of Proverbs are no longer enough either to sustain an educational ideology or to promote a moral imperative to hit children.

In the contemporary context, the following talmudic saying (Shabbat 119b) perhaps comes into its own, revealing a teaching that seemingly has waited for our times to be fully understood and accepted in all its moral authority:

> R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: "Do not touch my anointed ones" (I Chron. 16:22)—these are the pupils sitting before their teachers.

Notes

1. See Bryan Magee, *Confessions of a Philosopher* (London: 1997), 185.
2. The high court's ruling was made on January 25, 2000; for a polemical discussion on the background to this decision, see Evelyn Gordon, "The Supreme Court in Loco Parentis," *Azure* 10 (Winter 5761/2001), 50–84.
3. See, for example, Philip Greven, *Spare the Child: The Religious Roots of Punishment and the Psychological Impact of Physical Abuse* (New York: 1991); Alice Miller, *For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence* (New York: 1983); idem, "Against Spanking," *Tikkun* 15, no. 2 (March-April 2000), 17–19.
4. For some studies, see Irwin A. Hyman and James H. Wise, *Corporal History, Practice and Alternatives* (Philadelphia: 1979).
5. Judge Stuart's decision, along with other "break-through" decisions, is cited in Shlomo Nahmias, "'Anishah gufanit bemosdot haḥinukh bemivḥan hamishpat," *Hapraklit* 37 (5747/1987), 244.
6. See Paul M. Kingery, Lynn McCoy-Simandle and Richard Clayton, "Risk Factors for Adolescent Violence: The Importance of Vulnerability," *School Psychology International* 18 (1997), 49–60.
7. See Miller, "Against Spanking," 17–18.
8. See John Martin Rich, "The Use of Corporal Punishment," *The Clearing House* 63 (Dec. 1989), 151.
9. Israel Abrahams, *Jewish Life in the Middle Ages* (London: 1896), 350. Also see Ephraim Karnafogel, *Jewish Education and Society in the High Middle Ages* (Detroit: 1992). Writing almost a century after Abrahams on Jewish education in the Middle Ages, Karnafogel placed this subject matter outside the range of his research.
10. See Shmuel Glick, *Haḥinukh barei haḥok vehahalakha: lehitpaṭḥutam shel dinim vetakanot baḥinukh bimdinat yisrael behashvaah lesifrut hahalakah*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: 2000), 478–523.

11. See Nathan Morris, *The Jewish School: An Introduction to the History of Jewish Education* (London: 1937), esp. 166–167, 170–173.

As an example of parental interest and concern (and, we might add, contempt for the deficient scholarship of teachers), Morris relates a talmudic story (Ḥulin 107b) about the sage Samuel, who as a boy was once found crying by his father. The father asked him why he was crying, to which he responded that his teacher had beaten him, "because he said to me, 'you were feeding my son, but you did not carry out the religious obligation to wash your hands before doing so.' "

The father asked: "And why did you not wash your hands?"

To which the boy replied: "It was his son who ate, so why should I wash?"

To this, his father remarked, "It is not sufficient that your teacher is ignorant of the Law, but he must also beat you?" (cited in ibid., 176).

Discussing this story, Moshe Aberbach notes that in Sanhedrin 104b, it is recounted that Samuel got back at this teacher when he interpreted the verse "they did not call upon the Lord" (Ps. 14:4) to refer to "the teachers of children." See Aberbach, *Haḥinukh hayehudi bitkufat hamishnah vehatalmud* (Jerusalem: 1982), 70.

12. On Old Testament justifications for beating children and various descriptions of how to "break the will" of children, see Greven, *Spare the Child*, 46–82.

13. See Eliyahu E. Dessler, "'Al hakaat habanim," in *Mikhtav meEliyahu*, vol. 3, ed. Aryeh Carmel and Alter Halprin (Bnei Brak: 5734/1974), 360–362.

14. See Zuriel Shitrit, *'Adnei haḥinukh: pirkai hanḥayah beḥinukh yeladim vegishah nekhonaḥ lehaknayat mishma'at* (Bnei Brak: 5759/1999), ch. 10. The idea that parents will live to regret a soft and pampering relationship with their children is found much earlier, of course—for example in rabbinic literature that criticizes Abraham's easy-going attitude toward Ishmael's corruption, Isaac's indulgence toward Esau, and David's toward Absalom (see Shemot rabah 1:1). Even before that, Proverbs warns parents continually against "sparing the rod."

15. See Zvi Lamm, *Conflicting Theories of Instruction* (Berkeley: 1976).

16. See the commentary of R. Naftali Zvi Berlin on this passage in his biblical commentary, *Ha'amek davar.* For a summary of rabbinic and exegetical opinion, see B.S. Jacobson on this passage in his *Meditations on the Torah*, trans. Z.W. Gotthold (Tel Aviv: 1969).

17. The book of Ben Sira also speaks approvingly of "chastening" children. However, since this is a book of the Apocrypha and as such not in the biblical canon, it is not likely to enter the discourse of Jewish education.

18. Modern readers are perhaps more used to reading the story through the eyes of Søren Kierkegaard, who argues in his celebrated study *Fear and Trembling* (Garden City: 1954) that the binding of Isaac represents a "suspension of the ethical" in which the service of God leaves moral considerations behind. This, however, is not the classic Jewish reading, which sees the problem precisely in the moral dilemma that God's command creates.

19. See Rich, "The Use of Corporal Punishment," 150.

20. See the mishnaic discussion in Sanhedrin 8:4 and the later talmudic discussion in Sanhedrin 71a.

21. See David Weiss-Halivni, "Can a Religious Law be Immoral?" in *Perspectives on Jews and Judaism: Essays in Honor of Wolf Kelman* (New York: 1978), 170ff. Weiss-Halivni argues that if the halakhah posits that eating and drinking beyond a certain amount makes one a rebellious son, this can no more than indicate a certain direction of thought—it cannot, by the Torah's own standards, be considered the sum total of what the Torah meant in discussing the rebellious son. Indeed, because there are so many other factors that need to be taken into consideration, carrying out this commandment is surely impossible.

22. Mishneh Torah, *hilkhot talmud torah* 2:2; ibid. (*hilkhot mamrim*), 6:8; Shulḥan 'arukh, *yoreh de'ah* 22:19.

23. Quoted in Simhah Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: 1930), 3.

24. Ibid., vol. 4 (Tel Aviv: 1947), 88.

25. Ibid., 85, 100.

26. Ibid. Although halakhic authorities defended the practice, they restricted it in theory. On the view of the Vilna Gaon, for example, see ibid., 104.

27. *Sefer hanhagat melamdim 'im talmideihem*, quoted in Assaf, *Mekorot betoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, vol. 4 (p. 182); based on the commentary of R. Moses Isserles to the Shulḥan 'arukh, *yoreh de'ah* 184.

28. See Shmuel Glick, *Haḥinukh berei haḥok vehahalakhah*, vol. 2 (Jerusalem: 2000), 513–514.

29. Ibid., 514.

30. See Mo'ed katan 3:1, cited in ibid., 506.

31. Ibid., 509–510. The distinction between legitimate punishment and assault (which consists of "hitting too much") appears in rabbinic literature, where it is first applied to parents who strike their "adult" (post-bar mitzvah) children (see Tosefta on Baba kama 9:8). Later, it is also applied to parents who strike minor children: "One who causes injury to his minor child is liable for [all payments] due to an assaulted party" (ibid., 9:10).

32. See Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, 4: 181.

33. See Bamidmar raba 12:3 and Eikhah raba 1:3.

34. See Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*,1: 18–21.

35. Even in talmudic times, a distinction was made between the wise and the teachers of small children (see Aberbach, *Haḥinukh hayehudi bitkufat hamishnah vehatalmud*, 73). On who taught the elite and who the simple in a later generation, see Elazar Touitov, "Haḥinukh hayehudi beMorocco bemeah hashemonah 'esrei," *'Iyunim beḥinukh* 33 (March 1982), 137–145.

36. Cited in Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, 4:18 Note that one who refrains from striking children is termed "a good man."

37. Morris, *The Jewish School*, 171.

38. See Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, 1:112.

39. Ibid., 4:88.

40. Ibid., 105.

41. Ibid., 1:206.

42. See Karnafogel, *Jewish Education and Society in the High Middle Ages*, 40. According to Karnafogel: "With regard to one aspect of its attitudes towards childhood. . . . Ashkenazic Jewish society seems to have been no different from its Christian counterpart. Jews tended to educate their elementary-level students as little adults."

43. See, for example, the analysis of religious life in medieval as opposed to modern times in Charles Taylor, *A Catholic Modernity* (New York: 1999), 13–37.

44. See Assaf, *Mekorot letoledot haḥinukh beyisrael*, 4:104.

45. Note that what the male child is not permitted to touch is the *brit*, the site of circumcision, which represents the covenant between Abraham (and his descendants) and God.

46. See Lamm, *Conflicting Theories of Instruction*.

47. See John Kekes, *Facing Evil* (Princeton: 1990).

48. On the first model, note the morning prayer in which the worshipper affirms that "the soul You have given me is pure." Conversely, Yishayahu Leibowitz's theology, which holds that one is obliged to observe the commandments even though one must despair of their "changing anything in human existence," seems close to the tragic view. See Leibowitz, *Yahadut, 'am yehudi umdinat yisrael* (Jerusalem: 1976), 13–36.

49. See Dessler, *Mikhtav meEliyahu*, 360–362.

50. See *Pesikta rabati* 21.

51. See Weiss-Halivni, "Can a Religious Law be Immoral?"

52. In this regard, my colleague Shalom Rosenberg has called my attention to Rashi's interpretation of Deut. 16:22, which prohibits setting up a pillar "which the Lord your God hates." How can it be that God now hates what was once used by the Patriarchs for His service? Rashi responds that "though it was beloved [to Him] in the times of the Patriarchs, now He hates it since the Canaanites made it a law [that is, an aspect] of idolatry." In other words, since the context has changed, God now "hates" what he once "loved."

Haredi Violence in Contemporary Israeli Society

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I would like to begin by describing and analyzing an event that took place some decades ago and to use that as the framework for the ensuing discussion.

The spread of permissive American culture in Israel in the early 1970s brought with it the opening of so-called "sex shops" in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This development met with displeasure in many circles, and especially within Israel's haredi (ultra-Orthodox) society, which viewed it as a manifestation of the moral deterioration of secular Israeli society. One night in the summer of 1972, two yeshiva students set fire to the store in Tel Aviv, and the resulting conflagration endangered the lives of the building's other residents. The perpetrators were arrested and charged with the crime; on the day of their arraignment, protest demonstrations were held in Jerusalem and in Bnei Brak. *Hamodia*, the newspaper of the Agudat Israel party, castigated the police for its "cruelty" toward the two young men. After they were convicted and sentenced to prison, a public and political campaign was launched to ease the conditions of their imprisonment and secure an early release. Although the torching of the "store of abominations," as they called it, was clearly an act of violence that not only damaged the store but also threatened the lives and property of the building's residential tenants, the haredi "street" was in clear sympathy with the two arsonists. This fact was a cause of great concern to Moshe Sheinfeld (1910–1975), one of the leading ideologues of the haredi "scholar-society" (*ḥevrat lomdim*).

Sheinfeld, who was not a rabbi, achieved an unusual status in haredi circles in Israel. He was a leader of the Agudat Israel youth movement, which was located on the extreme right of Agudat Israel. His articles, published mainly in the movement's newspaper, *Diglenu*, had a considerable influence on the haredi scholar-society, centered in the yeshivas and in the *kolelim*, that by the 1970s had become a major influence in Agudat Israel. Sheinfeld, whose religio-political perspective was close to that of the more extreme Neturei Karta, was disturbed by the fact that haredi society viewed the two arsonists as heroes. His response was set out in an article titled "Violence—A Foreign Branch in our Education!" which appeared in *Niv hamoreh*, the journal of the semi-autonomous Agudat Israel educational system (*ḥinukh 'aẓmai*). Although *Niv hamoreh* was a relatively obscure publication, the

views expressed in it contribute greatly to our understanding of the phenomenon of religio-ideological violence in haredi society.

Sheinfeld opens characteristically by stating the heart of the problem from his standpoint:

> As much as Torah [= haredi] Judaism has invested supreme efforts in erecting spiritual walls to separate us from the erring secular Jews [*ḥilonim*], the winds pass through them and affect our tender youth in particular. Heaven forbid that we should adopt an ostrich-like stance and ignore the spreading manifestations of violence that are increasingly leaving their mark on the haredi street. Whoever makes light of these phenomena and draws comfort from the saying, "Let the young men now arise and play before us" [II Sam. 2:14], has blinded himself to the gravity of the anticipated consequences and the foul wells from which they spring forth.[1]

Sheinfeld sees the phenomenon of religio-ideological violence in haredi society not as intrinsically Jewish, but as imitative of past and current trends in modern secular society and as part of the permissive world of modernity:

> The evil winds that poison the atmosphere in the secular street of late are gradually taking hold in our midst. It comes as no comfort that they wear the cloak of zealotry. If we view the matter clearly, we shall discover that this mantle is deceptive and tainted with hooliganism.[2]

Not only was Sheinfeld aware of the link joining the arsonists with traditional Jewish zealots; he was also aware that a majority of haredim viewed them in this light. This was most disturbing, as in his view, it endangered the future of haredi society as a whole. Such zealotry, he believed, gave expression to an irresponsibility among youth that bordered on outright rebellion against the rabbis and yeshiva heads.

Sheinfeld was far from naive. He was fully aware of manifestations of violent religious zealotry toward those who deviated from Jewish tradition. However, there was another aspect of the torching of the sex shop that frightened him in particular. Not only did such violence endanger those Jews ("infants, elderly, and probably sick people as well") living in the building, it further jeopardized the status and security of the haredi world within an already hostile Israeli society. In Sheinfeld's view, although haredi Jews lived in the state of Israel, nonetheless they still were in "golus," or exile.[3] What is more, the rules for living in golus as a persecuted minority vis-à-vis the surrounding society had to be adhered to even more strictly in Israel, precisely because it was "golus among brethren":

> During thousands of years of golus, we learned how to live as a minority among a hateful majority . . . how to cultivate the degree of separation that protects us from imitation, absorption, and intermingling with those who are different, and how to duck one's head under the evil waves, in the hope and faith that the waves will pass and we will remain whole. Golus among brethren is immeasurably more searing and painful [than that among the Gentiles], but the same rules of experience and life wisdom apply. The future of Torah Judaism depends upon developing reserves of young people and keeping them within its bounds, as at the foot of Mt. Sinai our forefathers declared, our children are the guarantors [of our future].[4]

It was precisely Sheinfeld's extreme anti-Zionism that made him so fearful that religio-ideological violence would expose haredi society to the vengeance of the secular Zionist majority. In support of his position, Sheinfeld drew upon the experience of the religious underground movements that were active in the early 1950s.[5] "Since the founding of the state," he wrote,

> a negative opinion has crystallized among the great rabbinical leaders of our generation against illegal demonstrations, and even more so against violent activity. When a religious underground was organized in Jerusalem and set fire to cars that had been driven on the holy Sabbath, the Ḥazon Ish, of revered memory, issued a public condemnation.[6] And not only that, he also expressed the view that the arsonists were deemed pursuers [*rodfim*] of the Torah-abiding community—as had been determined halakhically in the case of Jewish counterfeiters in the countries of the non-Jews, who by their deeds had endangered the Jewish collective. [7]

As noted, Sheinfeld was not a political innocent, and the title of his article, "Violence—A Foreign Branch in Our Education!" did not give expression to some historical or social truth. By the mid 1950s, the phenomenon of violent underground organizations had virtually disappeared. Significantly, during this time, haredi society had been transformed into a scholar-society in which all males studied in yeshivas and continued learning in *kolelim* for many years after marrying. Located within what sociologists define as "total institutions," which maintain strict social supervision at all times, these students were wholly subject to the authority of the rabbis and the yeshiva heads.[8] Since the latter were highly apprehensive of the dangers of religious violence, they acted to suppress all hints of such activity. The fact that yeshiva and *kolel* students did not serve in the Israeli army and were therefore not practiced in the use of weapons and explosives also militated against the further development and maintenance of an armed haredi underground.

Nonetheless, the potential for violence continued to exist. What Sheinfeld and others saw in religious undergrounds (he expressed this explicitly in his article) was the trend toward a lack of student discipline with regard to their rabbis, alongside the silent "surrender" of some of the rabbis to acts of religio-ideological violence. Moreover, the haredi scholar-society was by definition comprised of idealistic young people situated in a pre-adult moratorium[9]—a situation that could well provide fertile ground for an ideology of violence and zealotry. The only barrier to such a development was a tough and unequivocal stance on the part of the religious leadership. In the case of the torching of the sex shop, it was precisely in this regard that Sheinfeld discerned signs of weakness. And it is likely that his fears were shared by others in the haredi world.

Those who knew Sheinfeld were aware that he would never publish such an article without the explicit backing of at least one of the *gedolim*—the recognized great Torah scholars of the haredi community. Indeed, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the initiative for it came from one or more of the *gedolim*. At the same time, the fact that the latter chose not to give public expression to their opinions suggests that there was greater solidarity and identification in the haredi community with the arsonists and the justice of their cause than with Sheinfeld and his fears. This perhaps explains why the article was published in a relatively obscure journal rather than in the more widely circulated daily or weekly haredi newspapers.

In haredi society, incidents involving the use of varying degrees of violence are a common occurrence. Nevertheless, manifestations of extreme violence and terror—acts of serious and permanent physical injury and killing—are utterly taboo. Although the burning down of the "store of abominations" belongs in this category, haredi society's identification with the perpetrators is explicable in the particular context: the neighbors and their apartments did not in fact suffer any significant damage, whereas the arsonists were perceived as sacrificing themselves on the altar of the ideals of "societal purity." But they never served as a model for emulation, and subsequent incidents of arson to maintain society "purity" were few and far between. From this perspective, haredi society is clearly unusual in that the potential for violence within it does not culminate in bloodshed but rather is defined, circumscribed, and controlled, both by means of education that penetrates deeply into haredi consciousness and by the effective social control that characterizes the haredi way of life.

As mentioned, religio-ideological violence is not a "foreign branch" but is directly connected with a central theme in the Jewish tradition, namely the myth of Pinhas the zealot, as recounted in Num. 25:1–13. Every traditional Jewish child knows the story of Pinhas, the grandson of Aharon the high priest, who, showing his zeal for God, speared to death an Israelite named Zimri (a chief of the tribe of Shimon) and the Midianite woman with him "in the sight of all Israel," and thereby brought about the end of a plague and earned the divine blessing of a "covenant of peace." Yet by the same token, every child in traditional Jewish society is aware of the talmudic interpretation of the phenomenon of violent religious zealotry, as expressed in Rashi's commentary. Neither is there a *talmid ḥakham*—a Torah scholar—who is unaware of the talmudic discussion on religious zealotry that appears in Sanhedrin 81b-82a.

The talmudic discussion opens with the mishnah:

> Whoever steals the *kasva* [believed to be a Temple decoration], utters magic curses, or has sexual relations with an Aramean woman—zealots shall put him to death.

In explicating this passage, the Talmud presents the opinion of R. Hisda:

> If one seeks advice from the court [because he had witnessed such forbidden acts], they do not instruct him [to kill the transgressor].

To this, Raba bar-Hana and R. Yohanan add:

> They should not instruct him to kill, and moreover, referring to the case of Zimri, if the latter had separated himself [from the Midianite woman] and Pinhas had nevertheless killed him, he [Pinhas] would have been put to death for it. [However], had Zimri turned about and killed Pinhas [in self-defense], he would not have been put to death for it, since Pinhas was a *rodef*.

In this talmudic discussion, the ambivalence of the attitude toward violent zealotry is palpable. On the one hand, Pinhas is doubtless an exemplary character, but on the other hand, there is a conscious tendency to prevent his becoming a model worthy of emulation. Here we find the equation "zealot = *rodef*" that Sheinfeld (following halakhic precedent) had used and expanded: where the Jewish people are a small, persecuted minority within a hostile society, any action (even one involving violent zealotry) that might provoke governmental action against the entire Jewish collective

falls within the category of *redifah*, or "pursuing," and everything must be done to prevent it, even at the cost of endangering the zealot.

In Jewish society, and particularly within the state of Israel, this equation served to impose prior restraints and boundaries upon acts of violent zealotry. Moreover, would-be religious zealots were of necessity constrained by the sense of Jewish solidarity that is rooted deeply in haredi consciousness. The concept of a *ḥiloni* (secular) Jewish identity never received legitimation from any segment of Orthodoxy; despite some tendencies in that direction, secular Jews were never denied full membership in the holy nation of Israel. This fundamental sense of ethnic solidarity with all Jews was strengthened in recent generations by the experience of the Holocaust, which heightened the recognition among haredim of the shared fate and mutual dependence of all Jews in the modern world. These feelings, too, have helped to curb violent activities by haredi zealots. For example, in the 1950s, members of the Neturei Karta stamped prayer books in Meah Shearim synagogues with the words: "Would that the state of 'Israel' be destroyed, but without any Jew being injured, heaven forfend."[10] And when, during Israel's lengthy war in Lebanon, *Der Yid*, the newspaper of the Satmar hasidim in the United States, declared, "We hope and yearn for the speedy passing [of the state of Israel]," it incurred the wrath of another Orthodox newspaper, *Algemeine tseitung*, which pointed out that destruction of the state would endanger the lives of "hundreds of thousands of Jews."[11] In response, *Der Yid* wrote:

> Simple Jews know well that the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of the Universe knows how to conduct His world in lovingkindness and mercy and to remove the restraints and delays to the coming of the Messiah, without, heaven forbid, harming any Jew. . . . He who passed over the houses of Israel in Egypt and saved those awaiting redemption will also show us miracles in the future redemption, when the time comes.[12]

This perception, as noted, is rooted so deeply in haredi consciousness that it was almost beyond reason that groups or individuals would ever organize violent actions endangering the lives of any Jews, including *ḥilonim*.

Zealotry as represented by the Neturei Karta is deemed by haredi society to be "passive" insofar as its adherents are willing to endanger themselves by their activities and literally "offer their backs to their assailants."[13] From its inception, Neturei Karta viewed itself as antimilitaristic, as the group charged with preserving the golus tradition of passive resistance, as against the Zionist resort to force. Neturei Karta began in the 1930s as an internal opposition within Agudat Israel, in protest against the latter's coming to terms with the Zionist movement and its enterprise in the Holy Land. It adopted the name Neturei Karta ("guardians of the city") to highlight its opposition to the *kofer hayishuv*—a voluntary tax collected by the Yishuv's Zionist leadership to finance the establishment of an armed force to guard Jewish settlements and residential neighborhoods from attacks and incursions during the Arab rebellion (1936–1939). Neturei Karta argued that only vigilant observance of the mitzvot, not military weapons, would protect the Jews under attack. In its view, a Jewish society that was not committed to upholding halakhah could not be sustained: "If the Lord does not watch over the city, in vain does the guard keep vigil; if the Lord does not build the house, in vain do the workers toil" (Ps. 127:1–2). Thus, it was not the police and sol-

diers who guarded the city, but rather those Torah students who faithfully observed its commandments.

In a eulogy of R. Amram Blau (d. 1974), the head of Neturei Karta, Sheinfeld emphasized the leader's passive zealotry:

> Many battles were waged by R. Amram Blau in his life. . . . He failed in many struggles, but he never made victory the condition for engaging in battle. R. Amram fought because he could not do otherwise. . . . Approximately 30 years ago, I witnessed an unforgettable scene: about an hour before the end of the holy Sabbath, the Edison cinema in Jerusalem opened its ticket booth. R. Amram did not hesitate to stick his head into the narrow opening. He paid no attention to the vicious blows, hair-pulling, and pinching inflicted upon him by cinema employees inside the booth. He did not even let out a slight cry of pain. His joy at preventing the sale of tickets enabled him to drive out the pain and torture. Alone, he continued to carry on the work until the stars emerged. This sight of individual heroism, of one who does not retaliate and does not even attempt to defend himself, so impressed his tormentors that they let up and looked at him with evident admiration.[14]

This description is only partially faithful to historical truth. Neither Blau nor his associates and followers renounced completely all forms of violence, as will be seen. Significantly, Sheinfeld reflects the standard view in haredi society that the religious zealot in Israel today—the present-day Pinhas—does not kill deviants for their public Sabbath desecration or consumption of forbidden food but rather protests such behavior, even at the cost of subjecting himself to violent attack; as Sheinfeld put it, such a person "does not retaliate and does not even attempt to defend himself." More important: if in the case of the biblical Pinhas, the zealot's violent act of killing the sinner constitutes the "termination" of their reciprocal relationship, in the case of Neturei Karta zealots such as Amram Blau, such acts are understood as an integral component of a complex and ongoing relationship with the zealot's secular "victim" that is based on both sides' recognition of their common identity and shared fate as Jews. From such a perspective, this reciprocal relationship lies in the "victim's" positive evaluation of the violent zealot, if only because the latter is perceived as sacrificing himself on the altar of his own belief. Indeed, one might go so far as to assert that the perception of Neturei Karta as zealots is contingent upon the "deviant" Israeli society's evaluation of them as idealists prepared to endure violence because of their faith. By the same token, their role as zealots requires the presence of a sinning and deviant Israeli society—even though they pray for its passing.

There are two underlying reasons why violence is not foreign to haredi society in Israel. To begin with, central to its self-definition is the belief that it is constantly at war to defend its way of life from the inroads of modernity and secularization, with the nonreligious segments of Israeli society reflecting the process of secularization in its most blatant and dangerous form. This war, it should be noted, has gone on for generations—indeed, ever since the development of Orthodoxy (especially its haredi variety), which arose in direct opposition to the movements for change that transformed traditional Jewish society in Europe during the 19th century. The rules and forms of the contemporary haredi war against modernity and secularization, including those relating to the use of violence, were determined in an earlier period and later

further sanctified by the continued endorsement of the *gedolim*, the supreme authorities in haredi society.

An analysis of the violent activities of haredi zealots, therefore, must take into account their relationship with the relevant great Torah scholars. Elsewhere, I have shown that the reciprocal relations between the two are not simple and harmonious but rather are complex, and include an inherent element of structural tension. Both sides need and are dependent upon each other. At the same time, zealotry is intrinsically violent, and must therefore be controlled by the *gedolim*. Their failure to do so will lead haredi society into dangerous territory from which it may be extracted only with great difficulty.[15]

Detailed descriptions of the complex relationships between great Torah authorities and the zealots under their wing may be found in haredi literature. Sheinfeld, for example, discusses events in the 1950s—the Neturei Karta's "war years"—when its adherents placed themselves at the forefront of the haredi struggle against Sabbath desecration in Jerusalem's haredi neighborhoods. At the time, one of the great Torah authorities, R. Yitzhak Zev (Velveleh) Soloveitchik, whose earlier endorsement and legitimation of the Neturei Karta were well known, requested them to moderate their activities on the grounds that their violent acts were proof that they were entrapped in the evil "shell" (*kelipah*) of Zionism.[16]

In sum, violence is the direct outcome of haredi society's definition of its situation as being under constant threat by outside forces. At the same time, however, violence in haredi society results from the fact that it is internally divided and lacks a powerful and accepted leadership with the authority to make binding decisions on the fateful questions confronting it. These conditions afford various zealots the latitude needed both to use violence and to obtain the required protection and support among the various autonomous and competing Torah authorities. In this respect, rather than being directed outwardly at the secular population and its "religious" supporters, haredi violence and zealotry are directed inward, against those political leaders—and even great Torah authorities—who commit the cardinal sin of seeking a modus vivendi with the surrounding Jewish secular society. It follows, therefore, that violence not only exists but is inherent in the economic, social, and political situation with which haredi society must contend.

With this understanding, it becomes possible to distinguish between two types of violent activity: outwardly directed and inwardly directed. The former—violence directed against non-haredim—today focuses mainly on three areas of public life: Sabbath desecration, violations of the standards of sexual modesty, and archeological excavations that involve the digging up of ancient Jewish graves. (Until the end of the 1970s, it focused as well on maintaining religious restrictions on the conduct of autopsies.[17]) Inwardly directed, or internecine, haredi violence occurs in a number of areas. As noted, it grows out of the struggle of extremist zealots against those within or close to haredi society who take an overly conciliatory approach to secular Israeli society. (A current example is the strident opposition to those haredi rabbis and politicians who support the *naḥal ḥaredi*, the special haredi army unit established at the end of the 1990s.) Primarily, however, inwardly directed haredi violence revolves around struggles for status, influence, and power within haredi society. A good example is the conflict in 1981–1982 between the Neturei Karta in Jerusalem (aided by

Satmar hasidim in the United States) and the Belz hasidim over kashruth certification in Israel. The latter established their own religious authority (*bet din*) in this sphere, thereby breaking the monopoly in these matters formerly held by the Badaẓ (an acronym for *beit din ẓedek*, or religious court) of the 'Edah Haḥaredit, with which the Neturei Karta was associated.[18]

Violence directed against those who breach the sexual modesty code has always been prominent among the various forms of haredi zealotry. Thus, in recent years, secular women who happened into such neighborhoods as Meah Shearim while dressed in a manner that blatantly breached haredi norms of sexual modesty commonly have encountered violent reactions—mainly verbal violence (shouts of "whore" and similar epithets) but also on occasion actual threats or physical assaults. Similarly, young secular women residing in or near these neighborhoods are deemed to be especially threatening to haredi society because of their dress and lifestyle. Not infrequently, young haredim have subjected them to harassment, physical injury, and property damage until they eventually moved out.

Sexual permissiveness has always been regarded as such a threatening attack upon the Jewish people's holy character that the haredi zealot is commanded to oppose it, even violently. Indeed, Pinhas—the quintessential Jewish zealot—killed Zimri and the Midianite woman because they blatantly undermined the norms of sexual modesty. To be sure, the case of Zimri is exceptional: it involves public sexual activity ("in the sight of the whole of Israel") and its outcome—death—is unusually grave and violent. But in the Jewish tradition, one also finds other examples of zealous acts in response to lesser breaches of sexual morality, and over the centuries these, too, have provided would-be zealots with models for emulation.[19]

In this context, the contemporary Israeli media frequently report upon the activities of a group known as *mishmeret haẓeni'ut*, or the sexual modesty guard, which uses violence to enforce norms of sexual modesty within haredi society. Few details are available about its early history, but from the little that we do know, this group seems to have arisen at the end of the Mandate period, following the increasing exposure of the residents of Meah Shearim and its environs to general processes of secularization and erosion. During the 1940s, these processes were accelerated perceptibly by the mobilization of haredi young men and women into the Zionist undergrounds and into the ranks of the British army. They were also manifest in distinct changes on the streets of Meah Shearim, such as the opening of a newspaper and magazine store on a street corner near the main entrance of the neighborhood. This store also contained a phonograph, and customers could pay to hear recordings not only of cantorial music, but also of popular Hebrew songs; its attractions were such that many of the neighborhood's youngsters were constantly milling around both inside and outside the store. The Neturei Karta regarded the store as evidence of a serious deterioration in standards of sexual morality, and twice set it on fire. They also took action against those young women from haredi homes who strayed from the straight and narrow and began to "go out" with young men and with British soldiers.

In the newspapers of the period, there is some mention of another organization named Bnei Pinhas (Sons of Pinhas), which also sought to stamp out deviations from the norms of sexual modesty. Over the years, however, following demographic changes that made the haredi neighborhoods more homogenous and conformist, the

activity levels of such groups declined markedly. Furthermore, their initial founders and members matured and aged. Today, as far as is known, the *mishmeret hazeni'ut* is not a structured hierarchical organization (as indeed, it may never have been). Rather, it is better defined as an ad hoc organization inspired by extreme haredi elements that acts in cases in which the perceived breach in standards of sexual morality threaten all the varied segments of the haredi public, and not just its extremist groups such as the Neturei Karta.

Thus, for example, the *mishmeret hazeni'ut* has taken action to prevent and break up unchaperoned meetings between young haredi males and females in public places and to drive out prostitutes from haredi neighborhoods. It has also been known to threaten—and at times to assault—men (whether haredi or not) involved in sexual relationships with married haredi women. Yet only rarely does the violence involve mortal danger.

Apart from some underground incidents during the 1950s, haredi religio-ideological violence did not involve the use of live weapons or explosives. Again, if we exclude one incident in 2000, which resulted in the burning to death of three prostitutes in a Tel Aviv brothel (and indeed, it is not clear whether the perpetrator was haredi in the accepted meaning of the term), one would be hard put to find evidence of haredi violence that resulted directly in loss of life. However, there have been many cases of physical injury, sometimes extremely serious, against persons perceived as criminals or as having impugned the honor of a great Torah authority or some other haredi leader. Instances of harsh verbal violence, contemptuous wall posters, and damage to property by means ranging from arson to vandalism have also been common. Sabbath demonstrations in Jerusalem (and elsewhere) commonly involve stone-throwing at cars. But in none of these instances has anyone been killed.

Thus, there can be no doubt that religio-ideological haredi violence is a complex activity that, while aiming to inflict harm, is at the same time limited and circumscribed. Its restrained character is an expression of the unique structure of haredi society, the major contributing elements of which may be listed as follows:

1. an awareness of the unique history of the Jewish people as a persecuted minority and a deep feeling of Jewish solidarity;
2. extensive social control within "total institutions" (yeshivas, *kolelim*);
3. a dependent relationship of yeshiva students on their rabbis and yeshiva heads, particularly in the realm of supervised matchmaking, where errant behavior can be punished by difficulties in finding a suitable marriage partner;
4. reliance of the yeshiva world on government budgets and exemptions from military service, which serves as a motivating force to restrain outwardly directed violent zealotry;
5. early marriages and economic dependence of young haredim on parents, communal, and governmental assistance, which similarly limits antisocial behavior.

All in all, these elements narrow the scope for maneuvering for contemporary haredi zealots. Thus, one of the most significant findings arising from a number of cases in which haredi youths were arrested for committing violent acts (such as the torching of bus stop advertisements featuring immodestly dressed women) is that the youths' families, and the religious authorities of the community to which they be-

longed, guaranteed their good behavior so as to secure their release. On occasion, such "wayward" youths were even sent overseas to keep them out of trouble.

In August 1987, a Jerusalem district court invalidated municipal ordinances forbidding the operation of movie theaters and other places of entertainment on Friday nights. The effect of this ruling was to legalize public Sabbath desecration in downtown Jerusalem. Haredim, as predicted, responded with angry demonstrations. Many of these harked back to the violent anti-Sabbath-desecration demonstrations of the early 1950s in an area that became known as Sabbath Square (located right in the middle of Meah Shearim). These demonstrations had greatly increased Neturei Karta's status and influence in haredi society, and a recurrence of this phenomenon was widely expected. However, after a short period of haredi demonstrations in the city center that passed relatively quietly, downtown Jerusalem—only a few streets away from Meah Shearim and its haredi environs—became the site of public entertainment activity on Friday nights.

A detailed sociological explanation for this haredi "failure" is beyond the scope of this article. However, one major fact stood out during these demonstrations: the Badaẓ ensured that the protest did not degenerate into outright violence by placing young men in the crowd in order to separate more extremist zealot elements from the main group of demonstrators. Wall posters in the haredi community called upon the public to come out in force against the blatant desecration of the Sabbath in the center of the holy city but also warned against succumbing to the zealots' incitement to violence. The citation by the rabbis of the well-known midrash that "the strength of the worm Ya'akov [the Jewish people] resides solely in its mouth [that is, through the power of prayer]"[20] gave clear expression to haredi society's awareness of the dangers of violent religious zealotry and of the need to restrain it.

Some years earlier, the Badaz had played a similar role in restraining recurring mass demonstrations against Sabbath traffic on the Ramot road in Jerusalem. From that time, behind-the-scenes cooperation between the haredi leadership and the police increased, due to a mutual interest in compromise. The rabbinical court took it upon itself to ensure that violent elements among the haredi zealots would be isolated and controlled, while the police responded in low-key fashion to haredi demonstrators and tended to overlook their numerous infractions of the law, including stone-throwing, disruption of traffic, and damage to municipal property.

Given a number of dramatic changes in haredi society, such restraints and limits may well break down. Two important factors bear mentioning in this regard. First, because of the socioeconomic crisis in the haredi scholar-society, large segments of haredi youth are exposed to the Israeli "street." More and more young haredi men (and even women) totally drop out of, or remain only formally enrolled in, their educational institutions, thus becoming more exposed to the secular influences of Israeli society. Second, the manifestations of religio-ideological violence among Islamic extremists and Christian fundamentalists also provide models for conscious and unconscious emulation, some signs of which are already evident in the relatively large number of haredi youth attracted to the various Kahanist[21] movements.

The violence of extremist Jewish settlers on the West Bank provides another model for violent haredi zealotry. But perhaps even more significant is the greater suscepti-

bility to violence of newly religious haredim (*ba'alei teshuvah*) who have not yet internalized traditional haredi restraints upon zealotry and whose newfound religious enthusiasm often moves them to extremes. Furthermore, some newly religious haredim are former criminals. While the violence of some of these *ba'alei teshuvah* is a new and "foreign branch," it has nevertheless made serious inroads into haredi society. Indeed, the Tel Aviv brothel arsonist was himself a recent *ba'al teshuvah* (influenced by another recent *ba'al teshuvah*).

This violent crime must surely be a warning sign to the haredi leadership. The fact that they have not yet responded is worrisome—as is the fact that Moshe Sheinfeld has no apparent heir.

Notes

1. Moshe Sheinfeld, "Haalimut—Zemorat zar behinukhenu!" *Niv hamoreh* 41 (Sept.–Oct. 1972), 10–11.
2. Ibid.
3. "Golus" is the Ashkenazic pronunciation of the Hebew *galut*.
4. Ibid.; in characterizing children as guarantors of the future, Sheinfeld was referring to *Yalkut Shimoni* on Jer. 267.
5. On haredi underground movements during the 1950s, see Menachem Friedman, *Hahevrah haharedit: mekorot, megamot vetahalikhim* (Jerusalem: 1991), 65–66.
6. The Hazon Ish (Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz; 1878–1953) was considered the leading halakhic authority of his time (*gadol hador*); following his death, his influence in the haredi community became even more significant.
7. Sheinfeld, "Haalimut." On the *rodef*, or pursuer, see the discussion concerning Pinhas that appears later in this essay. According to the halakhah, one who endangers the Jewish collective is considered a "pursuer"; one may either kill him or turn him over to the (non-Jewish) authorities. See, for instance, Shulhan Arukh, *ḥoshen mishpat*, 425a. Following 1993, the term *rodef* was increasingly used by religious political opponents of the Oslo accords to deligitimate those in the government who supported and promoted the peace process—most notably Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who was assassinated in November 1995. The operative political implication of the concept of *din rodef* (the law regarding the pursuer) was to provide a religious justification for Rabin's assassination.
8. On "total institutions," see Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Structure of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (New York: 1961).
9. See Menachem Friedman, "The 'Family Community' Model in Haredi Society," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 14, *Coping with Life and Death: Jewish Families in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Peter Y. Medding (New York: 1998), 166–177, esp. 170. Yeshiva and *kolel* students, who by definition are meant to devote all of their time to their studies, are thereby exempted from supporting themselves or their families. In this sense, their lives are in limbo for the duration of their studies.
10. A copy of one such prayer book is in my possession.
11. *Der Yid*, 30 March 1984.
12. Ibid., 11 May 1984.
13. Cf. Isaiah 50:6.
14. Moshe Sheinfeld, "Haemet tehe ne'ederet," *Niv hamoreh* 49 (Sept.-Oct. 1974), 8–10.
15. See Menachem Friedman, "Religious Zealotry in Israeli Society," in *On Ethnic and Religious Diversity in Israel*, ed. Solomon Poll and Ernest Krausz (Ramat Gan: 1975), 91–111; Menachem Friedman, "Jewish Zealots: Conservative versus Innovative," in *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (New York: 1990), 127–142.

16. Sheinfeld, "Haalimut." In Jewish mystical literature, the *kelipah* refers to a class of demons.

17. More specifically, there have been protests against Sabbath traffic on major thoroughfares located in or near haredi neighborhoods (for example, the Ramot road and Bar Ilan St. in Jerusalem and Hashomer St. in Bnei Brak); movie theaters open on the Sabbath (for example, the Edison and Eden theaters in Jerusalem); swimming pools that were open on the Sabbath; and roads or buildings (for example, the French Hill intersection of highway no. 1 in Jerusalem and both the Holiday Inn and the Scottish Church in Tiberias), the plans for which had to be altered after graves were discovered.

18. The 'Edah Haḥaredit is the official name of the organized community of the extreme ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem, which, on religious grounds, denies the legitimacy of the state of Israel and its religious institutions. The Badaẓ functions as its religious court.

19. See, for example, Berakhot 20:1.

20. See *Midrash tanḥuma* on "beshalaḥ," 9.

21. A reference to extremist political movements related to the Kach movement founded by the late Meir Kahane.

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Essay

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Fighting for Palestine and Crimea: Two Jewish Friends from Philadelphia during the First World War and the 1920s

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Throughout the period of the Palestine Mandate, Gershon Agron promoted the Zionist pioneering ethos and became known as the preeminent English-language publicist working in the Yishuv, the Jewish community in Palestine.[1] Born in Europe in 1894, Agron and his family emigrated to the United States when he was 11. He later graduated from Temple University and regarded himself as an American "college man, more or less," as well as a member of Philadelphia's Jewish community. But Agron's Americanization never became complete.

In 1914, on the eve of his enrollment in college, Agron declared his intention to settle in Palestine in a remarkable letter addressed to Arthur Ruppin, the head of the Palestine office of the Zionist Organization in Jaffa.[2] Toward the end of the First World War, Agron made his way to Palestine and served in the Jewish Legion. He stayed in the country after his discharge, working as a public relations attaché with the Zionist Commission. Back in the United States from 1921 to 1924, he served under Jacob Landau as news editor in an innovative Jewish media project, the Jewish Correspondence Bureau (later, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency). He then returned to Palestine with his young family, settling there permanently.

Over the course of the Mandate period, Agron retained close ties with the American Zionist movement. He attended world Zionist conferences as a delegate for the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA); had a part-time position as a publicity agent for the American branch of the Palestine Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod); wrote columns for American Zionist publications; and, as a salaried official with the Zionist Executive, devoted a considerable share of his time to hosting American Jewish visitors in a semi-official capacity.

Agron's career was capped by two main achievements. He was the founder of the *Palestine Post* (later, the *Jerusalem Post*) and served as its editor until 1955, when he was elected mayor of Jerusalem. Shortly before his death in 1959, he energetically sponsored a number of municipal construction and cultural projects that were heralded by admirers such as historian Howard Morley Sachar.[3] Agron's mayoral term also provided a foretaste of bitter religious-secular disputes in Israel's capital; after

approving mixed swimming at the public pool in the city's German Colony, for example, he was bitterly opposed by some ultra-Orthodox groups, who carried caricatures of him in Nazi uniform in protest marches outside the gates of the White House.

From the outset, Agron led a comfortable life.[4] Even in his first years in Jerusalem, his family residence was among the city's finest. Once he became a journalist (thereby solving the occupational dilemma he had broached in his letter to Ruppin), Agron cultivated a bourgeois brand of idealism. Self-conscious about his success, he was careful not to contravene the spartan social norms of the Yishuv; until his death, he would declare ritualistically that he "owned nothing." In short, Agron maintained a steely Zionist veneer—which, during the 1920s, masked a good deal of anxiety and insecurity.

Notwithstanding the Balfour Declaration and the British conquest of Palestine, the Jewish national home-in-the-making did not attract much attention in the world's press. Agron's journalistic output throughout the 1920s consisted largely of failed attempts to have articles accepted by major news services such as the Associated Press. His main professional focus in this decade was the United States, and news editors there were loath to challenge the prevailing mood of isolationism. (Indeed, the contrast between Israel's current reputation as a media mecca and the near oblivion into which Agron was cast as a journalist-settler in the early Mandate years could not be greater.) Whenever the odd "newsworthy" event did occur, Agron was—or seemed to be—the only bona-fide English-language correspondent on the scene. When an earthquake dramatically convulsed the Holy Land in 1927, for instance, he was in such demand that he filed copy for a number of competing wire services under his wife's name, in this way circumventing an exclusivity arrangement he had worked out with the Hearst Universal Service.[5]

In Zionist terms, being a journalist was anything but novel. A remarkable proportion of Zionist leaders, including Theodor Herzl, Vladimir Zev Jabotinsky, and Ahad Ha'am, had started out as journalists; by the 1920s, "new" Yishuv leaders such as Berl Katznelson were rediscovering the utility of the print media.[6] As a middle-class admirer of the Labor movement, Agron's situation bore a strong resemblance to that of members of the *ḥugim ezraḥiyim* (literally, "civic sectors") that consolidated in the Yishuv during the Fourth Aliyah of 1924–1929; a parallel can be drawn, for instance, between Agron and a member of that aliyah, the Polish-born journalist Moshe Glickson, who became the editor of *Ha'aretz* in 1922.[7] What, then, apart from language, made this ambitious new immigrant from Philadelphia different from other Zionist publicists?

During the early Mandate period, daily discourse in the Yishuv tended to be directed inward. A fundamental precept of Zionist ideology, "negation of the diaspora" (*shelilat hagolah*), worked against the sort of public relations work Agron had in mind. Indeed, it could almost be said that Agron's ambitions worked in two directions. On the one hand, he aspired ardently to become part of a revolutionary Jewish community that utterly rejected the diaspora. On the other, he was acutely cognizant of the political imperative to present the Yishuv's case both to Jews and to Gentiles abroad. The challenge Agron faced in the formative period of his life—and his main innovation—was that of operating in different and often contradictory spheres.

Agron's role as a pro-Weizmann propagandist during the tempestuous rift with the

American Zionist leadership (headed by Louis D. Brandeis) at the start of the 1920s;[8] his private feelings of insecurity as a white-collar city dweller in a pioneering culture; his protracted and frustrating efforts to interest prestigious American wire services in his articles about the Jewish national home—all complicated Agron's bid to find his place in the Yishuv of the 1920s. However, the most poignant and dramatic demonstration of the challenges and dilemmas he faced is afforded by an account of a lasting friendship Agron had with another activist journalist from Philadelphia, Louis Fischer. An entire spectrum of Jewish politics is encapsulated in this friendship—which, among other things, mapped the ultimate limits of Jewish political destiny in the buoyant period that preceded the rise of Hitler.

With extravagant flair, Louis Fischer (1896–1970) showed how far journalism and idealism might propel a Philadelphia Jew. Fischer surrendered himself entirely to the flow of history: an autobiography he published in 1941 has far more to say about the tragic events in Germany and the Soviet Union than about his own life.[9] Political crisis, turnabout, and recovery characterized his career after the 1920s. After embracing Soviet Communism, Fischer disavowed it in a series of confessional tracts designed to mobilize Cold War opposition to Russia.[10] For a time he venerated Mahatma Gandhi as a nonviolent alternative to the Soviet antimaterialist "god that failed." There were also a number of grand interludes—among other bold strokes, Fischer was the first American volunteer in the anti-Franco International Brigade during the Spanish civil war.[11] In the late 1950s, as Agron concluded his term as Jerusalem mayor, Fischer was residing not far from his childhood home, a member of the Institute of Advanced Studies in Princeton.

Whereas Agron's achievements followed an unswerving political course, Fischer's trajectory in life was anything but straight. Nonetheless, at the end of the 1920s, the two friends stood out as equally accredited hosts and spokesmen for two ideological systems that seemed to be alternatives to an American system battered by the start of the Great Depression. Fischer's autobiography depicts the role he played as ideological chaperone to a cadre of VIPs who came to the Soviet Union to fawn over the first Five Year Plan. "For thousands of intellectuals and intelligent people a trip to Russia had become a compulsory summer course with credit," Fischer recalled. For the revolution (and for pay), he guided Will Rogers, Theodore Dreiser, Paul Robeson, John Dewey, George Bernard Shaw, Harold Laski, and many others through Soviet Russia.[12] And at that moment, when the pull of Soviet Marxism was most potent, Agron was operating as a one-man welcoming committee for American Zionists visiting in Palestine. Just before the Jewish national home was jolted badly by the riots of 1929, Agron was overwhelmed by requests to show the Holy Land to Zionist donors and to prominent American Jews.[13]

Separated by a continent and thousands of miles from Philadelphia, the two men corresponded throughout the 1920s. Their letters offer a compelling portrait of itinerant American Jewish idealism after the First World War. After becoming friends as young adults in Philadelphia, Fischer and Agron found common cause, during the First World War, in the Jewish Legion promoted by Jabotinsky. Their paths parted during the debate in the mid-1920s over American funding for Jewish colonization in Crimea. Notwithstanding, their correspondence continued: a dialogue in which dilemmas in modern Jewish politics were distilled, personalized, contested creatively,

and reconstructed for the public at large. Indeed, Fischer and Agron's unfinished business, grudging accommodations, and outright clashes reflect broader trends and unresolved issues in Jewish historical research.

In theory, the Jewish Legion should never have come to the United States; Jabotinsky, who fought for the idea, centered his lobbying campaign in Britain. His efforts, however, met with upstairs-downstairs opposition in the Jewish community. Upper-class assimilated Jews reacted with horror to Jabotinsky's idea of marshaling Jewish energy in a semi-autonomous framework, fearing that it would raise issues of political loyalty.[14] No less exasperating, potential lower-class recruits from Whitechapel—the immigrant Jewish tailors from Russia, the so-called "schneiders"—remained stubbornly insulated from the atmosphere of mass mobilization and patriotism around them and recoiled from the prospect of fighting for a force allied to the hated tsar.[15] Pelted with eggs and tomatoes by the recalcitrant tailors at Legion enlistment rallies held in the fall of 1916, Jabotinsky persevered, eventually persuading Chaim Weizmann to embrace the Legion and incorporate it into his Balfour Declaration diplomacy. During August and September of 1917, Weizmann threatened to resign from the English Zionist Federation whenever the Legion plan stood in danger of being rejected.[16]

How did the Jewish Legion campaign cross the ocean and come to fire the imagination of young American Jews such as Agron and Fischer? Here the key intermediary was Pinchas Rutenberg, who in future Mandatory years would become the Yishuv's leading industrialist, the head of a major electric power plant at Naharayim. Agitating for the idea in the United States from May 1915 to February 1917, Rutenberg headed the American flank of the proposed Legion. But he then became sidetracked, choosing to focus his energies on the formation of what eventually became the American Jewish Congress. With the outbreak of revolution in Russia, Rutenberg again changed his tack, attaining privileged passage rights to sail back to his home country and thus abruptly terminating his Legion work.[17]

Rutenberg's inconstancy as a founding patron and recruiter for the Jewish Legion contrasts with Jabotinsky's persistent allegiance to the idea. Indeed, Rutenberg exemplified the Jewish political dilemma of his time as he vacillated between his newfound, particularist enthusiasm for Jewish nationalism and revolutionary activity in Russia. His internal conflict portended the debate between the two Philadelphia Jews, Agron and Fischer.

Rutenberg had developed the Legion's case in a pamphlet he published after being converted to Zionism in 1915. (He had attended a public meeting in New York at which leading Poale Zion figures, including David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, had appeared.) In Rutenberg's view, the willingness of Jews to take part in the fighting in Palestine would furnish irrefutable testimony of Zionist resolve to reclaim the Holy Land. In a wartime atmosphere of patriotism and upheaval, this was the appeal that must have fired the emotions of young Zionist idealists such as Gershon Agron.

In "Survey of the Jewish Battalions," sponsored by the Zionist Commission on Palestine in the spring of 1919,[18] Agron lavishly recollected American Jewish enthusiasm for the Legion after the United States had entered the war and the British recruiting mission had organized depots in numerous U.S. locales. American Jews,

Agron recounted, had come "flocking from all corners of the land," "fresh from the University or the sweat shop," to enlist in the Legion. Agron noted a process of effective, rapid ideological preparation, and he underscored the Zionist motivation of each recruit: "There had been inculcated in him during weeks before enlistment the spirit of sacrifice, selflessness and love for a country he had not seen."[19]

A year earlier, Agron, Fischer, and Joseph and Moses Brainin (sons of the prolific Hebrew and Yiddish writer Reuben Brainin) had traveled from New York to Canada and then to England with a third wave of recruits in April 1918. Agron served as corporal and sergeant in training camps at Windsor and Plymouth.[20] Contemporary accounts suggest that he was hand-picked from the beginning to serve as the spokesman for the American Jews in the Legion. His progress in the Legion was watched carefully by key figures in the ZOA establishment such as Brandeis' Zionist deputy, Jacob De Haas, while the head of the ZOA public relations outfit, A.H. Fromenson, waited impatiently for Agron's military dispatches to begin arriving from the front in Palestine.[21]

While in England, Agron rubbed shoulders with distinguished Zionist leaders and philosemites. His mood soared. He believed that American Zionists would arrive en masse to Palestine, whether to provide material assistance to the Yishuv or to help fight for its freedom. A tone of ebullience pervaded Agron's pronouncements in the summer of 1918. At one event, held at the London Opera House, he shared the rostrum with Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, Sir Alfred Mond, and Nachum Sokolov. In his address, Agron alluded to the Hadassah-sponsored American Zionist Medical Unit (which had arrived more or less simultaneously with the Legion in Palestine), averring that it was "more than coincidence" that had assembled American Jewish fighters and healers for work in the Holy Land. American Zionism, he declared, was doing its share in "the great process of Jewish regeneration."[22]

By Agron's reckoning, the 3,800 recruits from the United States and Canada accounted for more than half of the fighters in the Jewish Legion. His report contains a fascinating, if idealized, depiction of sociological processes that evolved in this milestone military adventure. Among other things, Agron stressed the ways in which highly motivated Jews from North America and the Yishuv adjusted to the largely apathetic recruits from England (some 1,600 in number), and the complications in kashruth observance that arose from the mingling of traditional Yemenite Jews, Americanized Jews, and non-Jewish officers such as the Legion commander, John H. Patterson.[23] Agron also noted that the Palestine campaign had exerted a salubrious influence on a number of New York Jewish underworld types who somehow found themselves in the Legion.[24]

Left almost unmentioned was the fact that, for many Jews who had been recruited amid great fanfare in the United States, the Legion turned out to be a terrible letdown. Agron did offer a passing contrast between the English Fusiliers (who marched victoriously with General Edmund Allenby in areas conquered in biblical times by Joshua) and the American Zionists who were left to languish in the scorching Tel El-Kabir desert. There was "something radically wrong with this fate," Agron reflected. However, as an astute propagandist (soon to become Weizmann's stalwart supporter), he did not pursue this line of thought. Rather, his conclusion was that a "series of lamentable accidents" had compelled Britain to keep the Jewish Le-

gionnaires mired in the sands of Egypt. With the Mandate's formal approval still pending, such special pleading on behalf of the British may have been politic. Nonetheless, "now that I see the report in print it is not to my liking," Agron confessed to a friend in the summer of 1919.[25]

An American Jew casts aside the opportunities of the New World to fight for Jewish survival and national rebirth in the ancient Holy Land. This is an arresting image, and Agron—shrewdly cognizant of the power of Zionist symbols—was reluctant to let it go to waste. As the Legion demobilized, and as settlement-employment programs offered by the Zionist Commission on Palestine proved to be meager and unsatisfactory,[26] Agron had a premonition that a historic chance to cultivate a new model of American Jewish idealism was being squandered. In his otherwise laudatory report, Agron did include one notable outburst:

> When these men go, there will go the finest lot of hardy, willing and disciplined workers that have ever come to Palestine, and the shattered hopes of hundreds of youths who came to fight for the land, and, granted life, to live in it. With them will also go the hopes of thousands of Jewish souls who regarded the legionnaires as their personal envoys to Palestine.[27]

Here is the place to point out that, although Agron was the main author of the "Survey of the Jewish Battalions," the report contained an appendix written by Fischer. The tone of this appendix was quite different from that of the main text, in accordance with the two men's differing personal and professional styles. Where Agron used propaganda, Fischer opted for candor. His account stressed the "grievances, difficulties and disappointments" in the Legion, and he refused to romanticize any aspects of the experience—rebutting, among other things, Agron's contention that a basis of the recruitment was genuine Zionist motivation (according to Fischer, Legion recruiting in America "was either hysterical, or the result of hysterical propaganda").[28] In the same private note where he acknowledged the report's shortcomings, Agron admitted that his friend's concise appendix was its best-turned part. Indeed, despite the political differences that developed between them, Agron never ceased to admire Fischer's unflinching journalistic honesty.

In the summer of 1919, Agron lobbied with Zionist authorities in Palestine to arrange a job for Fischer. Knowing his friend's free-spirited disposition, Agron realized it was unlikely that Fischer would accept a conventional publicity job with the Zionist Commission. Nonetheless, Agron attested solemnly to Fischer's "remarkable honesty" as a writer and to the "noteworthy organizing ability" he had shown in the Pennsylvania branch of the American Zionist movement. Fischer, a former schoolteacher, had "gotten hold of Hebrew in a way which puzzles most Palestinians," Agron swore, and he added that Fischer was as determined as he was to remain in Palestine.[29]

Although Fischer ultimately rejected Zionism and other nationalisms, he remained in Palestine for 15 months following his demobilization. He worked hard, and true to Agron's attestations, he showed unusual cultural facility. Exploring the new communal settlements in Palestine, Fischer acclimated in a few months' time to a frontier pioneering lifestyle that would always remain frustratingly foreign to Agron.

Upon his return to the United States, Fischer wrote two detailed reports on labor

Zionism that exhibited considerable expertise (and residual enthusiasm).[30] In the first, "Cooperation in Palestine," Fischer counted 40 cooperatives in Palestine that were being worked by 1,300 socialist pioneers. He analyzed the ideological principles underpinning the new socialist cooperatives, siding in the end with the individualist model sponsored by a talented, American-trained agriculturist, Eliezer Jaffe.[31] The second report, "Cooperative Consumption in Palestine," described a key apparatus in the evolving labor Zionist framework, the Hamashbir consumers' cooperative. Fischer thought that Hamashbir was a promising start in an effort to "check the advance, or at least circumvent the comfort, of private enterprise in Palestine."[32]

How is the legacy of the Jewish Legion to be adduced in Fischer's case? His own published answer was to deny any influence. Fischer's memoir stressed the inanity of the British command and contended that defense needs of Jewish settlers were met only when the British-controlled Legion was circumvented. In one colorful anecdote ("a young settler named Shor was killed at my feet, while Arab bullets whistled all around"), Fischer writes that he managed to take part in the defense of Tel Hai and Kfar Giladi by going AWOL from the Legion for two weeks.[33] The truth, however, seems to have been more complicated. In the mid-1920s, at a time when Fischer frequently wrote to Agron from Moscow, he offered a somewhat more nuanced appraisal. In one letter, written in October 1925, he indicated two reasons for feeling alienated from the Legion: his contempt for the degrading colonial attitudes of Europeans in the Middle East, and his own character as a rebel who needed to be "unconstrained by any bonds." Summing up his Legion memories, Fischer conceded that "it was not altogether bad."[34]

For Fischer, as for Agron, the campaign in Palestine was a release from the ideological and emotional constraints of Philadelphia's Jewish community. Despite some incipient misgivings about nationalism, Fischer had not abandoned his romantic belief in grand causes by the time he left Palestine; on the contrary, the Yishuv's collective structures served as eye-opening paradigms for what he would seek elsewhere. Fischer was also no pacifist at this point, nor for many years thereafter. During the following decade, as noted, he would once again take up arms, this time to fight Fascism in Spain.

Their common experience as Jewish legionnaires sealed the link between the two men. Although their military stint had many demoralizing aspects, Fischer, Agron, and a few other American friends emerged from it with renewed idealism. This was their ideological and personal training ground. Agron learned to coexist with military discipline and with the British empire, realizing that these two forces would have to be co-opted for his own (and for Zionist) ends. Fischer, for his part, learned to hate both.

For a few years in the early 1920s, both Fischer and Agron were based in the United States and working for the Jewish Correspondence Bureau/Jewish Telegraphic Agency (both names were then in use). Fischer had a high time in the Roaring Twenties. In early 1922, for example, he boasted to his friend about his exploits at parties in New York and Philadelphia: "They taught me how to dance, and the consensus was that I am an apt pupil."[35] However, restless and idealistic as always, Fischer could not subsist on jazz and flappers alone. In a letter to Agron dated March

22, 1922, he announced his intention to travel to Europe in order to complete a book whose thesis was that the Great Powers' hunger for oil was a prime determinant of their militaristic behavior.[36] Finding himself unwelcome in London because of his reputation as a Jewish radical ("Scotland Yard doesn't like my complexion," he quipped), Fischer wound up in Berlin, where he was in a position to witness the absurd and ominous results of the vicious postwar cycle of reparation payments and loans institutionalized under the Dawes Plan.[37]

Over time, Fischer's Jewish identification began to wane. Back in March 1922, he had described hobnobbing with leading German Jewish stewards in America—"Marshall, Warburg and that crowd"—at private luncheons in Philadelphia and New York. Fischer had been invited to these affairs as a Jewish colonization expert. He was expected to give testimony about the collaborative work of the American Joint Distribution Committee and the American Relief Administration in Soviet Russia—efforts that would soon crystallize as the Agro-Joint program for Jewish colonization in the Crimea and Ukraine. In late 1922, Fischer wrote to Agron about his ideological disagreements with the world Zionist establishment. Criticizing statements made by Leonard Stein (the political secretary of the Zionist Organization) in defense of the French colonial regime in Syria, Fischer warned against the dismissive Zionist attitude toward Arab nationalism. Soon afterwards he was in Russia, clearly thrilled by the progress of the revolution ("It's very interesting here—I see much, I am learning a great deal not only about Russia but also about life"). The announcement of his resignation from the Jewish Correspondence Bureau, as will be seen, was a particularly pointed indication of Fischer's growing emotional, political, and professional distance from Jewish affairs. Awkwardly, he tried his hand at theology and philosophy, hoping that Agron would find a publisher for a droll disquisition he had written on the subject of how conceptions of God became increasingly abstract in the course of mankind's cultural progress.[38]

Fischer's fixation with the Bolshevik revolution hampered his working relationship with Agron. Although dependent on his friend's American connections in order to publish some of his articles, Fischer never trusted Agron's treatment of his copy. His suspicions had some basis: Agron had demonstrated his distaste for Bolshevism as early as the pair's Legion days. In late 1919, an article in the London *Times* had alleged that Bolshevism was a Jewish plot. Agron countered with a letter written to the London *Jewish Chronicle*, in which he rebutted the accusation by turning to the perennial question of Jewish politics ("Is it good for the Jews?"). His answer was that Bolshevism manifestly was not, since, among other things, "Jewish schools have been closed, the Hebrew language suppressed, Jewish leaders imprisoned. . . ."[39] Now, four years later, Fischer was infuriated by Agron's handling of his reports to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, suspecting that his friend was inclined to highlight their Jewish content and downplay any positive coverage of the revolution.

When Agron embellished copy sent from Moscow in May 1923 with a report about a "rabbinical conference" in the Soviet city, Fisher fumed. He charged that Agron was naive about the delicacy of his situation, and that the new agency's nationalist Jewish slant could easily backfire: "Yevseks [members of the Jewish section of the Communist party] see it and say, aha, Fischer is well informed, there was a conference if he says so; that is illegal, the rabbis are criminals." Undeterred, Agron went on to doc-

tor Fischer's account of the trial of a Moscow rabbi named Schneerson, inserting an observation to the effect that the defendant's testimony had inspired listeners in the courtroom. Actually, Fischer had wired that the rabbi's remarks had been inaudible. "I do wonder what your standards of journalism [are]," Fischer fired back on May 21, 1923, and announced his resignation from the Jewish news agency.[40]

On July 4 of that year, Fischer dispatched a declaration of expatriate independence to his friend. The radical who had once worn a Jewish army uniform now swore that "I wear Russian blouses only." For weeks, Fischer wrote, he had been bedridden, mortally afraid that he had tuberculosis. Now he was celebrating his recovery by devouring the Soviet press. In Fischer's febrile mind, his recuperation was a metaphor for the country's improved industrial conditions as a result of the New Economic Plan. The cultural overachiever now confessed to his Zionist peer that "when I rehearse Hebrew in my mind, I lose myself in Russian."[41]

One refrain in this continuing correspondence was Fischer's insistence that all "serious" journalism had to follow his own model of self-sacrifice and unadulterated commitment. Lurking behind the affectionate prefaces and cheerful digressions in Fischer's letters was the hurtful accusation that Agron was an intellectually dishonest propagandist. Agron appears to have respected his friend's ascetic idealism; certainly he never countered that Fischer's own reporting was hardly devoid of political bias. Then, too, it was never entirely clear whether Fischer's main criticism concerned politics or professional purity. Was Agron too Zionist, or was the problem that he wrote for money? Sometimes it appeared that the answer was both. "This is just the time," Fischer chided Agron in a letter of December 1922, "to drop your [Zionist] office connections and become a pure journalist. . . . If you work hard and become a grind machine you will produce a few articles that will be a credit to you, even if they don't bring much financially."[42]

Such criticism can be regarded as a bit of ideological skirmishing on Fischer's part. But as the months went by, a much more serious clash began to develop. At issue was Tel Hai—but not the Upper Galilee settlement whose battle Fischer claimed to have fought, and about which Agron had written in his role as press officer for the Zionist Commission.[43] Five years after that battle, Fischer made a pilgrimage to a different Tel Hai, this one a Jewish colony in the Soviet Crimea, funded in part by the Agro-Joint Crimea venture.

Historians today agree that the Joint's involvement in the Crimean project was a pivotal moment in American Jewish history, although they differ about the exact character and legacy of this episode. The project's time frame spanned roughly a decade, Stalin's compulsory collectivization program bringing it to an inglorious end in 1933. During this period, the Joint funneled some $16 million into Jewish colonies in the Crimea. How were Zionists to view this massive infusion of American Jewish capital into a colonization project outside of Palestine? According to Henry Feingold, the Agro-Joint Crimea project taught Zionists the importance of recruiting wealthy non-Zionist donors for Palestine projects—in fact, he implies, the campaign to include non-Zionists in the expanded Jewish Agency was prompted by the Agro-Joint project.[44] Yigal Elam, the Jewish Agency historian, argues just the opposite.[45] He also notes that "the Joint involvement in the Jewish enterprise in Crimea developed virtually without premeditation," a claim supported by Yehuda Bauer.[46] Assuming this

to be true, the reports filed by Fischer really did matter, as "uptown" American Jews proved not only attentive, but willing to assist.

The Fischer-Agron correspondence on Crimea opens a window onto the evolving identities of two articulate and politicized American Jews whose ideological positions both solidified and diverged during the 1920s. Fischer, as noted, first visited the Crimean Tel Hai in early 1925, accompanied by a field-worker agronomist named Joseph Rosen.[47] "I had to speak to [the colonists] for half an hour about the events preceding the death of Trumpeldor," he wrote to Agron. "My Hebrew is weaker than it was but I can still express myself rather waterly." In addition, he reported, he had "milked" their friend Bernard Richards (of the American Jewish Congress) for a $100 advance on a report he was preparing about the Soviet colonization projects for Jews.[48] However modest, it was a fateful sum, since later that year, American Jewish Committee leader Louis Marshall not only utilized the report to help justify the Joint's support for the Crimean venture, but donated $100,000 of his own money.

In this report, titled "Soil Movement of the Jews in Soviet Russia," Fischer described how 20,000 Jewish families had "indicated their desires of settling in agricultural colonies in Russia" for a combination of economic, political, and cultural reasons. Jewish merchants, he explained, lived in "constant fear of economic extermination," anticipating that private trade liberalism would soon be repealed. The Jews were also eager to disprove antisemitic innuendo; they were "tired of being considered pariahs and parasites." With one pragmatic stroke, moving from "city to steppe," they became liberated from the fear of the "tax inspector" and "joined the honored caste of those who vote and rule in Russia." Nonetheless, Fischer acknowledged, Crimea was not the Jews' first choice. A majority would emigrate to the United States if that were possible, and "any number of them say that they would like to go to Palestine."[49] Since these options had been blocked by U.S. and British immigration restrictions, Crimea had become the preferred alternative. By September 1923, some 1,900 Jewish families were settled in Crimean and Ukrainian colonies; 20 new settlements had sprouted by the first half of 1924; and by 1925, there were, according to Fischer, four self-proclaimed Zionist "halutz" colonies.[50]

Fischer may have been the only contemporary journalist intimately acquainted with Jewish collective settlements in both Palestine and Crimea. As such, his comparative remarks carried considerable weight. Somewhat surprisingly, the radical journalist (dressed, as will be recalled in "Russian blouses only") came out, on balance, in favor of the Yishuv settlers. Fischer wrote that the Soviet Jewish pioneers were "inferior in caliber to the workingmen in Palestinian kvutzoth." He was particularly hard on the women, declaring that it would take several years for them to become "good material" for Palestine. At the same time, Fischer believed that Jewish socialism in Palestine was being badly compromised by Zionist policy on the Arab question. His critique of Zionism was implied in observations such as the following: "Elsewhere, Jewish settlers can hire cheap labor to do [their] work, but in Russia a Jewish colonist becomes a peasant immediately in touch with the soil."[51]

For a while, Fischer conducted himself as a globetrotting expert on Jewish colonization. In May 1925, for example, he wrote to Agron from Berlin, informing him that he was trying to line up a commission for a "parallel" report on communal pro-

jects in Palestine.[52] Agron, for his part, was not initially disposed to adopt an either/or policy on Jewish agricultural settlement. His work for the Jewish Telegraphic Agency had been eclectic, devoted to the well-being of Jewish communities around the globe. Agron was also perspicacious when it came to antisemitism, and he understood that Jewish settlement programs could in theory run in tandem with Zionism. His open-mindedness on the subject is indicated by the flattering coverage he gave to a visit to New York by the territorialist Anglo-Jewish playwright, Israel Zangwill, in 1923.[53]

In the summer of 1925, Agron participated in the Zionist Congress in Vienna, which turned out to be an exasperating experience—so much so, that he even contemplated resigning from the Zionist organizational positions he had so arduously courted. Relief from such burdens came during a stopover at Fischer's bohemian Berlin apartment, which teemed with infants and "excess non-family members." Fischer's wife, Markooshka, received Agron affectionately.[54] During the visit, Fischer sought to exploit Agron's weakened Zionist resolve. He probed lightly at first, knowing that there was little chance of severing Agron from his deep ideological commitments. In later correspondence, however, he became more blunt. He urged Agron to forgo his work for the Zionist bureaucracy in Jerusalem in favor of a genuine halutz lifestyle, saying, "I really think you must quit being an imported official, and become a citizen of the country." There were other reproving remarks about Agron's materialism, including an unkind cut at Agron's wife, Ethel. "Tell Ethel," Fischer advised his friend, "she mustn't be a 17th Street lady in Jerusalem."[55]

Toward the end of 1925, Fischer's report on the Crimea project came under attack from American Jewish Congress leader Stephen Wise, who claimed that the pro-Soviet journalist had been guilty of bias. Agron wrote sympathetically to his friend, saying that Wise was being disingenuous, since Fischer's views were known to all when the report was first commissioned.[56] But when Fischer took on Ludwig Lewisohn, a pro-Zionist and anti-Soviet polemicist at the prestigious liberal publication *The Nation*, Agron stopped being sympathetic. Lewisohn had referred to Soviet "subsidized murder," a statement that the infuriated Fischer intended to rebut. Agron was dismayed at the prospect of a vitriolic public debate. "If you are attacking the Zionists," Agron wrote to Fischer after receiving a draft of Fischer's proposed letter, "I hope that it will never be published. . . . In this particular case it would appear that you went out of your way to break with Zionism."[57]

Fischer, however, refused to relent, and a piece he published some time later in *The Menorah* got Agron angry enough to respond, in a letter of September 1926: "You can go to hell."[58] It is unlikely that Agron had access to more reliable information than did Fischer about the Crimea settlement project, but his tone was certainly confident as he accused Fischer of "swallowing all the lies, hook, bait and fish, dished up by Rosen." Although he insisted that their friendship transcended political differences ("Of course you will think that this is all my Zionist bias, but my Zionist bias affects no more my personal attitude to you than does your pro-Bolshevik bias affect yours to me"), Agron seemed in this letter to be indicating a parting of ways. Far from apologizing for his comfortable, urban version of Zionist pioneering, he now seemed to be reveling in it. He wrote, for example, about his "big Arabic house" with its "gor-

geous arched ceilings and doors which are the envy and despair of all Jerusalem." One of the rooms in his new house, he noted pointedly, was larger than "our big room" in the old 17th St. dwelling.[59]

As it happened, Fischer had written an equally fiery letter that crossed Agron's in transit. Fischer's main target of attack was what he viewed as Zionist double-dealing and bigotry. "You and all the Zionists don't want to believe that this [Crimea] movement can succeed, and therefore you don't—that's the upshot of it all," Fischer wrote. "Everybody who sees the Crimea colonies, Jews and non-Jews, Zionists and non-Zionists, are won by them." But the Zionists, he charged, were deliberately suppressing information about the project. He described how a mutual friend, Joe Brainin, had visited the Crimean colonies and had been impressed. Later, however, Brainin had received a wire from two American Zionist leaders, Wise and Louis Lipsky, who urged him to quell his enthusiasm for the project. "This is the love of truth," Fischer noted sarcastically.[60]

At this juncture, the competing claims of the internationalist Soviet revolution and the Jewish national rebirth in Palestine were becoming mutually exclusive. Agron and Fischer's falling out illustrates this fragmentation in Jewish politics, as ideology came to disrupt their longtime friendship. Both Agron and Fischer were strong-willed men who had chosen to live in dynamic settings where new forms of society were to be built; both believed that their instincts and commitments as journalists would shield them from dogmatic tendencies to which ideological movements are prone. In this they were mistaken. As the Crimea debate illustrates, both Agron and Fischer had become firmly entrenched in opposing causes, which they defended with doctrinaire zeal.

Although the friendship between Agron and Fischer continued, their correspondence clearly displays Fischer's continuing lack of patience for Agron's professional role as a Zionist publicist. Agron, he contended time and again, was little more than a propagandist. Indeed, in his autobiography of 1941, Fischer drew a provocative analogy between the two "G.A.'s," as he called them: Gershon Agronsky, the founder of the *Palestine Post*, and George Antonious, the foremost historian of Arab Palestinian nationalism, who, as a correspondent for the Crane Foundation, expressed official Arab views.[61]

While clever, Fischer's analogy is a bit off the mark. Historically, a major motivation of Zionists has been the rebutting of allegations of Jewish abnormality; a good deal of Zionist activity is related to the attempt to mold a more positive image of Jews in the public mind. Classifying Zionists as propagandists is thus something of a tautology. Moreover, one could just as easily characterize Zionists as remedial workers. Certainly in the 1920s, this is how many of them saw themselves. For instance, Agron's counterparts in Hadassah (the most vibrant American Zionist submovement during this period) proposed to "heal" the Jewish people by running first-rate clinics and hospitals in the Yishuv. Beyond making the somewhat insipid point that there is nothing invidious about propaganda per se, it may be noted that Agron's chosen calling as a public relations pioneer offered an equally plausible response to the prevailing perception of Jewish abnormality. In key ways, it was even less pretentious and

less deferential: whereas the Hadassah healing approach presumed that there was something wrong with the Yishuv, Agron's publicity work did not.

A zealous Zionist, Agron rarely flinched. But during the 1920s, he was constantly taunted, and occasionally knocked off keel, in his relations with Fischer. As has been seen, the issue between them was not always politics—just as frequently, it concerned lifestyles and professional integrity. Fischer took more chances. He displayed extreme idealism and had bohemian habits combined with professional perfectionism. He spent much of the decade sick, broke, estranged from capitalist editors, and separated from his wife and two children. Agron, in contrast, cultivated a steady, workmanlike professional style and minimized risks. To the extent that he felt compromised and uncreative during the 1920s, it was most often connected with Fischer's admonitions.[62]

Agron's relatively restrained idealism had some advantages, however. As his peripatetic comrade fought too many lost battles while searching for the one good fight, the more conservative Agron stayed put in Jerusalem. At the end of the decade, riots flared in Palestine, while the Soviet experiment continued to be in vogue: the ways in which history would vindicate Zionism and reject Soviet Communism were not yet readily anticipated. Poignantly isolated by his rejection of charismatic and purist models, Agron is to be credited for standing his ground.

Notes

1. Published biographical work on Agron is not comprehensive. Some of his writings appear in Serayah Shapira (ed.), *Asir haneemanut* (Tel Aviv: 1964). See also Howard Morley Sachar, *Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel* (New York: 1961), 39–70. Agron is a shortened version of the name Agronsky. Agron's nephew, Martin, once the host of a well-known U.S. television news discussion program, used the original version of his surname.

2. Central Zionist Archives (CZA) A209/12. In his letter, Agron asked which type of college training would be preferable: engineering or agriculture. Ruppin's reply was evasive and cool.

3. See Sachar, *Aliyah*, 66–67.

4. Meir Ronen, a veteran *Jerusalem Post* writer who knew Agron, testifies that by the 1920s, "Agron was highly successful as a journalist. . . . His income was considerable." See *Jerusalem Post*, 5 June 1992.

5. CZA, A209/16.

6. See Anita Shapira, *Berl Katznelson*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: 1983), 241–269.

7. See Dan Giladi, *Hayishuv bitkufat ha'aliyah harevi'it (1924–1929): beḥinah kalkalit ufolitit* (Tel Aviv: 1973); Yigal Drori, *Bein yemin lismol: "haḥugim haezraḥiyim" bishnot ha'esrim* (Tel Aviv: 1990).

8. The Brandeis group, representing mostly Americans of Central European origin, differed with Chaim Weizmann on a number of fundamental issues (they believed, for example, that the Zionist movement had to focus its efforts on specific development projects in Palestine, whereas those supporting Weizmann were sympathetic to a broader conception of Jewish nationalism). Tensions between the two camps simmered for years and finally led to a confrontation in 1921, at which time the Brandeis group relinquished its leadership of the American Zionist movement. A number of works have been written on the Brandeis-Weizmann rift. See, for instance, Ben Halpern, *A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann and American Zionism* (New York: 1987) and Yonatan Shapiro, *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization* (Urbana: 1971).

9. See Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics: An Autobiography* (London: 1941).

10. See Richard Crossman (ed.), *The God that Failed* (New York: 1949).

11. Fischer's break with the Soviet Union dates from the Spanish civil war, during which he witnessed the vicious opportunism of Stalin's foreign policy.

12. See Fischer, *Men and Politics*, 182–196.

13. Agron's archive file is replete with requests for his services as a tour guide and liaison for middle- and high-ranking donors and VIPs. In the first three months of 1928, for instance, American Zionist leaders such as Louis Lipsky asked Agron to chaperone United Palestine Appeal guests from Reading, Staten Island, Boro Park, Providence, St. Paul, Buffalo, and elsewhere. See CZA, A209/16.

14. In fact, because of such fears, the name of the Jewish Legion was changed to that of the Royal Fusiliers. See Elias Gilner, *War and Hope: A History of the Jewish Legion* (New York: 1969), 107–113.

15. Yigal Elam writes that "Jabotinsky found it inconvenient to acknowledge . . . that Jewish Whitechapel was furious." See his book *Hagedudim ha'ivriyim bemilḥemet ha'olam harishonah* (Tel Aviv: 1973), 111–112. According to Jabotinsky, the schneiders had been agitated by Bolshevik ruffians who took orders from G.V. Chicherin. See Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Story of the Jewish Legion* (New York: 1945), 77. Interestingly, Fischer later came to know Chicherin; his wife was employed as Chicherin's secretary, and Chicherin provided him with information that was indispensable to Fischer's work on early Soviet foreign policy.

16. See Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (London: 1961), 486–501.

17. Rutenberg served as the commisar for public order in the Keremsky provisional government, and is sometimes reported as having urged his boss to hang Trotsky and Lenin. On Rutenberg, see the essay by Theodore H. Friedgut in this volume, esp. 53–55.

18. Set up by the British in the wake of the Balfour Declaration, the Zionist Commission was meant to act as a mediating body between the Yishuv and the British military government. It was also mandated to supervise welfare distributions and to collect data pertinent to future Jewish settlement. See Hagit Lavski, *Yesodot hatakẓiv lamif'al haẓiyoni: va'ad haẓirim 1918–1921* (Jerusalem: 1980).

19. "Survey of the Jewish Battalions," CZA, A209/1B.

20. See Roman Freulich, *Soldiers in Judea: Stories and Vignettes of the Jewish Legion* (New York: 1964), 34–35.

21. CZA, A209/1B.

22. Ibid., A216/54.

23. Patterson, an Irish Protestant, had made a name for himself before the war as a lion-killer. For his Legion account, see Patterson, *With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign* (London: 1922).

24. Ironically, the exploits of these "famous 14" New York gangsters are one of the few items from the American Jewish Legion experience that have remained in the Zionist collective memory. Elam's study contains a colorful recollection ("punches for them were like *minḥah* prayers for the observant Jew"). See Elam, *Hagedudim ha'ivriyim bemilḥemet ha'olam harishonah*, 289. See also a recent memoir by Hayim Be'er, *Havalim* (Tel Aviv: 1998), 89.

25. CZA, A209/12.

26. On the settlement-employment programs, see Joseph Glass, "Yahadut araẓot habrit vekanada beereẓ yisrael: hityashvut veyozmah lefituaḥ hanof hayishuvi bemaḥaẓit harishonah shel tekufat hashilton habriti" (Ph.D. diss., The Hebrew University, 1995).

27. "Survey of the Jewish Battalions," CZA, A209/1B.

28. Ibid.

29. CZA, A209/12.

30. Both reports are found in CZA, A209/134.

31. Jaffe called for the establishment of new "moshav" villages, comprising some 50 settlers on nationalized plots of land, with a small farm allotted to each family. The individualism afforded by this plan appealed to the socialist Philadelphian. For more background on Jaffe, see Margalit Shilo, "Niẓanei ra'yon 'haikar haẓair': hakevuẓah haamerikait ba'aliyah hasheniyah," *Cathedra* 26 (1982), 79–99.

32. CZA, A209/134.
33. Fischer, *Men and Politics*, 230–232.
34. CZA, A209/14. Agron had recently visited Port Said, which for Fischer brought back memories of their first sight of Egypt during the war: "little Gypos diving for money thrown by the 'gentlemen' on the decks" (ibid.)
35. CZA, A209/1A.
36. The book, intriguing if a bit overstated, came out a few years later. See Louis Fischer, *Oil Imperialism* (New York: 1926).
37. CZA, A209/12.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid. On the background of the Anglo-Jewish response, see Sharman Kadish, "The Letter of the Ten: Bolsheviks and British Jews," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 4, *The Jews and the European Crisis, 1914–1921*, ed. Jonathan Frankel (New York: 1988), 96–112.
40. CZA, A209/12.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. CZA, A209/159. As press officer for the Zionist Commission, Agron was the first to provide an English-language account of Joseph Trumpeldor's last stand at the battle of Tel Hai, including Trumpeldor's final words, "it is well to die for our country." These words, the essence of the Tel Hai myth and a standard in Zionist education, have been in dispute for decades. The only firsthand account of Trumpeldor's last words was provided by another American Jewish legionnaire, a Dr. Gary, who treated the dying soldier. See Nakdimon Rogel, *Parashat Tel Hai: teudot lehaganat hagalil ha'elyon betar"ap* (Jerusalem: 1994), 441.
44. See Henry Feingold, *A Time for Searching: Entering the Mainstream 1920–1945* (Baltimore: 1992), 182.
45. See Yigal Elam, *Hasokhnut hayehudit: shanim rishonot* (Jerusalem: 1990), 65–66.
46. Ibid.; see also Yehuda Bauer, *My Brother's Keeper: A History of the American Joint Distribution Committee 1929–1939* (Philadelphia: 1974), 64.
47. According to Bauer, Rosen was mainly responsible for winning the support of Felix Warburg for the Crimea project. At Rosen's initiative, 5,646 Jewish families were settled in Crimea and the Ukraine between 1924 and 1928. In 1928, the Agro-Joint backed 105 Jewish colonies in Crimea. At this stage, 13 colonies were defined as Zionist (ibid., 60–61, 64).
48. CZA, A209/14.
49. "Soil Movement of the Jews in Soviet Russia," in CZA, A209/133.
50. Ibid. Fischer offers no further explanation of the "halutz" colonies. Natan Shaham, however, describes halutzim from Palestine who later go to the Soviet colonies in his novel *'Ezem el 'azmo* (Tel Aviv: 1981).
51. CZA, A209/133.
52. CZA, A209/14.
53. CZA, A209/12. Zangwill broke with the organized Zionist movement after it rejected the Uganda scheme, a proposal that the Jews would accept a temporary refuge (in lieu of Palestine) in British-ruled Africa. In the following years, Zangwill sponsored various territorialist schemes designed to provide Jews with a temporary refuge.
54. Fischer described his Latvian-born wife as "Russian in her unconventional spirit, German in her education, a pianist by profession, a psychologist by natural endowment." The couple began living together in Berlin in December 1921 and married a year later "so that Markooshka could have a baby without too much social inconvenience." In subsequent years, Fischer shuttled back and forth between Central Europe and the Soviet Union. See Fischer, *Men and Politics*, 5, 6, 46.
55. CZA, A209/14.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. CZA, A209/15.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.

61. See Fischer, *Men and Politics*, 234–235. The Crane Foundation was established by Charles Crane, an American Progressive and businessman who also espoused anti-Zionist positions.

62. An additional source of frustration was Agron's affiliation with the American Zionist leadership headed by Lipsky. This group had taken over following the rift between Brandeis and Weizmann.

Review Essays

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Personal Accounts of the Holocaust: What Can We Glean from Them?

Alan Adelson (ed.), *The Diary of Dawid Sierakowiak: Five Notebooks from the Lodz Ghetto*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 271 pp.

Henry Greenspan, *On Listening to Holocaust Survivors: Recounting and Life History*. Westport: Praeger, 1998. 199 pp.

Fanya Gottesfeld Heller, *Strange and Unexpected Love: A Teenage Girl's Holocaust Memoirs*. Hoboken: Ktav, 1993. 279 pp.

Lawrence Langer, *Preempting the Holocaust*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 207 pp.

David Matzner, *The* Muselmann: *The Diary of a Jewish Slave Laborer*. Hoboken: Ktav, 1994. 166 pp.

David Patterson, *Sun Turned to Darkness: Memory and Recovery in the Holocaust Memoir*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. 233 pp.

Moshe Prywes, *Prisoner of Hope*. Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1996. 371 pp.

Mark Roseman, *The Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001. 491 pp.

Robert Moses Shapiro (ed.), *Holocaust Chronicles: Individualizing the Holocaust through Diaries and Other Contemporaneous Personal Accounts*. Hoboken: Ktav, 1996. 302 pp.

Adam Starkopf, *Will to Live: One Family's Story of Surviving the Holocaust*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1995. 242 pp.

Jack Werber with William B. Helmreich, *Saving Children: Diary of a Buchenwald Survivor and Rescuer*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996. 129 pp.

Hermann Wygoda, *In the Shadow of the Swastika*, ed. Mark Wygoda. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1998. 167 pp.

Morris Wyszogrod, *A Brush with Death: An Artist in the Death Camps*. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999. 254 pp.

Personal accounts have come to constitute a significant niche in the documentation and published literature of the Holocaust. It is hard to say how many individual testimonies have been taken from survivors, but over the years, tens of thousands of eyewitness accounts have been documented. More than 30,000 of these are to be found

at Yad Vashem; by the end of the 1990s, the Shoah Foundation had some 50,000 on record. In addition, thousands of testimonies were collected by the Soviet authorities at the end of the war and in the postwar years to be used in judicial proceedings against war criminals. Published memoirs about the Holocaust first appeared during the last years of the war, and many shorter personal stories were included in the memorial books that were written to commemorate destroyed communities.[1] Nearly 4,800 book-length memoirs by Jewish survivors have been published, and several hundred diaries written by Jews during the Holocaust have also come to light, of which the majority remain unpublished.[2]

Finally, a number of books have appeared in recent years that discuss the meaning of firsthand accounts of the Holocaust and what one can expect to learn from them. Significantly, most of the authors are not historians, a fact whose implications are discussed in the following section.

The Nonhistorical Approach

In *Sun Turned to Darkness: Memory and Recovery in the Holocaust Memoir*, David Patterson, a professor of comparative literature at the University of Memphis, attempts to uncover the deeper meaning of what he calls the "Holocaust memoir." Patterson's spiritual and metaphysical discussion is predicated on a narrow definition of which Jews actually suffered the Holocaust: those who were in camps, in hiding, or in the ghettos are included, but not those who either fled (whether out of Nazi-dominated areas, or to the partisans) or else managed not to be deported. Unconcerned with the historical debate such a narrow definition might raise, Patterson focuses on the nature and deeper meaning of Holocaust memory rather than on historical details that may be gleaned from individual recollections.

To a large degree, Patterson bases his interpretive method on his reading of Emil Fackenheim's steps for the *tikun* (or mending) of the world. The Holocaust memoir, in Patterson's view, recovers memory, which is the substance of Jewish tradition. The "illness" from which the Holocaust memoir can help us recover is that of indifference, whose main symptom is silence. Finally, Patterson believes that the existence of the Holocaust memoir is an integral part of the observance of Fackenheim's 614th commandment that "Jews are forbidden to hand Hitler posthumous victories."[3] In Patterson's words: "The essence of memory in the Holocaust memoir, therefore, entails not just a memory of time but a recovery of the eternal in time through the observance of the 614th commandment" (Patterson, pp. 21–22).

Patterson believes that memoirs can heal the soul and bring back the centrality of God's presence. Moreover, only by dealing with the frightful past can there be a future. "This is the last and most important point to be made about the essence of memory in the Holocaust memoir," he writes. "Here memory moves from perception of the past toward a recovery of the future, which is a recovery of time, through a relation to the other" (ibid., p. 19). Patterson looks to Jewish tradition to corroborate his view of the Holocaust memoir. For example, in discussing the loss of parents, he notes that in tradition, the father represents the custodian and transmitter of memory. "The father is the guardian of one of the avenues of God's revelation," he writes. "There is

no murder of the father, then, that does not entail a murder of God the Father. And there is no memory of the loss of the father that does not include the memory of God" (ibid., p. 75).

Clearly, this view of memory is different from those of other Holocaust scholars—historians or otherwise. Patterson singles out two nonhistorians for criticism: Lawrence Langer and James E. Young. The former is faulted for being too concerned with what took place and not enough with why it took place; the latter, for arguing that the self has been removed from the Holocaust memoir. For Patterson, there is only one conscientious way to read the Holocaust memoir: "Either Torah or Auschwitz—that is the existential necessity confronting the Jew and underlying the recovery of tradition. And neither the Holocaust memoir nor a responsible reading of it can avoid this either/or" (ibid., p. 24).

Although Patterson's book is thought-provoking at times, it is a deeply flawed work. The root of the problem is Patterson's eschewing of historical method for the sake of finding deeper meaning in the Holocaust memoir, while at the same time using examples from historical events. Lacking the craft of a trained historian, Patterson makes mistakes that a person with more finely honed historical sensibilities would have avoided.

For example, Patterson discusses *the* Holocaust memoir versus Holocaust memoirs. Obviously, although many memoirs have common points, no two stories are identical, not only because no two individuals are the same but also because memoirs were written at different times, in different places, and in different languages. A second fundamental problem is Patterson's uncritical use of sources. Analyzing Nazi intentions, he relies upon survivors as historical experts. For instance, he quotes Nathan Shappel, who writes that "the Germans obviously understood only too well the family structure of the European Jew," implying that they also sought to undermine it (quoted in ibid., p. 35).[4] While Shappel is undoubtedly an expert about his own experiences during the Holocaust years, he is hardly an authority on Nazi intentions; to the best of my knowledge, researchers have yet to uncover documentation that shows the Nazis discussing how best to destroy Jewish families. So Patterson is on thin ice when he claims that "the Nazi project aimed at the devastation of the home took a variety of forms" (ibid., p. 53) without providing some sort of documentary evidence.

Other statements go beyond a mere lack of historical sensibility. According to Patterson, when the Nazis devised the system of using numbers instead of names in the camps, they did so with an awareness of Rabbi Nachman of Braslav's dictum: "You must watch over your name and your soul" (quoted in ibid., p. 166). It is ludicrous to think that when Theodore Eicke first established the model for future concentration camps in Dachau, he or any of his staff was aware of Rabbi Nachman or his dictum.[5] It is also unsettling to come across Patterson's uncritical assertion that "like a stone, the body of the Jew in the antiworld was raw material for soap, fertilizer, clothing and lamp shades" (ibid., p. 168). Of course, Patterson is not the only one to claim that Jewish fat was used to make soap; many survivors have done so.[6] But this claim has long been viewed as controversial, and many scholars, notably Henry Huttenbach, regard it as a myth.[7] A serious scholar writing in the 1990s should have known better than to include it without explanation.

Patterson's book is a prime example—another, more famous, example is Hannah

Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963)—of what can happen when nonhistorians write about the Holocaust. In order to analyze this unique historical event, one needs to have a solid understanding of the historical events surrounding it. Lacking a firm historical underpinning, any analysis, no matter how thought-provoking, simply does not hold up.

Unlike Patterson, Henry Greenspan, a psychologist and playwright, does not focus on the historical details to be found in firsthand accounts of the Holocaust. Instead, his interest is in the actual process of recounting. In *On Listening to Holocaust Survivors: Recounting and Life History*, Greenspan tells of how he listened to several survivors tell of their experiences time and again. His goals were to understand how survivors tell their stories, to uncover the problems inherent in their telling, and to learn to listen better.

Greenspan's conclusion is that each individual speaks in a multidimensional voice. "Survivors' voices are thus compound voices," he writes.

> In some uncertain balance, each contains both earlier identifications and their reductive transformations; both a primary theme and its opposite; echoes of both the murders and the dead. . . . [S]urvivors' voices often have a uniquely orchestral quality, reflecting the complexity. They may become vibrant. . . . Yet the fuller they become, the more they risk breaking against the memories that no single voice can articulate. At these moments, the silence comes not so much "between the words" as erupts within them, sometimes taking them over again (Greenspan, p. 17).

Like Patterson, Greenspan acknowledges that silence is part of the recounting. But unlike Patterson, he does not try to impute to silence a grandiose meaning. He writes:

> In entering into survivors' voices and stories . . . we also find "I's" inside of "I's," memories inside memories, with "I's" and memories interchanging, interweaving, but attaining no final integration. We also find conscience becoming silence and peace. But the silence and peace . . . are not those of redemption (ibid., p. 90).

Greenspan reminds us that there are some things that words, even a flood of words, simply cannot convey.

On Listening to Holocaust Survivors offers several other valuable insights. In recounting their experiences, Greenspan notes, survivors try to fashion stories out of events that do not necessarily fit into a story format and thus often struggle unsuccessfully to find the words to express themselves. Holocaust narratives have a common perspective: all are stories of survival. In addition, these accounts are linked to the concept of legacy, the passing on of experiences. Like Patterson, Greenspan sees survivor accounts as having a role in redemption. His reading, however, is much more low-key; such narratives, he writes, hold the "promise of redemption from an eternity of wandering or loss" (ibid., pp. 146–147).

On Listening to Holocaust Survivors does not suffer from a misuse of historical data, since Greenspan does not relate to Holocaust accounts as factual information that needs to be put into its historical context. Nor does he seem to believe that any moral lessons can be drawn from personal accounts of the Holocaust. In this, he is similar to Lawrence Langer, one of the most important writers on the subject of survivor testimony.

In his most recent book, *Preempting the Holocaust*, Langer discusses at length what

he believes we can or cannot learn from firsthand accounts of the Holocaust. Lest readers be swept up by pretensions, Langer starkly brings them back to earth: "All efforts to find a rule of hierarchy in that darkness, whether based on gender or will, spirit or hope, reflect only our own need to plant a life-sustaining seed in the barren soil that conceals the remnants of two-thirds of European Jewry," he writes. "The sooner we abandon this design, the quicker we will learn to face such chaos with unshielded eyes" (Langer, p. 58).

For Langer, even those who confine their search to historical facts must beware. "Literalist discourse about the Holocaust," he argues, "leads nowhere but back into the pit of destruction." And "we learn nothing from the misery it finds there" (ibid., p. 22).

Yet Langer is by no means a stranger to the historical dimensions of the Holocaust. Among the works discussed in *Preempting the Holocaust* is the diary of Dawid Sierakowiak, a youth in the Lodz ghetto. Several times in his diary, Sierakowiak expresses his anger at his father for taking more than a fair share of the family's food. Most readers, one may assume, would side with the boy against his father. Langer, however, reminds us that it is not the father who is at fault, but the "starving man" the German regime created (ibid., p. 135). Here and elsewhere, Langer's knowledge of the historical context informs his analysis.

Notwithstanding, Langer believes that "taking or watching Holocaust testimony is a humbling experience. You begin with the hope of creating order out of chaos, finding patterns in the survival narrative that can be organized into what some call a 'syndrome.' You imagine you can design a new template of evil to gain insight into the motives that lead to mass murder" (ibid., pp. 78–79). Here Langer falls into the same trap as Patterson, trying to learn something from the wrong source. Firsthand accounts of the Holocaust given by Jews cannot teach us about the nature of Nazi evil. They can only teach us about the effects of the horror on individual victims and the experiences of those who actually faced the horror.

Limitations of Published Memoirs

As is true for other sources upon which the writing of history is based, published memoirs have inherent limitations and problems, some connected to the very process of publication. For instance, published manuscripts are usually edited for content and language: copy-editing that makes the text more readable may inadvertently cause changes in meaning. Similarly, manuscripts are often abridged to meet the needs of the publisher. Yet abridgement often results in the exclusion of material the author had deemed important and may also cause shifts in emphasis that distort the original theme.

Moreover, in setting their memoirs on paper, survivors often engage in self-editing. In his memoir, Eli Wiesel expresses this point eloquently. "I must warn you," he writes, "that certain events will be omitted, especially those episodes that might embarrass friends and, of course, those that might damage the Jewish people. Call it prudence or cowardice, whatever you like. No witness is capable of recounting everything from start to finish anyway. God alone knows the whole story."[8]

Some Holocaust memoirs, published posthumously, are collated by family members from several partial manuscripts. Others are ghostwritten by family members or professional writers. All of these processes make published memoirs different both from oral testimony, which is more spontaneous, and from unpublished diaries, which were written at the time of the events described in them. (Published diaries, of course, may also be subjected to editing, as is demonstrated by the various published versions of Anne Frank's diary.)[9]

As Greenspan observes, the issue of perspective is crucial to our reading and use of published firsthand accounts. Here, too, several problems arise. First, as previously noted, is the problem of the author as "Holocaust scholar." While authors of Holocaust accounts are clearly experts regarding their own personal experiences, they were almost never privy to firsthand information about such matters as Nazi intentions regarding anti-Jewish policies. Second, survivor accounts often move from the first person singular to the first person plural without elucidation of the change in voice. When a survivor says "we" it is not always clear in just whose name he or she is speaking. Morris Wyszogrod, for example, writes the following: "When the British and the French entered the war a few days later, we thought it would be over very quickly. The happiness of the population was beyond description. But as the days passed, we came to realize that there would be no quick end to the war" (Wyszogrod, p. 29). Here Wyszogrod is speaking in the name of "the population." But which population: the Jews of Warsaw, all of Warsaw, or perhaps all of Polish Jewry?

Similarly, in his memoir, *In the Shadow of the Swastika,* Hermann Wygoda writes that "those who had experienced World War I knew the difference between the Feuhrer and the Kaiser, and their fear and anxiety were correspondingly great" (Wygoda, p. 11). It is unrealistic to assume that such a sweeping statement is based on firsthand knowledge. Were he to qualify his statement with phrases such as "my impression at the time was . . ." or "among the people I knew . . . ," or were he to introduce some sort of corroboration, his statement would be much less problematic for readers and scholars alike.

Another issue of perspective concerns date of authorship. Most authors wrote their accounts after the war, and their stories often mix information that was gleaned afterward with what was known at the time. Sometimes the authors themselves note this mixing of information, though more often the reader is left without a clear indication. Moreover, even postwar assessments are at times based on incorrect or partial information.

Jack Werber's *Saving Children: Diary of a Buchenwald Survivor and Rescuer* offers several illustrations of the problem. Writing about a job he obtained (from the context, the date appears to be either late 1939 or early 1940), Werber comments: "Since they needed furriers they ordered me to come the next day. They were already thinking about invading Russia and they wanted warm clothing for their soldiers" (Werber, p. 28). It is exceedingly hard to believe that more than a year before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, Werber knew about the Germans' plans. In an earlier section, Werber describes how the outbreak of the war caught him away from his home in Radom. He had traveled to Vilna on business, he writes, and "if I had stayed in Vilna, I probably would have made it safely through the war, since it was possible to travel from Vilna to Shanghai, where many Jews found a safe haven

throughout the war period" (ibid., p. 20). In fact, as demonstrated in a number of books and articles on the subject, only a small percentage of the Jews in Vilna attempted to go to Shanghai, and the chances that Werber might have done so had he remained in Vilna were extremely slim.[10]

Finally, published memoirs are not necessarily the only source of information about any given individual, and there are often discrepancies between different accounts. In a fascinating article about Rabbi Y.M. Aharonson, who wrote both a diary and a memoir concerning his experiences in the Konin labor camp, Esther Farbstein notes a number of discrepancies between the two accounts and astutely points out that these derive in part from the difference in the nature of the two media. The diary—written under the pressure of events and the fear of discovery—goes into less detail than the postwar memoir and reflects more about "public" experiences, whereas the memoir devotes more detail to "private" experiences.[11]

Similarly, Mark Roseman has written an absorbing biography of Marianne Ellenbogen (née Strauss), a young Jewish woman who hid in Germany during the war. In *The Past in Hiding: Memory and Survival in Nazi Germany*, Roseman makes use of a variety of sources, including interviews with Ellenbogen and people who knew her, archival material, a wartime diary and a short postwar memoir, and many letters. Among the discrepancies that he discusses are different versions of Strauss' experiences at school before the outbreak of the war. Various accounts depict her as happy, well liked, and enjoying school, versus being withdrawn, isolated, and suffering from prejudice. Roseman concludes that the "many discrepancies did, in fact, faithfully reflect different contemporary perceptions of events" (Roseman, p. 66)—a notion that seems to be a variation of the "multiple voices" described by Greenspan.

Two other episodes that Roseman explores revolve around Strauss' separation from those she loved: her parting from her fiancé, Ernst Krombach, when he was deported to Izbica, and her flight from her family home when the Gestapo came to deport her and her family. Both episodes have more than one rendering. "It seems to me that the inaccuracies in Strauss' memory were evidence of her pain and loss and a sign that she had sought to control the past within her, just as she sought to limit communication about it to the outside world," Roseman writes. "The stories had been gently changed into metaphors. As 'parables' of her and her family's fate, they were very slightly more bearable" (ibid., p. 411). In a sense this echoes Greenspan's theory that survivors who have a difficult time articulating their experiences still try to do so by somehow fitting them into a story format.

What Can a Historian of the Holocaust Glean from Personal Accounts?

In one of the essays to be found in Robert Moses Shapiro's edited collection, *Holocaust Chronicles: Individualizing the Holocaust through Diaries and Other Contemporaneous Personal Accounts,* Nechama Tec notes that, even though some events are so strong as to be indelibly etched in an individual's memory, the chronology of events and dates (especially in later survivor accounts) may be somewhat confused (Shapiro, p. 273). Indeed, anyone who works with this material quickly learns that it can be frustrating trying to determine precise details such as the name, rank, and unit of any

given perpetrator. The corroboration of information, either by comparing multiple firsthand accounts or by comparing such accounts with other types of documentation, is crucial in order to obtain "hard" historical information. Nonetheless, firsthand accounts do yield information that is unavailable elsewhere—glimpses of daily life in the forms of vignettes and verbal snapshots.

In published memoirs, most writers say something about their prewar lives. Occasionally these descriptions are idealized in a way that is eerily reminiscent of the practice of speaking only well of the dead. Some writers, however, tell a more realistic story about their lives before the war. Moshe Prywes, for example, devotes 40 pages of his memoir, *Prisoner of Hope*, to a detailed account of his experiences as a student in Poland in the years preceding the war. Seeking to study medicine, Prywes had to contend with the strict annual quota on Jews accepted to Polish medical schools. Once he was accepted, he had daily brushes with antisemitism, ranging from the "Jewish benches" in the classroom to occasional physical attacks on the part of nationalist Christian students. Prywes also recalls more positive moments, such as how some of his fellow students and teachers came to the aid of Jewish students who were attacked.

In general, prewar life is described in a brief opening that leads to the more detailed account of the wartime years. Morris Wyszogrod, however, opens *A Brush with Death: An Artist in the Death Camps* with the war already underway, in a scene that evokes a powerful image of tradition amid momentous change. It is the first night of Passover 1942, one year before the outbreak of the Warsaw ghetto uprising and several weeks before the advent of mass deportations from the ghetto to Treblinka. Everything in the house has been made kosher for the holiday. The meal comprises "water boiled with coarse black salt and some rotten cabbage leaves" (Wyszogrod, p. x). The father says kiddush on water, since there is no wine—and, of course, no matzo—and then reads the traditional Passover ceremony from the haggadah. Wyszogrod writes:

> He wanted so much to believe that the miracle of our people's deliverance from Egypt would occur for us too. . . . To the last moment, he believed with all his might that some miracle would occur and we would be spared from death. He tried to convey this to us. "Children," he says, "don't fall into despair" . . . and my father began to recite the *Shfoch Chamoscho*, the passage in the *Haggadah* entreating God—"Pour out Your wrath on the nations who do not acknowledge You." My father's *Shfoch Chamoscho* was the most powerful curse I ever heard in my life. It was his rage, his hatred, [and] his belief that the enemy could be mortally wounded with his words. He hurled it at the enemy with all his remaining strength, the last breaths of life left to a man dying in agony. At that moment, his curse was also mine. I too was killing the enemy . . . (ibid., p. xi).

Other Holocaust accounts depict a life in hiding, and sometimes a single sentence conjures up a powerful image of the misery that such hiding entailed. Fanya Gottesfeld Heller, for instance, describes hiding in a barn owned by the Polish friend of her Ukrainian boyfriend. The inability to wash was a constant agony: "There were so many lice that my hair was moving" (Heller, p. 192).

Marianne Strauss had a very different experience of hiding. Posing as an Aryan with the help of members of an underground German organization called the Bund,

she actually lived quite openly, traveling on trains in order to go from one safe house to the next. Occasionally eating in restaurants obviously meant for Aryans only, she would even find a spot at an SS man's table and flirt with him. In a different memoir, Hermann Wygoda, a Polish Jew, tells how he posed as a *Volkesdeutsch* and eventually reached safety in Italy.

Often the challenge of posing as Aryans was to successfully live a quiet, day-to-day life. As described in *Will to Live: One Family's Story of Surviving the Holocaust*, the Starkopf family—Adam, Perla, and their daughter, Jasia—spent the last two years of the war posing as Aryans in several villages not far from the Treblinka extermination camp. In late autumn of 1943, soon after two Jewish families posing as Poles in a nearby village were discovered, they heard rumors concerning their own neighbors' suspicions. They decided to pretend nothing was amiss and waited for the rumors to die down. Only in the spring of 1944 did they dare to move on to a different village.

One of the central questions in Holocaust research concerns how much was known at various stages of the Final Solution. Diaries, it might be assumed, would be a good source of information. David Engel examined 11 diaries from the Warsaw ghetto to determine what the diarists knew. His conclusion: "In the final analysis, it may be that a particular diarist's perception of the threat . . . was primarily a reflection of his own individual psychological makeup and was thus ordained from the beginning of the war" (quoted in Shapiro, pp. 79–80). As Engel notes, Jews in the ghetto were faced with the challenge of evaluating not only the veracity of rumors about anti-Jewish measures, but also their significance:

> They had to ask themselves whether the actions had been taken impulsively on individual initiative, or as part of a program directed from Berlin. If the latter, they had to guess what the program might be, in order to determine the likelihood of the actions being repeated and of their affecting any particular Jew directly. And the operative word was always "guess," for they could never confirm their inferences with hard evidence until it was too late (ibid., 73).

Various entries in Sierakowiak's diary show how he oscillated between optimism and despair as he endured months of deprivation in the Lodz ghetto. How much did he understand of what was happening around him? In April 1942, he characterizes what is happening to the Jews of Lodz as a "pogrom" (quoted in Adelson, p. 160). A month later, he writes that "there are rumors about an enormous ghetto for all the Jews from the Reich, but only for those who can work. Nobody knows what the Germans do with the children of those unable to work. . . . No one knows what happened to the Jews deported from Lodz. No one can be certain of anything now" (ibid., 170).

The Sierakowiaks do not know at this point if the deportations are necessarily bad; the father even debates whether he should volunteer for a transport. Several months later, in February 1943, Sierakowiak notes a newspaper report concerning Hitler's plan to exterminate the Jews, and in March he writes that "there are no new food rations. Extermination is approaching" (ibid., p. 259). It is hard to say whether Sierakowiak really understood that the Nazis were in fact trying to murder all of Europe's Jews. Engel's insight seems to apply here: the most Sierakowiak is able to do is to guess at the significance of the events happening around him.

For Strauss, sources of information were much clearer at some junctures of her life under Nazi rule. One of the clearest pieces of information she had was about the impending murder of her parents. In her diary in June 1944, she writes that she heard a BBC broadcast reporting that Jews who had been deported from Germany to Theresienstadt after December 18, 1943 were slated to be sent to Auschwitz-Birkenau to be gassed. Strauss knew that her parents had been deported to Theresienstadt on December 18, 1943, and thus were likely to be murdered in Auschwitz. Mark Roseman corroborated this entry in her diary with material from the BBC archives.

Linked very closely to the issue of information and its analysis is that of decision-making. Personal decisions, one would assume, were based on how Jews assessed their situation at a given time. Explaining his decision to pose as a *Volksdeutscher*, Hermann Wygoda writes:

> There were no rules to go by. No handbook had ever been written or ever will be written that could be of use to a man who is hunted like a wild animal just because he was not born an Aryan. There were no rules of safety to follow to save one's life; all our choices had to be quick, ad hoc decisions made as each case presented itself. One important factor remained in my favor: I was born in Germany and spoke German without an accent (Wygoda, p. 19).

"There were no rules of safety" is probably a postwar assessment. But during the war, Wygoda came to realize that his knowledge of German was an asset. It was this knowledge that allowed him to begin his *Volksdeutscher* ruse, one of whose initial steps was fleeing his hometown.

The decision to flee or to stay put is presented in many survivor memoirs. Wyszogrod, who was 19 years old at the time, describes in his memoir the debate in his family about fleeing Warsaw at the start of the war. Ultimately, they decided to stay put. "People advised us to leave too, but we never did," he writes:

> We had no money. We had no place to go, no one in any villages to run to. In addition, although my father was influenced by socialist ideas, he did not altogether trust the Soviet Union. The memory of Russian pogroms was too strong. . . . Finally, although people tried to convince me to run away with them, I would not leave my parents, and they did not believe things would get so bad that they should run away. They trusted their memories of the way Germans had behaved during World War I. Back then the Germans were considered a better occupier than the tsar, who was no hero to the Jews. . . . So, all things considered, my father believed that, in the worst case, we would get ration cards and have to do forced labor (Wyszogrod, p. 31).

Similarly, Jack Werber's family decided to stay when they realized how few of their personal possessions they would be able to take with them, and the Sierakowiaks were unable to sell their possessions in order to raise the funds that would enable them to flee.

Starkopf's story is much more complex and includes a series of decisions made over the course of several months. With the outbreak of the war in September 1939, Starkopf, like many other Polish citizens, answered the government's call to gather at Brzesc to join the Polish armed forces. After five days of walking, sometimes in the midst of crossfire (several companions were killed), Starkopf and several others

reached Brzesc, only to discover that the town was aflame. From there, they moved into territory that soon was to be occupied by the Soviet Union. Soon thereafter, Starkopf decided to return to his wife and the rest of his family in Warsaw. In the course of several weeks, he left Warsaw once again to seek his brother-in-law in Soviet-held territory and, once there, attempted to persuade his wife and in-laws to join him. His wife arrived, but when she discovered that her brother had died, felt compelled to return to her parents. After the establishment of the Warsaw ghetto and the birth of a daughter, Starkopf again began to think of escape. A first plan fell through at the last moment when he and his wife had second thoughts. Finally, with the help of false papers and a complicated ruse, they managed to slip out of the ghetto through the Gesia Street cemetery.

Strauss' narrative tells of two crucial decisions connected to escape. In the first instance, early in 1939, her parents had to decide whether to send Marianne and her younger brother to Britain as part of the *Kindertransports*. They decided against it, hoping that the entire family might still get out of Germany. In August 1943, the Gestapo came to her parents' house in Essen to take the family away for deportation. Standing in the kitchen (in different accounts, the Gestapo agents are either in the cellar or in the living room), Strauss followed what in her written account she calls "the impulse of the moment" and ran out of the house

> just as I was, with a few hundred mark notes which my father had stuffed into my pockets moments before. I ran for my life, expecting to hear a pistol shot behind me at any minute. But to go in that way seemed to me a much better fate than the unimaginable one awaiting me in Auschwitz or Lodz, in Treblinka or Izbica. But there was no shot, no one running after me, no order, no shouting (quoted in Roseman, pp. 2–3).

The most extraordinary aspect of this recollection is Strauss' mentioning of Auschwitz, Lodz, Treblinka, and Izbica, and her apparent knowledge of what these places meant. Could a young Jewish woman sitting in Essen in August 1943 have known about these places? As extraordinary as it may appear, Strauss probably did have a fairly clear notion. Her fiancé, Ernst Krombach, had been deported with his family to Izbica, near Lublin, in May 1942. Over the course of several months (with the help of a Christian mechanic who frequently traveled between Essen and Izbica), she had been able to correspond with Krombach and learn about the awful conditions in Izbica. At a certain point, she also found out that Krombach's parents had been deported—though, as Roseman points out, the Jews of Izbica were mostly murdered in Belzec or Sobibor rather than in Treblinka or Auschwitz. Nonetheless, some information about Auschwitz was available in Germany by the summer of 1943: Lili Hahn, a journalist, mentions Auschwitz and Birkenau in a diary notation of May 1943.[12] It may be that, like Hahn, Strauss also had heard of Auschwitz at this point. Alternatively, as her account was set down after the war, she may have included certain information in the story of her escape that she learned only later.

Holocaust memoirs depict various individuals who successfully applied new rules in their decision-making process. Others, such as Wygoda, learned that "there were no rules of safety" because new factors were constantly coming into play. The few vignettes presented here are not sufficient for building a general theory. However,

they do give us insight into the difficulties camp prisoners faced when they had to make decisions under circumstances that were radically different from those that had applied before the war.

Working in a quarry in Buchenwald, Werber describes the kind of "tricks of the trade" one could pick up to help ease the daily grind of slave work. "Crucial to survival," he writes,

> was learning how to select and hoist onto your shoulder the right stone in a split second. It took me about a week to master how to carry the stones. If you took a stone that was too small, they beat you up for being a loafer. And if you chose one that was too large, you ran the risk of collapsing under its weight. After a while, I learned how to select stones that looked big but were lighter because they were a little hollow on the inside (Werber, p. 44).

Although Werber found one way to make his work easier without the guards noticing, a second idea led to tragedy. Werber and three friends realized that by using a rope to hold the rocks, they could work more efficiently and with less strain. But when a guard saw their innovation, he shot one of them and punished Werber and two friends by having them "hung in a fiendish manner" (ibid., p. 49). Notwithstanding, Werber continued to take risks in an effort to make his life easier. When he learned that some prisoners would be taught bricklaying, he decided to volunteer for the work, reasoning that since it would take time to learn the craft, he might be spared the worst outdoor work during winter. At it turned out, his decision also saved him from a mass deportation to Auschwitz in October 1942.

In *The Diary of a Jewish Slave Laborer,* David Matzner recounts two incidents in which he was faced with the decision of whether or not to tell the truth. In the first instance, an SS man in the camp told him to lie to the camp commandant about having seen two Jewish senior prisoners light the SS man's cigarette (a breach of the "no fraternization" rules). Matzner lied and was beaten severely as a result. In the second incident, an SD investigator asked Matzner if he had told other prisoners that Munich had been bombed—and if so, how had he heard about the bombing in the first place? This time Matzner opted to tell the truth, and suffered no ill consequences. In the first case, it is reasonable to assume that, had he told the truth, Matzner would have been beaten by the SS man instead of by the commandant. In the second case, the fact that he was not punished may have more to do with the whim of the SD man than anything else.

Although Holocaust memoirs contain many examples of kindness on the part of Gentiles (notably, in the memoirs under review, the prolonged aid provided to Fanya Gottesfeld Heller's family by her Ukrainian lover, Jan, and by Jan's Polish friend, Sidor), what stand out more are the stories of gratuitous cruelty. Adam Starkopf describes a scene of particular heartlessness that occurred when he and his family were hiding in the village of Sadowne, on the railroad line to Treblinka. One night early in January 1943, some Jews jumped off the Treblinka-bound train. Starkopf's landlord and his family came to his door and called to him by his assumed name:

> "Mr. Budovski! Mrs. Budovski!" they chorused. "Didn't you hear the commotion outside? Some Jews just escaped from a train and the Germans started to shoot at them! They

must have hit quite a few. Just think—all those Jews lying on the ground, ready for the taking! It's a windfall! We can go out, pick them up and turn them over to the Gestapo. We'll take their clothes, clean out their pockets and on top of that we'll get a reward from the Germans for bringing them in. Come on! Everybody else in the village is going, too, so we'd better hurry! Otherwise there'll be no Jews left for us to catch" (Starkopf, p. 160).

Fanya Gottesfeld Heller describes several incidents of sexual abuse of women by Germans. This is a particularly sensitive topic, not least because of the question of veracity: sexual contact between Jews and Germans was completely against Nazi ideology. At least one of the incidents Heller describes happened to her, and another concerned her aunt. Other incidents, however, are based more on hearsay evidence. As previously noted, Holocaust accounts suffer at times from a blurring of authorial voice ("we" substituting for "I") and from the mixing of information known at the time with knowledge obtained much later. Hearsay accounts are another limitation of Holocaust memoirs. Moreover, even eyewitness testimony can be open to question.

Jack Werber, for instance, is one of those who claim to have showered with soap made from Jewish fat. He also writes that the coffee served to prisoners in Buchenwald in 1940 was poisoned. There is no evidence that this was the case, although it is quite possible that this is what prisoners believed, and it may well have been one of their explanations for why they felt so awful, became sick, and often died. David Matzner makes a much more demonstratively inaccurate claim when he writes of conversations he had with the Satmar rebbe on the eve of Yom Kippur in 1944 in the Wolfsburg labor camp. Although a Kol Nidre service really was held that year in the camp—a prayer book for the High Holidays was even produced there[13]—the Satmar rebbe, Yoel Teitelbaum, was never in Wolfsburg; he was one of more than 1,680 Jews who had left Budapest on the rescue train organized by Israel Kasztner.

The likelihood is that Matzner did not knowingly falsify his account. Writing after the war, he may have assumed that the Satmar leader he spoke to at Wolfsburg was Yoel Teitelbaum. Especially where the misinformation serves no apparent purpose, a reader can assume that an innocent mistake has been made. Nevertheless, it is important not only to be aware of such gaffes but also to realize that inaccuracies are an inherent problem in firsthand accounts.

The explanations offered by scholars such as Greenspan, Roseman, and Tec shed light on the roots of inaccuracies and discrepancies in Holocaust accounts. Diaries, testimonies, and memoirs about the Holocaust should not be put on a pedestal or treated as sacred. They need to be approached with an understanding of their fundamental strengths and weaknesses. Like any other historical source material, they need to be read critically. But it also behooves those who read firsthand accounts of the Holocaust to remember that they are not just recountings of a historical event. They do embody a deeper meaning. Among other reasons, their mere existence is important because, as Ruth Wisse writes, "individualizing the Holocaust undoes the leveling work of the Nazi regime" (Shapiro, p. xviii). When we read firsthand accounts about the experiences of Jews in the Holocaust, we are involved not only in a learning process, but in commemoration.

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Notes

1. One of the earliest publications was Bracha Habas, *Shenem 'asar pelitim* (Tel Aviv: 1943). In English, one of the first accounts was Jean-Jacques Bernard, *The Camp of Slow Death* (London: 1945); the French-language version was published in 1944. The Yad Vashem library has nearly 1,200 memorial books in its collection.

2. It should be noted that some of these diaries have non-Jewish authors. There is also a certain amount of overlap between published and unpublished diaries.

3. Emil Ludwig Fackenheim, *God's Presence in History: Jewish Affirmations and Philosophical Reflections* (Northvale, N.J.: 1997), 84.

4. See also Shappel's published memoir, *Witness to the Truth* (New York: 1974).

5. See Israel Gutman (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (New York: 1990), 339–343.

6. Survivors, in particular, have been known to write of the existence of such soap. As will be noted later, Jack Werber makes this claim in his memoir. He writes: "Once a week, usually on Sunday, we were able to take hot showers with soap. The soap was engraved 'RJF.' The Stubdienst explained to us that the letters stood for Reine Juden Fat, meaning that fat from dead Jews was used to produce the soap. Even in the showers, the Nazis had to remind us of our ultimate fate" (Werber, p. 41).

7. As Huttenbach explains, the soap commonly used by the Germans during the war was stamped "RIF," an acronym for *Reichs-Industrie-Fett*, or (Reich industrial soap). See Henry Huttenbach, "The Myth of Nazi Human Soap," *Genocide Forum* 1, no. 6 (1994).

8. Eli Wiesel, *All Rivers Run to the Sea* (New York: 1995), 17.

9. Among the English-language versions of Anne Frank's diary are the following: *The Diary of a Young Girl* (Garden City: 1952); *The Diary of a Young Girl: The Critical Edition* (New York: 1989); and *The Diary of a Young Girl: The Definitive Edition* (New York: 1995). The diary has been published in more than 30 languages.

10. On escape from Vilna to Shanghai, see Yitzhak Arad, *Ghetto in Flames: The Struggle and Destruction of the Jews in Vilna in the Holocaust* (New York: 1982); David H. Kranzler, *Japanese, Nazis and Jews: The Jewish Refugee Community of Shanghai, 1938–1945* (New York: 1976); Efraim Zuroff, "Attempts to Obtain Shanghai Permits in 1941: A Case of Rescue Priority during the Holocaust," *Yad Vashem Studies* 13 (1978), 321–351; idem, "Rescue via the Far East: The Attempt to Save Polish Rabbis and Yeshiva Students, 1939–1941," *Simon Wiesenthal Annual* 1 (1984), 153–183; idem, *The Response of Orthodox Jewry in the United States to the Holocaust: The Activities of the Vaad ha-Hatzala Rescue Committee, 1939–1945* (New York: 2000). All but the last were published prior to Werber's memoir.

11. Esther Farbstein, "Diaries and Memoirs as a Historical Source: The Diary and Memoir of a Rabbi at the 'Konin House of Bondage,' " *Yad Vashem Studies* 26 (1998), 87–128.

12. On Lili Hahn, see David Bankier, "The Germans and the Holocaust," *Yad Vashem Studies* 20 (1990), 72.

13. On the prayer book produced at Wolfsburg, see Bela Gutterman (ed.), *Maḥzor Wolfsburg, 1944: maḥaneh la'avodat kefiyah, Germaniyah, 1944* (Jerusalem: 2000).

The Slow Death of the Oslo Process

Aharon Klieman, *Compromising Palestine: A Guide to Final Status Negotiations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. x + 284 pp.

Danny Naveh, *Sodot memshalah (Executive Secrets)*. Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronoth and Sifrei Hemed, 1999. 255 pp.

Edward W. Said, *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After*. New York: Pantheon, 2000. xx + 345 pp.

John Wallach, *The Enemy Has a Face: The Seeds of Peace Experience*. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000. xvii + 119 pp.

Seven years after the Oslo agreement was signed on the White House lawn with great pomp and circumstance, the "peace process" disintegrated. In July 2000, at the Camp David summit, the last serious chance to agree on a basis for the promised "permanent status agreement" failed, and was followed three months later by a renewed explosion of violence and terror. For some policymakers, analysts, and citizens, this outcome was a catastrophic shock; for others, it was the inevitable result of fundamental weaknesses. The books under review represent the views of both camps.

Danny Naveh, who served as cabinet secretary under Benjamin Netanyahu, belongs to the latter group—for whom Yassir Arafat was never "a partner in peace" and has always remained a terrorist. Naveh's personal account of the Netanyahu term of office is reasonable, interesting, and well written. Although readers' expectations of titillating secrets from the inner sanctum are undoubtedly dampened by the "cleared by censor" stamp that is displayed prominently on the front cover, the book does offer some insights into the perceptions and policy-making process during this period. Like others in this genre, *Sodot memshalah* is based on diaries. Rather than offering a dry chronological account, however, Naveh has arranged the story loosely according to major themes. The drawback of this approach is a certain confusion of sequence: as he weaves together events that occurred at different times, Naveh's logic is often difficult to follow. Moreover, some of his facts seem to be forced into slots designed to lead to the desired political conclusion.

Naveh reminds us that efforts to blame Netanyahu for the failure of the peace process ignore the circumstances that brought him to power—particularly the brutal suicide bombings of 1996. Although the Likud did not run its campaign explicitly against the Oslo accords, Palestinian terrorism and Arafat's support for the bombings were major factors in the campaign, and votes for Netanyahu were clear expressions of protest and anger. However, as prime minister, Netanyahu recognized that a pol-

icy of halting Oslo altogether was politically untenable. Hence, he opted to reshape the process, attempting to maintain support from his Oslo-skeptical core constituency while at the same time minimizing friction with Washington. Indeed, Naveh's first task as (still unofficial) cabinet secretary was to issue a message of reassurance on election day regarding the new government's "commitment to peace and security" and a pledge to honor international agreements.

In this context, and after some difficulties, negotiations with Arafat and other Palestinian leaders resumed. As cabinet secretary, Naveh became a direct participant (and from March 1997, coordinator for the Israeli delegation), logging many hours with the PLO leadership. In contrast to the Peres/Beilin/Savir view of Arafat as reformed statesman, Netanyahu and his colleagues always regarded the Palestinian leader as a dangerous enemy, and meetings with him were emotionally as well as politically draining. "As you sit opposite him . . . it is difficult to accept the fact that this man was responsible for the murder of so many men, women, and innocent children," Naveh writes. Every word and step had to be weighed carefully in order to prevent Arafat from realizing "his dream to reach the moment when he would pray at al-Aksa as the president of a Palestinian state" (pp. 33–34).

These meetings were essentially public relations exercises, and they did not lead to any substantive agreements. Arafat remained opaque, leaving Norwegian diplomats to serve as his interpreters and spokesmen (p. 27). These diplomats consistently covered for their protégés, allowing the Palestinian leaders to speak of jihad and armed struggle in Arabic, while talking in English about peace. Hiding behind this screen, Arafat was careful to avoid direct discussions of substance with Israeli interlocutors.

The first crisis to face the new government erupted in Jerusalem in October 1996 with the opening of an ancient underground tunnel that runs parallel to the Western Wall. This decision (for which Naveh blames Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert) gave the Palestinians an excuse to test Netanyahu by launching attacks and demonstrations; as the Palestinians used their new military force for the first time, a number of Israeli soldiers were targeted and killed by snipers. Grossly underestimating the crisis, Netanyahu flew to Europe for a scheduled series of official meetings. As a result, he did not at first have a clear picture of the events. Naveh attempts to defend his boss (and his own role), portraying Netanyahu as decisively directing the Israeli military and diplomatic response, but this version is not convincing. In many respects, the handling of this crisis was marked by incompetence, and Netanyahu's government never recovered fully.

The violence ended in a mini-summit in Washington, at which Netanyahu negotiated from a position of weakness. This set the stage for renewed discussions over the Israeli commitment to evacuate most of Hebron. Eventually, small changes were made in the original terms, including a renewed (and, as it turned out, totally ineffective) Palestinian pledge to end incitement and fight terrorism. Netanyahu then implemented the Israeli withdrawal from most of Hebron, an act that was widely seen as signaling the acceptance of the Oslo process by Netanyahu and the Likud. This perception, however, was inaccurate: the Hebron agreement represented a bare minimum in terms of Israeli concessions. As Naveh notes in great detail, Netanyahu, under pres-

sure to assuage his opponents on the right, announced his government's plans to go ahead with the construction on Har Homa, a southern Jerusalem neighborhood that bordered on Palestinian-held territory. Har Homa immediately became a source of controversy and international criticism of Israel.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu had also obtained a side letter from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher that pledged Israel's full autonomy in deciding on the scope of three "further interim deployments" called for under the 1995 Cairo agreement. But this diplomatic achievement proved ephemeral. When it came time to transfer more land to the Palestinians, Washington gave Netanyahu plenty of "friendly advice," as Naveh describes in detail. As with other minor, short-term achievements of the Netanyahu government, the Christopher letter quickly lost any value it may have had.

Netanyahu's ultimate juggling act between right-wing domestic demands and U.S. pressure for concessions took place in October 1998 at the Wye Plantation summit, which the Israeli prime minister attended reluctantly. Although he has some good descriptions of the Wye summit (at which yet another interim agreement was drawn up), Naveh does not add much to existing accounts. What is most interesting here is his credible and detailed analysis of an important side issue: Netanyahu's demand that President Bill Clinton announce an agreement to pardon Jonathan Pollard, the convicted Israeli spy. Naveh shows how Clinton, in the midst of a growing sex scandal, was unable to deliver on his promise to free Pollard. As a result, Netanyahu was deprived of a much needed "side payment" to be used to appease his right-wing critics, who were angry over further Israeli concessions, however minimal, that had been made at Wye.

The Palestinians' failure to collect illegal weapons and end incitement provided Netanyahu with the rationale for holding off on land transfers. In addition, the pledge to amend the Palestinian National Covenant (calling for Israel's destruction) was turned into a farce in which President and Hillary Clinton played a leading role during their trip to Gaza. Barely two months after the Wye summit, Netanyahu was politically isolated. Largely because of mistakes that were unconnected with either Arafat or Clinton, the Likud leader was forced to call early elections. In their wake, Ehud Barak became prime minister, the Labor party regained power, and the Oslo process appeared to go back on track.

With Ehud Barak's election in May 1999 came a wave of optimism concerning the possibility that a successful conclusion to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was finally within reach. During his campaign, Barak had pledged that within a year, the "permanent status agreement" specified in the 1993 Declaration of Principles would be negotiated. In September, Barak joined Clinton, Arafat, and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in Sharm el Sheik in a public effort to renew the process, including establishing the timetable in a formal agreement.

Finally, it seemed, the difficult issues that had been avoided at Oslo and in the six years that followed (borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, settlements, and water) would be addressed. The interim process, in which Israel turned over land to the Palestinians in exchange for ambiguous pledges of cooperation, was over. In the final step, the parties would be taken to the finish line to end the conflict, forever. Israel,

the Palestinians, and the surrounding countries would live in harmony, with secure and recognized borders and a shared arrangement for Jerusalem, and most Palestinian refugees would become full and constructive citizens in their own recognized state.

These expectations provide the backdrop for Aharon Klieman's book, subtitled "A Guide to Final Status Negotiations." Klieman recognizes that the foundation for agreement is the establishment of a Palestinian state—that is, implementing the "two state solution" at the core of the U.N. partition plan of 1947, and rejected at the time by the Arab side. Although the 1993 Declaration of Principles and subsequent agreements never specified permanent status as requiring a Palestinian state (in theory, other options exist, such as a Jordanian-Palestinian federation), none of the alternatives were feasible. Self-determination for both peoples meant sovereignty, and this in turn meant that the territory remaining after Transjordan had been separated from the area of British-mandated Palestine in 1923 had to be partitioned.

However, as Klieman shows in *Compromising Palestine*—and as all Israelis and Palestinians recognize—drawing a clean dividing line between Jews and Arabs is impossible. By carefully reviewing maps and basic territorial and geographic factors, Klieman highlights the difficulties in resolving borders, sharing Jerusalem, dividing water resources, and living with the demographic and economic realities of partition. While placing partition at the center of his analysis and recommendations for a resolution of the conflict, Klieman recognizes that this is far easier said than done.

In contrast to other books that are essentially ideological polemics wrapped in an academic cover, *Compromising Palestine* does not display its author's own political and ideological views. Indeed, after explaining the extreme complexity of the situation (something that Clinton seems to have discovered after eight years of unprecedented efforts) and the various intersecting historical and religious claims, Klieman leaves the reader hanging. He does not present his own maps and formulae, but rather uses terms such as "partition plus," a concept that allows for flexibility and interaction in key areas. This kind of analysis reflects the optimism of the period after Barak's election, when such a plan seemed plausible. Similarly, Klieman's detailed review of the concept of "ripeness" in negotiations actually demonstrates (in retrospect, at least) how the term lacks rigor and is a poor tool for prediction. Events have shown that in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the logic of partition is not strong enough (at least not yet) to provide a basis for agreement.

According to theories of conflict resolution, the development of "ripeness" and a readiness to accept difficult compromises is in part a function of the degree of interaction between the parties. To this end, many would-be peacemakers have developed programs to bring Israelis and Arabs together so that they can get to know each other, exchange "narratives," and work towards compromise. Seeds of Peace, one of the most ambitious of these programs, brings together Israeli and Arab teenagers for three weeks of summer camp in the woods of Maine.

John Wallach, who died in July 2002, was a journalist who logged many hours covering the Middle East conflict, and who later initiated and directed Seeds of Peace. His book, *The Enemy Has a Face*, illustrates both the good intentions and the difficulties found in conflict resolution efforts and is an interesting albeit somewhat pre-

dictable account. This is not an academic or "scientific" book but rather a journalistic work based on selected incidents and anecdotes, written by an enthusiast who made a major personal investment in his program's success.

According to Wallach, the beginning stage of each three-week session is dominated by partisan narratives, stereotypes, and hostile images. Toward the end of the program, however—after a major crisis and catharsis—the stereotypes break down and friendships are formed. Psychologists may not find much here that is new. However, the strong resistance to Seeds of Peace on the part of the Palestinian and Arab leadership (which reject such programs as "normalization") suggests that there is more here than an unusual summer camp experience.

To their credit, Wallach and his colleagues understand that personal friendships and the recognition that "the enemy has a face" are not enough to overcome political barriers. While encouraging the development of such friendships, the program is explicitly political, with a central role for "coexistence sessions." As Wallach describes them, Seeds of Peace sessions were often very difficult for the participants. In many cases, teenagers were forced to confront the narratives of "the other side." Palestinians and other Arabs discovered that Israelis were not merely foreign colonialists but had a very deep connection to the land, whereas Israelis began to see the strength of Palestinian identity. While debating history, some participants came to realize that it would take generations for their differences to be resolved. The confrontation was intense, and to preserve their new friendships, some campers "made a rule that we won't talk about politics" (p. 41). For them (as well as for the negotiators themselves), personal links stopped at the edge of the political waters.

The major weakness of the book is reflected in the set of highly questionable assumptions that are taken as gospel. Wallach assumes that all of his campers come because "they want to make peace"—although the transcripts indicate that many come (or are sent) primarily to score points. Moreover, Wallach clings to his own stereotypes, such as that of frustrated Palestinians who learn that "hurting can be an empowering experience" (p. 52). Making Israelis cry in frustration and anger by abusing, cheapening, or denying the Holocaust is considered by Wallach to be "empowerment." Wallach describes how in 1997, after receiving the news of a terrorist bombing in Jerusalem that killed a number of teenagers, many of the Israelis didn't want to go to the coexistence sessions because "they didn't want to share their pain with the other side," this being "too threatening" for them (p. 73). Possibly—but more likely it is because the Israelis were in no mood at this particular moment for yet another shouting match about entrenched ideologies and interests.

Since only a small number of people can participate directly in Seeds of Peace, the program's political effect depends to a large extent on the degree of spillover that takes place. Wallach illustrates this spillover effect with a number of anecdotes in the final chapter. For example, after returning to Nablus, a youth named Adbelsalem convinced his friends at home (who were planning to kill all Israelis when "Palestine has an army") to spare his friend Shani, her family, and eventually, all Israelis; after the Palestinian Ministry of Education rejected his request to bring Israelis to talk at his high school, he founded a "Palestine in Peace" club (p. 91). In Israel, with the prevalence and influence of groups such as "Peace Now," the process is easier. The alumni

contribute to, translate, and distribute copies of the Seeds of Peace publication, called, of course, "The Olive Branch." They also have stayed in touch—at least until the collapse of Oslo in September 2000—via internet chat rooms and reunions.

But the process of spillover and the spread of tolerance and knowledge is very slow. As Wallach notes, there is strong opposition to participation in Seeds of Peace. In January 2001, an article published on the official Fatah internet site called for a boycott of the program,[1] and continued Palestinian participation is in doubt. In addition, in the midst of the "intifada war," the resilience of the personal links established in earlier years is unclear. Like the entire Oslo effort, the Seeds of Peace program may be remembered as a well-intentioned effort that, in the final analysis, succumbed to conflicting interests, powerful ideologies, and human folly.

Edward Said's anger and rejectionism represents the antithesis of the optimism to be found in such programs as Seeds of Peace. Said continues to be venerated as a Palestinian prophet and symbol long after his claim to have been a refugee forced out in the 1947–1948 war has been exposed as fraudulent[2] and after he has been photographed at the Lebanese border throwing rocks at Israelis on the other side. The op-ed articles and essays collected and reprinted in *The End of the Peace Process* demonstrate both the power of Said's pen and his role in perpetuating those myths of Palestinian victimization and Israeli occupation that have become the stock clichés in the world's salons and news bureaus. Providing an example of P.T. Barnum's motto that "a sucker is born every day," Said attempts to pass off his extreme rejectionist views on Israel and on the U.S. efforts to broker agreements as contributions to the development of "peaceful coexistence."

These essays also reflect Said's ongoing bitter dispute with Yassir Arafat, whom he condemns for compromising Palestinian interests by negotiating the Oslo agreement with Israel. However, upon examination, their goals seem to be identical; beyond the personal venom that is a cornerstone of Middle Eastern politics, the differences between the two men mainly concern tactics. Zionism is the enemy for both and the real issue, as Said reveals, is the moral right of the Jewish people to claim sovereignty, regardless of borders, in their ancient homeland. "Why . . . should a Jew born in Warsaw or New York have the right to come and settle here . . . whereas we, the people who lived here for centuries, do not have the same right?" (p. 314). For Said, and for many Palestinians and Arabs, Jewish history, culture, and religious attachment to this land is invisible.

If Zionism is the original sin and the enemy, then repealing Zionist accomplishments is the antidote. For Said, as for many other Palestinians (probably including Arafat, as became clear when he walked away from the permanent status negotiations), peace does not require partition and a two-state solution, but rather the creation of a binational state. The Palestinians would then dominate, and the Jews would return to their rightful place as a "protected minority"—for a few generations, at least, until the last Jews disappear. With all of his intellectual powers, Said is blind to the cycle of history, including the fact that the Jews have fought tenaciously every Arab effort to deny or destroy their state.

Said's other theme is the Palestinian Authority's dictatorial structure, the absence of democracy in the proto-Palestinian state, and its corruption. "There is no Palestin-

ian constitution or basic law. Arafat simply refuses to accept limitations on his power" (p. 317). In Said's view, this is just another dimension of the grand Israeli-American conspiracy to create a pliant dictator who will provide "permanent Palestinian submission." (He does not explain why this conspiracy has so far failed to deliver the goods, but simple historical facts have never been an obstacle for the Edward Said–Noam Chomsky school of creative writing.) Nor is the problem limited to Arafat. In an essay written to mark 30 years since the June 1967 war, Said notes that "the structure of power in the Arab world has remained in place, with the same oligarchies, military cadres, and traditional elites holding precisely the same privileges and making the same kind of decisions that they did in 1967" (p. 161).

Edward Said is a talented writer, but he preaches to the converted. The sharp anger and uncompromising ideology displayed in the pages of this book leave no room for understanding and acceptance of any other perspectives. Indeed, Said would make a good candidate for participation in one of John Wallach's "coexistence sessions."

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Notes

1. See "Challenges and Ways of Confrontation," http://www.fateh.net/e_editor.
2. See Justus Weiner, "My Beautiful Old House and Other Fabrications by Edward Said," *Commentary* 102, no. 2 (Sept. 1999), 23–31.

Assimilating, Coalescing, and Spiritual-Seeking: Recent Trends among American Jews

Steven M. Cohen and Arnold M. Eisen, *The Jew Within: Self, Family, and Community in America*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. 242 pp.

Etan Diamond, *And I Will Dwell in Their Midst: Orthodox Jews in Suburbia*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 215 pp.

Sylvia Barack Fishman, *Jewish Life and American Culture*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2000. 242 pp.

Chaim I. Waxman, *Jewish Baby Boomers: A Communal Perspective*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2001. 221 pp.

Although the four books under review differ in their methodologies and in the sectors of North American Jewry on which they focus, their authors are in agreement on the wide-ranging change that has taken place in American society. America today, according to these authors, is more pluralistic, tolerant, and open. The cultural tensions or incompatibilities that existed in the past between American culture and Judaism/Jewishness have disappeared in a society in which an ideology of multiculturalism now celebrates religious and ethnic differences. Discrimination against Jews in higher education, in certain realms of business, and at country clubs is no longer encountered, and very few respondents in these studies report any personal experience of antisemitism. The compatibility of being Jewish and American is no longer an issue. American Jews no longer seek integration into American society because they have already achieved it.

The effects of these changes on the character and future of American Jewry continue to be debated. On the one hand, the weakening of social boundaries between Jews and non-Jews—as shown by the high rates of interreligious friendships, dating, and marriage reported in these studies—is seen by some as a threat to the religious and communal survival of American Jewry. On the other hand, Jews no longer feel uncomfortable in expressing religious distinctiveness or in establishing institutions such as Jewish day schools, which formerly were perceived as diminishing Jews' chances to be accepted and to succeed in the wider society.

Although the implications of a pluralist, tolerant society for U.S. Jewry are discussed in all four books, only Chaim Waxman makes the issue of the "survival" of the American Jewish community the focus of his book. As he explains, the "revi-

sionists" of the 1980s, such as Charles Silberman, Calvin Goldscheider, and Alan S. Zuckerman, challenged the widespread consensus of social scientists since the early 1960s that there had been a decline in the quality and quantity of American Jewish life. Revisionists painted an optimistic picture of changes within American Jewry that guaranteed its continuing strength, and Waxman's own writings at the time tended to emphasize signs of strength in the religious and ethnic expressions of American Jews. His central thesis now, however, is that there are significantly lower levels of Jewish identification among Jewish baby boomers as compared with the previous generation. Waxman draws principally upon data from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey, which do not appear to support the revisionist position. Instead, the data show a weakening of both Jewish identity (the subjective perception and awareness of oneself as a Jew) and Jewish identification (having formal and informal Jewish associations).

Compared with previous generations, fewer baby boomers live in Jewish neighborhoods, know Hebrew or Yiddish, have emotional ties to Israel, or belong to Jewish organizations. Among the findings from the 1990 survey: Jewish baby boomers are concentrated in professions where most colleagues are not Jewish; they marry less frequently and later than their non-Jewish peers; their birthrate is below the replacement level; less than one fifth say that they would oppose their child's prospective marriage to a non-Jew; less than one fifth report observing kashruth; three quarters have never visited Israel; and less than a quarter attend synagogue at least once a month. Waxman does not wish to suggest that there is massive assimilation. He notes that there are indicators of deepening communal ties among some segments of American Jewry, specifically the minority with extensive Jewish education. The overall picture, however, is of a weakening community—which could be strengthened, Waxman proposes, by decentralization or the encouragement of local, small-scale institutional settings to which baby boomers appear to be receptive.

Waxman has the enviable skill of presenting statistical data in an interesting way, and his book has a clear focus on the baby boomers, those who were between the ages of 26 and 44 in 1990. Sylvia Barack Fishman also draws upon the 1990 survey, but her study is less focused and her presentation of statistical data occasionally becomes a list of numbers and percentages without clear indications of their meanings. Her study, however, is strengthened by the incorporation of additional methodologies: interviews, focus-group conversations, and content analysis of literary and cinematic sources. Her chapters on the various institutional areas of Jewish life (education, family, religion, formal organizations) begin with a summary of the traditional Jewish community. She then traces the changes that occurred in the United States among the previous generations and presents the data on the contemporary situation from the 1990 survey and other sources.

Fishman reports that the trend in religiosity is, for the most part, downward: Jews keep fewer rituals today than in the past, and younger American Jews keep fewer rituals than their elders. Some of the revisionists argued that secularization or a decline in religiosity did not necessarily mean a decline in Jewish cohesiveness because high levels of education and socioeconomic status were providing alternative bases for group cohesiveness. To some extent, Fishman notes, data from the survey corroborate the revisionist position: among younger cohorts of American Jews, there is a pos-

itive relationship between secular education and Jewish ethnic identification and involvement. She differs, however, with another argument of the revisionists (Goldscheider and Zuckerman), namely, that a high rate of intermarriage did not necessarily mean a decline in the Jewish population, assuming that many of the non-Jewish spouses would convert. This claim is not supported by the data presented by Fishman. The 1990 survey showed that more than one-third of Jews who married during the years 1985–1990 had married a non-Jew, that the rate of conversion of non-Jewish spouses had fallen, and that more than half of the children of interreligious couples were not being raised as Jews.

Whereas Fishman states that Jews have a comparatively lower outmarriage rate than other white ethnic Americans, Waxman notes that the intermarriage rate for Jews is higher than for Protestants or Catholics. Thus, the slant given to the data depends somewhat on the point of comparison; should Jews be compared with other ethnic groups or with other religious groups? The increasing number of Jews-by-choice who have converted to Judaism (usually as a consequence of marriage to a Jew) might result in some de-ethnicizing of the American Jewish population, but for most American Jews, as for most Jewish minorities elsewhere, religion and ethnicity are fused. Cohen and Eisen report that, although their respondents emphasize the right of each Jew to choose his or her own Judaism—which includes the right to reject it—they understand Judaism as given at birth. The only way to lose the Jewish birthright is to choose another religion.

Fishman introduces the concept of "coalescence," the merging of American and Jewish identities and cultures, and uses it as an analytical focus in interpreting the data from the 1990 survey and other sources. Fishman argues that coalescence has supplanted assimilation (the abandonment of Jewishness for Americanness) and compartmentalization (the division between Jewish areas of life, such as the family, and non-Jewish areas, such as work). Coalescence refers to simultaneous processes: the Americanization of Judaism and the Judaization of Americanness. According to Fishman, American Jews merge messages, or "texts," from Judaism and American culture and come to perceive the unified texts as an authoritative Judaism, losing the consciousness of their separate origins. Thus, American liberal values such as free choice, universalism, individualism, and pluralism have been incorporated by American Jews into their understanding of their Jewish identity. A recent example of coalescence is the Jewish "renewal" movement, which merges Jewish religious traditions, especially Jewish mysticism, with the self-actualization movement and Eastern religions.

An area of coalescence of particular interest to Fishman is that between feminism and Judaism. Fishman points to a number of examples, including developments among modern Orthodox women such as the proliferation of women's prayer groups and modes of dressing, that fuse Orthodox requirements of modesty with current American fashions. Similar developments are described by Etan Diamond in his study of Orthodox Jews in suburban Toronto. Diamond writes, for example, on the commodification and commercialization of kosher food, a phenomenon that enables the middle-class, suburban Orthodox to participate in the same consumerist trends as their nonkosher neighbors. The kosher food industry has come to include gourmet kosher goods, an extensive kosher wine industry, and a wide range of kosher Chinese,

Moroccan, and Yemenite restaurants, alongside the more common pizza shops. Meanwhile, as "kosher" has come to represent quality and healthfulness, non-Jewish consumers have become a majority of those buying kosher products. Thus, religious practices of Orthodox Jews have become part of mainstream North American culture.

The proliferation of kosher establishments in suburbia is part of what Diamond terms the "sanctifying" of suburban space. Drawing upon archival sources (particularly of synagogues and newspapers) that are supplemented by some interviews, Diamond describes a blending of traditionalist religion with consumerist, modern suburbia. He traces the move of Orthodox Jews from the inner city to suburbia beginning in the 1950s and describes a process whereby Orthodox Jews come to create a sacred space in a secular environment. The establishment of congregations and day schools and the clustering of Jewish commercial establishments produce a visibly distinctive Jewish culture on the suburban frontier. This new sacred space is neither exclusive nor all-encompassing; although concentrated in a particular neighborhood, the Orthodox Jews remain a minority in the area, and they create a religious consumer infrastructure that combines Orthodoxy with modern, secular styles. The suburban Orthodox community in Toronto as described in detail by Diamond is not an exceptional case; suburban Orthodox Jewish communities are now to be found in every metropolitan region in North America.

Ultra-orthodox Jews perceive the middle-class, suburban lifestyles of the modern or centrist Orthodox as compromising the authenticity of their Judaism, but the trend among the centrist Orthodox has been to increase the strictness of their religious adherence and, at a formal organizational level, to reduce their contacts with non-Orthodox Jews. A feeling of security within the wider society has made the Orthodox more confident both in asserting their independence and in hardening their criticisms of Conservative and Reform Judaism. The mostly Conservative and Reform "moderately affiliated" Jews studied by Cohen and Eisen are in turn critical of those Orthodox who challenge their own Jewish identity by questioning the very legitimacy of their Judaisms. However much the centrist Orthodox have adjusted to the wider culture, their adherence to a binding and unchanging law sets them apart from non-Orthodox Jews, who believe that authority rests with each individual or family. This emphasis on the "sovereign self" is at the center of Steven M. Cohen and Arnold Eisen's analysis of contemporary American Jewry.

Like Waxman, Cohen and Eisen focus on the baby boomers who constitute nearly half of the American Jewish adult population. They differ from Waxman, however, in restricting their analysis to "moderately affiliated" Jews who belong to at least one Jewish institution, a synagogue or a secular Jewish organization. They also differ in their methodology: their major resource is 50 in-depth interviews with Jews from around the United States, although they also refer to data from a mail-back questionnaire of 1,005 respondents. Their search is for the meanings attributed by American Jews to their Judaism and Jewishness, and meanings are more likely to be discovered through interviews than through survey data.

For Cohen and Eisen's subjects, the meaning of Judaism is to be found in the private sphere where the most important Jewish practices take place. Cohen and Eisen refer, with some hesitation, to a "postmodern" Jewish self, for whom the "grand narrative" of the Jewish people and its destiny has been replaced by "local narratives"

and "personal stories" of the individual and the nuclear family. The Judaism of postmodern Jews is personalist, focused on the self rather than on the group, and voluntarist, with an emphasis on the freedom to choose selectively (and perhaps only temporarily) from the repertoire of Jewish religious beliefs and practices. The question of what is correct has been supplanted by what is meaningful, and the quest for Jewish meaning is perceived as never-ending, since it is the journey more than the arrival that is valued.

Like many non-Jewish Americans, these interviewees display a new "spirituality of seeking" that emphasizes individual experience and the inner self. Interest in Jewish organizational life has diminished, as has interest in, and emotional ties to, Israel. Denominational differences are also of less concern, and although many go occasionally to synagogue, what matters to them is not the content of the liturgy but rather the opportunity to reflect on and explore personal meanings.

Cohen and Eisen have written a fascinating book that successfully introduces themes from recent works in the sociology of religion, particularly those of Robert N. Bellah, Clark Wade Roof, and Robert Wuthnow, to the case of American Jews. Waxman also discusses recent literature in the sociology of religion and ethnicity, which allows him to fit American Jews into wider patterns of American religion and ethnicity. However, Waxman's chapters on religion and ethnicity in American society follow his chapters on the analysis of the 1990 survey, and this presentation is less successful than Cohen and Eisen's more integrative approach of introducing the more general perspectives at the very outset of their work.

Waxman refers to the "new spirituality" among American Jews. This subject is far more central to Cohen and Eisen's analysis, which offers extensive discussion concerning the values of voluntarism and personalism and the right of the individual to be able to choose what is personally meaningful. What in fact is meaningful, however, often remains unarticulated. The common self-definition of baby boomers as "spiritual" rather than "religious" appears to give them great leeway in talking about "seeking" without saying very much about what is actually being sought. Most believe in God, but they do not say that this is what they are seeking, and their conceptions of God as some kind of a force or spirit would be difficult to relate to some ultimate end. A cynic might be tempted to conclude that the language of meaning is a mask for an absence of meaning; either that, or the search for meaning *is* the meaning.

In similar fashion, Cohen and Eisen's subjects state their right to reject religious observances that they do not find meaningful. But what are their criteria of meaningfulness? The answer appears to be that rituals are meaningful if they celebrate the family. Cohen and Eisen write that the family is the context and major locus of, as well as the principle reason for, the observance of the major religious holidays. They also write that the rituals maintain and enhance the collective consciousness, being valued because they confirm and transmit a distinctive identity of which the subjects are proud. This suggests that, for all the talk about personal meanings, a Durkheimian perspective is appropriate: the holidays are celebrated because they are occasions for members of the family to express and reinforce their togetherness, to enjoy the special foods and sociality, and to signify their identity with the Jewish people.

Rituals, according to Cohen and Eisen, must be open enough to allow for individ-

ual intentions and closed enough to retain a communal form that is shared despite differing intentions. But do intentions, in fact, vary so much? As in the previous generation, the baby boomers join a synagogue when their children reach school age, and the most popular holiday rituals remain the Passover seder and the lighting of candles at Hanukah. In contrast with Cohen and Eisen, who write of significant changes among the baby boomers, Waxman writes that there is no evidence of a radical change between the baby boomers and the older age cohort. These differences may be related to differing methodologies; Cohen and Eisen might argue that Waxman's survey data could not reveal the changes that they discovered through in-depth interviews. However, similar in-depth interviews were not conducted with the previous generation, and the impression of change may derive from the methodology itself. If the previous generation had been asked open-ended questions such as "Would you call yourself a 'spiritual' person?" perhaps they too would have emphasized personal meanings and a concern with seeking.

Cohen and Eisen write that if the meaning of an observance disappears over time, the observance will also cease. However, they also write that Hanukah, which is one of the two most popular holidays, carries no significant meanings for their respondents, and that the High Holidays, which carry adult messages and focus on the synagogue rather than the family, pose a problem for those who are unable to endow them with personal significance. That the most widely observed holidays are not endowed with personal meanings is difficult to reconcile with an argument about the importance of personal meanings for ritual patterns. Waxman writes that the popular rituals are observed because they are family-oriented—which is especially important when there are young children at home—and because the Jewish holidays coincide with Easter and Christmas. Thus, Purim with its child-oriented celebrations has become more popular among baby boomers, since it provides a Jewish counterpart to Halloween and Mardi Gras. Waxman notes that the Passover seder and the lighting of Hanukah candles have become American rituals in some circles. An increasing number of Christians hold a Passover seder as an ecumenical ritual and light Hanukah candles to express their solidarity with Jewish Americans.

Waxman writes that almost 30 percent of baby boomers report that someone in their household has a Christmas tree, and that this number is almost twice that of the pre–Second World War cohort. Cohen and Eisen, in contrast, report that Christmas (which they note was celebrated by a notable minority of American Jews a generation ago) is rarely celebrated among members of their sample. Sixty-nine per cent of their sample agreed that "having a Christmas tree would violate my sense of being Jewish." Whereas Cohen and Eisen state that most of their respondents view Christmas celebrations as contrary to their Jewish identity, Waxman writes that, for many Jews, Christmas may have become a modern American cultural symbol rather than being perceived as a Christian religious holiday.

Such differences between the two studies no doubt reflect the different samples (Waxman's sample includes both weakly affiliated and nonaffiliated), but they may also reflect differences in interpretative frameworks. Whereas Cohen and Eisen seek to demonstrate meanings of Jewish distinctiveness, Waxman's emphasis is on the continuing absorption of Jews into American culture and society. It should be noted, however, that Waxman did not include within his sample those respondents who reported

that they were born Jewish but did not identify themselves as Jewish by religion. These respondents either identified with other religions or reported no religious identification; had they been included in the sample, the overall levels of Jewish involvement would, of course, have been lower. Hopefully, further studies of the Orthodox and of the middle sector of affiliated Jews will be augmented by studies of the weakly affiliated and nonaffiliated. Such studies would throw further light on the complexity of contemporary trends among American Jews.

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The Political Culture and Social Posture of American Jews

Michael Alexander, *Jazz Age Jews*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 239 pp.

Gulie Ne'eman Arad, *America, Its Jews, and the Rise of Nazism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. ix + 314 pp.

Marc Dollinger, *Quest for Inclusion: Jews and Liberalism in Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. xi + 296 pp.

At the heart of these three books, diverse in subject, method, chronology, and point of view, lies a single overriding concern: the authors' wish to substantiate the existence of an American Jewish sociopolitical-cultural tradition. Notwithstanding their affirmative identification of such a tradition, however, they diverge widely in their understanding of its efficacy, value, and ultimate source.

Two of the three authors—Gulie Ne'eman Arad and Marc Dollinger—conclude that, when push came to shove, American Jews sacrificed principles for security and material interests. Michael Alexander, in diametrically opposed fashion, argues that Jews have tended to sacrifice material interests and security in a calculus of ideology and self-image. On other grounds of comparison, Dollinger and Alexander both declare their interest in the exceptionalism of American Jewish liberalism, whereas Arad accuses American Jews of having failed, in the 1940s, to take American liberalism seriously enough. All three authors engage the reader in a debate over the real extent of American Jewish integration and influence in American society.

Taken together, these books and their dovetailing arguments are of prime interest to American and Jewish historians. The three works were the respective authors' doctoral theses, which speaks well for the development of scholarship in the field of American Jewish history, for they are unusually thought-provoking, ably researched, and eminently readable. They are also, each in its own way, one-sided. Each, therefore, leaves gaps that others will have to fill.

Marc Dollinger's *Quest for Inclusion* starts with the reign of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the New Deal, Jewish philanthropy and social work during the Depression, and the Jews' dual stand during this time against domestic nativism and racism, on the one hand, and the rising threat of German Nazism, on the other. Moving on to consider the Jews' wartime record and their approach to postwar issues (including Zionism and the United Nations), he then proceeds to examine issues of civil liberties in the era of

Joseph McCarthy, racial equality in the 1960s, and finally the ambivalent record of Jewish groups on "affirmative action" in the 1970s. Dollinger is convinced that, "acculturative forces, more than empathy for the downtrodden, . . . inspired American Jewish politics" (p. 226), and that

> Jews used liberal politics to power their move from the margin to the mainstream of American life. . . . The politics of acculturation turn on the question of social inclusion, not liberal conviction. . . . American Jews chose the liberal path most often because that political persuasion offered the best hope of turning a painful European Jewish past into a successful American future (pp. 5–6).

Further, he is persuaded that Jews were essentially foreign and marginal to American society in the 1920s, and so they would have remained had they not supported government intervention in favor of activist liberal policies. Paradoxically, they found that acculturation in a liberal mode did not always serve their own survivalist ends.

With this instrumentalist approach to American Jewish liberalism in mind, Dollinger contends that, at several critical junctures, American Jews parted company with a "dominant left-leaning trend" when it would have been damaging or counterproductive to adhere strictly to liberal principles. Here he cites Jewish silence over the notorious internment of Japanese Americans in California during the Second World War, southern Jews' resistance to the civil rights politics of northern Jewish liberals, and Jewish protests against quota-based programs of "affirmative action" to reverse the effects of past racial discrimination. "Faced with a choice between liberal politics and their own acculturation," Dollinger claims, "Jews almost always chose the latter" (p. 4). The qualifier "almost" is significant, because Dollinger is usually nuanced enough in his presentation to note the exceptions to his rule of thumb.

Michael Alexander's *Jazz Age Jews* might easily have been subtitled "Quest for *Exclusion*" (in counterpoint to Dollinger's "inclusion"). Alexander's thoroughly engaging book argues that as Jews in America began to enter the social mainstream, they identified "downward": that is, they consciously embraced marginal social groups (a behavior characterized by Alexander as "exceptional Jewish liberalism" [p. 1]). Consequently, they marginalized themselves with respect to the American cultural, social, and political consensus when they might have pursued acculturation without such self-inflicted handicaps. Here, Alexander's perspective contrasts quite directly with Dollinger's: where Dollinger sees the Jews as essentially marginal in the America of the 1920s—as outsiders looking in, sensitive to their own vulnerability and bereft of real political influence—Alexander's case is based on the opposite assertion. The second generation, raised in America, was well on its way to successful integration by the mid-1920s, he tells us, using as his yardstick the tremendous gap between their economic and social freedom and their parents' European experience: "In the ghettos of Eastern Europe . . . Jews had been estranged from the predominant economy. In America just the opposite was true. Within a generation, working-class Jews rapidly (though not easily) entered the middle class" (p. 17). Rather than feeling a need to overcome their marginality, second-generation American Jews felt a need to reinvent that marginality, to compensate for their "discomfort with social suc-

cess" through identifying with those who were not succeeding. They thus met "the obligation of their own definition of themselves as a marginalized people" (p. 181).

As against Dollinger's three egregious cases of Jews' preference for their own social acculturation and security over liberal political principle, Alexander counters with three equally egregious cases in which Jews, either by behavior, by common consent, or by cultural initiative, challenged the American status quo. His first case is Arnold Rothstein—arch-gambler, big-time swindler, underworld celebrity, and loan-shark—portrayed by Alexander as a kind of picaresque hero to the wider Jewish public: "[T]he larger community of Eastern European Jews in America accepted and welcomed its controversial brethren precisely for working along the margins of the American business world at a time when so many Eastern Jews were rising higher in the legitimate economy than they had for centuries" (p. 18). Next comes Felix Frankfurter in his 1920s role of radical gadfly and defender of Sacco and Vanzetti, the Italian anarchists convicted and executed for murder. Partly because of a campaign orchestrated by Frankfurter, American Jewish support for Sacco and Vanzetti was even stronger than that of the Italian American community.[1] Finally, Alexander takes up the case of Al Jolson, the fantastically successful entertainer (the eponymous "Jazz Singer"). In a ringing rejoinder to Michael Rogin, [2] Alexander contends that Jolson's blackface routines transformed racist white American minstrelsy into an actual identification with a Jewishly imagined African American culture: "In blackface, Al Jolson became a symbol through which Eastern Jewry in America understood itself. To a people who imagined itself as fundamentally Other, a Jew painted as an African American was an image of magisterial striking power" (p. 182).

Alexander follows two distinct lines of thought to account for this overweening hankering after marginality. The first is sociocultural in nature, and involves a stereotypical distinction between German Jews (who immigrated in the 19th century and who Americanized by identifying "up" with the Anglo-American Protestant elite) and the far larger group of East European Jewish immigrants and their progeny, who preserved an enduring memory of their marginality in the "host society" (p. 4). In America, the second generation of these East Europeans felt no compulsion to engage in an Anglo-American conformity. Not only did they remain secure in their own distinctiveness, but they also viewed America as a society composed of "others" like themselves. "In the Jewish imagination, Jews, Blacks, and America all conjoined in their mutual marginalizations," Alexander notes (p. 177). They Americanized by means of a "downward" orientation.

The second line of explanation is theological-existential and carries the book's underlying message: Jews, Alexander reminds us, had in the past constructed their very definition of selfhood out of two parallel concepts—commandment and exile. Jews were Jews because they were singular in their religious behavior and forever estranged from Christendom and Islam. Alexander identifies in second-generation American Jewry (and in their descendants today) an ever-deepening abandonment of commandment, but a concomitant and compensating embrace of estrangement: "*[M]arginalization* had replaced *commandment* as the framework of Jewish identity: exile replaced covenant" (pp. 176–177).[3] In order to retain any sense of authentic Jewish identity, American Jews had to recreate a deliberate—and somewhat con-

trived—self-marginalization. But at the same time, "the doctrine of exile released from the obligations of the covenant would be something short of Judaism, an empty ideology without an attendant structure of behavior" (p. 177).

The extent to which Jews really did feel at home in America lies at the crux of Gulie Ne'eman Arad's *America, its Jews, and the Rise of Nazism.* The author argues that, in maneuvering anxiously between concern for their own safety and for that of European Jewry, American Jews exposed the fragility and contested nature of their American identity. They fell short of achieving a truly rooted identification with American ideals of democracy when they failed to assert their civic prerogatives and their interests as a constituency in their own right, and as a result were ineffective in aiding European Jewry in the crucial period leading up to 1942, when it might ostensibly have made a difference.

Like Dollinger (and unlike Alexander, whose interests lie elsewhere), Arad deals almost solely with Jewish organizations and their leaderships, despite the wider implication of her book's title, which speaks of America and "its Jews." Once again (as in many past treatments of this subject) the usual suspects are rounded up, with the American Jewish Committee and Stephen S. Wise heading the list. Overall, Arad's assessment agrees with that of Dollinger, who finds that, having equated Jewish values and Jewish survival with Americanism, liberal Jews found it all but impossible to turn around and assert a legitimately separate Jewish interest.

Arad's discussion, however, which depends so heavily on the evidence in the Jewish organizations' files, does not include the comparative perspective that Dollinger evinces, as in the following passage in which he assesses the difference between the Jewish organizations' response to the United States' entry into the war and that of their Christian counterparts. Jewish support for the war effort, Dollinger asserts, "surpassed that of Christian religious denominations," and "the Nazi persecution of European Jews pressed American Jews into an interventionist mindset long before the mainstream Christian churches engaged the question" (p. 83). Arad argues that a sense of insecurity immobilized American Jewish leaders. In Dollinger's more nuanced account, it prompted Jewish leaders to search actively (if not very successfully) for a coherent policy:

> The politics of acculturation weighed on Jewish organizations much more than on their Christian counterparts. American Jewish leaders linked their support for the war effort to protecting their co-religionists abroad, fighting anti-Semitism at home, and insuring civil protection for their constituents. These endeavors politicized Jewish organizations and infused their rhetoric with powerful civic dimensions. . . . Jewish leaders carried the burden of social inclusion on their shoulders while churches did not serve that function for Christian America (p. 84).

Arad focuses instead on a comparison of a different order, between what was and what ought to have been. "What unavoidably emerges from the sad saga related here is the weakness inherent in an ambivalent identity," she concludes, "which not only inhibited the exercise of power but also the testing of its potential" (p. 155). Here she returns to a point of view expressed by Jerold S. Auerbach, who has written: "The issue is not whether it was 'realistically possible' to expect that Wise, or the American Jewish community, could reverse the Roosevelt administration's refugee exclusion

policy, [or] alter its wartime priorities." Instead, Auerbach (and now Arad) would have it, the issue was whether it was "'realistically possible' to expect Wise, . . . with his unrivaled eloquence and passion, to speak out—to shatter the American wall of silence. . . . It was not . . . an issue of power, but of courage—and the lingering question is why Wise could not lead, and why his followers were so docile?"[4] That lingering question is squarely asked in *America, Its Jews, and the Rise of Nazism.*

Arad appears to acknowledge the aforesaid distinction between what was and what was not "realistic" by limiting her account to the period that ended in early 1942. After that point, and until 1944, there was indeed little or no realistic way for America (let alone America's Jews) to directly and physically rescue Jews from mass extermination. Within her chosen chronological division and conceptual limit, Arad is able to pursue those questions that really matter to her: questions of choice, integrity, leadership, and political self-paralysis—not rescue as such. This is the true subject of her book, and it is this focal point that prompts her to reach back to the 1840s to discover the putative roots of an American Jewish tradition of low-profile, self-protective tactics that ultimately determined how Jewish leaders in America were expected to behave.

Now as to the gaps alluded to earlier . . .

Although she contends that antisemitism was a palpable force in American history, Arad also sees Jewish leaders as unduly immobilized and fecklessly prone to manipulation by administration figures who played upon their fears for American Jews' security. This dual perspective is problematic, for surely if antisemitism was as bad as she (along with David Wyman)[5] says it was, American Jews had good reason to feel intimidated. It then follows that their potential influence was minimal and their cautiousness both warranted and astute. Arad attempts to resolve this problem by pointing out that antisemitism had not prevented a cadre of talented Jews from occupying key positions in FDR's closest personal orbit, a vantage from which they might have been expected to exert more influence over "the boss." Indeed, one of the important contributions of Arad's book is her discussion of these "president's Jews." What is missing from her treatment—hence, missing from her solution to the insider/outsider conundrum—is the realization that advisers are not independently influential. Their "influence" derives from their proximity to the leader, and that proximity, in turn, is controlled by the leader. This sort of position "at court" cannot be equated with the real sources of political clout in FDR's America—something that the president certainly knew, and the "president's Jews" (such as Felix Frankfurter) would know that he knew.

Her approach to the subject of Jewish leadership leans too heavily on the "tradition" thesis. It tends thereby to underestimate the most proximate and reasonable factors. We do not really require "tradition" in order to account for why Jewish leaders in the 1930s and early 1940s needed to play by American rules—which meant, in practice, defining all sectoral interests as legitimate only if they might be subsumed under and represented by the collective struggle for democracy's survival. The fact is that those were the only rules that worked in the 1930s and 1940s without collapsing under the strain of the Depression and then world war. All other choices, beginning with the Communist Left and continuing on through the League of Nations and

Europe's humanist traditions, failed. By sticking to American rules, Jewish leaders were responding to the evidence of civilization crashing down all around them.

Arad's suggestion, therefore, that American Jewish leaders responded to the rise of Nazism primarily as Americans is something of a truism. Having said this, however, she leaves a crucial point unsaid: namely, how deeply committed those leaders must have been to the Jewish fate to have entrusted it to the better instincts of the American people and their president at that particular point in time.

Returning now to Michael Alexander's *Jazz Age Jews*, which delves more deeply into the psychological recesses of the American Jewish experience in the 20th century than have many other books on the subject, it is hard not to be drawn into the inherent drama of the episodes he describes. Nonetheless, perhaps because of his precise and artful attention to these stories, Alexander devotes surprisingly little space to substantiating his case for the mainstream integration of Jews in U.S. society in the 1920s.

Alexander points to three second-generation Jews—Rothstein, Frankfurter, and Jolson—who purportedly aroused a profound sense of identification in the minds of their second-generation Jewish peers; but much of his evidence (especially regarding Rothstein and the Sacco-and-Vanzetti affair) is drawn from the ethnic Yiddish press, a notably first-generation phenomenon. The gap in logic here involves more than generational chronology: Yiddish-speaking immigrants were in fact still marginal, and thus were not "stooping" to a contrived marginality if they expressed empathy with those at the margins of American society.

It is on this muddled question of where Jews really stood vis-à-vis American society that more work needs to be done, especially in light of both Arad's and Dollinger's portrayal of Jews' having inhabited a zone of dense psychological insecurity as late as the Second World War and beyond. The case for the second generation's at-homeness in the prosperous 1920s is not established simply by referring to Jews' rising income levels, as Alexander has done. As Benjamin Ginsberg has observed in his study of Jews, antisemitism, and American politics, the 1920s marked a time of "the most severe and systematic pattern of discrimination and exclusion" ever faced by American Jewry.[6]

Alexander takes only the briefest note of the antisemitic factor, dismissing it in the end as an inadequate explanation for distinctive Jewish behavior, given the fact that other groups, too, had faced adverse discrimination without embracing a strategy of "identifying down." Nevertheless, despite this drawback, he has substantially enriched the discussion surrounding the manner in which Jews introduced change in American high culture, the academy, and popular culture, despite resistance from the dominant white Protestant majority.[7]

Marc Dollinger's firm rejection of any essentialist argument concerning Jewish religion and liberalism is to be applauded. Throughout *Quest for Inclusion* he steadfastly links Jewish organizations' political postures to such immediate environmental factors as contextual shifts in the Jewish situation, changing trends in American affairs, and adjustments in the perceptions of liberalism. What requires further elucidation, however, is why this particular religious minority, among all such marginal groups in American society (take the Mormons, for instance), made political liberalism its hallmark. It is helpful in this regard to consider Alexander's suggestion that

some form of identity construction was at work here, rather than merely the pursuit of equalitarian integration.

Dollinger and Arad share a joint view of the American Jewish political tradition as a prudent search for protective coloration. Benjamin Ginsberg's aforementioned study provides an interesting contrast on this point, when he notes that adoption of a liberal stance in the interwar period was anything but safe or prudent; rather, it entailed entering the lists in a volatile political struggle whose outcome could in no way be assured.[8] Thus, while Dollinger adopts aspects of Ginsberg's view that Jewish liberalism was a path out of marginality, Ginsberg's corrective should be taken into account when evaluating the acculturative model. Certainly it behooves us to consider its implications for the question of Jewish docility that Arad raises in her study, since the risks undertaken by Jews and their allies (as Ginsberg sees it) do not square well with her thesis.

Given their widely divergent views of the Jews' actual status in American society in the 1920s, it is ironic that Alexander's elegant book about "Jazz age" Jews should lend weight, from yet a different quarter, to Ginsberg's point about the high stakes involved in the Jewish liberal strategy. Alexander's portrait of second-generation Jewish renegades, mavericks, and performers—and their ethnic home-ground admirers—reinforces the idea that, between the wars, Jews in America were anything but prudent or supine, either in their politics or their self-understanding.

If this argument has any merit—and I believe that it has—then Jewish political behavior in the face of the catastrophe of the Holocaust cannot reasonably be ascribed to a polite, don't-rock-the-boat tradition of long standing, dating back to before the Civil War. Suffice it to say that the last word on the subject has yet to be written.

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Notes

1. Alexander's account of Frankfurter and the Sacco and Vanzetti case appears, in abreviated form, as "Frankfurter Among the Anarchists," in *Studies in Contemporary Jewry,* vol. 17, *Who Owns Judaism? Public Religion and Private Faith in America and Israel,* ed. Eli Lederhendler (New York: 2001), 175–191.

2. Michael Rogin, *Blackface, White Noise: Jewish Immigrants in the Hollywood Melting Pot* (Berkeley: 1996).

3. Emphasis in the original; cf. 6, 181–182.

4. Jerold S. Auerbach, *Rabbis and Lawyers: The Journey From Torah to Constitution* (Bloomington: 1990), 181.

5. David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941–1945* (New York: 1985).

6. Benjamin Ginsberg, *The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State* (Chicago and London: 1993), 96.

7. Also see Susanne Klingenstein, *Jews in the American Academy, 1900–1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation* (New Haven: 1991); David A. Hollinger, *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture: Studies in Mid-Twentieth Century American Intellectual History* (Princeton: 1996); Stephen J. Whitfield, *In Search of American Jewish Culture* (Hanover, N.H.: 1999).

8. Ginsberg, *The Fatal Embrace,* 5–6.

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Book Reviews

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Antisemitism, Holocaust, and Genocide

Gerald Aalders, *Berooid: De beroofde joden en het Nederlandse restitutiebeleid sinds 1945*. Amsterdam: Boom, 2001. 464 pp.

Isaac Lipschits, *De kleine sjoa: Joden in naoorlogs Nederland*. Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2001. 206 pp.

In recent years, supplementary financial restitution for assets stolen during the Holocaust has become a major issue on the international Jewish agenda. In 1997, the Dutch government started to appoint a number of commissions to investigate restitution issues that had been reopened by the press. In this way, it averted a parliamentary inquiry. Based partly on the conclusions of the various commissions of inquiry, the government, insurance companies, banks, and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange eventually settled Jewish claims against them with representatives of the Dutch Jewish community. These two very different books deal with this financial restitution—and to some extent with the more basic issue of the Dutch treatment of Jews in the aftermath of the Holocaust.

The first book, whose title translates as *Penniless: The Plundered Jews and Dutch Restitution Policies since 1945*, was written by Gerald Aalders, a scholar who conducts research at the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation (NIOD). One of his earlier books deals with the looting of Dutch Jewish property during the Second World War.[1] Aalders focuses in this new book on issues such as the wartime preparation of restitution legislation by the Dutch government-in-exile in London, and how restitution efforts were eventually organized and carried out. He interprets the studies of various government commissions of inquiry, thus making their findings more accessible. He also deals with the rediscovery and very partial restitution of looted works of art (to this day a highly controversial topic) and the return of securities to their owners (a central issue in the debate on discrimination against the Jews by various postwar Dutch governments).

Isaac Lipschits, a retired professor of contemporary history at Groningen University, is the author of the second book. Though well researched, *De kleine sjoa* is nonetheless described by the author as a nonacademic work (although a detailed list of sources can be obtained on request). Lipschits has played a key role in the public debate about the revival of the restitution issue in the Netherlands. In order to maintain his independence, however, he has refused offers to be a member on any of the various committees dealing with the matter. This, then, is a personal account, whose

title (*The Little Shoah*) sums up his main thesis concerning the Dutch attitude toward Jews in the postwar period. "In the liberated Netherlands," he writes in his introduction, "the Jews were not physically threatened. However, verbal antisemitism became sharper; the despoilment of the Jews continued . . . the . . . isolation of Jews went on. . . . The reception was so cold, bureaucratic, hostile, humiliating, so disappointing, that I call the postwar period 'the time of the little Shoah'" (p. 10).

Had Anne Frank never written her diary, the myth of a generally benign Dutch attitude toward the Jews and of widespread Dutch resistance to the Nazis may never have gotten off the ground. Written while its author was being hidden by good Dutchmen, *The Diary of Anne Frank* ends before her family is betrayed by the bad ones. In fact, those who helped the Jews and took risks on their behalf constituted only a small part of the population. They merit great gratitude, but are hardly representative. As described in detail by NIOD historians and others, the greater part of the Dutch population, along with its bureaucracy, both willingly and efficiently assisted the German occupiers. Few Germans needed to be sent in to assemble and deport 110,000 Jews (of a total community of 140,000) to the death camps, where all but 5,000 perished. Visiting Israel in 2000, Dutch prime minister Wim Kok still denied any wartime Dutch responsibility. Failures of the Dutch government-in-exile in London continue to be overlooked, while popular literature still perpetuates the myth of broad-based Dutch resistance during the Second World War.

A new significant distortion, however, is emerging regarding the postwar period. Even today, Dutch politicians do not want to admit that democratic postwar governments, with full intent, seriously discriminated against members of the surviving Dutch Jewish community. For instance, in March 2000, just before the final debate on restitution, the government sent a document to the parliament in which it noted that there was "too much formalism, bureaucracy and . . . chill in the postwar restitution process." The government went on to express "sincere regrets" to "those who suffered then, without, however, presuming wrong intentions by those responsible."

In the battle over historical memory, Lipschits and the Dutch government belong to opposing camps: the former, to that of historical truth, the latter, to its embellishment. In his book, Lipschits describes many instances of unethical postwar behavior and discrimination against the Jews that hindered their social reintegration. In this sense, *De kleine sjoa* follows earlier historical work: for example, that of Jacques Presser, Dienke Hondius and Michal Citroen (on the general treatment of Dutch Jews upon their return from concentration camps or from hiding); Joel Fishman and Elma Verhey (on the hostile attitude of postwar Dutch authorities with regard to the placement of Jewish war orphans); Fishman and Chaya Brasz (on efforts to revive Jewish organizations after the war); and Ido de Haan (on Jews' memories of persecution within Dutch society).

In contrast, Aalders continues to waffle, as he has done during the past few years. In the introduction to *Berooid*, for example, he concludes that "in view of its aims, the restitution process has not failed, even though its execution has been a road of suffering" (p. 9). At the same time, he stresses that he has never spoken about the "success" of the process, and he skirts most of the issues regarding how the process could have been handled differently, indicating that it could have been—in some ways—without ever specifying how. (Aalders also acknowledges the criticism of his views

expressed at a conference held in 1998 at the Hebrew University on the subject of the Dutch war myth.) Thus, although *Berooid* is in many ways a solid and informative book, it essentially serves the continued government efforts to shape memory by rendering the Netherlands' postwar record vis-à-vis the Jews more palatable.

In the most recent round of the financial restitution process, the government largely achieved its goals in its confrontation with the weak Dutch Jewish community. Agreement was reached on payments that were substantially below what was due; the Jewish community helped it to prevent international Jewish organizations from getting involved; and the Netherlands' international image remained untarnished. Nonetheless, continuing criticism of the Netherlands' postwar behavior—which goes to the very roots of the Dutch value system—has not been silenced. Lipschits' book is just one example of a critique that goes far beyond the issue of financial restitution.

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Note

1. See Gerald Aalders, *Roof: De Ontvreemding van joods bezit tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (The Hague: 1999). An English translation of this book is in preparation.

Yair Auron, *The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian Genocide*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000. 405 pp.

Richard G. Hovannisian (ed.), *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999. 328 pp.

Great crimes don't go away. Their traces linger; the wounds fester; and try as they might, perpetrators are unable to silence the victims. The first great crime of the 20th century, sadly the precursor of holocausts to come, was the Armenian Genocide, but unlike subsequent great crimes it has lingered in the shadows of memory and been rendered "controversial" by a persistent campaign of denial. Yet year after year, the Genocide has returned to the public stage—in demonstrations, parliamentary resolutions, and a steady flow of scholarly investigations. Yair Auron's monograph on Zionism and the Genocide and the edited volume by Richard G. Hovannisian are two of the best of recent exposures of the what and why of the crimes of 1915 and the obscene attempts to cover them up. Here is where a student or journalist might fruitfully begin an honest effort to learn what so many would prefer that we forget.

Remembrance and Denial is composed of papers given at an 80th anniversary symposium at the University of California, Los Angeles in April 1995 that range broadly from historical studies of aspects of the Turkish massacres and deportations (by Stephen Astourian, Hilmar Kaiser, and Levon Marashlian) to close looks at the practices of genocide denial (Ara Sarafian, Hovannisian, Yves Ternon, Marc Nichanian,

Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton) and literary and memoir reconstructions (Yair Auron, Lorne Shirinian, Rubina Peroomian, and Donald E. Miller). The efforts to deny or distort the history of the Genocide are carefully documented here. What is most disturbing is how little the non-Armenian public, even in academic circles, knows about it and how a few writers have managed to falsify or trivialize the events of 1915–1916. In fact, the number of deniers is quite small—the most prominent in this account being Sanford Shaw, Justin McCarthy, Heath Lowry, and Bernard Lewis—but their influence is great by virtue of a pernicious alliance with the official campaign of falsification by the government of Turkey. Sadly, scholars of the Genocide have been required to spend much of their intellectual energy on refuting the claims of pseudo-scholarship, while a mere handful have turned to the hard work of explaining what happened in 1915–1916 and why.

The historical accounts by Astourian and Kaiser are important contributions to understanding the causes and the scope of what Armenians call *Aghed* (the Catastrophe). Astourian argues that the Genocide is primarily a product of Turkish nationalist ideology, formulated in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which reflected both elite and popular attitudes toward the Armenians. Religious conservatives and traditionalists such as Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909) perceived Armenians and other infidels as "overstepping the boundaries of their position in society, being ungrateful and disloyal to the empire, and constituting a danger to its territorial integrity" (p. 27). Through an innovative study of idioms, proverbs, and sayings, Astourian attempts to reach down into popular mentality. Turks, he shows, perceived Armenians as avaricious and greedy, and as unfaithful friends, cheats, and social climbers. Turkish nationalism (Turkism and Pan-Turkism) and ideas of national economy, most clearly expressed in the writings of Ziya Gok Alp, "excluded the ghiaours [infidels] from the nation and denied the identity of the Kurds, thereby promoting a racially and culturally homogeneous nation: modern Turkey" (p. 38). There simply was no place for Armenians in this new, nationalist vision of the Ottoman empire.

Kaiser attempts to answer one of the most vexing questions about the Genocide: the role of the Germans, then the principal allies of the Ottoman empire. He demonstrates that there was no uniform German position toward the Ottoman Armenians. On the one hand, the German government actively denied that massacres of Armenians were taking place, even though their consuls were reporting atrocities, and the military excused the actions of Lieutenant Colonel Böttrich, who signed an order to deport Armenians from the Baghdad railroad. On the other hand, German officials of the Baghdad Railroad Company tried to protect Armenians who were employed on the railroad, and other German civilians protested against the actions of the Turks. Arguing that German actions ranged from complicity to active resistance, Kaiser disputes the more radical assertion of a prominent scholar of the Genocide, Vahakn Dadrian, who maintains that both German military and civilian authorities were complicit in it. Kaiser and Astourian represent an important turn in Genocide scholarship toward careful empirical reconstruction with a minimum of polemic. Yet in both of their accounts Armenians remain somewhat in the background, victims rather than agents. It would be fascinating, for instance, to learn about Armenian proverbs about Turks and how their popular attitudes intersected with those of other Ottoman peoples, or to find out more about the Armenian employees of the Baghdad Railway.

In *The Banality of Indifference*, Israeli historian Yair Auron demonstrates the multiplicity of attitudes toward violence and genocide through a detailed study of Jewish, Zionist, and Israeli responses to the sufferings of the Armenians over the last century. While the founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, tried to bargain for advantages for his own people with Abdul Hamid II (both the target of Armenian violence and the initiator of violence against Armenians), other prominent Jewish leaders, such as Aaron Aaronsohn, condemned the atrocities visited upon a people so similar to the Jews. As reports came in concerning the brutalities of the Genocide, Jewish settlers in Palestine (who for the most part sided with Germany and the Central Powers) feared a similar fate and tried to assure Jamal Pasha, the commander of the Fourth Turkish Army in Syria, of their loyalty and their distinctiveness from the "treacherous" Armenians. Younger pro-British Zionists in the Yishuv, however, were inspired by the tragedy of the Armenians to form the Nili group in an attempt to carry out espionage against the Turks. Between the wars, Franz Werfel's popular novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, had a profound effect on young Jews in Palestine and in the European ghettos. Though Werfel himself was criticized by Zionists as an assimilated Jew who flirted with Christianity, his work became emblematic of resistance to assimilation and annihilation, and the Armenian defense on the Mountain of Moses was seen as a parallel tale to Jewish suffering.

Auron ends with an indictment of Israeli government policies that have attempted essentially to erase any memory of the Armenian Genocide and prohibit any comparison with the Jewish Holocaust. State authorities have repeatedly banned films, intervened against scholarly conferences, and discouraged educating the Israeli public about the first genocide of the century. Israeli's diplomats even lobbied on behalf of the Turkish government to keep mention of the Genocide out of the Holocaust Museum in Washington. But one mention did make it to the walls of the museum, the famous quotation of Hitler (disputed by the Turks), who asked on the eve of his invasion of Poland, "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?"

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Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. 605 pp.

In the wake of Hitler's accession to power, France emerged as an important haven for German and Central European Jews. By 1939, there were said to be more than 30,000 German and Austrian refugees in the country, the majority of whom were Jewish. In addition, France "hosted" between 15,000 and 20,000 illegal East European Jews fleeing antisemitic outrages and economic hardship in Germany, Poland, Romania, and Hungary.

Vicki Caron's *Uneasy Alliance* is the first comprehensive study of France's reception of Jewish refugees in the 1930s. The author presents what she believes is a more balanced analysis of the topic than is found in previous studies of French immigration policy and of the French Jewish community in the interwar era. Specifically, Caron

argues that rather than progressively hardening their policy toward refugees, French government leaders—at least until the last months of peace—traveled a "twisted road," in the course of which harsh laws were replaced by more liberal approaches. This came about, she writes, as a result of both practical economic and military considerations and the efforts of a coalition of "countervailing" pro-refugee forces.

Caron also maintains that in emphasizing political and ideological factors shaping anti-refugee popular sentiment, previous scholars have tended to ignore the role of middle-class groups in commerce and in the liberal professions, which sought to block the entrance of German Jews into the French economy. Finally, she stresses that native Jewish leaders, who heretofore have been portrayed as uniformly hostile to refugees, were in fact deeply split, with more sympathetic elements emerging as the dominant force in the latter half of the 1930s. In presenting what she maintains is a more complex picture of the plight of Jewish refugees in the 1930s and early 1940s—one in which individual personalities and events play cardinal roles—Caron also seeks to counter the commonly held assumption that Vichy's antisemitic policies were the inevitable result of attitudes and actions taken during the last decade of the Third Republic.

Uneasy Asylum is notable not only for its meticulous documentation (there are almost 200 pages of invaluable endnotes to accompany the 364 pages of text) but also for its fascinating insights into little-known aspects of the subject. Especially intriguing is Caron's discussion of the abortive and often cynical negotiations to settle Jewish refugees on the island of Madagascar, and of the efforts by government officials to empty out mass internment camps and mobilize foreigners for the war effort in the period between September 1939 and the German invasion of 1940.

Uneasy Asylum is clearly a major contribution to the field. However, in an effort to emphasize what she calls "historical contingency," Caron often overstates her case. The painful reality is that for all the efforts of pro-refugee elements in the 1930s, and for all the liberal programs of the Popular Front regime, they were largely ineffective. Caron is certainly justified in pointing out the variety of opinions toward refugees within the French Jewish community in the 1930s. (Indeed, a serious examination of the immigrant Jewish press would have made her argument even more convincing.) Yet it strains credibility to argue that the growing pro-refugee consensus within the native Jewish elite after *Kristallnacht* extended into the war and shaped the "laudable" efforts by the Union générale des israélites de France (UGIF) to "sustain the relief effort" (p. 320). Finally, as an early contributor to the study of French Jewry in the 1930s, I take issue with Caron's argument that previous historians have ignored the role of middle-class elements in fomenting anti-Jewish sentiments.

At times, Caron seems to recognize the weakness of her arguments by qualifying them to a point where they lose their significance. She readily admits, for example, that despite the Popular Front's efforts to alleviate the plight of refugees already in the country, in many ways its attitude toward refugees "did not differ significantly from that of its predecessors" (p. 170). Similarly, Caron notes that pro-refugee sentiment—which, she admits, was never strong—shrank considerably over the decade, and that by the outbreak of the war, the voices of moderation within the Jewish community were "reduced to almost nil" (p. 11).

In the end, one is left with the sense that, notwithstanding forces and attitudes that

led to fluctuations in refugee policy, long-range factors associated both with weaknesses in the Third Republic and with the deep-seated nature of French xenophobia (exacerbated in the 1930s) ultimately determined the fate of the Jews in France under Vichy. Caron rightly argues that such developments were not inevitable. Despite her best efforts, however, she does not convincingly demonstrate that the struggle between pro- and anti-refugee elements was waged on an equal footing throughout the 1930s, or that it was only as a result of the crisis of 1939 that hard-line proponents eventually gained the upper hand.

Although far from being a bold new approach to an important subject in French Jewish history, *Uneasy Alliance* provides a more nuanced view and significant documentary evidence for events and issues that have only been sketched out in previous historical studies. For these contributions alone, the book is worthy of serious examination.

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Inga Clendinnen, *Reading the Holocaust.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 227 pp.

This book, which unflinchingly engages the most disturbing issues surrounding the most disturbing events of the 20th century, should be required reading for anyone who has ever attempted to think seriously about the Holocaust. The author is a woman raised far from the epicenter of these events—an Australian, for whom Nazis, nevertheless, were the bogeymen of her childhood. She approaches the Holocaust unapologetically as neither a witness nor a scholar but as nothing more than a reader, though one, she notes, who is also a historian. She is a careful and discriminating reader who has mastered the most important literature on the subject, both primary and secondary, available in English. She has done her reading with remarkably fresh eyes, yet she is hardly naive. Her prior work has included an attempt to understand the culture of the Aztecs, and especially the centrality of torture and human sacrifice in that culture.[1]

Reading the Holocaust is a series of essays linked by a common thread: a refusal to mystify the Holocaust, to view it as something other than a historical event. Clendinnen is hardly the first to adopt such a stance; writings by Yehuda Bauer and Michael Marrus come to mind.[2] What is new is the rigorous consistency of her approach, which leads her to question less a method than a contemporary habit of mind: "I want to dispel the 'Gorgon effect'—the sickening of imagination and curiosity and the draining of the will which afflicts so many of us when we try to look squarely at the persons and processes implicated in the Holocaust" (p. 4). Responding to the implication emanating from writers such as Eli Wiesel and institutions such as Yad Vashem that "the only possible and proper stance for the observer is one of awed incomprehension" (p. 21), Clendinnen reminds us that precisely "in the face of a catastrophe on this scale so deliberately inflicted, perplexity is an indulgence we cannot afford" (p. 5), and proposes that

> understanding can best be advanced by unglamorous techniques we use every day for the evaluation of gossip. These are the same techniques used by biographers and historians: the piecing together of contexts, the establishing of sequences of actions, the inferring of the likely intentions behind those actions from our knowledge of the individuals involved and our general stock of knowledge about human motivations (p. 20).

Adhering to such principles, Clendinnen is able repeatedly to shed light where others have looked away.

It makes sense that she should discover a kindred spirit in Primo Levi, the meticulous chronicler of hell, about whom she cites Chekhov: "to chemists there is nothing unclean in the world" (p. 42). Unlike Elie Wiesel in *Night*, who seems to be "looking for an obstinately absent God rather than at the humans all around him" (p. 44), Levi is rooted in the human—to such a degree that despite his early intention to memorialize the "drowned," those sucked under and lost in the horror, Levi's books are essentially "a celebration of individuals who remained individuals despite dehumanising circumstance" (p. 45). At the same time, Levi's humanism functions as an obstacle to certain paths of understanding. Clendinnen points out that he is incapable of any empathy with the *Sonderkommando*, the squads of Jewish laborers used to despoil and dispose of the bodies of the gassed. Here Levi sees nothing but debasement. But Clendinnen follows them into the "zone of fire" (p. 66) and suggests disquietingly that at certain moments between the *Sonderkommando* and the Nazis, "some small sense of community and some recognition of the other as a comrade seems to have bloomed in that unlikely place, and in that blooming lightened one corner of the darkness that was Auschwitz" (p. 74).

Nor does Levi attempt to understand the motivations of the perpetrators. For him they are nothing but brutish Germans doing what comes naturally. Levi shares this attitude, Clendinnen notes, with other writers such as Aharon Appelfeld and even, albeit more indirectly, with some historians. On this matter, Clendinnen subjects Saul Friedländer's reading of Himmler's speech to senior SS officers in October 1943 to a pointed critique.[3] Basing himself, according to Clendinnen, on only one part of the speech, Friedländer concludes that the Final Solution represents "an amorality beyond all categories of evil." Responds Clendinnen: "Where are we to find the springs of action in this swamp of amorality?" (p. 86), whereupon she turns toward the more traditional categories of historical understanding, insisting on "teasing out why people act as they do" (p. 88). Baffled by the "opaqueness" of Auschwitz commandant Rudolph Hoess' autobiography, she declares: "What I need at this point of paralysis is neither grand theory nor a dismissive classification, but a good biographer: someone sufficiently sensitive, informed and intelligent to help me see how a particular man could come to be what he was" (p. 107). She discovers her biographer in Gitta Sereny and her books on Treblinka commandant Franz Stangl and Hitler's architect Albert Speer.[4]

Reflecting on the leaders, Clendinnen recalls the power of a vision that insisted that lives "unworthy of life" must be terminated: "I was shaken to realize that Hitler was . . . so systematic a racialist that [as the war was ending] he could declare his total unconcern as to the fate of surviving Germans (he calls them garbage) because the fact of their survival in a time of all-out struggle had defined them as 'inadequates' anyway" (p. 99). For the "ordinary" murderers, Clendinnen contrasts Christopher

Browning's meticulous concern for the process whereby such men were produced with Daniel Goldhagen's lack of curiosity "about these men and what they did, because he believes he already knows why they—indeed, why all Germans—did as they did" (p. 118), namely, because of what Goldhagen calls "eliminationist anti-Semitism."[5] Finally, and most originally, she looks at the SS personnel who ran the camps. Levi terms their behavior "useless violence"; he and others insist on the absurdity of such rituals as the interminable roll calls at Auschwitz. Perhaps not so useless from the perspective of the SS men themselves, responds Clendinnen, who goes on to consider the possible subjective gratifications for what anthropologists call "ritual conducts." "Theatre was everywhere in Auschwitz" (p. 145), she stresses, theatre staged by and starring the members of the SS, who could thereby attempt to transform their dreary and hellish world into spectacle. Even Clendinnen, however, discovers in the behavior of the SS certain kinds of cruelties "which continue to escape final diagnosis" (p. 154).

Her closing essay examines the extraordinary problems of representing the Holocaust. Characteristically, she demands careful distinction between historical and fictional writing. The difference between them, for Clendinnen, is a moral one; the reader has "no human responsibility" toward the characters in a novel, but in a story that claims to be true, she relates to the protagonists morally "because they are my fellow-humans, whose blood is real and whose deaths are final and cannot be cancelled by turning back a page" (p. 170). Above all, she argues for the centrality of writing in general and historical writing in particular. Film, in contrast (with an occasional brilliant exception such as Claude Lanzmann's *Shoah*), "remains a drunken giant, inept for the delicate imaginative and critical work of transmitting our uncertain understandings of the worlds which have closed behind us" (p. 176).

Not the least of the many virtues of this book, a sort of metavirtue, is that it is a work of healing. In an age of rupture when intellectual trends have mirrored reality by declaring the category of the "human" to be empty, the Holocaust has loomed as the ultimate prooftext for such readings. Inga Clendinnen's insistence that even the Holocaust can be subjected to the demands of human reason reaffirms precisely what most of the 20th century denied. Her work may be hopelessly old-fashioned but it may also be post-postmodern. Regardless, it is useful to recall the statement that Clendinnen has adopted as an epigram for the book as a whole, the words of a great historian at perhaps the worst moment of the awful century just past: "When all is said and done, a single word, 'understanding,' is the beacon light of our studies" (Marc Bloch, *The Historian's Craft*, 1944).

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Notes

1. Inga Clendinnen, *Aztecs: An Interpretation* (Cambridge: 1991).

2. See Yehuda Bauer, "Against Mystification: The Holocaust as a Historical Phenomenon," in his *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle: 1978), 30–49; Michael Marrus, *The Holocaust in History* (Hanover, N.H.: 1987).

3. See Saul Friedländer, "The 'Final Solution': On the Unease in Historical Interpretation,"

in *Lessons and Legacies: The Meaning of the Holocaust in a Changing World*, ed. Peter Hayes (Evanston: 1991), 23–35.

4. See Gitta Sereny, *Into that Darkness: An Examination of Conscience* (New York: 1974); idem, *Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth* (London: 1995).

5. See Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: 1992); Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (London: 1996).

Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. xi + 527 pp.

Jeffrey Herf has written an absorbing and detailed study of how postwar German leaders sought political power by establishing a "master narrative" of the Nazi period. The role of historical interpretation in establishing political legitimacy and ethnic identity is a favorite topic in contemporary political science. The past is used to justify the structure and extent of the territorial state, its forms of government and society, and the ethnic and social makeup of its population. In short, the past is used by a people to tell itself—and others—who it is.

While such narratives are the work both of elites and masses, the storytelling initiative most often comes from political elites. These elites focus on one central task: to justify a particular arrangement of power favorable to themselves. Thus, as Herf demonstrates, the construction of a legitimizing narrative cannot be separated from the elites' strategies to gain and hold political power.

In the case of Germany, a notorious preoccupation with the history and identity of the German people was given added intensity and political relevance by the horrific Nazi era and especially by the unparalleled crime of the Holocaust. How could Germans construct a usable past out of such morally dubious material? As it turned out, the process took very different forms in the two German states and societies that emerged under the impress of the Cold War. Herf compares East and West German responses to the past, with a particular focus on the ways in which the postwar narratives dealt with the relationship of Germans to Jews. In so doing, he restores the Jews to their proper place at the center of German history—a place from which it had long been the goal of antisemities, and specifically Nazis, to remove them.

Herf concentrates on the public (and to some extent, also the private) writings and speeches of political leaders, as well as on official commemorations. He begins with politicians-in-exile and covers the broad spectrum of the first postwar leadership cohort. Although his detailed analysis is concentrated on the earlier period when the narrative of German postwar history was first being established, several chapters cover later German perspectives on the Nazi era and the Jewish-German relationship, particularly in the Federal Republic and in the unified Germany of the past decade. *Divided Memory* is thus a "study of how anti-Nazi German political leaders interpreted the Nazi past . . . the mixture of belief and interest, ideology and the drive for power which shaped the political memory and public narratives" of postwar Germany (pp. 1–2).

Herf comes to a paradoxical finding: Jewish issues were (and remained) prominent in West Germany but were soon suppressed in the East. In the officially and overtly

"antifascist" German Democratic Republic (GDR), domestic and foreign policy considerations, plus ideological prejudices, choked off open discussion of Jewish matters, whereas in the Federal Republic, the presence of an active democratic opposition constrained the inclinations of conservative political leaders to minimize discussion of Nazi crimes and the degree of responsibility to be borne by the German nation.

In East Germany, the pivotal figure was Paul Merker, a prominent Communist leader and member of the Communist Party Central Committee. Although not himself Jewish, Merker stood out among post-1945 German Communist leaders for his willingness to engage Jewish concerns, including compensation and support for Jewish statehood. Herf ascribes this stance in part to Merker's wartime exile in Mexico, where he came into contact with a wide range of exiles in addition to North American Jewish representatives. In postwar East Germany, however, this history marginalized Merker. His focus on Jewish concerns ran counter to the supposed primacy of class interests. Moreover, contacts with international ("cosmopolitan") Jewish representatives were translated by Stalin into treason, and support for a Jewish state was abandoned in favor of a pro-Arab foreign policy—an important point for a country that, prior to 1973–1974, was desperately seeking diplomatic recognition outside the Soviet bloc.

Consequently, "German Communism's master narrative" featured Communist fighters rather than Jewish victims; denied any long-term GDR responsibility to the world Jewish community; and stressed Soviet primacy in the defeat of Hitler. Several chapters detail this partly forgotten struggle of the early 1950s, in which the "Muscovite" faction around Walter Ulbricht defeated that of Western and internal exiles for leadership of East Germany.

Herf next turns his attention to the Western occupation zones, and especially to the varying narrative approaches of West Germany's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer; its first head of state, Theodor Heuss; and three Social Democratic opposition leaders, Kurt Schumacher, Ernst Reuter, and Carlo Schmid. While Herf's sympathies clearly lie with politicians such as Schumacher who strove to build a German democracy based on confrontation with the past, he also shows understanding for those who put social peace ahead of justice in their list of national priorities. Adenauer, for example, chose to build democracy with the compromised human material at hand and therefore stressed *German* suffering, avoiding a clear reckoning with those who caused Jewish suffering. In Herf's formulation, Adenauer chose democracy over memory, and the "delay and thus denial of justice was the single greatest failing of Adenauer's approach to building democracy after Nazism" (p. 288).

Herf does not doubt Adenauer's personal revulsion against Nazi crimes but notes that Adenauer understood those crimes as part of a broader trend of German militarism and centralism—just as Ulbricht, for his part, understood them in a Marxist-Leninist context. Neither leader (at least privately) had a high opinion of the Germans' political inclinations; both refrained from making Jewish suffering a central issue in order to build what each of them understood to be a better Germany.

Over time, of course, unresolved questions about the fate and role of the Jews in German life recurred in both Germanys. As democratization of the GDR took hold in 1989–1990, East German leaders began to acknowledge their nation's complicity in Jewish suffering and consequently distanced themselves from the more virulent anti-

Israel stands of the past. In West Germany, such issues were debated all along. Moreover, as Herf shows, political attitudes in present-day Germany often derive from varying interpretations of the nation's past, as seen in the debate over German involvement in Bosnia in the 1990s.

Herf usefully shows that, contrary to widely held assumptions, East Germany did not de-Nazify much more thoroughly than West Germany. Both regimes carried out a de facto exculpation of low-level Nazi party functionaries, employing many of them in high positions. Of perpetrators brought to justice in West Germany, some 6,700 were convicted between 1945 and 1985 (more than 80 percent by Allied courts). In East Germany, the Soviets convicted about 12,500 individuals; some of these, however, were postwar opponents of the Sovietization of East Germany. After 1951, East German war crime convictions dropped sharply. Per capita, convictions in the two Germanys were roughly equal until 1964 (pp. 335–337).

This richly detailed, cogently argued and stimulating book would have been improved by judicious editing: Herf repeats a number of points in various chapters. He devotes many pages to an overview of such issues as removing the statute of limitations for Holocaust crimes, the furor over Adenauer's appointment of such tainted figures as Hans Globke, the establishment of a restitution program for Jewish victims, and the series of German war crimes trials beginning in the 1960s. This survey is too often a perfunctory run-through of political events; Herf does not always show how a particular event relates to the "master narratives" established earlier. Finally, although the book focuses on opinions and statements of members of the political elites, some indication of the popular response to various pronouncements would have been welcome, not least because this would have allowed Herf to show whether leaders modified their narratives to make them more effective.

Beyond the scholarly value of this book, a reader also takes away from it a residue of sadness at the loss of what was once a largely symbiotic community of Jewish and non-Jewish Germans. Herf quotes Theodor Heuss' speaking of "Germany's infinite loss" beyond his own personal loss of German Jewish friends (pp. 313–315). Germany today, albeit united, will remain an amputated society unless and until its Jewish component comes back to life.

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Itamar Levin, *The Last Deposit: Swiss Banks and Holocaust Victims' Accounts*, trans. Natasha Dornberg. Westport: Praeger, 1999. xvi + 250 pp.

Gregg Rickman, *Swiss Banks and Jewish Souls*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1999. xvii + 294 pp.

On August 12, 1998, U.S. District Court Judge Edward Korman announced an agreement in principle between the major Swiss banks, Jewish organizations, and the plaintiffs in the class-action suits launched against the Swiss banks. The arrangement called for the banks to pay a total of $1.25 billion, in four payments over the course

of three years, "in a manner to be determined." Two years later, on July 26, 2000, Korman ratified the agreement and gave the parties a week to settle all outstanding issues. The final order and judgment was issued on August 9; three and a half months later, Korman approved the distribution plan, according to which $800 million would be allocated to cover dormant accounts of Holocaust victims in the Swiss banks, with the remaining funds to be paid to former slave laborers, refugees denied asylum in Switzerland, and survivors whose assets were looted by the Nazis. With the release by Korman of $43 million for payment on July 17, 2001, the practical implementation of the agreement finally began.

This sequence of events (occurring after both books under review went to press) marks the culmination of a nearly decade-long campaign waged by Jewish organizations and American politicians against the Swiss banks. The initial goal was to force the banks to acknowledge their failure to return funds deposited before the Second World War by Jews who were murdered during the Holocaust, and to compensate the rightful heirs. Over time, however, a wider range of issues relating to Swiss behavior during the war became the focus of debate—most significantly, Swiss business ties with Nazi Germany and the government's stringently legalistic approach toward Jewish refugees seeking a haven in Switzerland.

The Last Deposit and *Swiss Banks and Jewish Souls* present the same basic story, albeit from somewhat different vantage points. Itamar Levin, an Israeli, emphasizes the role of the Jewish organizations, particularly of the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency, and those Israeli politicians who helped them. Gregg Rickman, in contrast, focuses on U.S. Senator Alfonse D'Amato (for whom he worked) and presents events from an American perspective.

As both books demonstrate, Swiss duplicity began immediately after the Second World War, when the government bypassed its own parliament to sign treaties with Poland and Hungary. As a result, funds originally earmarked for refugee rehabilitation were used to compensate Swiss citizens whose properties had been confiscated by the Communists. Similarly, Switzerland ignored a commitment it had made to the United States, according to which German assets were to be applied to refugee rehabilitation. Moreover, violating the spirit if not the letter of its own law concerning the return of property without heirs, the Swiss government over the years consistently ignored moral considerations in its pursuit of financial self-interest.

What was true of the Swiss government was even more true of the Swiss banks, whose enormous power and influence enabled them to act more or less as they pleased. For years, the banks took no practical measures to make a list of dormant accounts, let alone seek out the heirs of those who had made the deposits. From the early 1960s, when laws were passed to compel registration of the accounts, the banks engaged in delaying tactics. At the same time, they effectively rebuffed the efforts of heirs who sought access to their relatives' accounts, demanding that they produce death certificates, notarized wills, and the like—which obviously did not exist for most Holocaust victims.

Such appalling behavior on the part of the Swiss gained widespread international exposure only in 1995, when Jewish leaders, especially those of the World Jewish Congress, decided to take action. Initially, the sponsors of the campaign focused on the plight of the relatives of Holocaust victims who had failed to recover their fami-

lies' assets: individual cases such as those of Estelle Sapir, Greta Beer, Jacob Friedman and Gizella Weisshaus were frequently featured in media accounts. It was not long, however, before the focus of the campaign was broadened to the larger question of Swiss-German relations during the Second World War, as evidence was uncovered regarding wartime Swiss policies that had severely damaged Allied interests as well as adversely affecting many refugees seeking asylum.

Given this change in focus and scope, it seems clear that those involved in the campaign against the banks made little or no effort to chart their course beforehand, nor did they assess possible consequences on attitudes toward the Jews and the manner in which the Holocaust was perceived. This lack of planning seems puzzling, if not irresponsible. However, neither book makes much of the point—perhaps understandably, since both Levin and Rickman write as participants rather than as objective observers. Rickman, as noted, worked for D'Amato; as legislative director of the senator's staff, he was actively involved in the campaign. And Levin, a journalist, nonetheless takes a partisan approach in his account, even attributing the involvement of Avraham Burg, then chairman of the Jewish Agency, to an article Levin had written for an Israeli business publication.

Considering the authors' backgrounds, it is not surprising that neither book provides much analysis, let alone criticism, of the campaign against the banks (among other things, it led to tension between Switzerland and Israel, heightened antisemitism in Switzerland, and a good deal of acrimony among Jewish organizations vying for a share in the ultimate settlement). Levin, to his credit, does offer some insight into why the World Jewish Congress and the Jewish Agency took up the fight when they did (there were no other major issues on their agendas) and how leaders of these two organizations differed from their more cautious predecessors (living in the United States or in Israel and having come of age after the Holocaust, they believed that Jews were not only entitled but obligated to demand their rights). In general, however, both Levin and Rickman focus more on description than on serious and objective analysis.

The Last Deposit and *Swiss Banks and Jewish Souls* tell their complicated story with passion, and the historical account presented in each book is more or less corroborated by the other. Both books, for example, correctly note the tremendous importance of the financial sanctions threatened against the American branches of the Swiss banks, first by the U.S. Senate banking committee chaired by D'Amato and later by other New York-based politicians. They accurately record serious tactical mistakes made by Swiss leaders, which eventually forced them to agree to an enormous financial settlement. Levin and Rickman also clearly demonstrate the vital role played by historical research in the campaign, particularly the way in which information was exploited to discredit both the Swiss government and particularly the Swiss National Bank.

To my mind, the revelations of Switzerland's wartime financial dealings with Nazi Germany and the heartless Swiss treatment of Jewish refugees are the most significant outcome of the campaign against the banks, yet neither author acknowledges this. On the contrary, both Levin and Rickman seem to view the importance of these revelations only as they served the instrumental purpose of gaining a larger settlement. Thus it is not surprising that the financial aspects of the campaign are overem-

phasized in both books. Levin, for example, concludes by asserting that in the wake of the settlement, European countries face the "real test" of choosing between "real penitence: restitution of . . . looted property" or its continued theft (p. 224). Along the same lines, Avraham Burg claims in his forward to Levin's book that "there could be no greater mission of human justice" than the efforts to restore Jewish property. Rickman, too, concludes his book by emphasizing the great importance of the compensation agreement. Ultimately, he notes, the dispute was "between Swiss banks and Jewish souls," a value judgment also reflected in the title of his book.

As one who has been involved for many years in the efforts to facilitate the prosecution of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, I find these claims bombastic. The crimes in question were not grand larceny but the most significant case of genocide in the annals of mankind. The enormous importance attributed to the campaign against the Swiss banks is thus exaggerated and self-serving. In focusing almost exclusively on this dimension, both Levin and Rickman overlook an important component of critical analysis.

The following example may help to illustrate the problematic nature of both these accounts. Over the long course of the campaign to obtain compensation from the Swiss, numerous proposals were made concerning who should be the ultimate recipients of the funds received. Obviously, survivors had priority; but given their dwindling numbers, it was clear that additional resources would be available. How should such funds be allocated? Causes mentioned most often were Holocaust education, humanitarian projects, and programs to strengthen Jewish education. To the best of my knowledge, throughout the entire campaign, those involved never suggested allocating funds for the apprehension or prosecution of Holocaust perpetrators, or even for the identification of those who were responsible for Swiss financial misconduct during and after the war. Nor were these issues raised during the course of the campaign, notwithstanding the fact that morality and historical justice were the key arguments marshaled to press the case. In the absence of such discussion, the campaign was essentially reduced to a drive for financial compensation, which—although entirely justified—is not as morally compelling as efforts to bring the guilty to justice.

While *The Last Deposit* and *Swiss Banks and Jewish Souls* are quite helpful in chronicling the campaign against the Swiss banks, they do not offer serious analysis of its genesis, conduct, or implications. One can only hope that historians will address these important issues in the future.

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Dan Michman (ed.), *Belgium and the Holocaust: Jews, Belgians, Germans.* Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1998. xi + 593 pp.

This volume is a compilation of papers presented at a conference on the Holocaust in Belgium, which was held in 1989 at Bar-Ilan University. About half of these papers have already been published in French under the title *Les Juifs de Belgique: de l'immigration au génocide, 1925–1945* (1994).

In an interesting introductory essay, Dan Michman, a specialist on Dutch Jewry during the Second World War, analyzes general trends in the historical research on the Holocaust and offers insights concerning the specific research on Belgium. Certainly in comparison with Dutch historiography, the historical research on Jewish communities in Belgium and the Holocaust started very late. A number of studies were published in the 1960s, but it was not until two decades later that the first in-depth history appeared. Authored by Maxime Steinberg, the three-volume *L'Etoile et le fusil* (1983–1986) analyzed the political history of the Holocaust in Belgium, focusing mainly on the German perpetrators and armed Jewish resistance. It did not, however, describe the growth of Jewish communities in Belgium or the Jews' relations with Gentiles, simply because no research in this field then existed.

According to Michman (who rarely relates specifically to Belgian politics or Belgian historiography), the late start of research can be explained mainly by the composition of the Belgian Jewish communities. For the most part, the Jews residing in Belgium in 1940—about 65,000 in number, as defined by Nazi criteria— were the product of large-scale immigration from Eastern Europe that had begun at the end of the 19th century. Although Belgian law made it easy for Belgian-born foreigners to acquire Belgian nationality, only 5,000 of these 65,000 Jews had Belgian nationality. Approximately half of the Jewish community perished during the war years. (Comparative figures for Dutch and French Jewry are 85 percent and 25 percent, respectively.) Further, many of the survivors did not remain in Belgium, but instead moved on to Israel or to the United States. In contrast to France, Germany, and the Netherlands, very few Jews in Belgium felt a strong loyalty to the country.

In *L'Etoile et le fusil*, Steinberg also points to the predominance of recent immigrants among the Jews in Belgium in 1940, arguing that this was the key to when and how the Jews were deported. Similar to the Nazi policy in France, the German occupation authorities targeted Belgium's Jewish citizens relatively late, in the summer of 1943, although a year earlier they had engaged in an intense xenophobic campaign to enlist the (passive) acquiescence of the Belgian administration.

Along with Steinberg, members of the "new generation" of historians (who were only starting their research back at the time of the conference), present their main findings in the volume under review. Rudy Van Doorslaer, for instance, gives a short overview of his research on the increasing Communist influence on organized Jewry in interwar Belgium, which resulted in a strong Jewish presence in the Communist-led resistance. Lieven Saerens investigates the attitude of bystanders in Antwerp, the most important Belgian Jewish community, and describes the antisemitic Antwerp New Order organizations that lent a hand in the deportation of the city's Jewish population. Aiding the antisemites was the indifference—and at times outright cooperation—of the local administration, which partly explains how it was that roughly two thirds of the Jews registered in Antwerp were to become victims of the Holocaust, a much higher figure than in any other Belgium community.

This Belgian historiography is supplemented by contributions from Israeli historians who, while for the most part not experts on Belgium, are able to use their broader expertise to analyze Israeli sources on the Holocaust in Belgium. Both Michman and Hava Wagman point to the need to further investigate Zionist and Orthodox Jewish groups; compared to the copious research on Communist Jews, there is a striking lack

of material on the former. The French historians Danielle Delmaire and Lucien Lazare focus on Jews who fled to France at the outbreak of the war, noting that these refugees essentially disappeared within the larger French Jewish population (more detailed analysis, however, might have yielded different results). Judith Tydor Baumel describes vividly the Belgian connection in New York, where Orthodox diamond traders who had fled Antwerp created a *landsmanshaft*, although her article is limited to the internal history of this community and does not refer, for example, to the contacts between the New York community and the survivors in the Antwerp community. Four other contributions from Israel, based in the main on oral testimonies, describe the experience of Belgian Jewish children who survived the war. The essay by Arye Riesel is the most interesting of these, detailing how war orphans mostly sheltered by Christian families and institutions during the war were returned to Jewish life and, in keeping with the heterogeneity of the Belgian Jewish communities, were reeducated in a wide variety of ways.

As noted, Holocaust research on Belgium began late, but increasing interest in the Holocaust will undoubtedly update and expand it. Commemoration posters and the establishment of a museum of the Holocaust on the former assembly point for deportees in Mechelen testify to this recent, vivid interest, as does the creation of a research team to investigate the issue of stolen property of Belgian Holocaust victims. The hiding of Jewish children during the war has also become a popular research topic, stimulated in part by the Belgian branch of the Hidden Child Foundation.

This book is the first English overview of research on the Belgian Holocaust, and it should prove to be a useful introduction for the interested reader. Those familiar with Dutch and French-language research have less to learn from it, although the Israeli contributors point to some hitherto neglected aspects of Belgian historiography. Hopefully the Israeli contribution will be a stimulant for additional research.

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Ernestine Schlant, *The Language of Silence: West German Literature and the Holocaust.* New York: Routledge, 1999. x + 277 pp.

In this wide-ranging survey of West German literary responses to the Holocaust, Ernestine Schlant has done scholars and teachers a considerable service. Choosing texts by the non-Jewish writers Heinrich Böll, Wolfgang Koeppen, Günter Grass, Hanns-Josef Ortheil, Hermann Lenz, Gert Hofmann, Peter Härtling, Alfred Andersch, Bernhard Schlink, Peter Schneider, W.G. Sebald, and others, and examining key passages in often minute detail, she charts the awkward, halting, and sometimes inept ways in which a barely imaginable series of atrocities was acknowledged, registered, and finally mourned. Schlant is clear that to record data is not enough: after so many violent deaths, the compatriots and descendants of those who murdered the Jews cannot remain wholly free of guilt. Either they deny their complicity or else they must confront their guilt, work through it, and engage in what in German is called the "work

of mourning" (*Trauerarbeit*). Schlant's analyses are usefully interwoven with a summary account of major events in West German history, from the currency reform of 1948 to the student protests and terrorism that culminated in the "German autumn" of 1977, to the public controversies of the 1980s, to unification and its aftermath.

Denial can take many forms, and tracing their variety provides much of the substance of Schlant's literary analysis. Outright antisemitism has been rare in the past 50 years, partly because its public expression is impermissible. The exception, Rainer Werner Fassbinder's grossly antisemitic and ostensibly anticapitalist play, *Der Müll, die Stadt und der Tod* (*Garbage, the City and Death*), is briefly discussed here (though not the novel of 1973 on which it was based, Gerhard Zwerenz's *der Erde ist unbewohnbar wie der Mond* [*The Earth is Uninhabitable like the Moon*]). Schlant is interested in the subtler form of antisemitism that she finds in Peter Härtling's unimportant but symptomatic novel, *Felix Guttmann* (1985), which portrays a German Jew who avoids the Holocaust by emigrating to Palestine, but whose attachment to Germany lingers, such that he is drawn back in 1948. While such a trajectory is not implausible, Schlant may well be right in arguing that Härtling has created this Jewish survivor as a father-substitute who dispenses symbolic forgiveness. She goes further in charging Härtling with "an underlying lack of interest" in Jewish experience "that can be viewed as anti-Semitic" (p. 180). Here she is influenced by Guy Stern's argument, which she quotes a few pages earlier, that "an omission of a declaration of sympathy for Jewish suffering" should be counted as "silent antisemitism."[1] Given the vast differences between Härtling and Fassbinder, however, I should be uneasy about applying the term "antisemitism" here and would prefer to regard Härtling's ill-judged novel as a clumsy piece of philosemitism.

In recent discussions, philosemitism rather than antisemitism has emerged as the principal obstacle to an honest portrayal of Jews in postwar German literature. This has been argued most forcefully by Ruth Klüger.[2] She has drawn attention to the number of respected postwar German novels that do include Jews as suffering or narrowly escaping the Holocaust, but which present the Jewish characters either as irredeemably alien in speech and manners or as passively dependent on benevolent Germans to ensure their survival. Though harsh and unsubtle, Klüger's critique is not easy to refute. Schlant agrees with it unreservedly, as is particularly clear from her account of Grass' *Die Blechtrommel* (*The Tin Drum*) (1959). A major Jewish character in this novel, the toy shop owner Sigismund Markus, has been the focus of critical controversy. Grass doubtless meant to make him an attractive figure in his unrequited love for Agnes Matzerath, as well as a martyr who has his shop looted and is himself killed by Nazis on *Kristallnacht*. Klüger, however, followed by Schlant, discerns in Markus the stereotype of the lustful Jew, while Sander Gilman sees his Yiddish-inflected language as typifying the damaged discourse readily ascribed to German Jews.[3] The debate over Marcus continues. Curiously, neither Klüger nor Schlant mentions another Jewish character in *Die Blechtrommel*, Herr Fajngold, who has lost his family in Treblinka and who has taken part in an uprising and escape from the camp. Surely Grass deserves some credit not only for mentioning the death camps in his reckoning with German history but also for recalling that Jews could and did resist their oppressors.

Writers of less talent and stature than Grass are easily caught out in evasions of the historical truth. Schlant is properly severe on the group of authors who in the late 1970s focused on conflict between the generations and used the Holocaust as a stick with which to beat their parents. Her sympathies are with those writers who help us to understand how moral obtuseness and historical amnesia are created. Hermann Lenz, still a marginal and little-read figure, is praised for showing in his novel of the Eastern Front, *Neue Zeiten* (*New Times*) (1975), how the protagonist semi-deliberately fails to register the atrocities going on around him. Gert Hofmann's novel of 1979, *Die Denunziation* (*The Denunciation*), is also commended for showing just how uncertain and deceptive the memory of trauma can be. One of Schlant's guiding principles is that clarity, certainty, and closure have no place in post-Holocaust fiction. An honest reckoning with the past requires a painful reshaping of the narrator's personality in the encounter with suppressed memories. It is consistent that she should end with a positive assessment of W.G. Sebald's meditative, semi-documentary novel of 1992, *Die Ausgewanderten* (*The Emigrants*), though she notes that Sebald's ingrained melancholy seems to rule out any possibility that his mourning over the Holocaust might lead to liberation from its shadow.

If this ambitious study sometimes provokes disagreement, that is no defect, given its urgent and intrinsically controversial material. Some inaccurate references to "Bertold" Brecht (p. 22), Ludwig "Erhardt" (p. 52), Oskar "Mazerath" (p. 69), and "Hendryk" Broder (p. 237) should be corrected in a future edition; the formulaic references to critics as "literary scholar X" could be pruned; and German originals should be cited as well as their translations. Yet all students of the period will profit from this book, and it will be an invaluable companion to university courses.

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Notes

1. Also see Guy Stern, "The Rhetoric of Anti-Semitism in Postwar American Literature," in *Anti-Semitism in Times of Crisis*, ed. Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz (New York: 1991), 291–310, esp. 304.

2. See Ruth Klüger Angress, "A 'Jewish Problem' in German Postwar Fiction," *Modern Judaism* 5 (1985), 215–233; for a later German version, see Ruth Klüger, *Katastrophen: Über deutsche Literatur* (Göttingen: 1994), 9–38.

3. See Sander L. Gilman, "Jewish Writers in Contemporary Germany: The Dead Author Speaks," in Gilman and Katz (eds.), *Anti-Semitism in Times of Crisis*, 311–342.

Efraim Zuroff, *The Response of Orthodox Jewry in the United States to the Holocaust: The Activities of the Vaad ha-Hatzalah Rescue Committee 1939–1945.* New York and Hoboken: Yeshiva University Press and Ktav, 2000. xxiv + 316 pp.

Despite an outpouring of writings, Holocaust research has yet to come to grips with some important themes. To cite just one example, American and British government policies toward rescue, such as they were, have been repeatedly treated, and later efforts on the subject have not necessarily proved better than earlier ones. In contrast, the history of the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, which includes the fate of a huge body of looted Jewish cultural treasures and their recovery, remains unattended.[1]

Another important institution in Holocaust rescue efforts, Vaad ha-Hatzalah—Hatzoloh, to its own people—has likewise been neglected, in large part because existing Vaad ha-Hatzalah records were long unavailable to outside researchers. Now, however, Efraim Zuroff, a scholar of solid Orthodox credentials (an important point for the Agudath Israel custodians of the Vaad archives) has written this long-needed history of Vaad ha-Hatzalah until 1944. Originally a doctoral dissertation, this book is a work of distinction that merits serious attention.

The first necessary observation is that Zuroff's work combines seriousness of approach with competent scholarship. He knows thoroughly the history of the Second World War and the Holocaust, and he is familiar both with the Orthodox world and with the rabbinic personalities who led the Vaad. For the most part, these were rabbis who were born, educated, and ordained in Eastern Europe. Orthodox rabbis educated in America generally belonged to the Rabbinical Council of America; unmentioned by Zuroff, they evidently were not represented in Vaad ha-Hatzalah, although many of them contributed to and raised money for it. Working alongside the Vaad rabbis were a few interested laymen.

The Vaad's avowed aim was to aid rabbis and students at East European yeshivas during the Second World War. Although Zuroff does not say so explicitly, it seems that most, if not all, of the yeshivas aided by the Vaad were located in Lithuania. Zuroff does note that many of the rabbis in the Vaad had been students in Lithuanian yeshivas and felt particular sympathy for their alma maters. As for aid to rabbis, with the exception of Moshe Shatzkes of Lomza and David Lifschitz of Suvalk, who were brought to America as *rashei yeshivot*, no community rabbi is recorded by Zuroff as benefiting from Vaad aid.

In Lithuania, the Vaad's central rabbinic personality was the remarkable Chaim Ozer Grodzinsky of Vilna, who despite his advanced years exerted decisive influence on its operations until his death in 1941. Following his death, there was considerable jockeying among yeshiva leaders for scarce funds and, especially, for all-important places on the list of persons to receive visas. His disciple Eliezer Silver, who had settled in Cincinnati, was the prime mover of the Vaad in America until the arrival in 1943 of the dynamic and eloquent Aaron Kotler of the Kletsk yeshiva. Also aiding the Vaad was Samuel Schmidt, a non-Orthodox friend of Silver. Schmidt, a public health physician and Poale Zion member, undertook a mission to Lithuania in 1940 in order to observe the Jewish situation and the activities of the Vaad. While there he

was captivated by Grodzinsky's personal qualities, and he continued to assist the Vaad after his return to America.

The special aid to yeshivas that Vaad ha-Hatzalah asked of American Jews should not be seen as an attempt to promote crass favoritism for one group. The Vaad had an ideology: its rabbinic leaders maintained that the yeshivas were the vessel that held the spiritual and religious future of the Jewish people (pp. 89–90). All reports spoke of the fervent devotion of yeshiva students to their studies under the most trying of circumstances. As such, a supreme effort was required to save them, along with their teachers and families. Specifically, the Vaad appealed for funds in order to send extra aid, including scarce food, to a yeshiva elite who were already receiving slender Joint Distribution Committee help equally with other Jewish beneficiaries.

Few Jews other than the Orthodox were responsive to the Vaad's appeal. Zuroff shows how the Vaad policy of supplementary aid led to serious friction with the Joint and with local communities who were strongly influenced by the Joint's reports and recommendations. On the basis of incomplete financial data, the Vaad is reported to have raised about $100,000 by the end of 1940, $372,000 in 1943, and $1,135,000 in 1944 (pp. 96, 280). In that last year, the Joint's worldwide expenditures were more than $15 million.

More than two wartime years were needed for the Joint and the Vaad to reach an uneasy modus vivendi. Shortly after the war ended, the Vaad issued loud, bitter denunciations of the Joint, alleging failures in rescue operations during 1944 in Europe. Zuroff discounts most of these accusations, and also points to less than accurate claims of success by the Vaad as well as imprecise financial reports.

Once the Germans overran Lithuania in the summer of 1941, flight became the only option for Jews hoping to survive. However, with the exception of the Mir yeshiva, members of the yeshiva communities in Russian territory (which included Lithuania after September 1939) had refused to seek visas to leave Russia. Most *rashei yeshivot*, practically omnipotent within their respective institutions, had instructed their students to stay put in the small Lithuanian towns to which they had migrated after having been forced out of Vilna. Zuroff writes gripping, complex chapters on the quest for visas, on several exceptionally generous foreign consuls who granted them, and on the routes of escape by which some yeshiva students ended up in Shanghai under Japanese rule, some in the United States and Eretz Israel, and a few in Canada. By the end of 1943, almost everything in the Vaad's original charter that was possible to do had been done, and it turned to rescuing Jews in general. Its efforts concentrated on Hungary, but it is not clear who were candidates for rescue and what effect Vaad efforts had.

Hopefully, Zuroff will follow these matters in a sequel. For now, what he has written constitutes a significant parallel to the notable work of his teacher Yehuda Bauer, who has added an introduction here.[2] Zuroff's literary style is adequate albeit awkward in places. However, his research among the manuscript collections of organizations and individuals, oral histories, memoirs, and secondary studies has been both tireless and comprehensive. He has succeeded in consulting the papers not only of the Vaad and many of its rabbis and activists, but also of neutral or unsympathetic organizations and individuals. He has seen pertinent records of the U.S. government, including those of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Readers and surviving veterans of

Vaad ha-Hatzalah may rightly feel that Zuroff's study provides proper recognition of the Vaad's efforts during the period of supreme crisis.

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Notes

1. Nothing has yet been written to equal, much less surpass, the 1950 article on the subject in *Jewish Social Studies* by the eminent historian Joshua Starr, a member of the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction staff. Many readers in Jewish libraries such as the Jewish National Library in Jerusalem and the libraries of the Jewish Theological Seminary and Yeshiva University have undoubtedly pored over books bearing the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction imprint, unaware that such books are often the only physical remnants of entire European Jewish communities.

2. See Yehuda Bauer, *American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee 1939–1945* (Jerusalem: 1981).

History and the Social Sciences

Yaakov Ariel, *Evangelizing the Chosen People: Missions to the Jews in America, 1880–2000*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. x + 367 pp.

Yaakov Ariel has written a richly detailed and heavily documented account of the efforts made by American Christian missionary groups to proselytize U.S. Jews and to assist their colleagues in Israel in spreading "the good word" within the Jewish state. Utilizing the extant archives of these evangelical groups as well as their published newspapers, journals, and religious tracts, he has adroitly analyzed the varying nuances of their theological stances as well as describing their practical strategies and methodologies for outreach activities.

Although Ariel is unconvincing in his constant attempt to establish the novelty and uniqueness of such efforts during the period 1880–2000—in fact, these varying forms of Hebrew Christianity date back to the early 19th century—he is nonetheless very effective in showing how much time and effort these highly motivated and well-funded groups expended on their crusades. As such, *Evangelizing the Chosen People* is a useful contribution to the social and intellectual history of Christianity in the United States. However, I am not sure how important this work is for our understanding of the American Jewish experience.

Ariel's focus is always on who these aggressors were, what their communities looked like, and how they lived out their lives. Much less is said about those whom they sought to influence and what the missionaries' variegated and ultimately unsuccessful efforts actually meant to Jews as a minority religious and ethnic group in the United States. For each of his three chronological periods—the age of immigration, interwar days, and the contemporary era—Ariel spends chapter after chapter discussing the missionaries' machinations, trials, travails, and scandals. In contrast, only one chapter per section addresses what all of this missionary activity meant to those under attack. In other words, Ariel's book is mostly about the convoluted world of the perpetrators of a form of anti-Judaism, and not essentially about Jews.

Moreover, Ariel does not really deliver on his promise to explicate how missionary activities "played an important role in the history of Jewish-Christian relations" (p. 5)—a very important theme for scholars in our field. He offers only fleeting references to tensions that must have arisen within interfaith dialogue groups whenever ostensibly large segments of one religious community were alleged to be in the business of undermining the religious integrity of the other. For example, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, a venue where many of these concerns might have been played out, is mentioned but once.

Similarly, Ariel has relatively little to say about how the threat of missionary success galvanized the Jewish community to upgrade its own network of social and educational institutions. To be sure, he does describe the dynamics of Jewish counterpropagandizing against its foes and includes useful discussions on how different Jewish religious movements spoke out against proselytizers. But again, the focus remains on the notorious protagonists of Ariel's book, the missionaries themselves. Not enough is said about how the fear of "lost children" moved Jews to open their hearts and pocketbooks to the establishment of competing institutions. Missing, for example, is any mention of New York's Educational Alliance, founded in the late 1880s at least partly in response to the (ultimately unfounded) threat of massive defections to Christianity by immigrant youngsters.

In sum, the basic problem with *Evangelizing the Chosen People*, as a work of American Jewish scholarship, is that its subject matter is but a minor theme in American Jewish history. For all of the mighty Christian efforts described here, the fact is that conversions of conviction were (and are) relatively rare and constitute but a subcategory within the larger rubric of patterns of assimilation. It is arguably the case that, for each of the periods Ariel analyzes—indeed, for the totality of American Jewish experience—far more Jews became Christians out of convenience rather than out of conviction. In the end, were we to focus properly on the "victims" rather than on their attackers, American Jewish conversions to Christianity would be contextualized as an enlightening and evocative detail within the larger history of the decline of Jewish religious values among several generations of those living under freedom, one small detail in the saga of attempts to defend Jewish status within a hospitable but still predominantly Christian society.

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Naomi W. Cohen, *Jacob H. Schiff: A Study in American Jewish Leadership.* Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1999. xiv + 320 pp.

The neighbors in a tenement house on the Lower East Side around 1908 were much troubled over conditions in the hungry Nussbaum household, where the husband was alcoholic and shouting and beatings were constant. To whom would they turn? A neighbor's boy who went to public school and thus knew English well was delegated to write to the obvious recipient, Jacob H. Schiff. Schiff, who answered his own letters, replied that the family did not need to hire a secretary to write for them (!) but that they should take his enclosed calling card to the United Hebrew Charities, where they would receive aid. This little incident—related by my father, the young "secretary"—occurred at about the same time as Sergius Witte, the finance minister of Tsar Nicholas II, personally invited Schiff to meet him for a political and financial discussion at Portsmith, New Hampshire. The humblest tenement inhabitants and the powerful finance minister alike recognized Jacob H. Schiff as the leader of American Jewry. He is the subject of Naomi W. Cohen's detailed study, which is based on Schiff's papers and other sources, together with a full use of the secondary literature.

The extensive sociological literature on leadership is not used here. Cohen's preferred method is simply to show Schiff as banker, philanthropist, communal leader, and the central figure of many an American and international Jewish communal enterprise, and to let the obvious conclusions about his leadership be drawn. But the author does not compartmentalize her subject. She connects Schiff the foremost American international banker to Schiff the leader of the American Jewish community, who was a world Jewish figure as well. He was a colorful person, warm-hearted, dominating, and given to bursts of temper—generous in the great and small sense. Cohen often quotes his speeches but could also have observed that, unlike most bankers, he was vigorously articulate and expressed his opinions on a variety of subjects to all manner of audiences. Schiff was in his element in corporate boardrooms, but no less in the Lower East Side, where he frequently mingled, argued, and ate with the people. Once he wrote to Walter Lippmann, then the brilliant young editor of *The New Republic* (not quoted by Cohen; I draw on memory), that he read the weekly although disagreeing with much of it. He objected, however, to the publication of an article that described in apocalyptic terms the coming blood-soaked downfall of the capitalist order, calling it irrational and inciting to violence. Lippmann replied that if all capitalists were as decent as Schiff, such articles would not be written. In fact, Schiff was sympathetic to trade unions in general and especially to the Jewish labor movement in the needle trades, despite the latter's political radicalism.

Such sidelights illustrate the breadth of Schiff's interests. They are remarkable for a man whose life was in business and who had no formal education after his years in the Orthodox Jewish school of his native Frankfurt. He spoke German often and endowed German studies at Cornell and Harvard. But the drama of Schiff's life was his battle for unrestricted Jewish immigration and against the tsarist regime. If this claim sounds grandiose even for a powerful banker, Schiff's financial support of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War should be kept in mind—not to mention his unyielding, lifelong obstruction of Russian loans on the American financial market, which he did not hesitate to explain as a reaction against Russia's oppression of its Jews. Unmentioned by Cohen, after the failure of the revolution in 1906, the arch-capitalist of New York subsidized the Jewish socialist Bundists in order to help them bring on the revolution that would finally crush tsarism in Russia.

Schiff was a prolific letter writer, and his correspondence, liberally quoted by Cohen, ranged far and wide. He became a friend and correspondent of his summer neighbor Charles W. Eliot, the president of Harvard, while the letters he exchanged with Lillian D. Wald of the Henry Street Settlement kept him informed on the affairs and the needs of the huge immigrant quarter and helped to guide Wald in her settlement activities. Another major recipient of Schiff's philanthropy was the Jewish Theological Seminary and Jewish culture and education in general. Apart from his esteem for the sometimes temperamental scholar and head of the Seminary, Solomon Schechter, Schiff respected the academic freedom of the Seminary faculty and (as was not the case with other institutions he supported generously) did not seek to place his impress upon the school. Neither did he seek to curb the Zionism, which he strongly opposed, of Schechter and most of the Seminary's faculty and students. Schiff's favorite philanthropy, however, was the Montefiore Home for Incurables, which modified its grim name to become the Montefiore Hospital and Home for Chronic

Diseases. Schiff dominated it with often exacting benevolence for 35 years. A recipient of Schiff philanthropy had to expect more than smiles from a distance and donations; the banker visited Montefiore weekly and went from bed to bed unaccompanied by any of the staff, inquiring after the personal and medical well-being of each patient, taking note of complaints, if any, and aiding the patients' distressed families. Then he went to the hospital office to receive reports and explanations. The practitioner of hands-on philanthropy also practiced hands-on banking. Schiff's bank (Kuhn, Loeb) underwrote vast bond issues of railroads, and Schiff himself inspected the lines for which he took the risk by having his private railroad car detached from its train and drawn into the yards. The immaculately dressed banker would get off and inspect the tracks and rolling stock, also collecting useful information from speaking with the workers.

Cohen places Schiff among the German Jews in America about whom she has written notable works such as *Encounter with Emancipation: The German Jews in the United States 1830–1914* (1984). As a son of the Frankfurt Jewish community, he retained a connection long after he quit it for America in 1865. Frankfurt's traditional philanthropic and religious habits had a hold on him, shaping a man who was traditionally observant in so many ways that he could hardly be classified a Reform Jew despite his Reform affiliation. At the same time, his insistence on immigrant Americanization resembled the wishes of those who were derisively called "Yahudim." Nonetheless, what he did for the strengthening of Judaism among the East European newcomers much exceeded what most of these contemporaries wanted.

Cohen calls the uptown German Jews "stewards," meaning supervisors or managers, of the immigrant public. She observes astutely that after approximately 1910, Schiff's undisputed domination of American Jewish affairs and that of his respected collaborators, Mayer Sulzberger and Louis Marshal, was challenged. They had to give way, but their authority remained powerful. They did not welcome the creation of the Kehillah of New York City and strongly opposed the American Jewish Congress during the First World War, but they accepted both. Their pleasure at the appointment of Louis D. Brandeis as the first Jewish Supreme Court justice contained an element of satisfaction that Brandeis, the most brilliant opponent they had ever faced, would no longer be active in either the Congress movement or in Zionism, whose nationalism Schiff deeply disliked.

Naomi W. Cohen leaves us with the image of a powerful, self-confident man, somewhat touchy while vigorously and proudly Jewish. Much of his foresighted philanthropy endures to the present day. Living in the age of the United States' leap to world economic leadership, he played a major role in it. No one realized more fully the long-term needs of the explosively growing American Jewish community, nor did more to make American Jewry an important player in the world Jewish scene. Among other commendable features, Cohen's excellent work leaves the reader with that realization.

Lloyd P. Gartner
Tel Aviv University

Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin (eds.), *A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jews.* Hanover, N.H.: Brandeis University Press/ University Press of New England, 1999. vi + 265 pp.

The effort to enable Jews living under Soviet rule to emigrate during the second half of the 20th century was one of the greatest combined endeavors ever embarked upon by the Jewish people. Of course it involved far more than sensational examples of Jewish activism: not only did the enterprise include Jews and non-Jews, it was also a war mounted on many fronts—governmental, public relations, economic, humanitarian.

Like other historic efforts made on behalf of the Jews of Russia—at the time of the crisis of 1881–1882 and during and immediately after the First World War, for example—the interactions of the various forces involved make for an extremely complex and fascinating study. What were the principal influences exerted? How successful were they? Were errors of judgment made? How did the various forces deal with each other? How did organized Jewish lobbies harness governmental power?

Because the struggle to help Soviet Jewish emigration is so recent, most of the key players are still alive and articulate. And the very closeness of events ensures that resentments are still strong; antagonists are still licking their wounds. Ironically, these antagonists are not American Jews versus officials of the former Soviet Union. They are American Jews versus other American Jews and Israeli officials. On the one hand are the "establishment" organizations in the United States, which worked cooperatively with—and according to information in some of the articles, in obedience to—the Israeli office (Lishkat hakesher) in charge of policy on Soviet Jews. On the other hand were what are referred to variously as "non-establishment," "activist," or "grassroots" organizations. In a situation where knowledge was power, the Israelis and establishment groups often kept a very tight hold on their sources of information, creating enormous resentment on the part of those activist groups that were also doing their best to help Soviet Jews.

Feelings on the issue ran so high that a conference held in June 1995 was largely boycotted by one group of ex-activists who felt that another group would be dominating the proceedings. The result of that conference is the book under review, *A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jews*, in which the establishment organizations and the Israeli position are overrepresented. Fortunately, the editors, Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin, did introduce some articles giving voice to the "other side." To their credit, this makes the book (largely, but not entirely, written by people who were actually involved at the American and Israeli end) a more complete record of the struggle than might have been expected.

Even the goal was in dispute at times. Was this an emigration movement or an aliyah movement? Were we trying to get Jews out of the Soviet Union and allow them to live full lives wherever they wished, or was the main aim to get all of them to Israel? Some of the lines of battle were consistently drawn between establishment and nonestablishment, as in what policy to adopt toward Anatoly Shcharansky until after his trial (the initial Israeli position was to avoid Jews like him who were also human rights activists in the more general sense, whereas nonestablishment people supported him

throughout); and what attitude to take toward "drop-outs" (nonestablishment groups supported the right of émigrés to choose their country of destination; the establishment/Israel position was against the right of Jews to head anywhere but Israel—and from the late 1980s, the latter policy translated into pressure to provide direct flights from the Soviet Union to Israel).

Careless editing has resulted in a number of annoying errors in the book, ranging from the use of the term Lishkat (instead of Lishka, when used alone) in the articles of both editors, to a reference to Shaul Avigor, instead of Avigur, to an incorrect reference to a show trial after the arrest of the doctors in the last year of Stalin's life in Micah Naftalin's article. The cover photograph is most likely from 1986, not 1996, as stated. These are only some examples.

On the positive side, there are a number of impressive articles. Zvi Gitelman presents an excellent discussion of the movement to free Soviet Jewry. It is regrettable that in his article and in others, the statistics remain those of 1994 and have not been updated for a book that was published in 1999. Douglas Kahn (a rabbi), provides a lively picture of what Soviet Jewish activism meant on the personal level. Indeed, those years of activity on behalf of their fellow Jews constituted a seminal experience for many Americans, establishment and nonestablishment, who gave themselves to the cause selflessly. The journalist Walter Ruby provides an outstanding chapter on the nonestablishment side.

In a revealing article about the Israeli role, Nehemia Levanon (who, for more than two decades, headed the powerful Israeli office dealing with Jews behind the Iron Curtain) explains certain key and once secret issues; describes various policies initiated by Israel; but fails to explain why Golda Meir was advised not to make public the first letter of the Soviet Georgians in 1969. He avoids the subject, while crediting Golda for eventually reading the letter aloud to the Knesset.

In tackling the "dropouts," Steven F. Windmueller refers to Soviet complaints about the misuse of Israeli exit visas but does not elaborate on the theme. Were the Soviets truly distressed by those Jews who stated that they wanted to leave for Israel, but then headed for the United States, Canada, or some other location? After all, in his famous Paris news conference of 1966, Aleksei Kosygin had spoken of Jewish emigration as a family reunion scheme. The idea of "repatriation" came at a later stage, from the Israelis. Indeed, there was also a strong impression in the 1970s that the Soviets were worried about possibly alienating their Arab client-states by permitting a large number of Soviet Jews to pour into Israel.

The question of the rights and wrongs of the Jackson-Vanik amendment are well covered here, with William Korey's "A Policy of Principle" followed by Marshall Goldman's "A Dissent." Later in the book, Windmueller takes up the question, asserting that the upsurge in emigration in the late 1970s had more to do with SALT II than with Jackson-Vanik.

A Second Exodus is well worth reading. But it is important to produce a responsible and balanced history of the entire period, utilizing personal testimony, archival material from the former Soviet Union, and records from Israeli and American sources (Kissinger's papers, for example, are soon to be made available). Such a work is needed in order to sort out the various strands of activity, the forces involved, and the power struggles both within the Jewish community and between East and West.

It should be written by someone with the necessary linguistic and research qualifications, who is disinterested enough to make points and not score points.

EDITH ROGOVIN FRANKEL
The Hebrew University

Veniamin Lukin (series ed.), *100 evreiskikh mestecheck Ukrainy: istoricheskii putevoditel'*. (*Podolia*, issues 1–2). Jerusalem and St. Petersburg: Ezro and Aleksander Gersht, 1997–2000. 256 pp. (vol. 1); 703 pp. (vol. 2).

Geographic-historical dictionaries of Jewish settlement have been with us for more than a century. The pioneer publication is the French-language *Gallia Judaica* by Henri Gross (1897; reprinted with additions 1969). *Germania Judaica* (in German) began in 1934, was interrupted several times, and is still being published. Unlike most such works, it is subdivided by period as well as by locality. Most recently, we have the *Pinkas hakehilot* series of Yad Vashem, in Hebrew, for countries whose Jewish communities were largely destroyed in the Holocaust. This project is also far from complete, although a number of volumes have appeared.

The work under review is, to my knowledge, the first attempt to do something similar in Russian. The area is Podolia, a province of tsarist Russia that had previously been under Polish rule for a number of centuries and today is part of Ukraine. Jews are known to have settled there since about 1500; and in Jewish history the town of Medzhibosh enjoys particular prominence because it was the residence of the Ba'al Shem Tov, the founder of Hasidism.

However, language is not the only factor that distinguishes this work from earlier ones of its genre. As indicated by its title and preface, the editor and compilers of these volumes have tried to provide more than another historical and geographic reference work. The volumes in the series are based not only on written records of all types, but also on expeditions to the area by mostly young Jews from Leningrad and elsewhere. When a revival of Jewish cultural activity was made possible by *perestroika* at the end of the 1980s, they decided to rediscover their "shtetl" roots by following in the footsteps of S. An-ski's famous folklore expedition to the southern part of the former Pale of Settlement in 1913. But where An-ski and his assistants found a vibrant culture, the Soviet-era city dwellers found only traces and remnants. Few of these towns had any meaningful Jewish life by the 1990s; usually there were only a few people left—sometimes none at all.

After a general historical introduction and an essay on what might be called "shtetl geography" come the entries for the selected towns. In volume 1, there are only six, but they are described at considerable length, from the historical to the contemporary, with special reference to the Holocaust period. Tourist information is provided as well. These entries are followed by some very brief entries for 11 towns of northwest Podolia. Many illustrations of all types—artistic tombstones, maps, notable buildings, and pictures of recent residents—are scattered throughout.

The second and much longer volume concentrates on the southeastern area of Podolia. Here the entries are much more numerous, with 15 lengthy entries followed

by 16 brief ones. Unlike the first volume, this work contains footnotes and an extensive multilingual bibliography. The introductions to this volume are devoted mainly to art and architecture.

Veniamin Lukin, a former Leningrader now working at the Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People in Jerusalem, points out in his preface that the editors and compilers all have full-time jobs in addition to the scholarly work they display in these volumes. We hope they find the time and money to continue with this unusual reference work cum tour guide.

AVRAHAM GREENBAUM
The Hebrew University

Christel Manning, *God Gave Us the Right: Conservative Catholic, Evangelical Protestant, and Orthodox Jewish Women Grapple with Feminism.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999. 283 pp.

Christel Manning's *God Gave Us the Right* is a timely and insightful analysis of U.S. women in conservative religious movements. Based on a qualitative study of women in the Los Angeles area, the book compares Evangelical, Catholic, and Orthodox Jewish women who are grappling with the contradictions and challenges of feminism and religious orthodoxy. The book begins with a case study approach, profiling the women in each religious community. Manning then characterizes the three congregations on which her study is based: Victory Church, an evangelical and charismatic Protestant group; St. Joseph's, a conservative Catholic church; and Congregation Beth Israel, a Modern Orthodox Jewish community. While pointing out the differences between these three communities, she convincingly notes the similarities that allow for an insightful analysis. The congregations are demographically similar with regard to class (middle), educational attainment (above the national average), and age (baby boomer generation). In addition, each of the religious organizations are integrationalist in orientation, encouraging the congregants' involvement in secular society.

The crux of Manning's analysis is an examination of conservative religious identity among women who hold feminist values in the workplace and at home while subscribing to more traditional values within the religious institution. From the outset, Manning questions the idea that theological traditionalism is always accompanied by social conservatism. Rather, as she points out, many of the women in her study simultaneously held orthodox religious values and beliefs while promoting gender equality and women's status in the secular and domestic spheres. This was especially true for Orthodox Jewish women, who tended to be more highly educated and to challenge male authority both at work and in the home. In an interesting comparison of the reconciliation strategies employed by each group of women, Manning found that whereas the vast majority of women worked outside the home, they rationalized this choice (in contrast to the more traditional religious role of homemaker) through very different integrative frameworks. The Orthodox Jewish women, for example, assumed an individual rights stance with regard to a woman's right to work outside the

home for personal or economic reasons. By way of comparison, the Protestant Evangelical women were more ambivalent about their employment roles and tended to justify women's participation in the workplace as a way of making use of "God given ability" (p. 94), and therefore permissible.

Similarly, with regard to gender relations in the home, various interpretive frameworks were evident in the women's narratives. Because Jewish law defines the home as the woman's domain, the Orthodox Jewish respondents in Manning's study assumed spiritual leadership in the family, adhering strictly to family purity laws and other rituals that reinforced the separation of men and women. Such adherence, they believed, gave women more rather than less authority in the home, a moral position that informed all areas of social relations, including that of decision-making. Well versed in Jewish law, the Orthodox women frequently argued with their spouses, seeking rabbinic opinions that would support their point of view in areas of disagreement. The Evangelical women, in contrast, took a somewhat different approach, although they too relied on religious authority—most notably that of God—to support their point of view. As Manning explains:

> As these women see it, submission works as follows. All decisions are ultimately made by God, and both men and women must pray to God for guidance. The next step is for both partners to share what God has told them, and then the husband decides what to do. If the wife disagrees with the decision, she may ask him to reconfer with God. . . . The implication, of course, is that if you don't hear the same answer, it must not be God's will (pp. 141–142).

Catholic women, while claiming equal authority in the home, nonetheless must contend with the submissive image of Mary in the church and the prohibitions on contraception. Their struggle within the family is therefore centered on the authority of the church rather than that of the husband.

Manning reports that, as compared with the secular and domestic realms, conservatism within the religious institution was accepted by women in all three groups, as the church and synagogue became the place where traditional identity was forged and maintained. To understand the secular versus religious split, Manning calls upon a number of theories that help to explain how conservative women can hold feminist positions outside the church while sustaining traditional values within the religious community. Here she refers to the theoretical paradigms of cognitive dissonance, bargaining theory, the protean self, and symbolic boundaries. Of these, the notion of a protean self—Robert J. Lifton's concept of flexible and adaptable identities—appears to be most compelling for an understanding of identity conflict in postmodern society. The final chapters of the book delve further into the complex issues that face conservative women, focusing especially on the controversies surrounding abortion and homosexuality.

Overall, the book is well written and researched. The fact that it compares women across denominations rather than focusing on only one group distinguishes it among the numerous studies on women and religiosity. At the same time, the comparative approach somewhat limits the depth with which each group of women can be studied. Nonetheless, Manning's analysis avoids the problems of superficiality, and her approach is particularly useful for courses that deal with the religious lives of women

across a variety of denominations and theological orientations. Through a careful and thoughtful analysis, Manning provides an informative portrait of the diversity and complexity of conservative women's lives.

JANET JACOBS
University of Colorado

Edna Nahshon, *Yiddish Proletarian Theatre: The Art and Politics of the Artef, 1925–1940*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998. xv + 260 pp.

Artef has long figured prominently in the romance of American Jewish Communism. The theater, whose name is the Yiddish acronym for *Arbter teater farband* (Workers' Theatrical Alliance), is remembered with nostalgia for its high artistic standards, its dramatic experimentalism, and its social engagement. Unfortunately, histories of "front groups" such as Artef in the 1920s and 1930s often gloss over the specific role that the Communist party played in directing their affairs. Whether this tendency reflects the residual influence of the disingenuousness of the Popular Front or the fear of the McCarthy era, it leaves out a dimension crucial to a full understanding of the history of the American—and Jewish—Left. It is to Edna Nahshon's credit that she avoids this sort of overly discreet nostalgia in her very interesting study of Artef. All in all, she does an admirable job of bearing out her "central thesis" that the workers' theater company can only be understood "when seen within the framework of American Jewish communism" (p. xiii).

Accordingly, Nahshon's periodization of Artef's history follows that of the history of the Communist movement from the mid-1920s, through the Popular Front of the late 1930s, and ending with the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939–1941. She discusses the origins of the theater company in the political and intellectual ferment of the 1920s, when American Jewish Communism brought left-wing dissidents from the Socialist and labor movements together with Yiddish intellectuals impatient with the cultural hegemony of Abraham Cahan and his *Jewish Daily Forward*. As in the Soviet Union, those who hoped for art at the service of the revolution coexisted uneasily with those who aspired to a revolution in art. Drawing on a tradition of amateur Yiddish dramatic clubs, Artef took shape between 1924 and 1926 as a drama studio at which worker/students underwent rigorous training under the tutelage of Jacob Mestel, a European-trained dramatist with a starkly modernist and symbolist aesthetic.

From there, Nahshon proceeds to chronicle each Artef season, discussing each production and the critical reaction it received in the English and Yiddish, Communist and non-Communist press. She always keeps in mind the demands of the party line and their influence on Artef's artistic approach and commercial success. During the so-called Third Period, for example, when the international Communist movement took a turn to the left, the party press took Artef to task for being too obscure and ignoring the role of art in the class struggle. Accordingly, the troupe began to present less challenging, more accessible material. Often this material was quite doctrinaire, and historical plays were used to settle scores with the Bund and other rivals to the

Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, this was also the time when Artef scored its first critical and commercial successes, as the actors matured in their craft and the company came under the direction of Benno Schneider. One problem that emerged during this period and remained chronic throughout Artef's history was the troupe's inability to find first-rate American plays to produce. Instead, it often turned to Soviet material.

The Popular Front, in the mid-1930s, brought a more positive attitude on the part of the Communist movement toward ethnic cultures and a less doctrinaire approach to art. Jewish Communists were able to break out of their isolation and reestablish links to the Yiddish intelligentsia and the Jewish community. Artef repackaged itself as a "people's theater," reveling in the fact that its audiences now came from circles well outside the orbit of the party. During this period, the company saw its primary goal as providing high-quality entertainment, albeit entertainment with a serious social message. Although it still imported much of its material from the Soviet Union, it now often drew on folk themes, which it presented in a folksy style. As Artef drew closer to the mainstream it also relaxed its collectivist stance, and individual stars began to emerge. The troupe went professional and moved into a larger theater. This nearly proved fatal, and the company missed the entire 1938–1939 season.

Artef's final downfall came, however, in the middle of the 1939–1940 season. The timing is significant, for, as Nahshon argues convincingly, the advent of the Hitler-Stalin pact and the end of the Popular Front sapped Communist strength in the Jewish community and deprived Artef of its audience. (The first half of the season was not affected, since many organizations had already bought blocks of tickets for theater parties and benefits. But demand fell off precipitously in the second half, despite the fact that the second production received better reviews than had the season's first play.) While many Jewish Communist institutions weathered the storm, Artef, with its already shaky finances, could not. How much longer it could have lasted is a question; as Nahshon points out, Artef in any case faced an overall decline in the Yiddish theater audience, especially in the younger and more sophisticated audience on which it depended. After the Second World War, there were several attempts to revive Artef on a smaller scale, but for the most part, the experiment in Yiddish workers' theater had come to an end.

Yiddish Proletarian Theatre gets off to a bad start. The first chapter, an overview of the history of the Jewish Left up to the 1920s, is full of errors of fact and interpretation. Subsequent chapters have fewer such mistakes, at least as far as I was able to discern. But many typographical errors and misspelled personal and geographic names still mar the book. At times, the author could have taken her analysis a little further. She mentions, for example, that Artef's fall coincided with the decline of the left-wing theater movement in general—implying that both were co-opted by the Federal Theater Project—but does not explain how this dynamic played out in Artef's case. Nevertheless, she has provided a real service. Artef constituted a remarkable episode in what was generally a remarkable period of flourishing and radical working-class culture, and Nahshon has approached the subject with the respect it deserves.

DANIEL SOYER
New York City

Steven A. Reiss (ed.), *Sports and the American Jew*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. 337 pp.

Sports and the American Jew is a positive contribution to American Jewish studies in general and to the subgenre of American Jews and athletics. Firmly in the second generation of historical scholarship on Jews, the contributors to this volume bypass descriptive, defensive, and laudatory accounts in order to focus on fashionable topics: ethnicity, class and gender, and (even more innovative) generation. Accomplishment and fame, while not ignored, are interwoven with antisemitism, ethnic identity crises, and criminality. Jews and sports are interpreted in accordance with the athletes' bourgeois or working-class background, their origin in Eastern Europe, Germany, or the United States, and the degree of their Americanization.

As this is an edited collection, it makes sense to start with a general scorecard. All of the contributions are at least informative, and a few have considerable verve and analytic sophistication. Reiss' introduction and chapter on boxing comprise better than a third of the book. The introduction is competent and comprehensive; the chapter on Jews in the ring, though somewhat anecdotal, is informed, well thought out, and extremely interesting. Linda Borish's essay, "Jewish American Women, Jewish Organizations, and Sports, 1880–1940," supplies an abundance of information on a topic that needs exploration. At the same time, it is repetitive and based on well-known interpretations of Progressivism. Gerald R. Gems' study of sport in the Chicago Hebrew Institute, 1908–1921, has the same problems: abundant (perhaps overabundant) data and too little original analysis.

Dealing with a more recent era, Pamela Cooper's essay on Jews and marathon running, like the two previously cited pieces, is oriented toward organizations and institutions and is descriptive rather than analytic. " 'Our Crowd' at Play," by Peter Levine, is an insightful presentation of a little known topic, elite Jewish country clubs in the 1920s. Since Jewish conceptions of country clubs differed little from their Gentile equivalents, it is difficult to advance novel interpretations, but Levine provides an interesting account of a new and important area of American Jewish recreational history and acculturation.

William M. Simons' content analysis of the newspaper response to Hank Greenberg's decision to play on Rosh Hashana in 1934 is a model of how to use a micro event to illuminate macro trends, in this case the conflicting and nuanced forces of religious and national identity, acculturation, and ethnic integrity. Donald M. Fisher's "Lester Harrison and the Rochester Royals, 1945–1957" is another excellent use of the specific to clarify the general. Fisher's account of the travails and transitions of the Royals basketball team illuminates issues of business structure, urban culture, and the clashing claims of cash and community.

Allen Guttman's chapter on Jewish sports fiction is disappointing for those who have read his books on American athletics. Although he provides some interesting analytical categories, his description is not sustained enough to counter the impression that he is cataloging rather than interpreting the novelists. A much better contribution in the realm of Jewish sports fiction is Eric Solomon's deep and sensitive appreciation of Eric Rolfe Greenberg's novel *The Celebrant*. Solomon calls it the best novel

in the genre of Jewish sports fiction and makes such a convincing case that I am about to read the book.

Among the advantages of *Sports and the American Jew* is its comparative dearth of dubious claims. I will close by examining these, but this strategy should not cloud the conclusion that the virtues of this volume far outweigh its drawbacks. This said, it seems doubtful that a Jewish New York Giant player in the 1920s would have short tenure on that team because of John McGraw's antisemitism (p. 42). It is well known that McGraw sought Jewish players to attract fans; he even wanted to break the color line by bringing in up-and-coming black stars. Sandy Koufax's retirement was not exactly due to a "sore arm" (p. 53). He won more than 20 games the year he retired and was forced out of the game by an arthritic condition that might have crippled him had he continued pitching.

Contrary to the impression given on p. 148, the vast majority of Jews, as well as other immigrants, were not inclined toward socialism, and Polish and Russian Jews were not "Eastern European peasants." It would be good to point out that the same Great Depression financial constraints that opened German Jewish country clubs to Jews from Eastern Europe also prompted Gentile city and country clubs to lower their barriers against the admission of Jews (p. 184). Finally, if American antisemitism peaked in the 1930s (p. 187), this was also a time of accelerated entry of Jews into U.S. politics, the public sector, and the world of popular culture (Hank Greenberg is one of many examples). Perhaps these unprecedented high levels of exclusion and integration were related.

FREDERIC COPLE JAHER
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana

Jon Stratton, *Coming Out Jewish: Constructing Ambivalent Identities*. London: Routledge, 2000. 341 pp.

Jon Stratton's valuable book is an exploration of the meanings of Jewish identity in its modern and postmodern phases, focusing on Europe, Australia and the United States. The territory is familiar—identity, migration, diaspora, assimilation, and (perhaps, less common) multiculturalism. The approach, however, is fresh, extending the new field of Jewish cultural studies as established by Daniel Boyarin, Jonathan Boyarin, Sander Gilman, and others. Stratton, a professor of cultural studies in Perth, Australia, is simultaneously concerned with employing the field of cultural studies to illuminate the situation of Jews and with establishing a place for "Jewish voices" within this field. Indeed, he suggests, there is an affinity between the practice of cultural studies and being Jewish, since both are "equally reflexive and uncertain" of their status. Unfortunately, Stratton also displays the penchant in cultural studies for jargon and ponderous prose.

The book's title is doubly suggestive. It is meant to convey the characteristic ambivalence of Jewish identity in western countries, whereby Jews can typically "pass" as members of the dominant white majority—but only up to a point. *Coming Out Jewish* also suggests something of the author's own uncertain Jewish identity (as does

the disclaimer that it is not intended as a "Jewish book"). Born in England, the son of a Gentile father and an "assimilating [Jewish] mother," Stratton tells us that he is fascinated by postwar, highly assimilated Jews like himself who know little or nothing of Judaism and may not even learn of their Jewish descent until adulthood.

This fascination, clearly reflected in the book, raises the question of the extent to which his subject lends itself to generalization. As Stratton puts it, "Can Jews be identified culturally?" At least partially, he suggests, since "Yiddish-background Jews share certain cultural elements," what Raymond Williams calls "structures of feeling" (p. 8). Some of Stratton's arguments seem to meet these criteria, for example, that the terms upon which Jews were admitted as citizens in the new nation-states of modern Europe continue to shape Jewish life and responses today. However, in many ways *Coming Out Jewish* is an anxious, cultural analysis of highly assimilated Jews, in particular. As such, it nicely complements Steven Cohen and Arnold Eisen's cooler, social scientific analysis of moderately affiliated American Jewry, *The Jew Within* (2000).

The book contains 10 self-standing essays, some previously published, that are arranged in three sections. The first theme to be explored is "How Not to Assimilate." Here, Stratton first examines why Jewish subjects have been conspicuously absent in (British) cultural studies, despite the fact that many cultural theorists are Jews. Stratton traces the anomaly both to the "self-silencing" of Jews following the assimilationist bargain that they accepted as part of their emancipation and to the "ambivalent racialisation of the Jews" (p. 48). "Blackness," he notes, decisively marked Otherness, and whereas clearly marginalized groups such as blacks, women, and the working class have been able to express dissenting voices in cultural studies and elsewhere, the ambivalent status of Jews encourages silence or, at most, uncertain representation of themselves.

Psychoanalysis informs the other two chapters in this section, one on the lives and work of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Derrida, the other, the remarkable "Ghetto Thinking and Everyday Life." Here, Stratton draws on personal stories to help make the point that a central aspect of the "structure of feeling" of Ashkenazic Jews is the fear of an antagonistic world arraigned against them. This fear, he argues, is transmitted intergenerationally even where no longer warranted by objective conditions. The personal accounts in this essay work admirably, although a few—such as Stratton's revelation that he imagines Nazis chasing him in order to move faster on the treadmill at the gym—seem more peculiar than instructive.

The second section, "(Dis)placement in the State," treats issues surrounding minority identity in the nation-state. For example, Stratton attributes the development of modern antisemitism to the advent of the nation-state. As an institution founded on the ideal of perfect representation, the modern state sought to construct a culturally homogeneous population and identity. Against such a project, a strongly self-identifying, cultural minority such as the Jews was bound to be viewed as incongruous and threatening. Stratton suggests that political antisemitism was most aggressive in Germany precisely because of its comparative difficulty in realizing a unified state. This argument, however, overlooks some key issues. The deep assumption of modern nation-states that political sovereignty requires cultural homogeneity fails to explain the specific targeting that is antisemitism. Moreover, recent historical scholar-

ship suggests that modern antisemitism arises not so much from Jews being a perceived obstacle to the integration of the new European states as from a perception that they were integrating too successfully.

In "Not Quite White," the concluding section of the book, Stratton luminously explores issues of race, ethnicity, and multiculturalism in Australia and America. Two chapters treat Jews under the white Australia policy and the more recent Australian multicultural policy, respectively. In a limited field, Stratton's are by far the best discussions of these topics to date. He notes that whereas Jews were considered to be "white" under the Immigration Restriction Act (1901)—the first act of the newly established Australian Commonwealth—from the 1930s, Ashkenazic Jews seeking to emigrate to Australia were increasingly racialized to the point of exclusion. Australian multicultural policy, in contrast, defines groups in ethnic rather than in racial terms, and has tended to mark ethnicity in terms of national origin, giving special prominence to "non-English speaking background." This leaves Australian Jews in definitional limbo, since they are a distinct, immigrant minority that lacks a common national origin. Stratton's arresting suggestion is that the Holocaust functionally serves as Australian Jewry's shared national background. This is an area where his focus on highly assimilated Jews limits his analysis: on almost every available measure (visitation, resident relatives, emotional attachment, philanthropy), Israel figures centrally in Australian Jewish identity. Stratton acknowledges the "preoccupation of Zionism among Australian Jews" but then says nothing further about it.

Another two chapters address Jewish identity in the United States. Whereas Australian immigration and social policy exchanged a racial for an ethnic emphasis over the course of the last century, American social policy has switched from an ethnic to a racial focus. Stratton discusses the prominent role of several immigrant Jews in the earlier theorization of ethnicity in America, such as Israel Zangwill (the melting pot) and Horace Kallen (cultural pluralism), contending that their ideas may be understood "as tactics of a subaltern group," that is, a subordinate group. Since the 1960s, racialization has tended to inform key social policies such as affirmative action. Similarly, African Americans have been the main advocates of multiculturalism, rejecting earlier (Jewish) models of cultural pluralism on the grounds that these ignored race. In the United States, where multiculturalism constitutes a societal battle over identity rather than state policy, the Jews have been designated members of the dominant white majority; accordingly, they tend to register ambivalence, if not hostility, to multicultural politics.

In his final chapter, Stratton offers a brilliant analysis of *Seinfeld* as a marker of contemporary American Jewish ambivalence. It is, he argues, an "ethnic sitcom in the era of multiculturalism," which signals the possibility of the "Yiddishisation of American culture" under certain, middle-class conditions. Stratton is a gifted interpreter of popular culture, and his readings of the popular film *There's Something About Mary* in the introduction and of *Seinfeld* are among the highlights of this rewarding volume.

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Clive Webb, *Fight against Fear: Southern Jews and Black Civil Rights*. Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 2001. xvii + 307 pp.

I once asked the Southern Jewish companion of a female cousin (who was about to join him in Mississippi) just how congenial that part of the state would be for her. "Oh, don't worry," I was reassured, "the [Ku Klux] Klan down there is pretty liberal." So peculiar and indulgent a standard imparts the flavor of a distinctive region, which harbored two centuries ago the largest concentration of urban Jews in North America (in Charleston, S.C.). Since then, however, Southern Jewry has been historically associated with stores that dominated the main streets of villages, with the reduction of Judaism to classical Reform, and with conformity to the racism that so decisively shaped the Southern way of life. The demographic weakness of Southern Jewry dampened the prospects of a vibrant ethnicity and faith, and blunted the sort of political dissidence that animated so many Jews elsewhere in the diaspora.

Clive Webb does not radically revise the conventional understanding of Southern Jewish history. But by focusing upon the crisis of civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, he demonstrates that caution, neighborliness, and privilege were not habit-forming, that a capacity to oppose white supremacy had not been entirely suppressed. Southern Jews very rarely transcended the cramped cultural boundaries of their time and place. Those who did were much more likely to invoke the rule of law (after *Brown v. Board of Education* unanimously invalidated segregation in public schools in 1954) than to proclaim the urgency of justice rolling down like mighty waters. Criticism of racial discrimination and bigotry tended to be indirect rather than a resounding echo of the Prophets. Yet Webb has located more widespread Jewish opposition to Jim Crow laws and to racist attitudes than any previous historian has been able to synthesize.

Fight against Fear does not hold Southern Jewry to a standard of moral absolutism, but instead emphasizes the perils that any champions of racial equality faced in the decades after the Second World War—the stores that would be boycotted, the synagogues that would be bombed, the anonymous death threats that would be fielded, the ostracism and hostility that families would have to endure. No wonder that most Southern Jews, like the Mafia, adopted a code of silence as they opted for neutrality in the battle over civil rights. Yet "a conspicuous minority demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice their personal and professional security in support of another persecuted minority," Webb asserts (p. 219); and though he betrays no interest in apologetics, his monograph constitutes something of a vindication of Jewish honor.

The case that he makes is judicious, subtle, and convincing. The first two chapters provide a valuable historical overview of the status of Jewry in Southern society from the colonial period until the Second World War, and of the interactions between Jews and Southern blacks. Following this overview, *Fight against Fear* is organized thematically. One subject is the turmoil over desegregation after 1954, which gave antisemites an opportunity to blame Jews for encouraging and manipulating Southern blacks. This, in turn, provoked fearful Southern Jews to undermine the efforts of national defense agencies such as the Anti-Defamation League to promote civil rights. The dilemma that desegregation posed was perhaps most poignant for Jewish mer-

chants, who flourished in cities such as Atlanta and Little Rock as well as in small towns. For such businessmen, livelihood and community were most obviously at stake. The appearance of divergence from the racial status quo was tantamount to economic ruin—but the danger could come from both directions. The owner of Leb's, a popular Atlanta deli, was so intimidated by the possible loss of white customers that he resisted change too vehemently, embarrassing so many Jewish patrons that by the end of the 1960s he was bankrupt.

Fight against Fear also includes ground-breaking chapters on three Jews who became ardent champions of segregation (among them, Solomon Blatt, who dominated South Carolina's house of representatives as its speaker from 1937 until 1973) and on Jewish women (plus two women married to Jews) who challenged the racial status quo in an era when men were men and women were volunteers. Webb's final chapter portrays nine rabbis who had to assuage the anxiety of their congregants while at the same time eluding the malice of dynamiters who, in less than a decade, demolished more than a dozen synagogues and a day school. Most of the rabbis managed to hold on to their jobs despite losing some congregants who would have preferred sermons devoted to biblical exegesis rather than to contemporary race relations. The Reform movement's Pittsburgh Platform of 1885 had reduced Reform Judaism to a progressive, ethical core—and that definition of Jewish religion was put to a supreme test when the demand for racial equality erupted more than half a century later. Most of the Reform Jews who lived in the South failed that test, Webb acknowledges. Nonetheless, as he shows, some rabbis and synagogue-goers managed to extract true grit from their heritage of social justice.

Fight against Fear is marked by the sort of ambivalence that invites a paraphrase of Bertolt Brecht's *Galileo*: pity the region that has so few heroes, but pity the region that has *need* of heroes. In realizing that bravery, much less martyrdom, may be too much to ask even of the descendants of Isaiah, Webb tends to absolve Southern Jews. Because of their isolation and vulnerability, they would have made little difference even had they been exemplary in their heroism. In putting their plight in context, he has drawn upon a remarkable range of sources, from correspondence found in scattered archives to interviews that he himself conducted, from autobiographies to editorials in the black press. In mastering both primary and secondary sources, he seems to have overlooked nothing. And yet such thoroughness is placed gracefully in the service of a text that not only assesses every significant episode during this crisis but also presents some fresh discoveries, such as the account of the successful integration of a hotel owned by a Jewish orthodontist. Marvin Goldstein fought the Klan with unobtrusive gallantry and, in so doing, warranted the faith of one appreciative client—named Martin Luther King, Jr.—that the arc of the universe inclines toward justice.

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Steven J. Zipperstein, *Imagining Russian Jewry: Memory, History, Identity*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1999. 139 pp.

In his prologue to *Imagining Russian Jewry*, Steven J. Zipperstein writes that the forms of historical narrative are "elusive" and that the "fluidity" of these forms is much too rarely appreciated. Historical writing, he contends, involves narrative strategies, intuitive skills, and "commitments usually associated with the writing of fiction" (p. 11). This last item is somewhat enigmatic; I take Zipperstein to be referring to commitments of an emotional nature, as in an unreasoned penchant for a particular type of situation or milieu. In his case, Zipperstein seems to embody this penchant in the number of personal associations he adduces to illuminate his learned and lasting interest in Russo-Jewish history.

That interest takes shape in this volume as a sort of metahistory. In recent years, this has at times been taken to such extremes that one yearns for a return to the positivistic simplicities of a Rankean history "as it really was." Not so here. In the first part of this volume, Zipperstein seizes on two topics, the shtetl and the *ḥeder*, as instruments and symptoms of changing representations. There was a time when the former was best dismissed from memory because of its association with poverty and pogroms; in the 1950s, Zipperstein strongly suggests, the shtetl was virtually rehabilitated through the influence of the Holocaust, the appearance of identity as a category of the American cultural scene, and the growth of American Jewish suburban communities that in certain ways were a recreation of the shtetl, complete with all the problems Tevye knew so well. Zipperstein's more straightforward depiction of the *ḥeder* shows how this institution, once vilified by such "westerners" as Simon Dubnow and Chaim Weizmann as the embodiment of pedagogical incompetence amid the most unsanitary surroundings, was later visualized as a welcome factor in the nationalist struggle against assimilation.

In his third essay, Zipperstein turns away from metahistory to the more accessible domain of history *tout court*—in this case, the history of Jewish Odessa and, more particularly, the history of its relationship with the intellectual world. This chapter is written *con amore*, the reader senses (and this affection, I think, is what leads Zipperstein into a serious exaggeration of Odessa's influence on the Jewish world). Zipperstein beautifully conveys both the pessimism of the superfluous maskilim in a commercial-minded city and their longing for "the self-contained Jewish towns where they were once shunned, persecuted, and also important" (p. 83). It is not quite clear whether the unquestioned pessimism of individuals such as Ahad Ha'am, Dubnow and Mendele Moykher Sforim springs from their sense of irrelevance or the awareness that the values prevalent in Odessa were unable to compensate for the values of "small-town" Judaism. In any event, by the late 19th century the Haskalah had essentially run its course and had been reduced to a mere subtheme of the period's warring ideologies.

Zipperstein has reserved for his last chapter the most troubling topic of all: how are contemporary historians of the Jewish past to comprehend the Holocaust in their portrayal of earlier periods? Zipperstein's answer, it seems, is to accept the inevitable existence of the historian's postfactum knowledge and perhaps even to exploit, or at

least embrace, this knowledge. Thus he writes enthusiastically about Theo Richmond's *Konin* (1995); and in his comment on David Meyer and Michael Brenner's volume of recent German Jewish history, Zipperstein maintains that although the authors explicitly disavow the use of postfactum knowledge, their choice of themes and emphases is necessarily influenced by the reality of the destruction of German Jewry. Zipperstein rejects the counterarguments of Michael Bernstein as presented by the latter in his *Foregone Conclusions* (1996); my own feeling is that there is a terrible danger in inserting the Holocaust's looming presence into a historical narrative. In so doing, the Holocaust itself comes to be perceived as the inevitable outcome of events.

"Illuminating" and "provocative" are terms of encomium that the individual essays in Zipperstein's collection warrant. Each is clearly the product of deep reflection that has yielded rewarding results. But why are these essays unsatisfying *en bloc*? I think it is because they are limited to the maskilic world, to the virtual exclusion of Russian Jewish religious and scholarly life. There is, of course, nothing wrong per se in writing in a maskilic spirit. But by and large, the Russian Jewry depicted here is that of "Odessa" and its kindred spirits. Its ideologies are even said to be "among the most influential in twentieth century Jewish life" (p. 83). By way of exemplication, "Vilna" makes no more than a fleeting appearance as a sort of pendant to "Odessa." This is all the more regrettable because recent work on, say, the yeshiva as a means of social control would lend itself well to Zipperstein's metahistorical mode of treatment. In Zipperstein's lectures, however, the clash and contrast between the Haskalah and other weltanschauungen have been eschewed, and this has contributed to a flattening image of Russian Jewish culture it was Zipperstein's apparent aim to unsettle.

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Language, Literature, and the Arts

Michael Braun, Peter J. Brenner, Hans Messelken, and Gisela Wilkending (eds.), *"Hinauf und Züruck / in die herzhelle Zukunft." Deutsch-jüdische Literatur im 20. Jahrhundert. Festschrift für Birgit Lermen*. Bonn: Bouvier, 2000. 571 pp.

The 41 contributions to this festschrift in honor of Birgit Lermen focus on the work of writers whose Jewish origins became a fateful *Tränenspur*, or "trail of tears," to borrow Paul Celan's expression (quoted in the preface). They cover a broad spectrum of German Jewish writing—several less known authors and works are featured—and they serve to illustrate most effectively how the hyphen often found in the epithet "German-Jewish" has both a unifying and a dividing function. The contributors are predominantly colleagues of Birgit Lermen at the University of Cologne, but there are also academic contributions from Washington, D.C. and Beersheba, as well as several pieces by writers whose work Lermen has promoted.

The first section of the book features poetry and prose (several pieces written especially for the volume) by Elisabeth Borchers, Hilde Domin, Sarah Kirsch, Reiner Kunze and Arnold Stadler, among others. The most notable contribution here is a piece by the poet and academic Peter Horst Neumann in which he applies his interpretive powers to four of his own poems, providing a fascinating insight into their context and inspiration.

The six chapters that make up the second section discuss historical context and major themes in German Jewish literary culture. The most significant essay is Helmuth Kiesel's "Moderne und Judentum," which explores the links between late 19th-/early 20th- century antisemitism and antimodernist positions. Kiesel emphasizes the importance of Jews in spreading modernist culture throughout German-speaking lands, in particular, in Berlin (among those noted are the painter Max Liebermann, the theater directors Otto Brahm and Max Reinhardt, and the publisher Samuel Fischer), and in Vienna (where Arthur Schnitzler, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Karl Kraus, and Sigmund Freud were to be found).

According to Victor Karady in his *Gewalterfahrung und Utopie* (1999), European Jews were "predestined" to become a modernizing elite, not because of any racial characteristics but rather as a result of social experience. As Kiesel elaborates this theme, Jews were "social outsiders"; as such, they were mobile, and also keen to spot ways to secure their existence. Limited in their activities to trade, capital, and intellectual pursuits, Jews developed precisely those abilities most in demand in the process of modernization. Similarly, their so-called "religious intellectualism" re-

sulted in their being more highly educated than other members of the population. Jews were also well versed in religious writings and disputes, speaking two or more languages and possessing a high level of (self-)discipline from the observance of religious rules. Along with a loosening of traditional ties and increasing assimilation within Christian (and later, secular) society, these factors account for the Jews' taking a leading role in modernist intellectual life. To associate the emergence of cultural modernism with Jewish emancipation is thus appropriate, but as Kiesel makes clear, such argumentation is often inextricably linked to the antisemitic views and prejudices of figures such as Richard Wagner, which helped lay the foundations for the Holocaust.

Another strand of antisemitic cultural myth is presented in Anneliese Senger's very readable chapter on two recent studies of Ahasver, the Eternal Jew, that mythical product of the Christian Passion story who supposedly abused the suffering Christ and was consequently condemned to a restless itinerancy until the Day of Judgement. In similar vein, Johann Michael Schmidt's challenging essay on the reception and enduring influence of Shakespeare's Shylock explores the conception of Jews in predominantly Christian societies, the role this conception played in making Auschwitz possible, and the way it continues to shape contemporary images of the Holocaust. Schmidt makes clear the continuing need for caution in staging Shakespeare's play—in particular, the need to show Shylock's behavior and fate as an outcome of Christian society dictates.

Constituting the bulk of the volume, the third and fourth sections feature a total of 25 essays on a variety of themes, plus exemplary works of German Jewish writing spanning the whole of the 20th century. The contributions vary in length and scope; all but three are published here for the first time. They include interpretations of works (sometimes single poems) by such authors as Walter Mehring, Tuvia Rübner, Hermann Broch, Rose Ausländer, Yvan Goll, Hilde Domin, Friedrich Torberg, and Paul Celan (from whose poem "Anabasis" [1963] the volume's title derives). Also included are more comprehensive evaluations of authors, notably Else Lasker-Schüler, Sarah Kirsch, Nelly Sachs, Jenny (Rosenbaum) Aloni, Franz Fühmann, and Barbara Honigmann.

Overall, this is an impressive collection of insightful and instructive literary and cultural criticism. It covers a remarkably broad spectrum of writing and writers, and it is to be recommended to anyone interested in German Jewish letters. At the same time, while one should not judge a festschrift by the same criteria as standard academic collections, it is a pity that the volume lacks a context-setting chapter on German Jewish writing to complement Kiesel's on Jews and modernism. Although there is a wealth of material here, nonspecialist readers are apt to have difficulty piecing together the rich mosaic of literary-biographical, literary-critical, and literary-creative contributions into some form of coherent overview. Writers of the Bohemian-Moravian and Czech regions, especially the so-called Prague Circle (Max Brod, Ernst Weiss, and Ludwig Winder), receive relatively little coverage. Other figures whose absence is somewhat surprising include Kurt Tucholsky, Franz Werfel, Stefan Zweig, and Joseph Roth, as well as German-language authors who live in Israel (only [Rosenbaum] Aloni is discussed at any length).

Nevertheless, the volume as it stands has considerable merit. It complements both

the recent edited collection of Margarita Pazi's writings on the subject and the comprehensive *Metzler Lexikon der deutsch-jüdischen Literatur.*[1] As such, it is a most welcome addition to recent writings on German Jewish literature.

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Note

1. See Margarita Pazi, *Staub und Sterne. Aufsätze zur deutsch-jüdischen Literatur*, ed. S. Bauschinger and Paul Michael Lützeler (Göttingen: 2001), and Andreas B. Kilcher (ed.), *Metzler Lexikon der deutsch-jüdischen Literatur* (Stuttgart: 2000).

Susanne Klingenstein, *Enlarging America: The Cultural Work of Jewish Literary Scholars, 1930–1990.* Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998. xxxiv + 492 pp.

This engaging volume is a sequel to the author's *Jews in the American Academy, 1900–1940: The Dynamics of Intellectual Assimilation* (1991). Like its predecessor, *Enlarging America* consists of a series of biographical portraits of Jewish professors—with a focus on professors of literature—associated with two major American universities, Columbia and Harvard. The first volume ends with an extended account of Lionel Trilling, who came to Columbia in 1928; the second begins with Harry Levin, who entered Harvard that same year. Included as well are profiles of some other familiar and still influential figures, among them M.H. Abrams, Daniel Aaron, Leo Marx, Allen Guttmann, Jules Chametzky, Robert Alter, Ruth Wisse, and Sacvan Bercovitch. Klingenstein also offers briefer sketches of four of Lionel Trilling's students (she calls them "refractions"), two of them successful academics (Steven Marcus and Carolyn Heilbrun), and two who chose nonacademic literary careers (Cynthia Ozick and Norman Podhoretz).

Enlarging America has a less academic, more journalistic feel than its predecessor. Partly this is because most of the figures portrayed here are our contemporaries—our colleagues, our teachers, and their teachers—and their stories, grounded in personal interviews with the subjects and those who know them, have an appeal akin to that of celebrity biographies. But there is a larger, more substantive reason. *Jews in the American Academy* shared with innumerable critical studies on modern Jewish figures (as well as with many literary works, from I.J. Singer's *The Brothers Ashkenazi* through Norman Podhoretz's *Making It* to Rebecca Goldstein's *The Mind-Body Problem)* the desire to discover and articulate the Jewishness of more or less assimilated Jews. Klingenstein's thesis in that earlier book was that the Judaism of the fathers is visited upon the prodigal sons. One example: Trilling's criticism was informed, she claimed, by a particularly "mitnagdic" way of thinking, an "intellectual grammar" inherited from his father that recapitulated essential Judaic values. Thus, on a deeper level, Trilling's embrace of the Western literary tradition was really an expression of *dos pintele yid*, or the little Jewish soul within him.

Such speculation is often intriguing. Sometimes, when it is built upon a well-wrought theoretical base—as in Susan Handelman's early attempt in *The Slayers of Moses* (1982) to identify the similarities between contemporary critical theory and rabbinic interpretation—the results are fascinating even for skeptics who prefer a more nuanced, historicized approach to questions of cultural assimilation and persistence. However, not all readers found Klingenstein's speculations so appealing. One in particular was Harry Levin, who refused to be fit "Procrustes-wise" into Klingenstein's "metaphorical scheme," and who even threatened to withdraw his permission to use his letters and interviews. To her credit, as she notes in her introduction, Klingenstein responded to Levin's criticism by rethinking her critical assumptions and effectually renouncing her earlier approach. Except for occasional lapses (at the end of the chapter on Daniel Aaron, for instance), *Enlarging America* "does not examine the careers of Jewish literary scholars through the prism of theory, but instead challenges theorists to hone their constructions on the biographical narratives presented [in the book]" (p. xix).

The challenge is formidable. All of the stories Klingenstein tells are interesting, and some (in particular those of Wisse and Bercovitch) are gripping. But what holds most of them together beyond university or departmental affiliation is not so much their intellectual grammar or some deep structure of Judaic heritage but rather the more mundane genealogical fact of being Jewish. The Ivy League has changed much from the time when Leo Wiener was promoted to the current era of Bercovitch and Wisse. America has changed much; the Jews have changed much. The history of that variegated and complex transformation is certainly worth telling, and Klingenstein's two volumes are an important and even essential part of it. Perhaps even more important is the intellectual honesty with which she faced Levin's criticism and her subsequent decision to let each of her subjects be as Jewish as they wanted to be: no more, no less.

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Religion, Thought, and Education

Louis Jacobs, *Beyond Reasonable Doubt*. London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1999. 267 pp.

Beyond Reasonable Doubt is intended as a sequel to *We Have Reason to Believe*, a book written 40 years ago that provoked the well-known Jacobs controversy. In his earlier book, Louis Jacobs presented a theory of revelation that tried to make sense of the fundamental Jewish belief in a divine Torah, but which also took into account the discoveries of biblical criticism and a historicist approach. *We Have Reason to Believe* cost Jacobs his job at Jews' College and eventually led to his being forced out of the Anglo-Orthodox community, in which he had previously functioned as a rabbi and teacher.

Although I have some reservations regarding his theology, I am an admirer of Rabbi Jacobs. I believe that he, like other brave souls who have dared to conduct their spiritual housecleaning in public, is a tragic figure. Far too often in today's Orthodox world, it is regarded as a serious breach of good manners, if not downright chutzpah, to raise honest and urgent questions concerning current Orthodox theology. The "keepers of the gate" can be very harsh in reacting to such lapses, and the degree of severity with which they treat offenders is usually in direct proportion to the establishment's inability to answer (or even understand) the questions that have been posed. Louis Jacobs deserves respect for his continuing courage in asking such questions.

Notwithstanding, I must confess that I found *Beyond Reasonable Doubt* a bit of a disappointment. Jacobs begins with a description of how the controversy over his previous book first developed and what were the issues involved. The tone of this first chapter is nobly dispassionate, without recourse to any blatant expressions of rancor. In the remainder of the book, Jacobs counters various arguments against his basic thesis that were made over time from both more conservative and more liberal directions. In these chapters—which appear to be a potpourri of history, biography, various items of scholarship, personal anecdote, and other curious vignettes—I found it difficult to extract anything important in the way of fresh material.

Jacobs does contend with the rather pathetic attempt on the part of some Orthodox authorities to censor Yitzhak Shimshon Lange's scientific edition of the 13th-century biblical commentary written by Yehudah Hehasid (which unself-consciously admits to interpolations in the Bible after the time of Moses).[1] He also demolishes the significance of recent attempts to enlist the technological sophistication of computers to analyze equidistant letter sequences in the Bible in an effort to prove its divine au-

thorship. However, Jacobs does not refer to the work of David Weiss-Halivni or Mordechai Breuer, both of whom have made notable attempts at addressing the theological challenge posed by the historical-critical school of thought (although he does mention the latter's uncle, Isaac Breuer). I believe that Jacobs' own views reveal greater theological awareness. Nevertheless, Prof. Weiss-Halivni is a major scholar whose views have a wide readership, and Rabbi Mordechai Breuer's approach (influenced in part by that of his uncle) has prompted a whole new school of biblical hermeneutics within certain segments of the Israeli yeshiva world. Both scholars deserve to be assessed by Jacobs, even if he ultimately rejects their arguments.

Beyond Reasonable Doubt does offer a few valuable clarifications. For example, Jacobs' "liberal supernaturalism," which asserts that there is both a human and divine element in the Torah, is not meant to be interpreted as a license to "go through the Pentateuch or the Psalms or the Mishnah or the Talmud with a pencil ticking the passages which appeal to us as divine and those which do not as human." Rather, he explains, his belief is that "God is behind the whole process," and that the Torah, produced by humans, is "eternity expressing itself in time," as such containing "error as well as truth, the ignoble as well as the noble" (pp. 50–51). Given this, we mortals are still left with the troublesome task of developing valid criteria for distinguishing between more and less noble elements of Torah—a problem that is the implicit leitmotif of Jacobs' book. For, once the absolute divinity of the religious message is undermined, on what grounds do we select among its various components? Although Jacobs fleetingly offers the criteria of "our moral sense, itself given by God" and "what the Jewish tradition itself declares" (ibid.), these answers are not subsequently developed in any systematic fashion, nor is their definition or adequacy examined from a philosophical point of view. In contrasting liberal supernaturalism with Orthodoxy, Reform, secular Judaism, and mysticism, Jacobs seems to get sidetracked by discussions concerning the history of these movements and by local denominational nitpicking. At other points, he appears to ramble into autobiographical digressions, settling his theological issues on somewhat idiosyncratic grounds of personal predilection.

A major flaw in Jacobs' presentation is the fact that he still frames the question of valid criteria for distinguishing truth from dross in an early 20th-century modernist mode. That is to say, Jacobs is one of those who believe that there is a rock-bottom foundation of objective, neutral truth, and that "getting the right answer" is a matter of somehow ridding ourselves of the prejudices of fundamentalist religion in favor of an approach that takes into account reason and scientific inquiry.

In this connection, Jacobs appears to make at least one inexplicable error regarding R. Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook's philosophy. Jacobs praises R. Kook's courage in embracing the theory of evolution and incorporating it in his religious belief despite its apparent contradiction to the story of Genesis. Nevertheless, he faults R. Kook for not dealing with the question of Adam and Eve's being treated in the whole of the Jewish tradition as real historical figures from whom all humans are descended (pp. 82–83). In fact, R. Kook came close to declaring the Adam story a myth when he insisted that "it makes no difference for us if in truth there was in the world an actual golden age, during which time man delighted in an abundance of physical and spiritual good, or if actual existence began from the bottom upwards."[2] More

important, he is one of the few Orthodox thinkers of the modern age who was prepared to take historicism into account. It is therefore not surprising that the glimmerings of a more sophisticated notion of revelation can be extrapolated from his writings.

Jacobs, for his part, fails to address the postmodernist notion that there is no neutral vantage point from which we may begin to discriminate between divine and human elements in the Torah. What postmodernism has taught us is that every act of observation is also an act of interpretation. The postmodern challenge to the divinity of the Torah is that no written or verbal medium can avoid the limitation of an all-pervasive perspective that both limits and biases its message. A Torah that appears as if it were a composite work that has developed over time can still logically be attributed to a divine author, either by asserting (as Mordechai Breuer does) that God deliberately dictated His message in this manner, or by declaring that the divinity of the Torah is not logically dependent upon its having been dictated completely to Moses. But what can we say about a Torah that reveals a more thoroughgoing perspective (for example, male, agricultural, Middle Eastern, or pagan)? Such a challenge entails a more subtle account of the relationship between revelation and interpretation, between author intent and reader reception, than that which is held by modernist notions of texts with a fixed meaning.

I had hoped that the book's final chapter, titled "Modernism and Interpretation," would address these issues. Jacobs, however, focuses in this chapter on a consideration of three significant Jewish themes (the purpose of creation, enjoyment of life, and the doctrine of imitatio dei) in a manner that weds the historical-critical approach to a theological approach, all the while avoiding the pitfalls of anachronism and tendentious readings. In all, *Beyond Reasonable Doubt* is a summary of Jacobs' battle against fundamentalism in Orthodox understandings of revelation. The parameters of that battle, however, are by now a little outdated. The supplements Jacobs has supplied will be of interest to those who are particularly interested in the author himself, or in the particular historical background of English Jewry that led up to the controversy surrounding his life's work. But in terms of theological substance, Jacobs' update is somewhat anticlimactic.

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Notes

1. See, for example, R. Moshe Feinstein, *Igerot Moshe, yoreh de'ah*, vol. 3, nos. 1140–1145 (pp. 358–361); cf. David Weiss Halivni, *Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis* (New York: 1991), 218 (n. 25).

2. R. Avraham Yitzhak Hakohen Kook, *Igerot haRaa"yah*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: 1985), 163. See my discussion of this passage in "The Cognitive Value of Religious Truth Statements: Rabbi A.I. Kook and Postmodernism," in *Hazon Nahum: Studies in Jewish Law, Thought and History Presented to Dr. Norman Lamm on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*, ed. Yaakov Elman and Jeffrey Gurock (New York: 1997), 500–501 and n. 45.

Leon Roth, *Is There a Jewish Philosophy? Rethinking Fundamentals*. London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1999. 199 pp.

This volume consists of 12 selected essays and lectures from the work of Leon Roth (1896–1963), who was the first professor of philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he taught from 1928 to 1951. The stated purpose of the publication is "to make known to a new generation, Roth's writing and teaching on Judaism, ethics and philosophy and their interrelationship."

Roth was an excellent choice to teach general philosophy at the newly established Hebrew University. His credentials in three areas vital to the appointment were impressive: he had studied philosophy at Oxford and had been teaching at the University of Manchester together with the well-known philosopher Samuel Alexander; he was fluent in Hebrew, which he had learned in childhood and had continued to study at Oxford; and he believed in the importance of a Jewish national home, even serving in the Jewish Legion during the First World War.

Roth's contribution to the academic life of the Yishuv (and later, of the state of Israel) was primarily in the field of general philosophy. Most of his published works, both in Hebrew and English, deal with classical and contemporary philosophy. Roth was instrumental in creating a library of classical philosophical texts in Hebrew, in this way fashioning a vocabulary that enabled the continuation in Jerusalem of a way of thinking started by Socrates. Rather ironically, however, Roth's contribution to posterity, as the contents of the present volume testify, is seen primarily in his writing on the subject of Judaism, which, while perhaps incidental to his professional career, was central to his life.

Roth was born in London to an enlightened observant Jewish family and from an early age was tutored in rabbinics and European classics. As a result, Roth knew Judaism in its three fundamental expressions—the Hebrew Bible, rabbinic literature, and medieval Jewish philosophy—from the inside as a living, God-centered way of life. When this knowledge was combined with Roth's philosophical training, the result was a penetrating insight into the basic principles of Judaism. Thus in this volume, Roth has significant things to say about the concept of God, the doctrine of man, the idea of holiness and *imitatio Dei*, biblical prophecy, Jewish mysticism, and the concept of law and authority. The same depth can be discerned in Roth's critical and lively analyses of Ahad Ha'am, Spinoza, and Greek thought, which will be touched upon later.

Perhaps because Ahad Ha'am was such a clear writer whose neat dichotomies were so popular, Roth felt the need to "step Ahad Ha'am down," arguing that he was not a philosopher but "at best a philosophically-minded essayist." Ahad Ha'am's view that the ethics of Judaism is based primarily on justice and that of Christianity on love is simply wrong, Roth insisted, pointing to Judaism's emphasis on *ḥesed*. According to Roth, Ahad Ha'am felt that "God is always within. He is the God of the heart, not of Sinai." In Roth's view, "Ahad Ha'am was a man of his own time, not of ours" (pp. 166–167).

According to Roth, Spinoza's conception of Judaism, grounded in the Bible, views the mission of the Hebrews as the formation of a society with fixed laws, the occu-

pation of a strip of territory, and the concentration of all forces to preserve the Hebrew community. However, Roth points out, Spinoza seems to have ignored the most significant parts of the Bible, which show that the purpose of the Jewish calling is moral and universal and that the "authentic voice of Judaism" is saying something quite different from what Spinoza claimed. "I suggest," concludes Roth, " that Spinoza has misread the evidence." According to the Bible, "the way of life which is the way of God created the nation, not the nation the way of life" (p. 102).

The longest essay (44 pages) is entitled "Jewish Thought as a Factor in Civilization," in which Roth considers the conventional wisdom that the basic ideas of modern Western civilization can be traced back to Israel, Greece, and Rome. Many others, of course, have dealt with this theme, but Roth exhibits his unusual ability to sum up the essential and unique features of Judaism in concise and pithy language. On the age-old issue whether the biblical way of life is tribal custom or universal law, Roth asserts, "the occasion may be local, the significance is universal and it is offered and recognized as such" (p. 36). In contrast to the Greeks: "Goodness in Judaism is not a theory or pious aspiration. It is action and action prescribed. Moral feelings must be exercised, if not they atrophy and become dead" (p. 113); "Judaism not only tells us to do good but what good to do" (p. 116). In comparing the Greek contribution to that of Judaism, Roth writes,

> The Greeks set out from the world of nature and produced mathematical science. The Jews set out from the world of man in which time and therefore history is all important, for history is the possibility of education. The Biblical account of history offers a pattern, a philosophy, a drama which includes all the families of the earth. History is not an aimless flux but a movement in which there is a mover and a moved. However, it is not mechanical. God is ready to help but much depends on man.

And as to the role of the Jew in history: "The Jew is a perpetual stimulus to the intelligence of mankind as he is a constant irritant to its conscience" (p. 71).

Roth's deepest insight, in my judgment, is in the area of the morality of Judaism. His essay "Moralization and Demoralization in Jewish Ethics" contains perceptions seldom articulated. Roth boldly asserts that a theory of morals (ethics) does not exist in Judaism (pp. 130–131), a condition that was certainly correct at the time of the writing in 1961. While he points to several instances in rabbinic writing where an argument on a point of morals is conducted on rational lines, there is no consciously adopted general framework of interpretation that would enthrone moral principles. Such a framework might have prevented certain random interpretations of texts that sometimes lead to "debasement and deflation in Jewish ethics" (p. 129).

The title of the book, "Is There a Jewish Philosophy?" is taken from the lead essay. According to Roth, the only coherent meaning to the term "Jewish philosophy" is a "philosophy of Judaism," that is, a rethinking of the fundamental elements in Judaism (dealing with such questions as: Who is God? Who is man? What is the purpose of life and the Torah? What is the "good?") and the attempt to relate these elements to each other so as to form a coherent whole. In this sense, the answer to the question in the title is affirmative. More than that, a philosophy of Judaism is desirable and necessary for anyone who believes that while religion may originate in the

heart, it must pass through the head. In order to know what one may believe and what one may not, we need philosophy.

Roth's political views as to the nature of Zionism and the uses of military power were closer to those of Judah Magnes and Martin Buber than to David Ben-Gurion (who was Roth's sergeant in the Jewish Legion). Roth was deeply troubled by Jewish violence toward the end of the Mandate and during the War of Independence. Indeed, he quietly resigned his position at the Hebrew University in 1951 and returned to England.

Roth is a clear and lively writer with an analytic grasp of what Judaism is all about. For a taste of vintage Roth, this collection is highly recommended, and not only to the "new generation."

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Gershom Scholem, *On the Possibility of Jewish Mysticism in Our Time and Other Essays*, ed. Avraham Shapira, trans. Jonathan Chipman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1997. 244 pp.

"The best thing about religion is that it gives birth to heretics." These words are not Gershom Scholem's, though anyone would be forgiven for thinking they were. Rather, they are the provocative maxim of Ernst Bloch, whose literary portrait at Scholem's lively pen concludes this slim and engaging volume of essays. This is fitting, in part because Scholem's encounter with Bloch early on in his life played a pivotal—if perhaps an apocryphal—role in the genesis of his own intellectual commitments. Scholem ranked his first encounter with Bloch (a nocturnal repartee that began at 6 P.M. and ended at 4 A.M.) as "among the most unforgettable hours of my youth" (p. 216). In May of 1919, Scholem visited Bloch at Interlaken and was stunned to find on his desk one of the foundational documents of European antisemitism, Johann Andreas Eisenmenger's *Entdecktes Judentum*. His astonishment grew as Bloch praised the text as the "most marvelous book concerning Judaism" whose author's only failure lay in his simplicity. The hideous Jewish blasphemies upon which Eisenmenger had heaped damnation in fact deserved acclaim as the "magnificent images of an abundant imagination" (p. 217). Scholem fancied the thought. They kindled in him, he recalled, "an idea which I have not forgotten to this very day" (p. 217): recovering heresy by reading the texts of the heresy-hunters *against* their stated intention.

The "linguistic lava" with which Bloch exploded onto the scene cooled considerably later on. But even at 90 years of age, Scholem insisted, "it continues to gush from him now and again" (p. 220). The same might be said of Scholem, and the series of his lectures, essays, exchanges, and portraits collected here, selected by Avraham Shapira from the Hebrew volumes *Devarim bego* (1976) and *'Od davar* (1992), testifies amply to the fact. Though organized thematically, they span a time from Scholem's first uncertain years in Palestine to the last decade of his life. The volume

includes several texts already well known to his scholars, among them Scholem's 1937 letter to Zalman Shocken on the "true intentions" of his Kabbalah studies and his letter of 1926 to Franz Rosenzweig on the "ghostly speech" spoken in the streets of a land (Palestine) he immortalized as a "volcano" that "hosts language" (p. 127). The volume also includes texts for the most part unnoticed by scholarly commentary, but which deserve it. A manuscript from 1926 likens the parable of Kafka's *Trial* to a secularized "summary of Jewish theology" unmatched in spiritual power by anything but the book of Job. This was a sensibility Scholem shared with others in the interwar period, particularly the Protestant theologians of crisis, with their disavowal of hope in divine providence. A poem Scholem composed eight years later, also at Kafka's (literary, not personal) prompting, asks similarly whether man has "completely separated from you, O God," of whom all traces have been banished from the world save "Your nothingness" (p. 194). These texts, along with others recently come to light, seem poised to inspire a new wave of commentary on Scholem and the possibility of justice.

The publisher does not intend the book for the scholar of Scholem per se. It aims at all those who wish to bathe in the radiance of his brilliant encounter with the two millenia of Jewish history that preceded him. In this, *On the Possibility of Jewish Mysticism in Our Time* succeeds beautifully. It commences with texts on Scholem's path to the study of Kabbalah. From there it moves to a series of treatments on Zionism, above all Scholem's surprising recovery of exile in a land built to end it. On its heels comes a set of pieces on the existential predicament of Judaism in Scholem's time. Here we find a moving exchange between Scholem and a group of teachers affiliated with Hashomer Hatzair, as they grapple with the intractable problems posed by the Jewish education of (and for) atheists. "I believe that an atheist can be a Jew," Scholem says. "Only the severance of the living tie with the heritage of the generations is, in my opinion, educational murder" (p. 85).

The volume takes something of a historical turn as it presents condensed historical overviews of Jewish mysticism and Jewish piety. Also reproduced is a brilliant lecture of 1946 on memory and utopia, which offers a critique of the discourse of memory that has arisen of late in the wake of the Holocaust—but with the stunning prescience of a good 40 years. The volume rounds out with portraits of Kafka and Rosenzweig, and with memories of Bloch, whose professed atheism, Scholem believed, was belied by a faint whiff of *homo religiosus*.

On the Possibility of Jewish Mysticism in Our Time nicely conveys the range and even the nuances of Scholem's spiritual and intellectual commitments, as much for the general reader as for the scholar. But it might have done more to reflect his political views: his anarchic hostility to the reigning forms of political Zionism, manifest not least in his early disavowal of the state as a European idolatry, and still more in the essays composed to further the program of the Brit Shalom (a cornerstone of the Hebrew volumes upon which this one was based). The spirit of such essays, like that of Scholem's kabbalists, has for a time disappeared—but may yet break out again, in us, today.

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Marc B. Shapiro, *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg 1884–1966*. London: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1999. 283 pp.

In the post-Holocaust period, Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg (1884–1966) became one of the leading authorities on Jewish law, answering questions posed by rabbis and scholars from Europe, Israel, and the United States. At that time, Weinberg, broken in body and partially in spirit after the horrors of the Holocaust years, made his home in Montreux, a small Swiss town with an even tinier Jewish population. Despite invitations to assume prestigious rabbinic posts in other countries, Weinberg would remain in Montreux until his death, carrying on a voluminous correspondence with colleagues and former students.

On the surface, there is little that would seem out of line in this portrayal of a sickly, elderly expert on Jewish law carrying on his expected task of responding to queries on various questions of the day. A closer look at the unique trajectory of Weinberg's life, however, shows us that this was but the final chapter in the life of a complex individual torn from his earliest years between two worlds—that of the yeshiva and that of modern Orthodoxy. Marc B. Shapiro quotes the words of Eliezer Berkovits, one of Weinberg's leading students, to the effect that any biography of Weinberg would "have to show the complexity of his character, the inner struggles . . . the tragedy and loneliness of his life" (p. vii). With *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy*, Shapiro has acquitted himself admirably.

How different is Shapiro's measured, careful, well-written, and critical yet respectful portrayal of Weinberg from the plethora of pious biographies of rabbinic figures issued in the last few years by a number of Orthodox publishers in Israel and the United States! The subjects of those works have no "warts" or doubts, the direction of their life is clear from earliest childhood, and any factual information that clashes with the image of a scholar totally immersed in Torah study (for example, that he may have read newspapers or listened to music) is edited out for the "benefit" of contemporary readers. Interestingly, Weinberg himself presented an alternative view of the believer in an early essay on Micah Joseph Berdyczewski, in which he wrote that belief characterized by calm and fulfillment is actually a sign of inner emptiness and lack of thought. His own views, at least in private correspondence, were often startling in their candor.

The bulk of *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy* traces Weinberg's life and works through three main periods of his life: his early life and education in Poland and Lithuania, including his tenure as rabbi of the small Lithuanian town of Pilwishki (chs. 1–2); the crucial years, starting with his move to Germany (where he enrolled in university studies), his affiliation with the Hildesheimer Seminary in Berlin, and his struggles and travails during the Holocaust period (chs. 3–6); and finally, Weinberg's last years in Montreux, when he gained his greatest fame as a *posek*, or halakhic decisor (ch. 7). An afterword and several fascinating appendixes round out the volume.

Throughout, Shapiro takes pains to show both the achievements and shortcomings of his subject. Weinberg's assumption of the rabbinate in Pilwishki in 1906, for in-

stance, was a "package deal" in which he agreed to marry the 16-year-old daughter of the town's deceased rabbi. The scholarly and relatively worldly Weinberg had little in common with his wife, and the relationship appeared doomed from the start; eventually, after years of separation, the childless couple was divorced (Weinberg never remarried). Shapiro also presents a sober view of the young Weinberg's first forays into publicistic writing. "He was not a thinker of great originality," Shapiro concludes. "He had certainly developed a good reputation among the Orthodox rabbinate, but considering the low quality of writing in this camp, their endorsement is not very significant. . . . It was only in Germany that Weinberg's full talents began to flower" (p. 50). At one point, Shapiro even calls attention to the fact that Weinberg, so quick to accuse other scholars of plagiarism, was himself guilty of plagiarism in one notable case. Finally, Shapiro finds that Weinberg's use of modern scholarly tools was limited both in his general writings and in his responsa. "When dealing with Weinberg, Heller, or any other Orthodox figure," he notes, "one inevitably finds scholarly conclusions being made to conform to dogmatic beliefs. It is the range of the latter which ultimately determines the broadness of the former" (p. 171).

When the Nazis assumed power in Germany, Weinberg gave a number of interviews to Jewish newspapers in Eastern Europe that expressed a hopeful, even naive view of the new government. These interviews were severely criticized by Jewish journalists. Shapiro reports the controversy in a balanced manner, showing how Weinberg's remarks, if somewhat extreme, were nonetheless indicative of a widespread view that the Nazi party was bound to moderate its antisemitic stance once it was in power. (Even granting this, it is painful to read the obsequious memorandum submitted to Hitler some months later by separatist Orthodox groups and the Agudat Yisrael in Germany, which appears on pp. 225–233 as an appendix.)

The great strength of Shapiro's study lies in his ability to "locate" Weinberg in each of the successive locales in which he found himself, whether it be the world of the musar yeshiva, the Hebrew periodical press, the small-town rabbinate, the German university system, or the different trends in German Orthodoxy. Shapiro's discussion is informed by his unerring feel for these successive social, cultural, and religious milieus, and it is based on a rich selection of contemporary and scholarly sources.

Nowhere was the split between the yeshiva world and modern Orthodoxy more blatant than in Weinberg's heroic efforts to deal with the Nazi regime's restrictions (supposedly out of humane considerations) on Jewish ritual slaughter (*sheḥitah*). Weinberg marshaled an impressive collection of sources and precedents to permit the stunning of the animal prior to ritual slaughter, as the new law demanded, and then traveled to leading rabbis in Eastern Europe to enlist their support. In the end, however, he bowed to the authority of the venerable Hayim Ozer Grodzinski of Vilna, who evidently feared that any concession of *sheḥitah* rules in Germany would open the floodgates for similar initiatives in Poland, Romania, and elsewhere. At the same time that the *sheḥitah* controversy was taking place, efforts were being made to transfer the Hildesheimer Seminary to Palestine. Although Weinberg was not a central figure in this episode, Shapiro convincingly demonstrates how the abortive attempt casts light on the ambivalent relationship between the East European rabbis and their German counterparts. Despite its notable achievements in keeping part of German Jewry loyal to Orthodoxy, German Orthodoxy was viewed by rabbincal leaders in

Eastern Europe and Palestine as being too dangerous to "import." Shapiro can only speculate how differently religious life in Eretz Israel might have developed had Hildesheimer been successful in his efforts.

During the 1920s and 1930s, Weinberg underwent a slow metamorphosis in his attitudes toward the path of German Orthodoxy, from the view of a critical outsider to that of an advocate of the way of *Torah 'im derekh erez*. Shapiro describes this transformation in detail, carefully noting that it did not denote any rejection of the East European *yeshivot*. Indeed, Weinberg's respect for that path never wavered. Nevertheless, he believed that the modern Orthodoxy of Samson Raphael Hirsch would eventually carry the day and help save Orthodoxy, and he was thus greatly disappointed that post-Holocaust Orthodoxy moved in the direction of increased stringency and lack of openness to modern culture.

Yet it was in the postwar period that Weinberg's influence in the rabbinical world became truly international in scope. As Shapiro points out, three factors helped bring this about. First, the destruction of the Holocaust left few world-class halakhists alive; Weinberg helped fill this void. Second, his many students from the Hildesheimer Seminary, now scattered over the globe, spread his reputation. And finally, more modern elements in Orthodoxy began to regard Weinberg as the halakhist best suited to rule on issues of the day. Although Weinberg was hesitant to break new ground unless backed by other scholars—often concluding his responsa with the remark that his analysis was to be regarded as theoretical and not practical halakhah—he nevertheless issued a number of decisions that to this day are regarded as path-breaking and even daring. Most prominent among these are his approval of the bat mitzvah ceremony, despite its having been an innovation of the non-Orthodox movements in Judaism (which Weinberg vehemently opposed), and his support for mixed male and female Orthodox youth groups. Weinberg also parted company with right-wing Orthodoxy over the issue of instituting a special memorial day for the victims of the Holocaust and over the permissibility of military funerals.

In Shapiro's view, the difference between Weinberg and his opponents did not concern talmudic dialectics, but rather an attitude toward modernity and change: "the right wing began by forbidding the innovation and then finding halakhic texts to support its position. Weinberg, for his part, was able to find other halakhic sources to justify his view. Here, as in so many other examples in halakhic history, it was the ideological position which created the halakhic argument" (p. 208).

Since Weinberg's main scholarly contribution, as Shapiro shows, lay in his responsa, it is a pity that this biography does not offer a clear and systematic analysis of *Seridei esh*, Weinberg's major work. I also missed a number of key documents that had originally appeared as appendixes in Shapiro's doctoral dissertation, on which the present book is based. These small criticisms aside, *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy* is a fine work of intellectual history and a worthy example of rabbinic biography written in accordance with the best standards of academic scholarship.

Under normal circumstances, this review would have ended here. However, a recent controversy has placed Shapiro's book in an entirely different context—namely, the debate over the nature of contemporary Jewish Orthodoxy. At issue is whether fig-

ures such as Weinberg or Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik "belong" to the modern Orthodox camp and, if so, how they may be "used" in the struggle against more right-wing Orthodox elements. In his book, Shapiro makes an eloquent case for the position that, on the basis of temperament, ideology, and halakhic approach, Weinberg should be considered part of modern Orthodoxy. Some critics, however, have accused Shapiro of promoting a personal ideological agenda—and in fact, some of the evidence brought by Shapiro seems to undercut his own assessment of Weinberg (for example, Weinberg's unwillingness as late as 1960 to publish a statement in support of women's suffrage).

Further complicating matters is a fascinating moral-ethical-halakhic debate over Shapiro's sources. In the last chapter of his book, Shapiro leans heavily on the candid correspondence between Weinberg and a life-long friend, Professor Samuel Atlas of Hebrew Union College. In many of these letters, Weinberg attacked Orthodox attitudes and leaders, expressed his personal disgust with the way Gentiles are regarded in halakhic sources, and stated his admiration for several Reform Jews. The correspondence was published separately by Shapiro in the *Torah u-Madda Journal* in 1997. [1] In a lengthy article responding to harsh criticism generated by the piece, the journal's editor, Jacob J. Schacter, attacked the common practice of falsifying biographies of leading rabbis by means of leaving out "sensitive" material. He conceded, however, that he may have erred in publishing Weinberg's private letters, concluding with a moving account of his visit to Weinberg's grave in Jerusalem, where he asked the late rabbi for forgiveness.[2]

Be that as it may, Weinberg's letters are now part of the public record, and Shapiro has begun a project of publishing Weinberg's heretofore unpublished articles and halakhic writings. In this context, *Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy,* an admirable piece of scholarship in its own right, is also part of an ongoing conversation within Orthodoxy that students of contemporary Jewish affairs should find of no less interest than historians.

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Notes

1. See Marc Shapiro, "Scholars and Friends: Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg and Professor Samuel Atlas," *Torah U-Madda Journal* 7 (1997), 105–121.

2. See Jacob J. Schacter, "Facing the Truths of History," ibid. 8 (1998–1999), 200–276. Among other issues that Schacter addresses is whether the publication of the letters violates the halakhic injunction against reading someone else's mail.

Shubert Spero, *Holocaust and Return to Zion: A Study in Jewish Philosophy of History*. Hoboken: Ktav, 2000. xviii + 398 pp.

Although its title directs the reader's attention to the key Jewish historical events of the 20th century, the Holocaust and the creation of Israel, this book ranges over the

whole of Jewish history from the biblical period to the present. Indeed, of its ten chapters, only one is devoted to the Holocaust and one to the return to Zion. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that the author's interest in the historical dimension of Judaism is driven by these key events in 20th-century Judaism, which propelled the Jewish story onto the world's front pages to a degree unknown since the destruction of the Second Temple.

It can be argued that from 70 CE to 1948 CE, the Jewish people went into historical hibernation. Nonetheless, Jewish thought did not become ahistorical. In a chapter dealing with the medieval era, Spero surveys the writings of figures such as the unknown author of *Yosippon*, Ibn Daud, Judah Halevi, and Maimonides and comes to the conclusion that historical thinking was alive and well in the Middle Ages even though the Jewish people no longer had a state of its own that could serve as a vehicle for Jewish participation in history. This was true even of Maimonides, who noted acerbically that "the reading of books found among the Arabs describing historical events, the government of kings, and Arabs generally, is a waste of time" (quoted on p. 147).

The holding of history in low esteem, Spero explains, goes back to Aristotle, who distinguished between universal concepts—the proper subject matter of human understanding—and particular things or events, whose contingency excludes them from the realm of science. Had the influence of Aristotle on Maimonides been decisive, Maimonides would indeed have been an ahistorical thinker, which is how a number of scholars see him. Spero, however, points out that Maimonides prefaces his major halakhic work with a chronology of the transmission of the tradition; explains many of the commandments as a function of the religious climate at the time of the giving of the Torah; and places events connected with the coming of the Messiah within a historical context. Maimonides, speculates Spero, could even interpret recent events in Jewish history messianically: "There is nothing in the text or logic of Maimonides' views that would preclude the identification of unusual events in recent history, particularly those associated with Eretz Yisrael, as being *potentially* or *possibly* messianic" (p. 156). Finally, Maimonides' credentials as a historical thinker are further strengthened by his comments that "were all the wise men in Eretz Yisrael to agree to appoint judges and ordain them," the original Mosaic ordination, which had been disrupted, would be restored (quoted on p. 154). This, in Spero's view, makes Maimonides a historical activist who assigns to humans a central role in actualizing God's plans in redemptive history.

It is with respect to Zionism, particularly religious Zionism, that the issue is most clearly joined. Has history settled the debate between the non-Zionist ideology of Agudath Israel and the pro-Zionist perspective of the Mizrachi? Spero cites Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik to the effect that God, through history, has settled the debate in favor of the Mizrachi. According to Soloveitchik, in matters of halakhah, God has given the sages of Israel the right to decide. But in historical questions, He has reserved that right to Himself. The creation of the state of Israel convinced Soloveitchik, and apparently Spero, that God favors the Mizrachi viewpoint.

Given Spero's unusual grasp of the significance of history in the self-understanding of Judaism, there are two positions, one on the right and one on the left, that are missing in this study. On the right there is the position of Yoel Teitelbaum, the rabbi

of Satmar, whose anti-Zionism Spero should not have left unexamined. Here and there, Spero mentions that "an ancient tradition forbade Jews to break out of the exile and enter Eretz Yisrael by violent means" (p. 323), but he does not note Teitelbaum's carefully crafted critique of the Zionist enterprise, which centers around the argument that the exile marks a period in which Jews are enjoined from making history. While this argument makes Teitelbaum somewhat ahistorical, his position can also be read as a kind of engagement with history: we probably think more about food when we are fasting than when we are not.

On the left side of the spectrum, one misses Spero's analysis of the historical school of liberal Judaism, the ideology that supports Conservative Judaism in the United States and much of liberal Judaism elsewhere. In the yeshiva world, Torah is studied ahistorically, as if the Judaism of Joshua or King David were identical with that of the Mirer Yeshiva. The historical school seized on the implausibility of this conviction and stressed the developmental dimension of Judaism. For Orthodox Jews, this raised many difficulties, ranging from biblical criticism to the approach to halakhah by authors such as Jacob Katz. Here again, Spero is silent on a form of historicism that is regnant in university departments of Jewish studies. One can only hope that he will deal with this issue in future writings.

Shubert Spero has written a far-ranging study that will be consulted often and for a long time. As history unfolds, Spero and we may change our minds. But we will not ignore history as it happens.

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Zionism, Israel, and the Middle East

Meron Benvenisti, *Sacred Landscape: The Buried History of the Holy Land since 1948*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 366 pp.

Meron Benvenisti's book, which deals with the erasure of ruined Arab villages from the Israeli map, is both harshly self-critical and a challenge to Israeli historiography and cartography. The author seeks to portray a landscape long vanished from the Israeli view and to rehabilitate—virtually—the Arab village and its agriculture, its health and educational systems, the mosque, and the very scents of the rural landscape. *Sacred Landscape* is a book written by an Israeli Jew who yearns for the landscape of his youth where these villages were present, and without which he cannot fully adapt to his birthplace.

Three overlapping circles compose the book. The first is the personal circle, dominated by a fascinating description of the author's father, a renowned educator and geographer. David Benvenisti's greatest challenge was to create a Hebrew map that would renew a specifically Jewish bond with the land. One outcome of that project was *Our Homeland*, essentially a work of indoctrination (it became an elementary school textbook) that assiduously avoided any mention of existing Arab villages and their residents. Apart from not learning about the Arab presence in their country, Israeli children were also involved in more concrete acts of erasure. Benvenisti recalls, for instance, his days in Kibbutz Rosh Hanikra, where he and others uprooted the olive trees—a staple of Arab agriculture—and replaced them with a grove of bananas.

The second circle, the scholarly crux of the book, focuses on the years following Israel's establishment, in which the new state sought to eradicate the memory of Arab villages by destroying their remains on the ground and by erasing their names from the map. By and large, this is an unfamiliar chapter in Israeli history, and Benvenisti makes an important contribution to its being brought to wider awareness. Finally, in the third circle, he seeks to resurrect the lost memory of Arab villages. Relying in part on personal diary descriptions, Benvenisti introduces the reader to a long list of villages: Ein Hawd, Ghaleisuyye, Deir Yasin, Qalunya, and Qastal, among many others. These descriptions, scattered throughout the book, are almost obsessive in their detail, as if Benvenisti feels impelled to share everything he knows, for fear that no one else will. Among other things, he discusses the land and its agricultural produce, the number of village residents and their occupations, and various health and educational facilities. The book would have been more effective had these descriptions been cut in length, or had they been gathered together in an appendix.

To a large extent, *Sacred Landscape* is a political book, and much of what Benvenisti has to say is both interesting and important. On the origin of the refugee problem, for instance, Benvenisti argues that only a minority of those Arabs who fled were physically evicted: even if Arab leaders did not call on the villagers to leave (as classic Zionist historiography has it), they did nothing to prevent the exodus. The extent of the Palestinian flight took Israeli leaders by surprise. They soon exploited it, however, and were adamant about not reversing the process.

Benvenisti makes a distinction between two periods. In the first, from the U.N.'s adoption of the partition plan in November 1947 until Israel's establishment in May 1948, Arabs and Jews were essentially two feuding communities. It was during the War of Independence and thereafter that government policy toward the refugees crystallized, as evident in Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's decision of June 16, 1948 that the refugees would not be allowed to return to their homes. Largely rejecting revisionist accusations of Israeli-driven refugee displacement just prior to and during the war, Benvenisti reserves his criticism for a later period, when the government evacuated a number of Arab villages whose residents had remained. Decades later, these Israeli citizens were still being denied the right to return to their land.

Estimates of the number of deserted villages range from 290 to 472, and their financial worth in 1950 was anywhere from one to four billion dollars. According to Benvenisti, the effort to erase their memory was headed by the Ben-Gurion government, which established a toponymy committee (unparalleled in the world) that within a few years had invented hundreds of Hebrew place names. Some of these were based on the Arabic names, which in turn had their origins in biblical sources; others were completely new. So effective was this effort that by the early 1960s, Arabic names were barely to be found on Israeli maps.

Sacred Landscape describes in great detail the evolution of Israeli policy regarding the resettlement of and (later) building over of the Arab villages. At first concerned with security issues, Israeli leaders came to realize the potential of Arab land for alleviating a burgeoning housing shortage in the wake of post-independence mass immigration. Between 1948 and 1954, some 400 Jewish settlements were built upon land that had once belonged to Arab villages. The government viewed this process as a mere population exchange: since Arab refugees had resettled in Arab countries, Jewish refugees (many of them from Arab lands) would take their place. The reality, however, was more complex. Israel created a legal "bubble" of sorts that allowed for confiscation of Arab land with only minimal compensation offered to its owners. The land was then handed over to the Israel Lands Authority, which then sold it to the Jewish National Fund—in this way blocking any future attempt to return it to its original owners.

A significant part of *Sacred Landscape* is devoted to the image of Arabs in post-independence Hebrew literature. With the exception of S. Yizhar, Benvenisti claims, Israeli writers have generally disregarded Arabs or else have portrayed them as evil. Benvenisti also faults the Israeli Left for willfully overlooking the injustice of Arab land confiscation and for dismissing Palestinian demands for the "right of return" as unrealistic or even petty.

Toward the end of his book (written prior to the breakdown of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process), Benvenisti offers his own partial solutions. In his view, it is

possible to address the refugee problem mainly on the symbolic level, by allowing for the return of a limited number of refugees in a way that does not compromise overall Israeli sovereignty. Benvenisti also argues that Israeli Arabs should be given the right to relocate to the periphery of their former villages—in most cases, to the periphery of what are now kibbutzim, moshavim, or urban Israeli settlements.

Written out of a sense of mission, *Sacred Landscapes* offers an elegy to a landscape long gone, alongside suggestions on how to heal what he regards as a longstanding wound. For the most part, Benvenisti succeeds in presenting the facts as objectively as possible. At times, however, he makes claims that somewhat strain credibility. For instance, he characterizes Palestinians as "the last of the Zionists" because of their continuing bond with the land. With all due respect to the Palestinian attachment to the land and its memories, Zionism encompasses far more—namely, the notion of establishing a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, which has as well an affinity to the origin of Hebrew culture. Indeed, it was its flexibility regarding the precise location of Israel's borders and its willingness to make concessions regarding Jerusalem in the partition plan of 1947 that paved the way for the success of the Zionist idea. Had Zionism clung to every tree and stone, it would have become an ephemeral historical episode.

Meron Bevenisti's book is recommended both to those seeking solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to those familiar with human suffering. It is not an easy book to read, and it could have been better edited, but the point of view it represents and the information it offers make it well worth the effort.

Yossi Beilin
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Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser, *Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular-Religious Impasse*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 167 pp.

Religion has been a fixture on Israel's public agenda since the creation of the state. Religious and secular leaders contended about the wording of the Declaration of Independence, argued to a stand-off about the creation of a constitution, and have disputed such issues as Sabbath observance; the definition of a Jew; procedures of marriage, divorce, conversion, and burial; the availability of non-kosher food; abortion, organ transplants, and postmortem examinations; the status of non-Orthodox congregations and rabbis; ancient graves uncovered in the process of construction and archaeological activity; the service of religious men and women in the armed forces; the modesty demanded of females portrayed in advertising posters; and the status of the land of Israel as a factor in government policy concerning settlement, international relations, and defense. There is no shortage of popular and scholarly commentary about the principal religious and secular figures in episodes of conflict or efforts to moderate dispute. There are competing assessments as to whether the conflict is growing or receding, either threatening the stability of the society or else little more than a chronic dispute within agreed-upon limits.

Throughout most of their book, Bar-Ilan University political scientists Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser present a gloomy analysis of worsening conflict that has come to threaten Israeli society. They borrow the theory of consociational democracy put forward by the Dutch scholar Arend Lijphart to describe the handling of religious-secular disputes in the first years of the Israeli state. Consociationalism seeks to deal with potentially serious disputes by accommodation, recognizing the legitimate concerns of a minority, granting autonomy where feasible, and steering clear of unilateral decisions that "solve" conflicts at the expense of the numerically weaker party. According to Cohen and Susser, consociationalism worked best when Mapai was the dominant political party and could provide concessions to the religious minority without feeling a threat to its political position. Once Israeli politics became closely divided and a change of government was an ever-present possibility, religious parties gained the capacity of toppling governments. This made them less willing to accept what the majority offered. A growing appetite on the part of the religious came along with the increasing strength of haredi parties. Anti-religious concerns sharpened in parallel to religious demands, and what had been a moderate struggle and a measured parceling out of benefits to the religious turned into a persistent and nasty struggle for advantage. Direct election of the prime minister added to demagoguery. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin by a religious fanatic pointed to worse consequences that were likely:

> Consociationalism—that is, the adaptive, unity-preserving political style of the first decades of Israel's existence—has given way, especially in the past decade and a half, to a crisis-dominated relationship between secular and religious Jews that becomes progressively more strident as the erstwhile common political language between them is lost. Rather than an accommodation of each other's needs in the interest of preserving national unity, a majoritarian, winner-take-all style has grown more and more dominant (pp. xii–xiii).

The nature of Cohen and Susser's argument leaves this reader unconvinced. They offer nothing approaching a systematic analysis of the quantity or quality of tensions, disputes, or the outcomes of conflict at various points of time. Rather they array episodes from the early period and the later period and claim that the former episodes represent accommodation more than the result of political pressure, while the latter represent the product of political pressure more than accommodation. Yet the differences seem less sharp than their claims. Shrill demands were voiced early in the country's history, while there have been cases in recent years in which both secular and religious leaders felt that their comrades were pressing so heavily as to endanger national comity.

Most recent history has not been kind to these political scientists. Writing during the Barak government and prior to the onset of what the Arabs call *intafada al Aqsa*, Cohen and Susser describe an Israeli regime made extreme by the direct election of the prime minister, and a Jewish population sharply divided by contrary views of the Oslo peace process as well as by issues of conversion, the rights of non-Orthodox religious Jews, and the exemption of haredi Israelis from military service. In 2001, however, Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister by an impressively large majority and formed a government of national unity extending from the moderate Left to the ex-

treme Right—with the inclusion, support, or at least tolerance of the Jewish religious parties. Moreover, the Knesset has enacted a return to a conventional parliamentary system without the direct election of the prime minister. Meanwhile, as of this writing, ongoing Palestinian violence has almost entirely quieted the usual Jewish disputes about religion.

If the authors can be excused their failure to foresee these events, they cannot as easily be excused from being too certain about the future. Moreover, their reading of recent religious disputes that fell within their time frame is less than convincing. While they see a real threat to Jewish unity in bitter disputes about conversions by non-Orthodox rabbis and the issue of non-Jews coming with the migrations from the former Soviet Union and from Ethiopia, the actual handling of both issues seems more suitable to a consociational kind of accommodation than any exploitation of political advantage by a majoritarian coalition. By their own description, the issue of non-Orthodox conversion has wallowed in a series of unresolved efforts by committees and protracted procedures of the Supreme Court. Although religious activists have lobbied against the immigration of non-Jews, this issue as well continues without a resolution. The lack of finality amounts to a form of accommodation and a continuation of consociationalism. Contrary to the implications of Cohen and Susser, there has been no imposition of a solution by one side of the conflicts on the basis of political advantage.

The authors themselves manage to cast significant doubts on their own argument in the final chapter. They write that "feelings of solidarity continue to be quite powerful in Israeli society" and that leaders of both secular and religious communities are aware of the dangers in extremism (p. 133). They speculate that the peace process may fail. They feel certain that if this happens "religious opposition to it will surely be one of the central reasons for such a failure," and they project a violent reaction against the religious from the Jewish Left (pp. 137–138). Currently it seems that a large majority of Israelis blame Arabs and not Jews for the breakdown of the peace process, and that Jewish unity rather than enmity has been the most apparent response.

Ira Sharkansky
The Hebrew University

Stuart A. Cohen and Milton Shain (eds.), *Israel: Culture, Religion and Society 1948–1998*. Jewish Publications, South Africa (n.d., n.p.). 98 pp.

Israel is well known both as a society whose complexity belies the large majority of one religious group and as a country that has changed significantly over its five decades of independence. Elements involved in the changes are the trauma of numerous wars alongside several waves of large-scale immigration, with other impacts originating in the economies and cultures of other countries.

This small anthology assembled by Stuart A. Cohen and Milton Shain grew out of a conference sponsored by the Jewish studies units at the University of Cape Town and at Bar-Ilan University. Its chapters convey both diversity and change. Anita Shapira summarizes the ongoing tensions between different conceptions of Israeli

history and current national identity. Charles S. Liebman compares findings from Israel and the United States with respect to Jewish identity. Bernard Susser finds a sharpening of tension among Israeli Jews. Hanna Herzog describes a growth of feminist awareness over several stages of Israeli history. Stuart A. Cohen portrays changes in Israeli conceptions of its armed forces, and Gabriel Ben-Dor identifies changes in prominent features of Arab-Israeli relations. As the occasion of the conference was Israel's 50th anniversary, none of the chapters relate to the latest of Israel's traumas, namely, the onset of violence from September 2000, which may come to affect all of the issues considered by the authors.

The volume provides a convenient summary of what transpired in Israel up to the point of its half-century anniversary. The lack of a recognized publisher will in all likelihood limit its significance in the ongoing accumulation of writing about Israel. Several of the chapters are provocative in dealing with ambiguities and contradictions in the evolution of Israeli society. None, however, offers an analysis that is sufficiently systematic to clarify the nature of historical developments, or to what extent and to what importance the present differs from the past. All rely heavily on other writings of the authors. If readers happen on this volume and want more, it is clear from the references where they can turn.

Ira Sharkansky
The Hebrew University

David Mittelberg, *The Israel Connection and American Jews.* Westport: Praeger, 1999. 192 pp.

The relationship between American Jews and Israel has been studied through a range of lenses since Israel's inception. David Mittelberg's new book examines the topic through a social scientific lens in which he explores the connection between a visit to Israel and American Jewish ethnic identity. Empirical study of this particular issue has expanded over the past decade, both because of a firm conviction that Israel programs are a valuable tool for nourishing Jewish continuity and identity, and out of a desire to show that such programs "work." *The Israel Connection and American Jews* is a quantitative study of what has come to be known as the Israel Experience.

"Will a visit to Israel make a difference to being Jewish in America in the year 2000?" To answer this basic question, Mittelberg utilizes two well-known data sets of the American Jewish community, the 1990 National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) and the New York Jewish population study of 1991, alongside his own longitudinal study of past participants of a year-long Israel program known as Otzma. His comparisons between various data sets are useful in supplying breadth and depth to a topic that is often analyzed narrowly (most research on the Israel Experience is limited to exclusive analysis of a particular program, often commissioned by that program). The book also benefits from the inclusion of both bivariate and multivariate analyses in which the author controls for particular variables, such as Jewish education. The multivariate analyses are especially helpful, as a number of competing variables and explanations are explored in this work.

In his first five chapters, Mittelberg focuses on the historical and theoretical context. This is one of the real strengths of the book, since most studies of Israel programs lack broad historical or theoretical discussion. Chapter 1 presents a historical background of American Jewry's connection to Israel as manifested in Zionism, pilgrimages, and contemporary travel to Israel. Chapter 2 reports on previous research on the Israel Experience, giving us an overview of *who* visits, *how* they visit and the *impact* of visits on Jewish identification. The next three chapters provide a theoretical background reflecting both general and Jewish literature. Chapter 3 outlines the interplay between identity, modernity, and ethnicity and shows how general concepts such as "plausibility structure" are applied to the realm of Jewish continuity. Chapter 4 briefly looks at the American Jewish community and the role of ethnicity—in particular, the notion of "symbolic ethnicity" and its relation to American Jews. Following this, Mittelberg examines the relationship between Jewish identity and Israel.

After this more general framework, Mittelberg turns to the data—first, that of the NJPS, which he examines over the course of five separate chapters (7–11). Most of the information in these chapters will be familiar to the reader well versed in Jewish population studies, although Mittelberg at times goes beyond the figures to offer welcome interpretations and policy recommendations. Following this, he cross-checks the data from the NJPS with those of the New York Jewish population study and the longitudinal study of Otzma alumni (ch. 12). Inclusion of the latter provides an additional point of analysis from which to consider the impact of the Israel trip.

Overall, the question whether visiting Israel makes a difference to being Jewish in America is answered by Mittelberg in the affirmative. In the concluding chapter, he incorporates his basic findings into the larger picture of modernity and Jewish identity, and then goes on to discuss postmodernism and multiple identities. Mittelberg also suggests several further policy recommendations, including the funding of Israel Experience programs for particular Jewish American populations.

The major deficiency of Mittelberg's book is his presentation of the data. Regrettably, he does not offer an innovative perspective to enhance previous research on American Jews and their connection to Israel. While Mittelberg's work does go beyond the typical exploration of frequencies and cross-tabulations, he nevertheless maintains a narrow focus on "impact." He does not push at the boundaries of existing research, but rather continues to demonstrate the point that visiting Israel is helpful in building Jewish identity. Moreover, although he includes a longitudinal data set, he does not address the larger question of the Israel Experience's long-term impact.

Mittelberg's lack of innovation and creativity does not only stem from his routine use of the concept of impact. It also emanates from an exclusive dependence on quantitative investigation at the expense of qualitative exploration. Traditionally, quantitative research asks closed questions to arrive at framed answers. There is room, however, to move beyond this narrow realm and contemplate more open-ended questions and expansive answers. Inclusion of qualitative methods not only provides a new means by which to consider the topic, but also presents a new lens through which to understand the connections that are fostered by the Israel visit.

"What happens during the Israel Experience that leads a participant to identify more strongly with Israel/Judaism upon his or her return home?" "Are there moments

or experiences that serve as a catalyst for increased identification in the eyes of the participant (or the observer)?" "Is it the trip itself or is it something that happens when the participant returns home that alters his or her pattern of identification?" These and other open-ended questions are missing from *The Israel Connection and American Jews*. Even without adding qualitative research of his own, Mittelberg might have made use of the growing body of qualitative work on American Jews and the Israel Experience in examining the issue and making recommendations.

Overall, however, Mittelberg's book is a welcome resource in understanding the Israel visit for American Jews, as it brings breadth and depth to the available quantitative research in the field. Mittelberg successfully incorporates historical and theoretical background with various empirical studies and with bivariate and multivariate analyses. Moreover, he asks a series of thought-provoking questions that guide the study throughout, as well as offering concrete and useful proposals.

MINNA WOLF
The Hebrew University

Susan Sered, *What Makes Women Sick? Maternity, Modesty and Militarism in Israeli Society*. Hanover, N.H.: Brandeis University Press/University Press of New England, 2000. x + 194 pp.

I am thankful to Susan Sered for providing me with the unique experience of being written about and thus allowing me to identify with the position of the native—the "other" around which most of anthropology evolves. As an Israeli feminist and as a woman who has lived here all of my life, I found *What Makes Women Sick?* extremely disturbing and challenging. So many things are said about "Israeli women," and in such an authoritative manner! As a reader, I found myself arguing with the author on almost every sentence in the book. It did not fit my own experience, nor that of my many female relatives and friends.

While I enjoyed the author's good writing and fascinating examples, I kept asking three main questions. First, *what is the basis for the author's sweeping generalizations*? Statistical or demographic evidence? Her own experience during the years she lived in Israel? Research conducted with informants—if so, who were they, how many, how representative? Impressions created by certain newspaper articles or television programs? And what about negative or even doubtful evidence—was there none?

Second, *with whom are Israeli women being compared?* With men? Israeli men? American women? Women in Okinawa (whom Sered has also researched recently)?

And finally, *are Israeli women really all of one kind?* How can someone who is knowledgeable of Israeli society ignore the vast cultural differences among Israeli subgroups—for instance, the ultra-Orthodox, the secular, or Russian or Ethiopian recent immigrants? (Non-Jewish women, Sered notes in her introduction, were intentionally excluded from this study.) What kind of serious analysis forgoes comparison and differentiation between these various mentalities?

For readers of this review who have not seen the book, let me summarize its main

thesis. Sered's starting point is that Israeli women are sicker and die earlier then their counterparts in the Western world. Not only do Israeli women talk more about health, but they actually suffer from poorer health. Since Sered believes (as I do) that both health and gender, with their apparent link to the body and its physiology, are basically cultural constructions, she aims to prove that "femaleness is constructed via reference to illness and that constructions of illness incorporate the notion of femaleness" (p. 2). In other words, patriarchy—that is, unjust gender practices and ideologies—is responsible for the poor health of Israeli women. In general, people who lack authority yet are loaded with major responsibilities suffer more than others from illness. Specifically in Israel, the encouragement given to women to have large families, the normalization of a military component in life, and the political power of the rabbinical system all have some impact on the health of Israeli women. Moreover, Israeli culture constructs women as weak, dependent, and in poor health. The state, the Jewish religion, and the military systems all collaborate to make sure that women are watched and controlled.

Motherhood is a major topic of this book. According to Sered, several powerful institutions, each with its own agenda, depict motherhood as a national goal and reinforce women for becoming mothers of large families. "Women's bodies bear the burden of the national mission of perpetuating the state, the state is seen as threatened and vulnerable, and women's bodies manifest feelings of peril and defenselessness" (p. 61). In other words, this position of women-as-mothers does not empower women at all. On the contrary, when Israeli women give birth, according to Sered, they do not trust their body to perform the birth process naturally, and they need many medical interventions. When they nurse their infants, they do not trust themselves to have enough milk, and thus escape to artificial substitutes. In addition, many Israeli women perceive themselves as suffering from problems of infertility.

I do not see strong evidence for these claims (along with others made in this book), and I must say that they do not agree with my own experience and observations. It seems to me that Sered has overgeneralized from her data to the Israeli society at large. Furthermore, she treats many of the topics without empathy, at least from my perspective as a reader. The following are a few counterarguments to Sered:

1. Most young educated men and women wish to have small families, and do so. They would scorn the idea that they are bringing up children for the state.
2. Although many ultra-Orthodox families are indeed large, this is an outcome of their religious—not patriotic, or nationalistic—perspective. Moreover, ultra-Orthodox women cannot be depicted flatly as weak and sick; there are many more aspects than this to their identity and societal situation.
3. Although the vast majority of Israeli couples are married by a rabbi, in accordance with the Jewish ritual, I would say that only a small minority of the brides take in any of the rabbinical advice about sex, modesty, and the importance of observing the laws of family purity. It is a mistake to extrapolate from rabbinical advice to make sweeping statements concerning what the majority of Israeli women (or men) actually feel and do.
4. Sered's argument that breast augmentation and reduction surgery are more prevalent in Israel than in New York or San Francisco seems totally off base.

I join the author only in her conviction that mothering boys, who then become soldiers, leads to a great deal of emotional stress among Israeli women. But even this matter is analyzed as part of the feminine construction of weakness rather than an examination of a real-life dilemma. I assume that had the author still lived in Israel, her view of this issue might have been different.

Assuming that Sered's contention that Israeli women are sicker than women of similar background in other cultures is correct, the question is why this is so. I would propose a more simple and traditional explanation. Israeli citizens, both women and men, cope with an extremely high amount of stress in their lives. This stress may affect women more than it does men, because women tend to be more "other-oriented" and are delegated more often with the social duty of worrying and caring for people's well-being. (Women visit physicians more frequently than men, as Sered also reports, but often to discuss health matters of other members of their families!) This, however, is not a manifestation of weakness or dependence. By delegating women and mothers with the social responsibility of care, society implies that women are strong enough to cope with the burden, as indeed most of them are.

Given my serious disagreement with Sered's thesis, I wonder whether my objection may be due to a defensive posture on my part—the obvious reluctance to accept what I read as an offensive depiction of women of my own culture. For this reason, I encourage other readers to take on Sered's book and judge for themselves.

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Shalva Weil (ed.), *Roots and Routes: Ethnicity and Migration in Global Perspective.* Jerusalem: Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1999. 248 pp.

The varied contributions to this volume had their origin in a conference held at the Hebrew University in 1994 on the subject of immigration, language acquisition, and patterns of social integration. Included are an introductory essay on ethnicity, migration, and social class; nine empirical case studies; three theoretical essays; and a concluding critique of the sociology of migration as conceived for the Israeli case.

Shalva Weil opens her introduction with a review of the literature on ethnicity in which she highlights the "micro theorists" of ethnic emergence, embedding this theoretical discussion in the "symbiotic" and "dyadic" relationship between ethnicity and migration in destination societies and cultures (p. 18). She begins by neatly summarizing the differences between primordial and situational ethnicity and goes on to examine the unwarranted teleology of straight-line assimilation theory, as well as the modern, homogenizing consequences of globalization on ethnic salience and identity. The dominant theme here is the continuing role of migration, even in postindustrial societies, as the universal independent variable, and the consequences of such migration for modern social and cultural life.

Weil's bottom line is that ethnicity—whether primordial or situational, actual, imagined, invented, or even barely distinguishable from nationalism—is here to stay. Why is this? Because we are all migrants, potential migrants, or receivers of migrants;

and what binds us or divides us is our ethnicity. Whether this is an adequate account of contemporary ethnicity remains questionable: Is it true that everything happening inside society can be traced back to its ethnic structure, and is its degree of social solidarity to be explained exclusively in terms of migration processes?

These and other important theoretical questions are addressed inductively in this volume, mainly via a series of interesting and contrasting case studies, which include a wide range of groups even in a single host country: for example, Bengal immigrants to Britain, alongside British Kashmiris in central England and British-born Sikhs throughout the United Kingdom. Europe is represented through case studies of multicultural Switzerland; Cambodians living in the French city of Rennes; and Moroccan and Turkish immigrants to the Netherlands. There is also a study of migrants from the Gulf countries to India's southern state of Kerala, and reports on two very different migrant groups to Israel—the veteran Circassian population of the Galilee (originally from the northwestern Caucasus) and the mass of recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

Elazar Leshem and Moshe Lissak's essay on the last topic analyzes how immigrants from the former Soviet Union were absorbed in Israel in the 1990s, as compared both with the experiences of those who went to the United States or Australia and those who came to Israel in the earlier wave of immigration back in the 1970s. The authors discern a two-stage process of social absorption for the later set of immigrants to Israel. In the first stage (1989–1992), the immigrants were "marginalized"—that is, lacking an indigenous civic structure bound together by loose, informal structures. But by the end of the second stage (1993–1996), these social networks had "evolved into a formal, hierarchical and heterogeneous community structure, on both the local and the national plane" (p. 161). Among other things, this second stage was characterized by the development of Russian-language mass media and the emergence of various immigrant organizations—most significantly, political parties with a national constituency. Thus, whereas the high premigration "human capital" of former Soviet Union immigrants to Israel was partly devalued once they arrived, especially in the case of older professionals, a new form of social capital emerged: that of a "solidaric" ethnic group.

Judith Shuval's extremely interesting concluding essay opens with a succinct account of the historical changes in sociological theories of migration. From here, she proceeds to debunk the claim made by many Israeli sociologists that Israel represents a unique case with regard to migration. Her argument is that current migration to Israel is no longer unique because the world as a whole has become more multiethnic; as a result, Israel is now one of many postindustrial migration destinations for immigrants, refugees, and foreign workers, both legal and illegal.

Although Shuval's essay reads well and is historically accurate as far as it goes, it is both overstated and undeveloped at its most critical point. What exactly are the social consequences of multiethnicity? And what does Israeli sociology have to learn from the case of contemporary multicultural societies such as Australia or Canada? These seem to be the more pertinent questions, rather than Shuval's critique of a misplaced, outmoded, and provincial claim of Israeli uniqueness.

As the case studies show, contemporary modes of transport and telecommunications encourage the retention of home country customs and language even as migrants

build new homes (often permanent) far from their places of birth. This is so even in the face of homogenizing processes in the destination country, whether ideological in nature or simply the outcome of globalization. Notwithstanding, according to Shuval, "it is unclear whether a society that accepts the legitimacy of a wide variety of ongoing ethnic subcultures, can attain real commonality with a sufficient consensus to provide for national identity" (p. 240). This is true, she argues, even of Israel.

I agree—but it is here that Shuval's essay, and the volume as a whole, leave me wanting to know more. What can Israeli sociologists offer in terms of explaining, on the one hand, what are the ethnic options open to migrants and, on the other, the ways in which a pluralistic society can at the same time generate social solidarity? For scholars seeking the answers to these questions in a comparative mode, the work in this volume can be recommended as a stimulating beginning.

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STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY JEWRY

XIX

Edited by Ezra Mendelsohn

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